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# LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE

OF

FIELD MARSHAL

# SIR JOHN BURGOYNE, BART.

VOL. II.

# LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE

OF

# FIELD MARSHAL

# SIR JOHN BURGOYNE, BART.

BY HIS SON-IN-LAW,

LIEUT.-COL. THE HON. GEORGE WROTTESLEY,

ROYAL ENGINEERS.

21473 a.c

*IN TWO VOLUMES.*

VOL. II.

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# LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE

OF

# SIR JOHN BURGOYNE.

## WAR WITH RUSSIA.

THE commencement of 1854 found war with Russia imminent, and Sir John Burgoyne in close and confidential communication with the Government of Lord Aberdeen. His "reflections on the war between Turkey and Russia, should we become involved in it," are dated 16th January, and a subsequent paper on the same subject, 23rd January, 1854. In these, he recommends the Government to take possession as early as possible of the Dardanelles, as a base of operations for their fleet, and to press upon the Turkish Government the reduction of their fleet to the lowest possible strength, the French and English undertaking to provide for all the naval requirements of the war. 1854.

If Constantinople could be secured, he considered that the best field of operations for the Turks against the Russians would be Georgia; and being apprehensive that the admirals in the Black Sea might be encouraged by the example of Acre to pit their wooden ships against the

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stone forts of Sebastopol, he wrote to Lord Raglan to demonstrate the dangers of such a proceeding, and the certainty of its failure, if attempted.

The first letter of Sir James Graham which follows refers to this communication; it will be seen from the correspondence of this period, that the power of Russia for offensive operations was very much overrated by those best informed in the matter.

*From* Sir JAMES GRAHAM *to* Lord RAGLAN.

"Admiralty, 12th January, 1854.

"MY DEAR LORD RAGLAN,

"So far from stepping beyond your duty in allowing me to read the enclosed able report, you appear to me to have executed your duty—as you always do—in an exemplary manner. It would be most unfair that the British Admiral should not have the advantage of the opinion of one of our most distinguished scientific officers, so far as imperfect information has allowed him the means of forming a judgment.

"I would suggest that Colonel Vicars should take with him a copy of Sir John Burgoyne's report, and that he should have permission to show it confidentially to Admiral Dundas.

"I hope that you will concur in this suggestion. If you do, no time should be lost in sending a copy to Colonel Vicars, for he leaves London to-morrow morning, and will embark at Portsmouth in the afternoon.

"I wish, also, that you would have the kindness to send me another copy of this same report for my own use.

"It may be very desirable that the Cabinet should see and well consider it.

"I am, &c.,

"J. R. G. GRAHAM."

"Admiralty, 18th January, 1854.

"MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

"You cannot offer us too much advice or too many suggestions: coming from you they are highly valued by me.

Your memorandum on Sebastopol has entirely changed my views of the policy to be pursued. 1854. War with Russia.

"I wish you could allow me the pleasure of a conversation with you. Could you call here to-morrow (Thursday) about four o'clock?

"Yours sincerely,

"J. R. G. GRAHAM."

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"Admiralty, 20th January, 1854.

"MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

"I have no faith whatever in * * * * * 's judgment or knowledge; and my opinion is quite in unison with your sound reasoning and long experience.

"My great anxiety now is with respect to the Dardanelles: if we have war, and if military precautions are not taken in good time, our naval position in the Black Sea is neither tenable nor consistent with our honour. A rapid retreat, leaving Constantinople undefended, to secure an escape through the Dardanelles at the last moment, would be a disgrace to our character and arms, which I blush to contemplate.

"This must not be.

"Sincerely yours,

"J. R. G. GRAHAM."

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"Admiralty, 21st January, 1854.

"MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

"I am anxiously awaiting a sight of your second Memorandum, which will treat of the occupation of a strong position on the Dardanelles as the basis of military operations, in conjunction with their fleet both in the Bosphorus and the Black Sea. Without this occupation, if the Russians advance in force to the Balkan, I conceive that the combined fleets, the Dardanelles being threatened, must return to Besika Bay; whereas if the position be well taken up, and properly fortified, it may be a Torres Vedras, on which we always can fall back with security and speed by the aid of steam, even from the shores of Circassia, where, by combined operations and sudden

1854. landings, we may weaken and torment the enemy exceedingly. It is of great importance to consider what the strength of the military force ought to be, and how composed.

War with Russia.

"I imagine that little or no cavalry would be necessary, and horses only for the use of the artillery. It must be a combined operation; and the French force would be at least equal to ours.

"Surely 10,000 English and 15,000 French would form a formidable corps d'armée, with the Dardanelles strongly occupied by land, and the combined fleet in complete possession of the passage both ways by sea.

"The Cabinet meets on Tuesday. If I am in possession of your views on this subject previously, my mind would be more at ease.

"The discussion of these questions in your clear and calm mode of reasoning, would be of infinite use in aiding the Cabinet to arrive at a sound conclusion.

"If you could let me have your Memorandum to-morrow evening, it might be better that I should see you on Tuesday before the Cabinet, say at one o'clock, when I shall have had time to read your Memorandum, and to consider it.

"I am most anxious not to fail in the least particular of the respect due to Lord Raglan, both personally and officially. You will keep me right with him on this head. The questions at issue are intimately connected with your branch of the profession: and your first excellent Memorandum, which produced so great an effect on my judgment, has naturally opened this larger field of discussion.

"The national honour, and the glory of our arms by sea and land, forbid us to make a mistake, which by forethought, and by joint deliberations, may be avoided in good time.

"I am, yours very truly,

"J. R. G. GRAHAM."

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"Admiralty, 22nd January, 1854.

"MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

"I shall consider your communication to me of your draft Memorandum strictly confidential. In the same strict

confidence, I send to you a copy of the letter from me to Lord Clarendon, and also Lord Clarendon's answer. Please to return these papers to me. 1854. War with Russia.

"If I might offer a suggestion, I think that your Memorandum might be expanded; that you may assume that Sebastopol cannot be attacked, and that Constantinople cannot be defended by an allied army, which must not be of a much larger force than France and England will think fit to send. Proceeding on these two assumptions, you must consider what is the allied force which would be sufficient to occupy and to hold the Dardanelles position against any attack which can be made by the Russians upon it, and of what arms and in what proportions this force ought to be composed.

"It will be necessary also to contemplate the contingency, that France may refuse to send a soldier, and that this occupation will be left to the English alone. Then how are we to proceed? What force is to be sent? How are the works to be prepared with the least possible delay? Is the limited advantage to be gained worthy of the effort, when, though very near to Constantinople, we cannot effectually cover it? Above all, what is the chance of our being able to render the position tenable before the Russians, having passed the Danube, may try to seize it?

"I shall be here all Monday, and most happy to see you and to converse with you on these points at any hour when you may find it convenient to call.

"You see the trouble which a good Memorandum entails on you.

"I am, yours sincerely,

"J. R. G. GRAHAM."

*To* Sir JAMES GRAHAM.

"8, Gloucester Gardens, 22nd January, 1854.

"MY DEAR SIR,

"I see the force of the additional matter you suggest, and will set to work upon it this evening, so that the paper may be with you through Lord Raglan to-morrow evening, and will postpone calling at the Admiralty till Tuesday.

1854. — War with Russia.

"I feared that I had been already too diffuse, but my desire is to give as many reasons as I can for my opinions, although they may appear to be manifest and superfluous.'

"I return, with many thanks for the perusal, your correspondence with Lord Clarendon. I am delighted to see the hint he throws out about an attack upon Georgia—the first thing is of course to save Constantinople if possible; but consistent with that, and for *aggressive* operations, I should conceive Georgia would be the most favourable point on which a good Turkish force could attempt to make any impression.

"Your faithful servant,

"J. F. Burgoyne."

"Admiralty, 25th January, 1854.

"My dear Sir John,

"I have just received the enclosed letters from Admiral Corry. The account of the dangerous illness of Colonel Vicars distresses me very much; but I infer from the Admiral's letter that he has proceeded on his voyage. George Elcock, the engineer, is likely to be an useful assistant in the Black Sea, and he has been sent in *Banshee* to Admiral Dundas.

"Your two Memorandums are now in circulation among the members of the Cabinet.

"Brunow has asked for *explanations*, and seems disposed to parley. Whether this be an attempt to back out, a few days will show.

"Yours very truly,

"J. R. G. Graham."

"Admiral Dundas has sent me the enclosed sketch of Sebastopol; he says, 'it is drawn by an Austrian officer, and I believe it to be good. By sea I apprehend it is not possible to attack it: and by land no one I have yet met can inform me of the lines of fortification. *It is a second Gibraltar.*'

"After this, there is no reason to apprehend any rashness of naval enterprise, unaided by an army."

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*From* Sir JAMES GRAHAM *to* Lord RAGLAN.

"Admiralty, 26th January, 1854.

"MY DEAR LORD RAGLAN,

"The Cabinet accepts with grateful thanks and acknowledgments Sir John Burgoyne's spirited and honourable offer of going himself to Constantinople without delay. They also duly appreciate your readiness to part for a short time with so valuable an assistant. We propose that Sir John Burgoyne should visit Paris by the way; that he should place himself in communication with Lord Cowley, who will be prepared for his arrival, and who will introduce him to the French authorities desirous of a conference. We have written to Lord Cowley, begging that Sir John Burgoyne may not be long detained in Paris: for we are anxious that he should reach Constantinople as soon as possible, and return, after inspecting the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, with the utmost expedition. We have also notified to the French Government, that if they wish to send an engineer officer to accompany Sir John, he will be happy to be so associated, and that we can give him a passage in the *Caradoc*, now ready and waiting orders at Marseilles.

"We must request Sir John not to go *beyond Constantinople*, but to turn his back on the Black Sea, and to hasten his return to England, as soon as the object of his mission is accomplished.

"The Cabinet is of opinion that if a field-officer of Engineers in whom you confide, could accompany Sir John, and be left by him at Constantinople in full possession of his views and plans, much time might be saved, and the public service would be promoted. We leave this arrangement to your better judgment and discretion. It might be possible to order Colonel Tylden to proceed from Corfu, *viâ* Malta, to Constantinople with the utmost expedition; and Sir John, in passing Malta, might make arrangements with Admiral Stewart for Colonel Tylden following him without delay.

"We shall not be ready with the despatches to Constantinople, which Sir John Burgoyne must take with him, till Saturday evening.

"I hope that Sir John, without inconvenience, may be able to make the arrangements for his departure within this short

1854. — War with Russia.

interval; and I trust that I may have the pleasure of an interview with Sir John before he goes. He knows my opinion on the matter and points which we wish him to investigate better than any other person.

"Thanking you sincerely for the kind assistance which you have given me on this occasion,

"I am, yours very faithfully,

"J. R. G. GRAHAM."

*From* Viscount HARDINGE *to* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE.

"Horse Guards, 26th January, 1854.

"MY DEAR BURGOYNE,

"There can be no doubt that a fleet, however superior to its enemy, can never bring the war to a conclusion.

"The Russians will strike at the heart, and nothing but a large army can save Constantinople.

"Your Memorandum takes a very true view of the state of the case.

"I doubt whether the fortified Peninsula can be completed in time on the Dardanelles, and, when completed, whether it would hold out against a concentration of Russian means, after the Russian is in possession of Constantinople.

"Yours ever, with the most friendly wishes for your voyage.

"Affectionately yours,

"H."

Mission to Turkey.

*From* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE *to* Lady BURGOYNE.[1]

"Paris, 30th January, 1854.

"*I am likely to regulate the affairs of Europe!!* as my conversations, it appears, have made an impression upon the Emperor and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and induced them to believe more can be done than they imagined.[2] I am to see the Emperor again at 9 P.M. this evening.

[1] When not otherwise specified, all the letters which follow are addressed by Sir John Burgoyne to members of his family.—ED.

[2] See Lord Cowley's letter of the 8th February following.—ED.

"M—— asked most tenderly after my eyes this morning; I thanked her much for her anxiety about me. '*The fact is,*' she said, '*I was afraid they may injure the effect of your* PICTURE!'" 1854. Mission to Turkey.

"30 janvier 1854.

"MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

"L'Empereur compte sur vous ce soir à 9 heures précises aux Tuileries (en habit bourgeois).

"Agréez tous mes compliments,

"MARÉCHAL VAILLANT."

"Paris, 31st January, 1854.

"I have had two interviews with the Emperor: he was cordial and frank, and admitted of a free discussion; he and (still more) the Minister of Foreign Affairs seem struck with the new lights, I think I have enforced upon them, and they see the importance of the result of the researches I am going to make.

"I am quite charmed with the Empress,—she is manifestly a very fascinating person. She speaks English very prettily, clearly and correctly, and if at times at a loss for a word, it is evidently not from ignorance, but want of habit of conversing. She talked to me for some time. She is by no means the commanding-looking personage I expected from her pictures, but fair, with a small face and features very young-looking, rather thin, which they say is recent, and from five feet four to five feet six high. There were nobody there but two ladies and three or four men, all in attendance, Prince Jerome, Marshal Vaillant, Colonel Ardant, and myself; and I remained about an hour, during which the Emperor, the Marshal, and I retired to confer over the map of Turkey.

"I then joined the party at the opera. M—— enjoyed the dinner and evening very much, but, as regards the opera, I believe she would rather have gone to one of the dirty little theatres on the Boulevard.

"I am in luck in getting a profusion of gratitude for small matters. Lord and Lady Cowley express the warmest thank-

1854. — Mission to Turkey.

fulness to me for admitting their son into the party. I would not have been so willing had his attendance been forced upon him, but his own anxiety is expressive on the occasion."

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.[1]

"Paris, 31st January, 1854.

"My mission, as far as this, appears to have been attended with good effects. I have had long interviews with the Emperor, with Lord Cowley—the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Marshal Vaillant, who is much in the Emperor's confidence. They seem to have been quite at sea about a possibility of acting in Turkey, owing to the danger of the Russians marching down on the Dardanelles, and, by so doing, forcing our fleets and troops (if there were any) to retire back to the Archipelago. I have been explaining the promising accounts that we have of the possibility of turning the Dardanelles into a stronghold, and the vast importance of taking early possession, if those accounts shall be realised. They all acknowledge it now, and look with as much interest to our further researches as our own Government.

"The French have a shewing of a good position some ten or twelve miles in front of Constantinople, the right on the Black Sea, the left on the Sea of Marmora, with a comparatively small *accessible* front, and that probably could be held by 30,000 troops, well entrenched. This, also, would be of vast importance, as it would not only cover Constantinople, and at a distance, like the lines of Lisbon, but would also cover the entire passage of the Bosphorus.

"IF we can secure the Dardanelles, we may play any game we please, with great or with small means, in the neighbourhood of Constantinople.

"Colonel Ardant, of French Engineers, accompanies us. He appears to be polite and intelligent, but somewhat sombre, and apparently not fond of roughing it. We are in hopes of being accompanied by Lord Cowley's son, of the Guards.

"We leave this by the eight o'clock train this evening."

[1] Assistant Adjutant-General of Royal Engineers at the Ordnance Office.

"On board H. M. Ship *Caradoc*, 4th February. 1854.

"We are gliding along the Mediterranean at the rate of thirteen miles an hour, and as smoothly as if gliding down the Thames. It is now 9 P.M., and we have all the windows of the cabin on deck open, to be cool. Mission to Turkey.

"Colonel Ardant is a sensible man, and we agree perfectly in our opinions on the affairs of our mission, which is a great comfort.

"The Commander of the *Caradoc*, Lieutenant Derriman, R.N., is as agreeable a man to sail with as it is possible to be. He gives himself up to the comfort and even to the caprices of his passengers, and I shall be very glad if the same ship is selected to bring us down again. Mr. Derriman admits of no exception to complying with every wish of the whole party, unless as it may possibly interfere with the comfort or desire of the *General*."

"Malta, 7th February.

"We entered the harbour of Valetta at nine o'clock of the 5th, and the Captain having signalled some hour or half-hour before that I was on board, the Governor and the Admiral (Houston Stewart) came on board to meet us. The whole party landed, and went up to the Palace with Sir William Reid. We got a light breakfast there, and went about our respective businesses, for we were only to be on shore three or four hours. I put the French Colonel and other French officers into the hands of Major Pocklinton, who, as a very young man, was a cricketing ally of mine when quartered at Portsmouth. He is Brigade Major, and the General (Fergusson), at my request, had desired him to attend the Colonel, get a regiment turned out for him to inspect, and shew him as much of the Barracks and Fortifications as time would allow.

"I need hardly say that Reid devoted himself to us the whole time, and everybody else, as civil and courteous as it was possible to be. I was particularly anxious to treat the French Colonel with every attention and distinction. They mounted him on the best and smartest-looking horse to be had, and studied how to attend most to his wishes. The *Caradoc* coming

1854. — Mission to Turkey.

in with such éclat, and French and British officers in numbers landing from her, made the rumour go about the Regiment, that was suddenly turned out in complete marching order, that they were on the point of embarking at once for Constantinople; and one soldier was heard to say to another: '*Sharp work, isn't this, Jack?*'"

*From* Lord COWLEY, English Ambassador in Paris.

"Paris, February 8, 1854.

"MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

"You will be happy to learn that your visit to Paris has produced a visible change in the Emperor's views, and he is making every preparation for a land expedition, in case the last attempt at negociation should break down, as it infallibly will.

"Without entering into details, I may say that we shall not know how that is for at least ten days more! The Emperor will not, under any circumstances, come to any determination as to the point of disembarkation for troops until your return; but he assures me he has men and transports ready, and that he can send 15,000 off immediately. I suppose that we can send ten or twelve. The French troops will all be sent from Africa, and therefore will be already inured to a hot climate and scanty supplies. Pray do not mention this *to any one*, but I thought it might please you to feel that you are not working for nothing.

* * * * * *

"Very faithfully yours,

"COWLEY."

*To* Colonel MATSON.

"H. M. Ship *Caradoc*, Gallipoli,
"12th February, 1854.

"All our officers and Sappers had been sent by the Admiral to examine the Dardanelles, and on our arrival here yesterday morning from Constantinople, I found Captain Chap-

man with Her Majesty's steamer *Spitfire*. He has come on board the *Caradoc*, and the *Spitfire* has gone to bring up the rest; for the important position to look for is across the Isthmus some ten or twelve miles in front of Gallipoli. In the course of the morning, an Austrian packet steamer anchored in the Bay with Colonel Tylden on board, which was very fortunate, and he joined us bag and baggage, and I have thus the opportunity of communicating thoroughly with him. 1854. — Mission to Turkey.

"I have been received in the most courteous and confidential manner by every high authority I have met with—the French Emperor, the Minister of Foreign affairs at Paris, Lord Cowley, Admiral Dundas, Lord Stratford, and the French Ambassador at Constantinople, General Baraguay d'Hilliers—which tends to facilitate proceedings greatly, and is personally very agreeable.

"I was only one day at Constantinople, and got one ride in company with the French Engineers, and saw a part of the ground for the defence of the city, which is very favourable, but too near to it, and not covering the Bosphorus; but there is, I understand, a position some twenty miles in front, between Buyuk Chekmedje on the Sea of Marmora, and Kara Burnu on the Black Sea, which, by lakes and river-courses, confine the real fighting-ground within about ten or twelve miles over the range of heights, where a favourable line could be taken; this would cover the entire Bosphorus, and would remove the contest from the immediate neighbourhood of the city and its confusion.

"Thoroughly entrenched previously, this position might be maintained well with about 40,000 French or British troops, or 60,000 or 80,000 Turks; but one great difficulty is to get the Turks to commence at once to work upon it. I have a great desire to propose for diplomatic consideration whether we might not send out a number of Engineer officers and some companies of Sappers, French or English, with tools, &c., and get 3,000 or 4,000 Turks to set to work at once."

1854. "H. M. Ship *Caradoc*, at anchor off Gallipoli,
— "22nd February, 1854.

Mission to Turkey. "The weather we have had has been generally very bad, high winds, hard frosts, heavy snow-storms, and pelting rains; but the intervals of occasional clearing up, for entire or parts of days, have been adjusted so conveniently, as to enable us to take extensive excursions, and to do a great deal of work, without being put to much trouble, so far as WE are concerned, who are not constantly at work. The detachment on the hill (Captain Chapman, Ewart, Burke, and the Sappers, with two French officers, Chef de Bataillon Jourjon, and Enseigne de Vaisseau De Varennes), who are engaged to take plans and make designs for works, I fear must have suffered great discomfort.

"Our first day on shore was occupied by landing on the beach about twelve miles in front of this place, in the Sea of Marmora, and walking through snow and wet and brushwood, with a prickly thorn intermixed, of a most penetrating and tearing nature, about three miles to the summit of a high hill and back; the Frenchmen were astonished at *my* prowess in being able to get through the day's work. Colonel Ardant informed me that I walked like a *Sous-Lieutenant des Hussards.*

"The next excursion was a ride from Gallipoli, about twenty miles out and home, fine overhead, but the ground very deep and wet and heavy, with great patches of snow, with no roadway whatever to be of assistance. M—— rode with us through that day, without any inconvenience. Our third day's work was on the 20th, when we crossed from the town of the Dardanelles on the Asiatic side, to a fine fighting position that had been in course of examination by our officers just before our arrival on the European side; the day was fine, the ground more firm. M—— rode with us; we lunched at a farm of the Consul, Mr. Calvert, and were out about seven hours, including the passages across in the Pacha's fine barge.

"We had a magnificent dinner at the Pacha's, drank toasts, and got very jolly.

"At various intervals on each day, we had pipes, coffee, sherbet, and lemonade. M—— must fill up all the details,

as well as give you an account of the harems of the two Pachas (civil and military) which she visited. She is quite well, and gets on beautifully with the Turks, delighting them by a few expressions in Turkish which she has picked up. We find it impossible to vie with the Turks in complimentary speeches; their Oriental ideas suggest figurative expressions that are frequently very pretty. Sulieman Pacha asked M—— how she liked Turkey, who answered that she liked it exceedingly, the people were so good and kind, and everything so pretty. 'Ah!' he said, 'you are too condescending—but the fact is, you *look at everything as in a mirror.*' 1854. Mission to Turkey.

"At our great dinner, on the 20th, they drank to the health of *the General*, and I replied, in thanking them, that I had seen some service, but was now old, and could not expect to do much more, but that I should be delighted to close the scene by a good active campaign in fellowship with the Turks, and in their cause.

"Ismail Pacha then said, in the name of Sulieman and himself, that they would both of them willingly give up five years of their lives to be added to mine! Our 'very much obliged to you' falls very coldly in answer to such sentiments.

"I wrote long letters to Lord Raglan and Sir James Graham, and occasionally to Lord Cowley and Lord Stratford, expressing fully my opinions on military operations, but I do not know how they will be all received. We expect to leave this on the night of the 26th for Constantinople."

"Constantinople, 5th March, 1854.

* * * * * *

"I don't think that either I or M—— were ever in better health and spirits. As for me, with all the pressure of warlike reports and discussions with which I am pressed, I feel like the old troop-horse at the sound of the trumpet!

"I am now about to set out on a confidential mission, to visit Omer Pacha at Shoumla, and endeavour to sound him on his projects, and to advise with him, if he will allow it; but as he has the character of particularly objecting to this interference

1854. of officers of other nations, I fear it will end in a visit of ceremony, and be of no avail; however, I must try, and, at worst, matters will only be as they were before.

Mission to Turkey.

"I had an interview with three of the great men in office here—Redschid, Riza, and Feti Achmet Pachas; all of them most frank and courteous. The latter has since intimated to me that he is no longer Master-General of the Ordnance, but that while I am here, he devolves all his authority that I choose to make use of to me!"

"H. M. Ship *Caradoc*, Black Sea, 10th March, 1854.

"We had a very fine day yesterday for our sail through the Bosphorus, which, it would be no news to tell you, is of the most beautiful scenery, and in effect greatly augmented by the large fleets now lying in several of its bays; we called at the Admiral's, at Therapia, and lunched there.

"Lady Emily Dundas was extremely civil to M——, who met a French lady, who was on a call, and who asked her if she was not a *Frenchwoman;* you see that the French *politesse* loses nothing by being transferred to the East. Sir Edmund Lyons and several captains called at the same time, most of them apparently to meet me, as the *Caradoc*, in coming in, hoisted the signal that I was on board. We had a very fine night, although with a little jerking motion, and are now (at 8 A.M.) going into the Bay of Varna. I have credentials from the *Grand Vizier* (which is, I believe, unusual), and from Lord Stratford and others, to Omer and other Pachas; and the only thing that seems likely to be disagreeable is a journey of fifty miles, from Varna to Shoumla, over what are called roads, but have never been made so. It will take us two days and a half; if there was a railway, two hours!

"Major Dickson (who speaks Turkish), Wrottesley, Burke, and Wellesley, are with me as my *suite;* Dickson, Burke, and Wellesley, will return by land to examine and report upon the country as regards military movements. The *Caradoc* is not allowed to remain in Varna, because the Bay does not afford shelter either against certain winds or against certain Russians,

should the latter be inclined to mischief, but she is to return for me on the day I shall fix, which will be probably the 20th or 21st." 1854. — Mission to Turkey.

*Journal.*

*March 9th.* Left Constantinople in H.M.S. *Caradoc* at 1 P.M. Visited Admiral Dundas at Therapia; met there the French Admiral Hamelin, Rear-Admiral Willaumez, Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, and several captains. Left at 4 P.M., and through Bosphorus before dark.

—— 10*th.* Anchored in Varna Bay at 7 A.M., landed at 12. Colonel Neale, Consul. Visited the two Pachas, Hussein (Civil), Said Omer (Military), and rode round the works.

—— 11*th.* Left Varna at 10 A.M. in a rough but good open carriage belonging to Mr. Colquhoun, late Consul at Bucharest; it was drawn by four horses, the rest of the party with baggage and two servants on post-horses. Arrived at Devenah (called 5 hours) at 2½ P.M., remained there an hour, and arrived at Yasi Tépé (3 hours more) at 6½ P.M. About 26 miles in all.

—— 12*th.* Set out at 8 A.M. Lunched at Yonsas Keni at 11¼ (4 hours), fine day but very cold. Arrived at Shoumla (4 hours) at about 4½ P.M. About 30 miles from Yasi Tépé. Two heavy days for four small horses, even to a light open carriage with two persons; most of the road heavy with ascents and descents, some very steep; the face of the country a great plain, and no streams to cross, except at Devenah, where are several mills. Arrived at Shoumla at 4½ P.M., about 56 miles from Varna. Major Dickson waited on Omer Pacha to report our arrival, and say that I would wait upon his Highness at any hour next day he would appoint. The Pacha sent us a good dinner. We were lodged in a house with bare walls.

—— 13*th.* Waited on Omer Pacha at 10 A.M. With him for about an hour, while M—— went in to see his wife and family in the harem. His wife is a Wallachian, young, handsome, and highly accomplished, but submits willingly to be shut up in the Turkish manner. Omer Pacha called in the evening at 8 P.M., and stayed at least an hour conversing. He is vigorous and intelligent; understands and speaks German, Italian, and French; knows the country thoroughly, and is evidently a

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superior character; but despises too much the Russians opposed to him, and says that two of his Turkish regiments would beat three Russian. I gave him a good portable map of Turkey in Europe, and a field-telescope.

*March 14th.* Omer Pacha went to the front. Visited other Pachas. Sadik (a Pole), who is organising a corps of Cossacks; Giafar, an Albanian, wild and rough, who commands 2000 Albanians, said to commit all sorts of irregularities, and who will probably be disbanded. Giafar's country and habitation is precisely opposite Corfu, and he had always friendly communication with the English. At length he joined an insurrection against the Turks, and, being a man of considerable influence in the country, gave much trouble. The insurrection was quelled, and he sought refuge in Corfu; by the influence of the British authorities, he was enabled to make his peace, and is now a Pacha. He and his Albanians are out of favour with Omer Pacha, and Giafar seeks through the interference of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, British Ambassador at Constantinople, to be removed to another station. Giafar made M—— a present of an inlaid silver bowl of Albanian manufacture, and I promised to send him a new pattern percussion musket from England. Sadik Pacha lent M—— a pretty and very quiet Arab mare to ride every day; she gave him a small gold watch-chain, as he carried his watch loose in his pocket. Found at Shoumla, Mr. Paton, a very intelligent man, and correspondent of the *Times*.

—— *15th.* Sadik Pacha insisted upon M——'s keeping the mare; she is an Arabian of good breed, Effa or Snake by name, and is now with foal by a handsome Arabian given to Sadik by the late Seraskier. Presented him with a Deane's revolver pistol complete. M—— visited Omer Pacha's wife again, and gave her a leather housewife with its knife, scissors, &c., and to the two little girls, boxes of bonbons. The lady gave M—— copies of two marches which she had composed, a little coffee-cup and stand, two pieces of fine muslin, and two enormous oranges. Visited Hassan Pacha, who is in command since Omer Pacha left.

—— *16th.* Major Dickson, Lieutenant Burke, and Wellesley went post to Rustchuk on the Danube, to join the army there

for a few days, with the sanction and approbation of Omer Pacha. M——, Wrottesley, and I set out for Varna in Mr. Colquhoun's carriage and four horses, and a hired light cart with three horses for servant and baggage. Omer Pacha insisted upon sending an escort with us of an officer and three dragoons; a Gavachè (mounted policeman) was also another necessary attendant. What with presents and expenses on road, the cost of travelling thus is very costly. Slept at Yeni Bazar, a rather large village, 4 hours (about 15 miles) from Shoumla. A fine turkey cost 1*s.* 8*d.*, and fowls, milk, &c., in proportion. Weather very cold, with snow, but the country pretty firm and well dried up. 1854. Mission to Turkey.

*March* 17*th.* Set out at 9½ A.M. Fine and not so cold; arrived at Devenah at 5 P.M., and slept there. The Bashi Bazooks (irregulars) committing many outrages over the country.

—— 18*th.* Left Devenah at 10 A.M. and arrived at Varna at 4 P.M. Very cold day. Visits from both Pachas.

—— 19*th.* Visited a new sea-battery now constructing, accompanied by both Pachas, Hussein and Omer. Captain Thomson, 10th Hussars, came in from Kalafat.

—— 20*th.* Very bad weather. Strong wind from N.E. with constant rain, sleet, and hail, and very thick. H.M.S. *Caradoc* arrived with Captain Simmons and Lieutenant Creyke, R.E., who had great difficulty in landing. Captain Simmons in a few hours went off post to join Omer Pacha. We could not get off to the ship.

—— 21*st.* Embarked with M——, Captain Thomson, Lieutenants Wrottesley and Creyke, at 5 P.M. in *Caradoc*. The mare slipped through the slings in an attempt to get her on board, and swam on shore, and was left in charge of Colonel Neale, British Consul.

—— 22*nd.* Arrived at Beicos Bay (Bosphorus) at 9 A.M. and visited Admiral at Therapia. At 12 proceeded to Constantinople, and took up abode again at Missirie's. Called upon Lord Stratford.

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Visit to Omer Pacha.

*Memorandum to his Excellency Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, on the result of a visit to Omer Pacha at Shoumla.*

Constantinople, 22nd March, 1854.

I arrived at Shoumla on the evening of the 12th of March, and waited on Omer Pacha by appointment the next morning. Nothing could have been more courteous than his behaviour, and he has been full of attentions to myself and the party with me ever since my arrival. One of his A.D.C.'s almost constantly in attendance to provide for any wants we might have, horses for the whole party, mounted orderlies, and dinners sent for us to the bare walls, in which, according to the custom of the country, we were lodged. We were not less than an hour with him, without any pressure on our part on his time; and he returned the visit the same evening at 8 P.M. and remained as long. His conversation was cheerful, frank, and I believe quite honest as far as he chose to communicate, but not very full as to his intentions. He set out for the Danube on the 14th, I was therefore only just in time to catch him. He calls his excursion a tour of *inspection*, adding however with a smile, that if he found an opportunity, he might perhaps strike some little "*coup*," implying rather the making some little attempt upon the enemy, if circumstances seemed favourable, than having any fixed plan of advance in much force, and yet the preparations seem to be extensive. Some regiments have been moved to the front from Shoumla, and the force from Adrianople (and perhaps other parts) are moving forward. One regiment arrived at Shoumla on the 14th, consisting of a very fine body of men armed with percussion muskets; but there appear to be large forces still remaining on the two extreme flanks, at Kalafat and the Dobrusché; and from a remark made by the Pacha incidentally, I imagine his project is to support a principal advance from the centre by a diversion from Kalafat, or *vice versâ*, to draw the Russian forces to the centre, while an attempt is made from Kalafat to take possession of the lesser Wallachia, where the inhabitants are said to be particularly indisposed to the Russians, and where a new line along the river Aluta is said to be very strong. There is,

however, manifestly some danger in these wide movements, or in these greatly dispersed positions, with an enemy concentrated in the midst of them, from whence he can attack any one he pleases with nearly his whole force. Omer Pacha is vigorous in body, and full of information and intelligence. He knows all this country thoroughly; he is evidently very sanguine and confident; but he holds strong opinions, and a considerable bias towards points he would *wish* to be established. I never knew so low an opinion given of the value of Russian troops as he entertains, while he is enthusiastic on the merits of the Turks. He says the difficulty is to retain his Turkish soldiers from moving forward, while those of the Russians have to be urged on by their officers. After descanting in this way for some time, I said to him lightly, "It would appear that your Highness would have no hesitation on any day to pit a regiment of Turks against one of equal force of Russians?" to which he answered emphatically that he would readily attack three Russian regiments with two of Turks; and I am persuaded that he fully believes their value to be in that proportion. There is no difference of opinion anywhere as to the courage of the Turkish soldier; and I can believe another of Omer Pacha's opinions, that he has more natural intelligence than the Russian, whom he describes as a mere machine. There is a Prussian officer at Shoumla in the Turkish service, who gives a much better opinion of the Russians; as a Prussian, however, he will naturally approve of a system that is worked precisely like that of his own country. He mentions in favour of the Russian officers what might appear, but not correctly, to justify the Pacha's judgment of the demerit of the soldier; that the officers were very forward in coming to the front in action to *encourage* the men to advance. If these judgments were formed at Oltenizza, it must be recollected that the position of the Russians was most trying; on a dead flat of great extent, subjected to a very heavy cross-fire of a powerful commanding artillery, during an advance to a well-manned entrenchment.

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Of the Russian artillery the Pacha describes the practice as bad, while it is said the Turkish field-pieces are well served, and, according to the Pacha, well horsed and equipped; and if

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so, the capability of movements quick and continued, is of much more consequence than accuracy of practice. I inquired of him about the provision of reserve ammunition: he said that he had in the different depôts in the garrisons as much as 1000 rounds for every effective field-piece; but did not give a clear account how the spare musket ammunition was conveyed.

He acknowledges that in cavalry the Russians have a complete superiority, but rather surprised me by considering that the most important of that force were the *Cossacks*. This country, that is, everywhere excepting the higher ridges of the Balkan, consists of vast open plains; the cavalry, therefore, ought to be of great service, and in trying contests when the infantry becomes loose in order, must be very influential. It is said, however, that in ordinary cases the Turkish infantry put themselves readily in compact masses and repel the charges of cavalry—a great proof of courage and of mutual self-confidence. The Prussian officer, and indeed general report, considers the Turkish officer as very inferior; he says that from the corporal upwards they are of descending order in merit, as they stand in rank. Omer Pacha estimates the Russian forces in the Principalities at 150,000 men in all, but he says that they have a large number of sick, a great many irregulars, and many scattered posts and depôts to protect, so that he does not consider that their effective manœuvring force can be valued at more than 100,000, which does not appear unreasonable. It is probable that thus far he may have tolerably good information, but he does not seem to know what they are doing in the rear, although he is inclined to believe that reinforcements to any amount are as far back as Kieff. It is very difficult to obtain information from within the Russian outposts at any time, and more particularly with such an impediment as the Danube in their front. On the other hand, the Russian system of espionage in their favour seems to be carried to a great extent. Omer Pacha not only cautioned us to secrecy in all our projects for the disposition of our troops or proceedings, but he evidently in his own manner shows a distrust of any of his proceedings being divulged; he was comparatively very open to us, but we could observe the difference in his conversation the instant any servants

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or officers came into the room, and I really believe that part of his reserve to us may be owing to this caution; not a distrust of our honour, but perhaps of our discretion. This distrust of even their own followers, and of one another, seems to be quite common to all the Turks in authority.

Omer Pacha must be sensible of knowing so much more than we can of the state of affairs here, he is so decided in his opinions, has so well considered a proposed course of action, and is now so high in position and power, that to presume to offer him direct advice, or to recommend caution to him, would appear obtrusive, if not impertinent; and unless we had had several interviews, when such ideas might have come out incidentally, was too much to be attempted on a first and only day's acquaintance. He certainly appears to be far too confident in the courage of his troops, his own arrangements, and in an erroneous depreciation of the Russians. He cannot take into sufficient account the many defects and wants in the Turkish system and organisation, and how much his own views may be obstructed by the want of conduct or intelligence of the commanders of distant corps; these, the numerical superiority of the enemy, and the dissemination of his forces, will probably lead to his meeting some check if he has an opportunity of trying any very forward movement; but I should hope it may not amount to any severe reverse. He has apparently a great deal of art in his proceedings and conduct; he worked to great advantage at Oltenizza by *masked* batteries, and I should expect that, metaphorically as well as literally, he is in the habit of working by *masked batteries.* If the Russians gain an advantage over him on the present occasion, unless it should be very heavy in the first instance, the season is not yet very favourable, and perhaps their preparations not quite sufficiently advanced for them to take full advantage of it, by any rapid powerful forward movements. The Turks will have a little more caution instilled into them by experience; they will look with more reliance to support from our troops, and will still, it is to be hoped, have a large force of gallant and tolerably organised troops remaining for further efforts. Even Omer Pacha himself, if he still retain the confidence of the troops, which he has now in an eminent degree, will improve by it, and then may become

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an admirable general and commander for a Turkish army. At all events the case is irremediable; the chances, whatever they may be, must be incurred; for Omer Pacha is in a position that, like the Lion in a recent *Punch*, cannot be held in. From the sample of his proceedings at Oltenizza and from his conversation on military matters, I assume that he will at starting, if he crosses the Danube, entrench a position on the left bank as a depôt and base of operations: this the Turks do rapidly, and defend to perfection. That position will be available to cover his retreat if required, and may tend to prevent any very serious disaster. In taking these views, I should be truly happy to find myself so far mistaken that he comes triumphantly out of some brilliant enterprise. Whatever may be his confidence, he is manifestly prepared for the possibility of having at some time to retire, because I understand that every pass of the Balkan has field-works of recent construction to assist in their defence. With regard to any advance he may contemplate across the Danube, the Turks have no bridges that will be available; but they hold islands, within which are collections of boats large and small; at one, he stated, sufficient to carry over 6000 men at once, and at another, if I understood him right, as many as 14,000. This affords a valuable facility for advance or retreat. Altogether there cannot be a doubt but that Omer Pacha is a very superior man for a Turkish general. He understands Italian, German, and French, and with Europeans is as one of them, and would be considered a good officer among all those nations, while he has a commanding influence over the Turks. In spite, therefore, of his assumed erroneous judgment in some particulars, if he were removed, neither observation nor information would lead one to believe but that he must be replaced by some very inferior character.

Major Dickson, Lieutenant Burke, and Mr. Wellesley are gone up to the front to make notes on the state of the troops and positions there, and should any operations take place early, they will witness them. They go with the entire approbation of the Pacha, who promises them every assistance. They will, in returning, act upon the directions of the Duke of Newcastle in examining one of the passes over the Balkan, and one of the routes from thence to Constantinople.

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In the course of conversation, I adverted several times to what Omer Pacha might consider would be most advantageously taken for the common cause, by any British and French land-forces that might be sent out; intimating that I could not say how many the two governments might determine upon, but that I thought the minimum force would be 20,000, and the maximum 70,000 in the first instance. He had told Major Dickson before I saw him that he thought he could manage the direct attack without our actually joining him, and when he entered on the subject with me, he more than once recommended that we should take post at Varna. He described it as a healthy country; that it would be easy to obtain there any amount of supplies; that there were already defences there for a large force, or a moderate one; that it would threaten in flank or front any Russian advance in Bulgaria; and at the same time, by our command in the Black Sea, would also threaten an attack upon the whole Russian north and north-eastern coast, Odessa or the Crimea. An attack on the latter was a favourite project with him. He said the inhabitants of the Crimea (Tartars and Mohammedans) were peculiarly adverse to the Russians; that on account of the narrow neck connecting it with the main, we could retain it, and that it would act powerfully in endangering the possessions of the Russians in Georgia and Circassia; but he did not advert to what we should consider most valuable, the fall of Sebastopol and the fleet there. All this is very sensible, but there are several difficulties to be considered.

I told him that Varna, though a fine bay, was quite open to some winds, and no port; to which he said it was well sheltered from the prevailing winds, and in summer was always considered an excellent roadstead. I then mentioned that the conquest of the Crimea would be most advantageous, but would be extremely difficult by a landing from the sea against such a force as the Russians no doubt had within reach; he estimated that force at perhaps 20,000 men. I told him that our Government believed their force there to be much more, 30,000 or 40,000 men. He made light of any difficulty, and in his confident manner said you had only to land and entrench yourselves near the shore, so as to maintain your footing until

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you put in the necessary amount of force. A very natural idea for a Turk, as it is very much in their mode of warfare; but too hazardous to be attempted by us, especially without ascertaining the nature of the country and the position itself previously; and it would be considered a wild project. The force of the argument relative to the bay of Varna as a road-stead for this purpose would be decided by the navy after more knowledge of the Black Sea; but there would be another considerable objection—it would not be thought right probably to send an army thus early into the Black Sea, with the Bosphorus and Dardanelles unsecured in its rear. The presence of a respectable force of British or French troops at Varna during the summer, is well worthy of consideration. It would no doubt greatly embarrass the enemy by its central position, from whence it might be directed to the Danube or any part of Bulgaria, or by Aidos into Roumelia on the one side, while on the other it would be more ready to make an attack upon the Crimea and all the northern and eastern coast of the Black Sea than from the Bosphorus, and would oblige him to maintain large forces in those parts, or risk the suffering some heavy disaster there. But it will probably be considered too forward a move to be determined upon, until events shall more completely justify it. Any previous footing, however, made at the Dardanelles or Constantinople, will be all in the way for such an advance into the Black Sea, should circumstances render it desirable, and will no doubt be so esteemed by the enemy.

With regard to the capabilities of the bay of Varna, Colonel Neale, the British consul there, states that during the seven years he has been stationed there, he has only known of the loss of six or seven vessels in it, and those ill-found Turks or Greeks, although an open bay and well frequented for trade. It is little more than 4000 yards wide; vessels in it, therefore, would be within the range of heavy guns on either shore. Within the place there are barracks for 3000 or 4000 men, and a fine military hospital for 700 sick. Whether in effecting a landing on the enemy's coast, or in retiring from it, the co-operation of a Turkish force would be extremely valuable for covering the advance or retreat in entrenchments, for which

they are peculiarly adapted. They would be more particularly desirable in any enterprise on the Crimea, or other parts, where the inhabitants are Mohammedans, and of friendly disposition towards the Allies. 1854. — Visit to Omer Pacha.

J. F. Burgoyne, Lieut.-General.

*From* Omer Pacha *to* Sir John Burgoyne.

"Im Dorfe Karagioz, den 3ten [1] März 1854.

"Euer Excellenz!

"Die Russen haben mit 16 Infanterie Bat[lons], 24 Geschützen und 1 Cavalerie Regimente unsere Position von Totrukan, welche mit 1½ Bat[lon] Infanterie, 1200 Mann irreguläre Infanterie und 6 Geschützen vertheidiget war, zwei Tage nach einander (den 28[t] Febr. und den 1[t] März) energisch angegriffen, und wollten im Angesichte unserer Truppen einen Brückenschlag forciren, welche aber energisch abgeschlagen wurden; nachdem ihnen einige Pontons zerschmettert wurden, müssten solche mit einem sehr grossen Verluste der beinahe 2000 Todte und Verwundete sich betragen soll, sich gänzlich zurückziehen. Unser Verlust ist 19 Todte und 46 Verwundete.

"Ich kann nicht begreifen wie die russischen Generäle im Bereiche des Artillerie und Infanteriefeuers, bei einer stark befestigten Stellung, einen Brückenschlag zu unternehmen sich wagen, und auf diese Weise ihre Soldaten ohne der geringsten Wahrscheinlichkeit ein Resultat zu haben, blos umsonsten aufopfern.

"Da ich sicher bin dass Ihnen diese Zeilen nicht abhold erscheinen werden, habe ich mich beeilt diese guten Nachrichten mitzutheilen.

"Genehmigen Euer Excellenz die Versicherung meiner grössten Hochachtung mit der ich geharre

"Euer Excellenz

"Ergebenster Diener,

"Omer."

[1] Old style.—Ed.

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Mission to Turkey.

*Translation.*

*From* OMER PASHA *to* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE.

"The Village of Karagioz, 3rd of March, 1854.

"YOUR EXCELLENCY,

"The Russians have, for two successive days (the 28th of February and the 1st of March) energetically attacked our position of Totrukan, with a force consisting of 16 battalions of infantry, 24 guns, and 1 Regiment of cavalry.

"It was defended by 1½ Battalion of infantry, 1200 irregular infantry, and 6 guns.

"The enemy attempted to force a bridge in the face of our troops, but were energetically repulsed and were forced to retire after the destruction of some of their pontoons and a considerable loss, amounting nearly to 2000 killed and wounded. Our loss consisted of 19 dead and 46 wounded.

"I cannot understand how the Russian generals ventured to attack a bridge in a strongly fortified position and within range of artillery and infantry fire, thus uselessly sacrificing their soldiers, without the most remote chance of any result.

"Being persuaded that these lines will not be unwelcome to you, I hasten to impart these good tidings.

"Accept, your Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration, with which I remain,

"Your Excellency's very humble servant,

"OMER."

*From* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE *to* Lord RAGLAN.

"Malta, 30th March, 1854.

"MY LORD,

"I returned from Shoumla to Constantinople on the 23rd inst., and left it on the 26th, during which period I again conferred with Colonel Ardant, and various different authorities, regarding the state of military affairs in Turkey in Europe; and I see no reason to alter the opinions I have hitherto given, as to their general aspect, and the course of proceedings, that would seem to be eligible.

"Colonel Ardant has examined the position of the Karasou, between the Sea of Marmora and the Black Sea, covering Constantinople and the Bosphorus, and fully confirms the reports that had previously been made in its favour by Lieut.-Colonel Jourjon; the really accessible part of this position across the ridge between the valley of the Karasou and the Lake Derkous is about 9 miles in extent, of commanding undulating heights, overlooking without interruption a great line of plain country, and well indented for defensive works; thoroughly entrenched, and with a force of 50,000 good troops, it could hardly be forced. 1854. — Mission to Turkey.

"Hitherto I have adverted entirely to the supposition of the Russians obtaining a decided superiority at the commencement of the campaign, which unfortunately is the prospect we have as yet before us; but should the German States draw off its forces, or other circumstances arise to give the Allies a power of offensive warfare, the basis of operations would be still the Dardanelles and Constantinople, and the Black Sea the scene of action where many fields are open for enterprise, either in attack of the Crimea or to penetrate into Georgia, or from Varna across the Danube, according to circumstances. One early desirable measure would be to take possession of Anapa and the south entrance to the Sea of Azoff, if possible, by which the Circassians would be more completely freed from Russian aggression or interference; our smaller men-of-war might perhaps be able to enter and gain the superiority in that sea, and the Crimea would be closely threatened on that side, and require most powerful protection from the enemy."

*Private Memoranda given to Lord Raglan.*

25th March, 1854.

Excepting in good towns and dwellings of Europeans, the houses in Turkey are totally without furniture, excepting carpets and matting; it is therefore absolutely necessary to carry, in addition to beds and bedding and canteens, camp tables and chairs or stools; the best of the accommodation in some

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villages is so bad, that Lord Raglan would do well to have also a marquee and two or three bell tents with his baggage: one of the light travelling-carts or waggons of the country, on four wheels and drawn by three horses of the country, which are small, but hardy and willing, would form a very useful part of his baggage equipment; pack saddle horses will, however, be best for the more rapid movements or more prolonged marches.

A pair of outer boots or galoshes, easy to be removed or put on, is really an essential in Turkey—to be taken off when you go into any house and put on again when you leave it—it is the fashion to suppose that this is a piece of Turkish *etiquette* that *we* ought not to submit to; but it is no such thing, the Turks sit and eat and drink and sleep upon the floor of their rooms, parts of which are a little raised, sometimes to the extent of a large proportion of the apartment, over the whole of which you must tread; to walk into and over the carpeted or matted rooms with muddy boots and shoes, is not only offensive but repugnant to one's own feelings: the streets of towns and villages being filthy in the extreme, I think everybody should for their own comfort adopt this Turkish habit, the effect of doing otherwise is the same as if you were in England to walk with muddy boots or shoes over chairs, sofas and tables.

The *Backshish* (present or fee) is a disagreeable and embarrassing part of Turkish arrangements, it is always expected, and of substantial amount, in all cases of service rendered or attention paid, and very much in proportion to the rank of the party. If an escort of honour is forced upon any officer as a mark of complimentary attention, it is expected that they will be supported and have a liberal present, and even the officer with it will not make the slightest scruple at taking the one or two gold pieces offered to him; if horses are sent by a great man for you to ride about the place, the grooms and attendants must be paid as much as in another country would be the cost of their hire; the houses which in ordinary times are allotted for your lodging must be paid for by an amount of presents far exceeding the value of the lodging; the Pachas themselves frequently make presents to their visitors, not of money but in articles sometimes of value, which custom renders it highly

offensive to refuse, and it would be derogatory to the position of those of any station not to return the compliment; without comparing the precise value of the give and take, the transaction is usually a very losing concern, as the article received is probably not one that you at all require. Sir Stephen Lakeman is said to have expended 50*l.* in presents on the occasion of a late visit paid to Omer Pacha at Shoumla. Sometimes, however, it is an agreeable and gratifying way of repaying attentions, and it is most useful to be provided with a variety of articles of different value for the purpose, taking care that each is good of its kind, for they are fully aware of what is trumpery. 1854. — Mission to Turkey.

Giafar Pacha, a savage-looking Albanian, whom I met at Shoumla, was most civil, and is a great friend of the English, his country and residence being precisely opposite to Corfu; Lord Seaton, Sir H. Warde, and Lord Stratford have all patronised and been of service to him; I promised to try and get one of our newest percussion muskets for him, and would be much obliged if Lord Raglan would give his authority for me to have one with bullet mould, or complete in a case for the purpose.

It is considered undignified in a person of any rank to move about on foot; this is a point that it is impossible for us, who desire to keep our bodies in exercise, to follow; but it may be desirable to concede to the custom in formal visits; a Turkish Pacha would mount a horse if he had only an hundred or even less paces to go for paying a visit.

"H. M. Ship *Curadoc*, Straits of Bonifacio,
"2nd April, 1854.

"My tremulous handwriting is not to be attributed to *age*, *drink*, or *infirmity*, but to the great vibration of the engine, which is the only drawback (and that not a very heavy one) in this agreeable ship, in which we have passed many comfortable and pleasant hours. We have every prospect of reaching Marseilles early to-morrow morning, and from thence I shall send this direct by post to announce our approach.

"From Marseilles I shall commence by sending a telegraphic

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message of my arrival to Lord Cowley at Paris, with a request that he will forward the notice on to London; M—— and I will follow as rapidly as we can to Paris, where Lord Cowley will probably be prepared to give me directions, either to push on to London at once, or to wait (and in that case probably not more than a single day) to communicate with the French authorities first. We would willingly travel night and day, and reach Paris in good time on the 5th, but fear there are many impediments to doing so, and it may be the 6th before we get there; we will lose no time between Paris and London, where we may be on the 7th.

* * * * * *

"We have had a great deal of very bad weather interspersed with occasional very fine days; but always bitterly cold from the time we first left the Dardanelles till we returned to it. Our visit to Shoumla was very interesting; we there got at once into the very interior of Turkey, and were witnesses of all its peculiarities.

"Omer Pacha is now quite a lion; he is a man of great intelligence, knowledge, and energy, quite on a par with an Englishman, Frenchman, or German; he speaks German, Italian and French fluently, and is quite high in the esteem of the Turkish soldiers; the Government have given him the highest dignity and authority in its power—he is no longer Your Excellency, but *Your Highness*, and he is consequently above any control.

"He is a fine, good-looking man about 50, and full of animation. He was extremely civil and even friendly with us; at our first interview we stayed an hour with him, without pressing ourselves upon him, and he took M—— early to his wife, where she remained; and when we wanted to come away, we were told that they were on some interesting matter of music, and we were requested not to hurry them. He came to our miserable lodging the same evening, and remained chatting with us an hour more; the next day he went away to the Danube, and we were lucky in just having caught him.

"The next most interesting scene I have witnessed has been an interview with the Sultan. M—— had persuaded herself that I ought to see him, and somewhat inadvisedly I intimated as

much directly or indirectly to Lord Stratford; who having been throughout most courteous and confidential with me, seemed determined to make an effort that it should be so; he accordingly rode out on the 25th to the Sultan's palace on the Bosphorus and asked His Majesty if he would see me, which he apparently out of complaisance assented to, for his Lordship told me at his dinner that day that I could see him the next morning at 10 o'clock; I went out accordingly in a carriage in full costume, attended by Count Pisani as interpreter. 1854. Interview with Sultan.

"About two miles from Pera, we pulled up at the gateway of an avenue of a fine pile of buildings, where there was a scrubby guard, of the ordinary Turkish soldiers, of six men. We walked down the avenue, and entered one wing of the buildings, which appeared as if deserted. Seated in a well-furnished reception room, we were joined by a Secretary of the Sultan, with whom we had pipes and coffee in the usual manner. A kind of upper servant then came in to announce that the Sultan was ready, and we four walked out together across a garden of terraced walks, with fountains, without a soul to be seen, and entered the opposite wing under marble columns, through a large open hall, in which were two or three common-looking servants, up a tolerable staircase, and into a large empty ante-room. At the opposite corner, our guide drew a curtain on one side, the Secretary stopped behind, and Count Pisani and I entered, and found, in a room without furniture, except the divans round the walls, a single man standing up a little in front of the divan. He was dressed like a common Turkish gentleman, quite plain; a short man, apparently about thirty-two years of age, his hands in his coat pockets, and with the toes of one leg turned in so much, and knee so bent, that he looked like a cripple, which I understand he is not at all. I paused for a moment, but it struck me at length that he must be the Sultan, and I made a bow, then advanced, and when near him made another, Count Pisani being at my side. I looked at the stranger, and he stared at me without saying a word, so, after a pause of some seconds, I thought it necessary to begin, and said, through the interpreter, that I was proud of having the honour of paying my respects

1854. to his Majesty; to which he muttered, in a deep bass voice, that he was glad to see me. Another pause, and as he did not seem inclined to say anything, I began again, that I was on a mission from my Government relative to the war, and had observed much that I hoped was satisfactory; to which he wished me a long life. Another pause; then he made a slight inclination of the head, which I thought a sign that I might retire, which I did accordingly; rejoined the Secretary in the ante-room, and we repaced our way through the deserted halls and garden! Surely never was a monarch before attended with so little state!"

Interview with Sultan.

*From* Lieutenant BURKE,[1] R.E., *to* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE.

"Constantinople, May, 1854.

"MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

"I have been in such an extreme state of bewilderment for the last month, trying to buy horses, searching for a servant, robbed by everyone, without a roof to cover one's head, that I would much prefer walking up alone to a Russian battery to going again through the last few weeks! I have now only come into Constantinople for a day, and leave again early to-morrow morning, without having been able to get a single thing I wanted. It takes at least a fortnight here to get through one afternoon of honest English shopping.

"After leaving you at Schumla, I went on with Dickson, Wellesley, and Private Cray, Royal Sappers and Miners, to Rustchuk, a few hours from which we met Omer Pacha. He was very civil, asked us to dinner, and invited us to take a ride with him down to the bank of the Danube, where he was going to inspect a battery in course of construction. When we reached the battery, he fired a couple of shots from a 24-pounder gun at a Cossack picket-house on the opposite bank, which made the Russians turn out from a village opposite, and a heavy column began to march down to the river; but, finding the firing was only chaff, they turned and went back again.

[1] Lieutenant James Burke, R.E., afterwards killed at Rustchuk, on the Danube, and brother of the Australian explorer.

This was my first glimpse of the enemy, and I saw them very well, as Omer Pacha was kind enough to lend me the telescope you gave him, a very good one, and which he seemed to like very much. We stopped a few days at Rustchuk, as we fully expected that some fighting would take place, and at no great distance; but a heavy fall of snow quite put an end to all our pugnacious hopes, and feeling that the army could not move without us, we started for Constantinople. 1854. — Mission to Turkey.

"Rustchuk is defended on the land side by a wide, shallow ditch, and a bastioned line of parapet, with a demi revetment, the whole of which is in a very bad state. These works are commanded by hills, occupied by field redoubts, and the same remark applies to them as to those of Varna; they are not, or were not, of sufficient profile for so important a position; the guns in them were crowded, and of very heavy calibre, and the parapets in a very bad state of repair.

"Ismail Pacha, the second in command of the Turkish army, arrived the morning we were about to leave. I went with Dickson to pay my respects, and when he heard I was an Engineer officer, he begged me to remain another day, and go round the works with his chief engineer, and any remarks I made would be attended to. I was graciously pleased to comply with the great man's request, so, with the General's chief engineer and an escort of cavalry, I rode proudly round. The Chief Engineer was a renegade Pole, a very nice young man, but with somewhat wild ideas on the subject of fortification. We got on very well together; he spoke German, and all my suggestions were prefaced by first asking his opinion on the subject, at the same time giving mine. I found he always agreed with me by these means, and seemed much pleased at his own intelligence. He did not, however, seem to fancy the idea of cutting down an orchard which grows up to the very counterscarp, as it belonged to Said Pacha, the Governor of the Province; but he said the instant the enemy made any move towards Rustchuk, down it should come. Whilst going round the batteries on the Danube side, the enemy commenced firing at us with Minié rifles, which amusement they kept up the whole afternoon. One shot nearly expended me; it would hardly have been fair to shoot me so early in the season!

1854. — Mission to Turkey.

"We went from Rustchuk to Sistova, and there, landing upon an island which had been lately occupied by the Turks, we got very close to some Russian riflemen, in many spots not more than 200 yards distant; but I kept my head pretty close. The civil Pacha who accompanied us, the military one being away, crawled on his hands and knees. Cray, the Sapper, was delighted. I found him seated in a sort of musketry hole, firing away at the Russian riflemen, with three Arnauts loading for him. The red jacket attracted the fire very much, and whenever he exposed himself, we were greeted with half-a-dozen shots. He was much disappointed when we took him away from his sport. On our return home, I heard him swearing a good deal to himself, and, on asking the reason of his bad humour, he replied that he was d——g the dancing-master at Malta. This rather puzzled me, but on asking for an explanation, it appeared that Cray was wont to attend an Italian class at Malta, but the superior attraction of a dancing-master, who set up next door, drew him and all the literary pupils away. 'Ah, Sir,' he said, 'if I had stuck to the Italian, I would have been able to speak to all these people.'

"Sistova, we heard, was strongly fortified, but we found only two batteries there—one of three guns, and another of two. It is a pleasant place, but of no military consequence. The ground on the opposite side is marshy for miles, and very unhealthy, and the Russians have never attempted to cross there.

"We went on from Sistova to Tirnova in the Balkans, and were there very hospitably received by the Pacha, who wanted us to spend a few days with him, but we had not time. The Shipka Pass of the Balkan is about eighteen miles in length, from Gabrora on the Bulgarian side to Shipka on the Roumelian side, and is quite passable for cavalry and artillery. Its defences consist of two batteries (one unfinished) and a block-house. The latter is not well situated, but would serve for barracks for the men who man the batteries. The country from the Balkan to Adrianople is very pretty and well wooded, with numbers of large villages, all seemingly prosperous, but the inhabitants living in a miserable state of terror from the ravages of the Bashi Bazouks, who have quite gutted the line of road from

Adrianople to the Danube. We were hospitably put up for the night at Eskilava by a rich Turk, who, some months previously, had purchased a very pretty slave for the large sum of 3000*l.* I heard she generally walked in the garden of an evening, and wishing to see this pearl of price, I pretended to lose my way going to the stable, and opened the little door leading into the garden; but a female figure was all I saw, as I was suddenly jerked back into the lane, and the door slammed in my face by a hideous Turk, all covered with pistols and daggers, who, however, smiled very pleasantly, and endeavoured to explain by a number of 'Yok's' that I was about to enter forbidden ground. I regret to say that, as yet, this has been my only adventure in Turkey! 1854. Mission to Turkey.

"The weather is getting fearfully hot, and working in the middle of the day is terrible work, but I hope we will finish this survey in about a month."

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*From* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE *to* Lord RAGLAN.

"Ordnance Office, London, 10th April, 1854.

"MY LORD,

"From the remarks with which I am met on every side, relative to the conduct of the war in Turkey, I think I can perceive that the tendency of some of my recommendations has been misunderstood.

"It seems to be assumed that, in urging forcibly the preparation of the position in front of Constantinople to cover the Bosphorus, I am inclined to consider a purely defensive attitude as one of absolute necessity, and that all the efforts of the Allies are to be restricted to remaining there and at Gallipoli, in whatever force we may be, with '*our arms folded,*' and until the enemy shall choose to attack us. Such was never my idea, nor do I think that my expressions will justify such a conclusion. On the contrary, I see reason to hope that openings may be presented to enable us to undertake proceedings more energetic and more effective against the power of Russia; but my wish is for the establishment of a firm base of operations, calculated

1854. to meet any emergency, and to give us an independent freedom of action to a more extended range.

Proposed operations in Turkey.

"The first impressions on the commencement of the war between Turkey and Russia were, that the latter would cross the Danube this spring with a formidable army, and in such power as could not be resisted by any forces the Turks could oppose to them, and it is to be expected that such may still be the case. The result of that attack might be of an overpowering nature, particularly if the Turks were subjected to such complete defeat in Bulgaria as absolutely to incur the risk of allowing the enemy to penetrate to Constantinople towards the end of perhaps the first campaign. At the same time, it was not at all clear what land forces the French and British Governments might be inclined to contribute to the support of their Ally.

"Under those circumstances, the occupation of a strongly-entrenched position in front of Constantinople might have prevented the final catastrophe, and perhaps, if the attempt was made, have caused a great reaction in favour of the Turks. Nor do I perceive, in the course of subsequent events, any reasons for deviating from the policy of that measure.

"Whether the Russians shall be able to produce such an extreme effect or not, we must anticipate that they will have an ascendency of force on the Danube, and will succeed in penetrating into Bulgaria, and at least threaten an advance on Constantinople. In that case, also, the stronghold covering the Bosphorus and the capital, by the barrier it will present, will afford a feeling of confidence and security that will give greater facility for operating elsewhere; and it seems to me to be particularly desirable to have such a hold as the starting-point or last retiring ground for the French and British forces; but, above all, as a security for our fleets in the Black Sea, which otherwise must quit it, and abandon the immense advantages that our ascendency over its navigation gives to the common cause, and which, without such a hold, must have a precarious tenure. While I perceive all these advantages in the early and energetic preparation of that important position, in no way can I find any disadvantages to it. It does not necessarily absorb any strength of force for its occupation, because

troops can be thrown into it, in ample time, at any period of danger. 1854.

Proposed operations in Turkey.

"The reason I have always been so pressing for this precaution, which seems to have given an undue impression that I thought it all in all, is, that I have perceived, and still perceive, a difference of opinion on the subject, and a reluctance, particularly among the French, to resort to it.

"Even as a preparation for the most determined offensive enterprises in the Black Sea, I consider such occupation as of primary importance.

"There is no difference of opinion about the propriety of giving a great degree of strength to the European Peninsula of the Dardanelles; and if a similar preparation be admitted for the one in question in front of Constantinople, and both be actively accomplished, we have two strongholds, having the effect of fortresses, in most important positions, absolutely covering the two essential communications into the country, and affording retiring fields of action, should circumstances give the enemy any great temporary advantage. They would neither of them require any large amount of force for their occupation while the enemy should be at a distance, but, being in readiness, could both of them be amply provided with their necessary garrisons, at the last moment, from the troops previously engaged in their front, or from other sources. The armies of the three Allied Powers would therefore, in the meantime, be fully available for any other operations. What those operations might be that could be undertaken with any prospect of success, must depend upon the course of succeeding events, the value of the objects to be gained, and the openings afforded by the enemy. Some will be much more desired by us than others, like the capture of the Crimea and Sebastopol, but they are likely, on that very account, to be more jealously guarded against by the enemy.

"By our naval superiority in the Black Sea, the whole of its coast will be open to our enterprises.

"If the principal offensive advance by the Russians across the Danube be into the Dobrutze, as seems to be at present understood, it is not a bold measure, nor one likely to be attended with the powerful effects of a passage at a more central

1854. — Proposed operations in Turkey.

point. It indicates a very cautious policy, to which the Turks will be able to give a direct opposition, by a concentration of the whole of their forces from Rustchuk, to their right on the Black Sea, with a clear retreat open to them to Shoumla, Varna, and the Balkan; while the large force which it is understood they have at Kalafat, might, perhaps, make a powerful diversion into the heart of Wallachia, maintaining, for greater security, the command of a perfect communication with the Danube on their right, on which, as it advanced, would be its connection with Bulgaria, and a new line of retreat in case of necessity. Omer Pacha, who is in immediate command on the right, has professed great confidence in his power to contend with the Russian army in the field, and if he can have collected his forces on the position of Trajan's Wall, which closes the gorge of the Dobrutze, and the enemy not have passed the Danube in force elsewhere, there may be great hopes that, if not absolutely gaining a battle, he may have subjected his opponents to such loss, and have shewn such a formidable front, as greatly to damp their energies, and give them but little hopes of making much impression on a country where their native enemies are likely to be supported by any amount of French and British troops.

"Such an amount of resistance, even attended by a retreat in some order, although the enemy might obtain what he would term a victory, and a partial advance into the country might be considered a triumph, as it would be a sure indication of a power of a prolonged defence on the main line of attack, while the whole coast of the Black Sea, and the southern extremity of the Russian possessions, would be exposed to the efforts of the Allies.

"With regard to any attack on Sebastopol, it can have little strength as a fortress, and its fate will depend upon the power of obtaining firm possession of the Crimea, an attack on which must be well considered before it be undertaken. No operation is of such doubtful issue as the landing in an enemy's country for the purpose of conquest. Modern, and British history in particular, is full of disastrous failures in the attempt, and those which have succeeded have been, generally, most hazardous. An army under such circumstances, not only is

placed under the notorious disadvantage of having no retreat, but is long before it can be so provided, as to be able to cope with anything like an equivalent force previously established and in occupation of the country. The result of the landing in Holland, in 1799, by a considerable combined army of British and Russians, is an unhappy example of failure; while the fate of one of the most successful enterprises of the kind, in 1801, in Egypt, was far more precarious than is commonly supposed. The British were enabled to land 5000 men in the face of 2000, by a very arduous effort. They were five days subsequently on the beach before they could be prepared for an advance, although in very moderate force, and a week after, having a hard battle to fight to maintain their position, from which they had no retreat; while a French General (Regnier) who was present, has shewn, by calculations, that the army that attacked them with so much vigour after a fortnight's establishment in the country, might have met them on the beach. Such attempts are not, therefore, to be made without good information of the means of the enemy to resist them.

1854. — Proposed operations in Turkey.

"A less difficult operation as a preliminary, might be, perhaps, to obtain possession of Anapa and the southern points of the entrance to the Sea of Azoff, and, by a force of small steamers, secure the ascendency in the navigation of that sea. This would not only afford greatly increased encouragement and support to the Circassians, but also open a much more close approach to the Crimea, and greatly facilitate an attack on it, if at all practicable.

"The object, however, of this communication, has chiefly reference to the occupation of a position between the Sea of Marmora and the Black Sea, being not only quite compatible with any extent of active enterprise against the enemy, but absolutely tending to facilitate it.

"The position of the Allies in Turkey will be in some respects analogous to that of the British in Spain and Portugal; the enemy's organised army then being in overpowering force to that of the British, while the movements of the native troops could not be closely combined with them, enabled great efforts to be made upon them, which, without a rallying-point, could hardly be resisted. Thus the unhappy retreat of Sir

1854. — Proposed operations in Turkey.

John Moore, and what would, to any other man, have been the dangerous position of the Duke of Wellington at, and after, Talavera. Circumstances were much improved by the subsequent establishment of the Lines of Lisbon, to which the Duke retired in 1811, under the pressure of the advance of the French army, and in spite of the taunts and abuse of the Press in England, headed by the veteran Cobbett, and though those Lines were maintained throughout the War, they were not afterwards resorted to, nor did they prevent the most active enterprises at a distance from them. The Duke, however, had two advantages in the Peninsula which will be far from attending the British and French generals in Turkey. One, the universal strong feeling of the entire population against the enemy, while in Turkey one half of the people will be, to say the least of it, indifferent; and the second, the excellent information he constantly possessed of the state and proceedings of the enemy, which hitherto seems to be totally unattainable from within the lines of the Russians.

"I have, &c.,

"J. F. BURGOYNE."

Appointment of Sir Hew Ross as Lt.-Gen. of Ordnance.

*From* the Duke of NEWCASTLE *to* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE.

"Downing Street, 10th April, 1854.

"MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

"I have been much annoyed at seeing a premature announcement in the newspapers of the appointment of Sir Hew Ross,[1] as Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance, as I was anxious to have explained to you why that office had not been offered to you, before any publicity had been given to it.

"I stated to you on Saturday that I relied upon having the advantage of your advice in the many preparations which have yet to be made for the war, but at the same time informed you that some of our military authorities were very anxious to keep you available for service with Lord Raglan. You most hand-

[1] Sir Hew Ross, at this time, was junior in rank to Sir John Burgoyne. He subsequently passed over Sir John's head, through a re-arrangement of the upper ranks in the Artillery, due to the Royal Warrant of 1854.

somely and generously replied that you were anxious only to consider how you could best serve the Public. 1854.

Appointment of Sir Hew Ross as Lt.-Gen. of Ordnance.

"Acting upon the conviction that this would be your feeling, I wrote to Lord Aberdeen a few days before, to recommend Sir Hew Ross to the temporary appointment, understanding from military men that the circumstances precluded the possibility of any idea of a slur upon you, or any want of appreciation of your services and the claims which you have by them established upon the Government of the country.

"The only motive is to secure to the State the advantage of your valuable assistance with the army in the East, if it should be found requisite to call upon you again to proceed there, without the inconvenience of another change in a Department whose efficiency would unavoidably be disturbed by frequent alteration in its members.

"I am, my dear Sir John,

"Yours very sincerely,

"NEWCASTLE."

"Ordnance Office, Pall Mall, 11th April, 1854.

"MY LORD DUKE,

"I feel bound to tender my best acknowledgments for your Grace's flattering communication of yesterday, explanatory of the circumstances of the appointment of Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Ross, Royal Artillery, to be Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance.

"I am perfectly confident that it was not *intended* to put any slight upon me, but the result of the appointment has been effectively (though I have no doubt not so understood) to place me and all my proceedings under his official control and command.

"I have the greatest esteem and respect for Sir Hew Ross, and am satisfied that he would never use his authority in any but the most courteous manner, but that will be owing to his forbearance, in the execution of his undoubted duty.

"In order to relieve me and the officers of my corps from the effects of the slur that the arrangement entails upon us, I have suggested that a junior officer should be placed in my post at

1854. this office, on an implied understanding that it was desired to keep me disengaged for any other service; but Lord Hardinge sees many objections to that course, and deems it an abandonment of services that the Government require from me.

Appointment of Sir Hew Ross as Lt.-Gen. of Ordnance.

"Determined as I ever have been and still continue to be, to resign every private feeling or interest to the requirements of the Government, I yield to the pressure put upon me on this occasion, but in doing so, I feel that I am making the greatest of all sacrifices,[1] involving a lowering of pride and position in the eyes of my friends, brother officers, and the army in general.

"Your Grace's faithful and obedient Servant,

"J. F. BURGOYNE."

*From* Lord RAGLAN.

"Paris, April 12, 1854.

"MY DEAR BURGOYNE,

"I am much obliged to you for your letter of yesterday. Here little attention is paid to the news of the defeat of the Turks. It is not credited to any extent.

"I am very glad to find that the Duke of Newcastle and Lord Hardinge have induced you to reconsider the view you first took of the arrangement made by the Government for the discharge of the duties of Lieutenant-General in the absence of the Master-General. I am very glad, for the sake of the public service, that you have determined to remain; and I should hope that you would soon lose all idea that it is in any way lowering to you. Such a notion never entered my head; and I should indeed be wretched if you should think that I, who have known you so long, and have entertained so great a regard for you, both as a friend and an officer of the highest distinction, service, and ability, for such a length of time, should have been a party to any course of proceeding calculated to affect your reputation, or the estimation in which you are universally held.

"Yours, &c.,

"RAGLAN."

[1] Sir John Burgoyne had written to resign his appointment as Inspector-General of Fortifications.—ED.

1854.

*From* Sir JAMES GRAHAM.

Preparations for embarkation of army.

"Admiralty, 11th July, 1854.

"MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

"I am very much obliged to you for allowing me to see the proposed draft of instructions to Brigadier-General Jones.[1] We have written to Sir Charles Napier in the same sense; and I have spoken to General Jones confidentially on several points to which I was anxious to direct his special attention. I hope that the calm good sense and temper of the General will be useful, and that he may be enabled by prudent and timely advice on all military questions to keep the Admiral right, and to prevent the exposure of the Marines in any desperate enterprises.

"I am always, &c.,

"J. R. G. GRAHAM."

*From* Brigadier-General TYLDEN[2] *to* Lieutenant-General Sir JOHN F. BURGOYNE.

"Constantinople, 24th May, 1854.

"MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

"As I stated in my letter of the 16th, General Cator and myself accompanied Lord Raglan to Varna on Thursday, and went over the works on Friday; we found them mostly in the state you left them, except that the heavy guns were removed from the outworks, and light ones substituted. General St. Arnaud, Lord Raglan, Omer Pacha, and the Seraskier met in consultation for some hours, the result of which was, that Lord Raglan and General St. Arnaud accompanied Omer Pacha to Shumla. I was ordered to return here the same night, to forward a detachment of Sappers with tools to repair the old wharf and construct a new one on the opposite side of the bay, leaving Wrottesley with Wagemann to make preparations and collect materials, Omer Pacha having given an order to the

[1] The late Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Jones of the Royal Engineers who was about to sail in command of the land forces to be employed in the Baltic.—ED.

[2] Commanding Royal Engineer with the army in Turkey.—ED.

1854. Pacha at Varna to furnish everything wanting in that way. Cator and I arrived here on Saturday at twelve o'clock, and I had all Constantinople ransacked to find proper tools and a portable forge, and only succeeded by 4 P.M. on Sunday. A detachment of Captain Bent's company, Gordon, Pratt, 28 non-commissioned officers and men, proceeded at once on board the *Caradoc*. Tuesday afternoon, Lord Raglan returned, sent for me, and gave orders for Captain Bent, with the pontoons and the remainder of his company, to proceed without delay to Varna; they are embarked and sail to-day. It is supposed the whole combined army will at once make a forward movement from Varna; the Light Division, under Sir George Brown, embark on Friday, and move on Saturday, and the First Division will follow on the return of the transports; we have a most powerful steam fleet all ready to start, with numerous very fine transports for artillery. Lord Raglan has ordered up Captain Gordon with Captain Hassard's Company and 1000 entrenching tools from Gallipoli—they are expected to-morrow —leaving Captain Gibb, with two subalterns, to carry on the lines. Chapman and Lovell, Burke and De Vere, are ordered in from Buyukchekmedje, the survey of which has taken a long time, and is not yet complete; as I have been unable to ride out, I cannot say if they have exerted themselves or not, but at present everything gives way to the forward movement, and I think it is in contemplation to fight a battle as soon as possible to relieve Silistria, which is now invested by about 60,000 Russians. Simmons, who came down with Omer Pacha, told me the garrison consists of 15,000 Turks with provisions for three months, but I hear Omer Pacha does not think it will hold out more than six weeks. The French have not advanced yet, but they are reported as sending 25,000 men at least. I have posted the officers to the several divisions, and only wait Lord Raglan's approval; it is now before him. I think we shall advance with all our force, except one regiment at Gallipoli, and one at Scutari, to take care of the hospitals and stores; most of the artillery have arrived, and one regiment of cavalry (17th), General Scarlett, and Lord Cardigan. I must now go over to Scutari, to see Bent's Company and pontoons embark.

Preparations for embarkation of army.

"4 P.M. *Scutari.*—The French mail has come in and brought me your welcome letters of the 11th and 14th May, and a store-ship is also reported as coming from Gallipoli with Engineer stores on board. I therefore hope we shall be able to take our place as we ought to do; but I see by a bill of lading, date 12th May (the first of any kind I have received), that no trench carts are yet embarked. They are the most useful in conveying tools quickly. There is very great difficulty in procuring horses, and every exertion is making to procure horses and mules for the Commissariat; it would have much assisted the transport had they purchased mules at Gibraltar from Spain and sent them on. With respect to the delay in our equipment, I am most glad to find the delay did not occur with our people during your absence; but it will be a good opportunity to impress on the authorities, whosoever they may be, that one part of an army being inefficient impedes the whole."

1854. — Preparations for embarkation of army.

The following letter from the Earl of Rosse is believed to contain the earliest proposal for an ironclad ship.

Lord Rosse's proposal for ironclad ships.

"13, Connaught Place, June 12th, 1854.

"DEAR SIR JOHN,

"You are probably worried with conundrums for destroying the Russian ships under their forts; this is mine. To build an iron screw steamer, proof against shot, shells, and boarders, and to run at the enemy's ship and sink it with one blow of the cutwater. To construct such a steamer I have no doubt is perfectly practicable; and I do not think it would be a very long business with the resources our great ship-builders have at command. The data we have would be sufficient to enable us to calculate the lines of the steamer, allowing, however, a very large margin of excess of strength: to prevent waste, a more accurate determination of the data would be necessary. First, the requisite thickness of iron:—the best data I know of are the *French* experiments, detailed in the third edition of 'Sir Howard Douglas on Naval Gunnery.' From

1854. these experiments I think we may assume that 3-inch iron plate would be shot-proof, except at a very short range, and where the impact was perpendicular; 4-inch plate, I think, would be safe under all circumstances which could occur in practice. The steamer should have no bulwarks, and when trimmed, the deck must not be more than 12 or 14 inches above the surface of the water. The first two feet of the side would be 4 inches thick; the next foot, being considerably protected by the water, would be 3 inches; and the fourth foot 2 inches; the remainder of the hull ¾ or perhaps 1 inch thick. The draught of water would depend upon the size and shape, but with the machinery, and *without the deck*, it need not, I think, exceed eight feet. As to the deck, I think it has been found that two layers of balk beams 12 inches thick each, crossed, is proof against heavy shells; I am speaking, however, only from a very distant recollection of the facts given either in the 'Aide Mémoire,' 'Jones' Sieges,' or the 'Professional Papers.' I suppose that to be so; then 2-inch iron plate would be about an equivalent; and as iron is nearly eight times as heavy as water, a deck of 2-inch iron plate would increase the draught of water 16 inches, so that allowing for deck beams and fastenings, the total draught might be perhaps ten feet. Before the lines of such a steamer were calculated, the best data should be obtained.

Lord Rosse's proposal for ironclad ships.

"1. I think it would be desirable to repeat the French experiments, employing a succession of plates riveted together, which is the way the required thickness would probably be obtained in practice. 2. To obtain the best information as to the impact of heavy shells. 3. The amount of protection which might be relied upon from the water at different depths. Should it be found that greater strength would be required, either in the deck or sides, it would only be necessary to increase the size: the great principle that the buoyancy increases much more rapidly than the surface would make all difficulty surmountable. The funnel need not appear above deck, as a fan would answer instead, and the hatchway could be effectually secured against boarders, the vessel being steered below. Small holes for muskets would probably be sufficient to keep the deck clear and prevent grappling.

"Ships in docks would of course be safe, but I think nowhere else where there was a fleet outside. You may, perhaps, discover some fatal objection to all this, but if not, perhaps it might be worth considering. 1854.

"Believe me, &c.,

"Rosse.

"In the rough calculation I have assumed 300 as the nominal horse-power."[1]

*From* Lord Raglan.

"Varna, June 29, 1854.

"My dear Burgoyne,

"I have received your several letters to the 12th June. I am very glad that you have recommended that a trial should be made of the Emperor's pontoon, the construction of which would be attended with no great expense. I saw cavalry, infantry, and artillery pass over it successively and successfully, and I counted six guns upon it at the same time. You might try it upon the upper Medway, where the river is narrow and the current comparatively inconsiderable. Army at Varna.

* * * * * *

"There are here entrenching-tools in abundance, and I shall, I hope, be able to carry with the army sufficient for all our purposes. But I shall use pack horses as much as possible; for draught animals are rarely to be found, and arabas with bullocks would frequently be too far in the rear, and be the occasion of endless vexation and disappointment. I have just heard that on the Danube there is a large breed of horses, some of which might be large enough for our artillery, and I shall get as many of them as I can.

"The Engineers would like a certain number of Flanders waggons well horsed; and I am fully alive to the importance of having in the field a sufficient body of Sappers, with all the implements they may require; but what constitutes a moveable army is not collected in a day, particularly in a country like this, where the habits of the people are opposed to activity

[1] An account by Lord Rosse of the way in which his suggestions were met by the Admiralty, will be found further on.

1854. — Army at Varna.

and exertion; and where, as I suspect, as regards Bulgaria particularly, the feelings of the inhabitants are enlisted rather in favour of the Russians than of the Allies. Nothing can be worse or more vexatious than the rule of the Turks; and the persons employed under the Government live by extracting from those who are subject to their authority all they can squeeze out of them.

"We are very deficient in information, and nobody offers to supply it upon even the most exorbitant terms; whilst the Russians, as I understand, obtain intelligence without difficulty.

"I have withdrawn all the troops from Gallipoli except the 4th Regiment and one company of Sappers, and I shall keep the latter there until the huts, which are constructing for 1000 men, and which are far preferable to tents, shall have been completed, which will be in about four weeks from this time. I am quite in favour of the Boulahir works. The ground at Bujuk Checkmedje none but your officers have looked at, and I found in my colleagues little disposition to enter upon the question.

"The raising the siege of Silistria is a great event. It is highly glorious to the Turks, and most humiliating to the Russians.

"Believe me, &c.,

"RAGLAN.

"I allowed Captain Bent and Lieutenant Burke to volunteer their services for Silistria, but the siege was at an end before they could reach the place. I shall have occasion to send Lieutenant Burke to Redout Kali on his return."

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*From* General TYLDEN *to* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE.

"Varna, 19th July, 1854.

"MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

"Yesterday there was a council of war held here—the Admirals, Marshal St. Arnaud, and Lord Raglan. In the afternoon, Lord Raglan met Wrottesley, and desired him to tell me

to have Lovell in readiness to embark this morning at nine o'clock, to be appointed with some other officers (I suppose French) to reconnoitre the coasts of the Crimea. Gordon has not yet returned from the coast of Circassia, and I have nothing from Lempriere; and, what is still more extraordinary, I have as yet received no report from Bent. I mentioned in my last that the written instructions I had entrusted to poor Burke to deliver to Bent, were found in one of his portmanteaus *left behind*, when opened by the Board appointed to examine his effects; but, nevertheless, I cannot account for Bent's silence, neither have I read any report of the arrival of the Sappers sent to join him under Pratt. 1854. — Army at Varna.

"I have not seen Lord Raglan since the affair I mentioned to you, as Colonel Steele wrote to Ewart to say Lord Raglan wished to see *him* every morning at ten o'clock. Ewart became unwell, and I then sent up my Brigade Major; this has continued until to-day, when he brought down a message that Lord Raglan desired to see me at two o'clock; as the mail closes at one, I shall be unable to let you know the result of the interview until next post, but I do not anticipate anything pleasant. He has consented to our having mules or horses for the trench carts which are landing from the *Cormorant;* but the Commissary has none to furnish, all the other departments having been supplied as far as means will go. I think it very late in the season to commence the siege of Sebastopol, even if the generals are mad enough to undertake it; but as Marshal St. Arnaud is independent of the English press, I hope he will not be goaded to undertake so hazardous an affair at this late period. The intervention of Austria will allow the Russians to double or triple their troops in the Crimea, as they will undertake no offensive operations against them, at least so it is reported here. We are beginning to be sickly, and some cases of cholera are reported to have occurred amongst the French. The hospital accommodation here is very bad, and very limited; there is a good one at Scutari, and another for 400 men has been prepared at Nagara Point (Dardanelles). Our forage runs short; no straw for baggage animals, and only 5 lbs. of hay for chargers, with 9 lbs. of barley. The material collected for moving the army is immense, but what we are to do with

1854. it is another thing. It will be a work of time to transport all to the other side, even should a landing be effected under the fire of the fleet.

Army at Varna.

"Gibbs' Company is still at Gallipoli hutting one regiment, but I trust he will soon be ordered up; as we have by no means Sappers enough to undertake anything of a siege, much less of such a place as Sebastopol; but the French are luckily better provided."

*From the same.*

"Varna, 29th July, 1854.

"My dear Sir John,

"I herewith send you returns of what I propose taking to Sebastopol, and also my memorandum to Lord Raglan on the subject. Sir G. Brown, General Canrobert, Colonel Lake, R.A., Captain Lovell, R.E., specially ordered by Lord Raglan, together with officers of the French Engineers, and of the État-Major of both nations, went on board ship on the 20th, to reconnoitre and report on the possibility of landing a force near Sebastopol, which has been a favourite project of the navy for some time; and the generals have, it appears, at last given way to the pressure from the public prints, as every order now indicates that we are to make the attempt, although I have not been taken into his Lordship's councils further than I before stated to you in my private note. Lovell is returned, and is making out his report. He reports favourably of a spot on the second stream north of the harbour, and the fort Emperor or Constantine, as it is called, stands farther back than shown in the maps, and that the ground is stiff clay. This is, so far, favourable, but there are many things, in my opinion, requiring mature consideration, which will not, I fear, be given. The navy feel confident of covering our landing. This is all very well, but it must be twenty-four hours before we can move from the beach in sufficient force to meet the strong army that will come down upon us, particularly cavalry; we hear they have at least 50,000 men in the Crimea, besides the 10,000 soldier-sailors. If we succeed, we shall be lucky fellows, but I cannot help

thinking it is a very rash undertaking. Our force is also far under what it ought to be; Gibbs' Company still at Gallipoli, and Lord Raglan will not order them up till the huts are finished, and Bent, 1 officer, and 37 men at Giurgevo; so that we shall not have much more than 200 men for the trenches. The French have 1200, but General Bizot is very anxious that we should take as many of our Sappers as possible, of whom they seem to have a great opinion. I confess I cannot help hoping it will be put off; but if we go, I am sure all our officers will do their best. We can get no intelligence whatever as to the strength of the work, but as they have been at it these two years, it ought to be more than respectable; the country is reported quite open round it, affording no shelter whatever." 1854. — Army at Varna.

*From* Brigadier-General TYLDEN, R.E., *to* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"Varna, 20th August, 1854.

"MY DEAR MATSON.

"The accompanying Memorandum I thought it my duty to send to Colonel Steele, with a view to its being shown to Lord Raglan, although my opinion has in no case been asked on any subject. I had previously shown it to Cator, who agrees with me in all essential points, and, I believe, had spoken his opinion to Lord Raglan before he left for Therapia. It was returned with the following remark from Colonel Steele, after its being shown to Lord Raglan:—'There is no question that an attack on Sebastopol is a hazardous undertaking, but the same may be said of war in all its operations—the greater the difficulties, the greater must be the exertions on all sides; and forty or fifty thousand English and French troops are not easily disheartened.'

"I had before stated, that whatever my private opinion might be, every nerve would be strained to carry out to the fullest extent his Lordship's orders.

"The game seems now about to be played to the end, and it is rumoured that Fort Emperor or Constantine is to be carried by assault; but we know nothing of the depth of the

1854. — Army at Varna.

ditches, or if the flanks be casemated, and I doubt if we shall be allowed to get sufficiently near to reconnoitre with any certainty.

"Report numbers the Russians at 70,000, and 10,000 from the fleet, and our numbers are to be equal—English 25,000, French 35,000, Turks 20,000—that is to say, if we are allowed to make good our landing. Lovell's report will show you that there is only a mile of front, and the enclosed view will show you whether the fire of the ships can protect the troops from the fire of artillery drawn up behind the hills on each side of the valley.

"We must then entrench our position before making our attack, and if the fort is not carried by storm, our approaches will be disturbed by sorties in such force that every one will be a night battle. Our troops are much attenuated by disease and effects of climate, and ill able to endure the harassing duty in store for them. Moreover, it is reported that the fort is on rocky ground without any soil covering it; so that what we carry to fill our gabions during the night, will be knocked over by their artillery by day, as we cannot enfilade all the faces. If, however, the fort is carried by a *coup-de-main*, we may then erect batteries on the heights to fire on the casemates on the opposite side of the harbour (where the town is built), and on the shipping; but this will require a much more powerful battering-train than we can muster, and that of the French has not arrived.

"Now, if, on the contrary, the army is picked, and certain regiments, both French, English, and Turks, are sent to Anapa to take it, and the main body put into winter quarters in a more healthy climate, the whole may be in an organized and fit state to take the field in May next. They could land at Kaffa (or Theodosia), the best harbour in the Crimea next to Sebastopol, where our fleet of transports could be in security all the summer, whilst the fleet keep up the blockade of Sebastopol; we should have an excellent base of operations, and in one campaign drive the Russians into Sebastopol, having all the resources of the country as we advance, and by landing a small force at Eupatoria, cut off any reinforcements from getting into the Crimea by that route, and they could not send a large

force from Sebastopol to dislodge them, for fear of a landing from the fleet. We should thus, after one or two battles, force the Russians to retire into the fortress, and could then either starve or shell them at our leisure; for if the Austrians only show face, they could not detach an army large enough to cope with the Allies, provided they once get a footing in the country, and it is very probable the Mussulman population would then rise in our favour; but if we are to take the field next year, we must have an efficient corps of horses and drivers. It is of no use talking about its originating here, I have already received too many rebuffs, although, thanks to Sir John, I have gained every point but this; it must come from him with a forcible note or minute." 1854. — Army at Varna.

*Thoughts on the projected attack on Sebastopol, submitted to Lord Raglan by Brigadier-General Tylden, Commanding Royal Engineers.*

"10th August, 1854.

"I understand it is in contemplation to attack Sebastopol with a view to the destruction of the Russian fleet, and that a landing is to be effected on an open beach, under cover of a squadron of ships of war, whilst the main fleet blockade the harbour of Sebastopol. This operation must take place in presence of an enemy reported to be equal, if not superior, in numbers to the invading army, in a high state of discipline, and, of course, amply provided with every necessary material for war, having the entire command of the resources of the country, and with great probability of a daily increase to its numbers; whereas, the invading army can have no base of operations, and must be entirely dependent for support and supplies upon a fleet, which at any moment may be forced by stress of weather to quit the coast. If the wind blows hard on shore, the men-of-war must draw off, but the heavy transports will probably be unable to do so, and will be liable to destruction by the powerful fleet of the enemy, secured in harbour a very few miles distant. Memorandum on attack on Sebastopol by General Tylden.

"Supposing the landing effected, and a battle gained, the army must proceed to the attack of a fortress which, from its position, cannot be *invested* by the force at our command, with

1854. the strength of which we are totally unacquainted, except from a reconnaissance taken at a distance of more than two miles at sea.

Memorandum on attack on Sebastopol by General Tylden.

"The besieging army will be liable to attack at all times in front, flank, and rear; it will, therefore, be necessary, in the first instance, to throw up strong entrenchments for its security, which *must* occupy many days, even if unmolested; whereas, the fortress is so situated that supplies and reinforcements can be thrown in at any and every moment.

"The strength and nature of the land defences, as before stated, are unknown, but it is an established fact in war that a weak fortress, which, from its extent or other causes, cannot be invested, is much more difficult, and takes longer time to capture, than one of much greater artificial strength which can be invested.

"The time allowed for this operation is necessarily very short, the winter in this climate beginning in November, when the fleet cannot keep the sea for any given time with certainty, and the preparations are necessarily extremely hurried. The Crimea, and particularly the port and arsenal of Sebastopol, have for many years been under the government of General Count Woronzoff, one of the most distinguished officers of his day. It is not, therefore, to be supposed that the fortifications would be neglected, and it is well known that many thousand men have been employed in adding to, and perfecting the land defences during the last two years; therefore, it is my opinion that the projected attack on Sebastopol, with our present resources at command, is eminently hazardous, and will, at best, require a longer time to effect, than the present advanced season will allow.

"W. B. TYLDEN."

1854.

# INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, 1854.

THE military policy which dictated the descent upon the Crimea in September 1854, was strongly impugned at the period of the Parliamentary inquiry into the causes of the disasters of the war; but there is much to be said in favour of it. Sebastopol at this date presented a tempting bait to the allied forces in the Black Sea, for Russia had committed the fault of establishing a valuable naval arsenal at a remote extremity of her territory, at a great distance from any reserves, and with a long and difficult communication to it from other portions of her empire. According to the best information procurable at the time, it had been left very imperfectly protected on the south; and the ground on that side of the harbour falling towards the water rendered the existence of a strong position on that front extremely improbable; certainly no military man, on studying the features of the ground as portrayed on the best maps of the Crimea, would have supposed that the spurs of land protruding from the southern plateau, in place of falling to the harbour in a continuous incline, would rise again before reaching the water, and form the fine military position of which the Russians made subsequently so good an use.

If a footing in force could therefore be established within the country, the fall of the place appeared to

1854. follow as a matter of course. It will be seen that Sir John Burgoyne's opinion of the difficult nature of the enterprise was based entirely upon the danger of a disembarkation in the immediate neighbourhood of a powerful force, and that he never contemplated any serious difficulty, if a decided superiority could be obtained over the Russian army in the field. These considerations appear to justify the attempt, for the result shewed that the information which the allied governments possessed of the weakness of the Russian force in the Crimea was well founded, and the efforts made by the enemy to prevent the fall of the place, with so extended and difficult a communication between it and the interior, ultimately prostrated even the colossal military strength of Russia.

Notes on reconnaissance of Crimea.

Upon the report of the reconnaissance of the coast of the Crimea, made by the officers named in General Tylden's letter, reaching England, it was shown to Sir John Burgoyne by Sir James Graham. His dissent from many of the conclusions of this document appears to have alarmed the English Cabinet, and led to his subsequent employment in the East.

*Notes on the Report of the reconnaissance of the Coast of the Crimea, contained in letters from Colonel Rose,*[1] *dated 28th July*, 1854.

No. 54. "If the British and French armies went against Sebastopol, might not the Russians fall on and discomfit Omer Pacha?"

The greater the means they throw upon the Danube to any lessening of exertions towards the Crimea, the better; they would be following the shadow, for they could do little or

[1] British Commissioner with the French Head Quarters, now General Lord Strathnairn.—Ed.

nothing before winter, while we should make play against the substance. Colonel Rose's reasons are conclusive on the probability of their making such an attempt, and it seems that Colonel Trochu coincided. 1854. — Notes on reconnaissance of Crimea.

No. 55. "The first landing-place between Eupatoria and Sebastopol, which is on the river Alma, is too far from Sebastopol. The second, on the river Katcha, about three leagues from Sebastopol, is favourable. The third, on the river Belbec, is too close, being only about 3000 metres or more from Fort Constantine."

I do not understand or concur in this apparent argument, except as to the river Belbec being too close; but so is, I apprehend, the second landing-place on the Katcha, which, it is believed, is only seven or eight miles, that is, almost within sight, and not exceeding three easy hours' march of 30,000 moveable troops, independent of a complete garrison left for the place; the whole of which 30,000, or a very large proportion might, and of course would be, on the ground, when the formidable preparations for landing an ARMY are before it.

Such a fleet, with transports, &c., as would convey the first part of these forces, would take much more than three hours, probably not less than ten or twelve, in bringing up, and other proceedings, till the first division could be put on shore; it is said that as many as 10,000 men could be put into the boats at once, but even if so, the landing, although rapid, could not be in that sort of order, to be able at once to contend with, say, only the same number of troops (though they might be double) in perfect readiness and order, and with field artillery and cavalry.

It is said that the landing of the troops could be covered by the fire from the shipping, which could be within 800 yards of the shore, but such protection would be of but small advantage; while the boats were distant, the enemy, by the fire of the shipping, might be prevented from going to the water's edge, but even that advantage would be lost, when the boats neared the shore; and there is no coast that ever I saw, that would not afford extensive cover from a ship's fire at 200 or 300 yards from the water, and the view of the beach which Sir James Graham showed me, gave very much the appearance of broken ground, immediately at the back of the beach, and moderately

1854. Notes on reconnaissance of Crimea.

rising ground on each flank that appeared most favourable for flanking positions for field artillery, which could be most rapidly covered from the fire of the ships, even if not so by nature; it is said that there were "*two elevated positions like forts, not far from the landing-place, which would protect the troops' disembarkation;*" but these features I should consider all in favour of the defence against the landing, and with the consideration of its being so near such a large force of the enemy, makes it, as it appears to me, anything but an eligible site for the purpose.

The landing of bodies of troops in an enemy's country, I should consider impracticable, if opposed by anything like equal forces, or most desperate if opposed by even half their number; the *landing ought to be by surprise*, at a distance from any collection of the enemy's troops, and on a calculation that the accumulated force could be disembarked up to the end with greater rapidity, than a force could be brought up to repel the invaders.

The country, either where the landing is effected, or near it, should be favourable for entrenchments to cover a base of operations, or a retreat in case of necessity,—the only disadvantage of landing at a considerable distance from Sebastopol is, I presume, the apprehended length of communication, as the troops move forward; but if the route is, as it naturally would be, parallel to the coast, the communication to the fleets would be established in advance at each bay or landing-place as it was passed.

J. F. BURGOYNE.

Very shortly after the delivery of these opinions, a letter from the Minister of War was put into Sir John's hands.

"17, Portman Square,
"Friday, 11th August, 1854.

"MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

"I am very anxious to see you this morning.

"Can you without much inconvenience put yourself into a cab and come up here immediately, or at any rate before 2 o'clock?

"Yours very sincerely,

"NEWCASTLE."

At this interview, the Duke[1] asked him if he would join the army in the East, and on Sir John's readily assenting, inquired how soon he would be ready to start, to which Sir John replied that he would start *the following night* by the mail train. This left him but one day to make arrangements for his journey, and he arrived at the head-quarters of the army totally destitute of the necessary equipment for the field, with which he supplied himself on the spot, by purchasing the horses, saddlery, canteens, &c., of officers who had died, or been invalided at Varna.

1854. Departure for the East.

" Chantilly, 13th August, 1854.

"At Dover Station we found Colonel Matson and Colonel Streatfield. On landing at Calais, a messenger from the Consul took charge of us, and a letter was put in my hands, with a telegraphic message from Lord Cowley, requesting me to stop at Creil with my luggage, and his carriage would meet me to take me to his summer residence at Chantilly, the remains of the magnificent palace of the great Prince of Condé. As the baggage was already disposed of for Paris, all I could do was myself to stop at Creil, and I am now staying here to an early dinner, to meet M. Drouyn de Luys, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, &c., and we go into Paris after dinner. In the mean time, Hugh,[2] with Maguire and baggage, went on, and

[1] The Duke of Newcastle appears to have made a *reconnaissance* of Sir John Burgoyne himself a few days previously. A letter from the latter, dated the 7th August, from the Ordnance Office, says—

"I have just had a long interview with the Duke of Newcastle, who called here on me, about many matters regarding all parts of the world, on which I had not previously understood his views; it was altogether a very amicable meeting, and with great professions on his part of being very confidential with me."

The Duke was not personally acquainted with Sir John before this interview; and as it was difficult to believe that a man of over seventy years of age would have the physical and mental activity necessary for taking a part in operations in the field, he probably wished to satisfy himself of the fact before asking him to join the army in the East.—Ed.

[2] His son, afterwards lost in the *Captain*.

1854. — Departure for the East.

I hope has got accommodation for the night at the Hotel Brighton, where I am going to enquire for him; he must have passed an unpleasant day. To-morrow morning I am to call on Marshal Vaillant, and go off per mail train in the evening. Lady Adelaide (Paget that was, now Cadogan) is here with her husband and two children.

"I am very sorry to find —— giving way to the mischievous and nonsensical doctrine of *presentiments* attributed to poor Burke. Every man of sense when going into a desperate affair, as Burke, by his remonstrance evidently thought this to be, or even going into action, must be more or less prepared for a catastrophe; some fall, some survive, but the *presentiment* only attaches to the former. Many and many similar presentiments I have known to be impressed on the minds of men who came out of the field safe and sound.

"Poor Burke! It is almost always the fate of men of great bodily powers, when mixed with high spirit, to get killed in action; they are so accustomed to be aware of their strength and activity, that they rush into the *mêlée*, despising each individual enemy, and forgetting that any puny fellow in the mass may shoot them. Shaw, the famous Life Guardsman at Waterloo, and various others of the same stamp, have fallen thus!"

"Marseilles, 16th August, 1854.

"1 P.M.—I shall embark on board the *Indus* in about an hour, and have done a great deal here. I have bought a military saddle, bridle and halter, a pack-saddle and bridle, a stretcher for a bed, that I am hereafter to adapt to boxes or portmanteaus, a double-barrelled pistol, brandy, tea, chocolate, a camp table and stool with a back, and a variety of little articles, and moreover I found time to get my hair cut!"

"On board French Packet *Indus*.

"*Me voici embarqué*, bag, baggage, and Maguire, having added a little more to the stock of good things I had before prepared.

"The passengers are not numerous, including an English officer going to his regiment, who does not speak a word of

French, about 60 French soldiers and two or three officers, and a French priest. 1854. Voyage to the East.

"They have given me a cabin to myself, promising that others shall be doubled up before me, so that I have every prospect of a good start.

"5 P.M.—We have just left the harbour. The officer on board whom I accused of not speaking French—having heard him at the Packet Office call for assistance because he "could not make these fellows" understand some very common-place matter,—tells me that he is a commissary newly appointed, and attached to the British regiment at Athens, and though quite inexperienced, he was selected because he was such a *good Frenchman*, and would have to act with the French commissary; and indeed he seems to get on pretty well, but not by any means up to the mark I should have thought entitled to being *selected* as a linguist."

"Piræus, 22nd August.

"We anchored here at 9 o'clock last night, and shall not leave till this afternoon.

"I have occupied myself during the voyage by forming projects for the invasion of the Crimea and attack of Sebastopol, under such little information as I possess of circumstances. I have done so, because I think the manner of commencing which we understood when in England to be contemplated, very injudicious, although it is somewhat presumptuous to say so, without being so well aware as they are on the spot, of the circumstances. I have enclosed the first rough copies to Matson or Sandham for their perusal, and then to be sent to you. These speculations are probably very needless, as we hear at this place that the expedition has started long ago from Varna, and consequently the first and decisive measures already taken.

"The French troops here have suffered terribly from cholera, but are now better. A young soldier came alongside just now, and said he was the only one of a party of 65 left alive! He was *décoré* in consequence."

1854.
—
Voyage to the East.

*To* Colonel SANDHAM, R.E.[1]

"Piræus, 22nd August, 1854.

"MY DEAR SANDHAM,

"I enclose my first rough copy of reasonings and speculations on proceedings for the attack of Sebastopol.

"When I left England, it was said that a very favourable place for a landing in Crimea had been found by the navy, and approved by Generals Canrobert and Brown,—it was near the river Katcha, but appears to me to be anything but desirable; and I have sketched out my imaginary proceedings in lieu of it.

"The great error seems to be in looking upon Sebastopol as an *insulated* fortress; whereas the first and main operation is to obtain the superiority in the country over the enemy's army, and not think of the proceedings against Sebastopol until that is accomplished.

"We are now given to suppose that the expedition has departed for the Crimea many days ago; the die will therefore be cast, and my speculations only as to what *might have* been. It has however afforded me occupation on the voyage."

*Proposed Campaign in Crimea*, 1854.

The enemy are supposed to consist of 75,000 men, exclusive of garrison of Kertch and other detached stations, not likely to be abandoned; this is probably an extreme calculation.

Of these, 15,000 garrison of Sebastopol, besides its 16,000 sailor-soldiers, and other 15,000 encamped near it, leaving a reserve of about 45,000, the greater part of whom, probably about Simferopol, or within the circle from Eupatoria by Simferopol round to Alushta.

Suppose the French and British forces to amount to 60,000, with 100 pieces of horsed field artillery, and 4000 horsed cavalry, and that 10,000 of the regularly organised Turkish troops with 12 pieces of artillery, and 1500 cavalry, can be made available for the undertaking.

That the combined fleet, and every other means of French

[1] Colonel Sandham was Deputy Inspector-General of Fortifications.

and British transports, can convey at one trip 40,000 infantry, with 40 field pieces and their horses, and that a Turkish fleet can convey 10,000 of *their* troops in addition, with 12 field pieces horsed, and 300 cavalry. 1854. — Proposed campaign in Crimea.

All the Turkish force, and as many as possible of the most active of the French and British squadron, to proceed in the first instance to make a demonstration of landing at Balaklava, or other part of the south coast; two or three steamers, the smaller the better, so as not to create alarm, watching Eupatoria, and between that and Sebastopol, and the rest of the fleet out of sight, until the day fixed for joining all the rest of the French and British forces, which will be rapidly collected in the bay of Eupatoria.

The troops to be disembarked as quickly as possible, and each vessel as it is emptied in succession of troops, spare ammunition, and provisions, sent off singly back to Varna for the remainder, for which reason the steamers should be the first to be discharged; the whole disembarkation of the first expedition, it is presumed, may be effected in about 24 or 36 hours.

The best defensive position that can be found within 10 miles will be taken up and entrenched with activity, and if possible, defensive works undertaken to cover the immediate landing-place.

If a small body of Turkish cavalry, and some Turkish officers to be selected for intelligence and discretion, could be landed very early, they might be pushed into the country to collect information, encourage the Mahometan inhabitants, and collect supplies, having with them French and British commissaries with money to pay a good price for everything, and to promise the same for whatever may subsequently be brought into the camp.

Within less than three days the reinforcements by the first vessels would be returning in succession; and in five days, probably the whole transported to the Crimea; before which, if the enemy are found to be in the available strength above assumed, the allied army could hardly make any very forward movement?

In the meantime, the corps of Turks should be landed on the south coast, at about the same period that the Allies were being

1854. landed, and establishing themselves in the north; if they could obtain a strong entrenched position, covering a landing-place, they might from thence make a very valuable diversion to draw off the Russian forces at the most critical period.

Proposed campaign in Crimea.

With regard to the proceedings of the enemy, it may be hoped that some misapprehension and loss of time will be created by the demonstration made in the first instance on the south coast, and subsequently by the doubts as to the nature and amount of the force which would definitively be landed there by the Turks; and by that, and other want of preparation against the right place, the Allies could be collected at and near the place of disembarkation more rapidly than the enemy, and the march towards Simferopol commenced at about five days after the first landing.

If the enemy should bring forward the garrison of Sebastopol, or any important part of it to augment his forces in the field, he must cover a retreat to the north for his main body, and one to the south for that of the garrison; and then if either flank were completely turned, and the battle gained, either the passage of the garrison into the place might be compromised, or the entire force driven into it.

We are not to contemplate defeat, but if unhappily thrown on the defensive, the retreat would be on Eupatoria; the battle, however, and general superiority in the field being sufficiently gained to attack Sebastopol, the return would be probably to most advantage to Balaklava, obtaining possession of the bays on each side of Cape Chersonese for a new communication with the fleet, while the Turkish force might be directed against detached posts on many points; perhaps Anapa, a very essential station to gain, would be then much weakened, or Kertch, &c.

The Turkish forces on the Georgian frontier would be required to act with vigour; and detachments from the allied fleets would make many useful diversions.

J. F. Burgoyne.

" Varna, 27th August. 1854.

"The sickness here and about from cholera, low fevers, &c., has been alarming. The sanitary condition of the day is the leading topic of conversation, and every pains is taken, by removals of the troops, to check disorder. It is at present quite subsiding, and as the worst month, August, is closing, we may hope that it will not recur. Army at Varna.

"Colonel Maule, our old friend Trevelyan, and other men of note have been carried off very rapidly, while many others have been removed to change of air. The Duke of Cambridge, General Cator, who goes home, my young friend Wellesley, of whom Lord and Lady Cowley gave me such good accounts, Wrottesley, Lord de Ros, &c. &c. They all stop at Therapia, where is a fine air, and it is there determined whether they ought to remove further. I find many here looking quite robust and healthy—Sir George Brown, Lord William Paulet, &c.—while very many, who still hold out, look enfeebled. This last effect, however, may be occasioned in some degree by the heat, which is very great.

"It is 80° to-day in what *appears* to be a cool room. People in general, however, are in good spirits about the health of the army, although all declare that the men have very little bodily powers. My own health is as yet excellent, though I am lazy from the heat. Lord Raglan received me very civilly, and, for him, confidentially, and took me to the Grand Council yesterday of leading generals and admirals. I also dined with him, and Tylden also; but I must be necessarily in a non-descript idle position, unless some great engineering operation brings me into active work and consultation.

"There is a great struggle just now between an earnest and anxious desire to do something, and the difficulties that present themselves in the way.

"Personally, I ought to hope that *something* will be attempted. If successful, it will be grand; if not, it will be awful; but still we shall have done our best, and the responsibility will not be with me. If we attempt nothing, we shall assuredly cut a poor figure, because there will always be some hardy men, and all the Press, who will say, 'Nothing

1854. — Army at Varna.

could have been more easy.' It will require a great deal of moral courage to consent to be put into such a position.

"I cannot be announced as on the Staff, till my appointment to it comes out from England, which I hope will be by the next mail, when Wrottesley and Stopford will be my A.D.C.'s. I saw Burke's brother yesterday: he seems very low."

"28th August.

"This morning was overcast and quite cool, and I took a ride with General Tylden to the other side of the Bay, to see the Artillery embark, and other sights. I left my name also with Marshal St. Arnaud, and visited General Bizot, of the French Engineers. I think I sent you a rough copy of a memorandum which I gave to Lord Raglan, recommending Eupatoria as a place for landing. I find that *now* that point is the favourite with everybody, so that I have reason to believe that I may have clinched the nail that others may have been before driving. It appears that I have quite hit Admiral Dundas's ideas. As you like complimentary notes, I enclose one from Colonel Brereton (Artillery), who is out as an amateur, on a visit to that Admiral."

"*Britannia*, Sunday.

"My dear Burgoyne,

"I rejoice from my heart that you are come. I only wish I could have seen you yesterday when I was at Varna with Admiral Dundas, but I had to take shelter with the Consul whilst the conference with the Marshal was going on, so I missed you. However, I shall see you, I trust. I ask no questions, but have seen enough to know that it is happy you have come.

"Adieu, faithfully yours,

"W. Brereton."

1854.

*From* Colonel LLOYD.[1]

"Buyukderé, 25th August, 1854.

"MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

"I hear you have arrived in Therapia. Thank God! it is our best chance. I congratulate all concerned.

"Very sincerely yours,

"J. A. H. LLOYD."

*From* Admiral DUNDAS *to* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE.

"H. M. S. *Britannia*, 28th August, 1854.

"Captain Drummond, of the *Retribution*, has just arrived from Odessa—reports that 140,000 men are in the Crimea; 40,000 marched from Odessa to the Crimea lately.[2]

"I hope you got my letter yesterday."

"Varna, 29th August, 1854.

*Memorandum.*[3]

"An attack on Sebastopol at the present time must be considered a most desperate undertaking.

Memorandum on attack on Sebastopol. August, 1854.

"To effect a landing in the face of an enemy of any but a small force (say not exceeding 2000 men, without Artillery), would be attended with a tremendous loss, very far exceeding

[1] Colonel Lloyd was sent out to act as Special Commissioner to the Circassians. He died of cholera a few days after this note was written.—ED.

[2] This letter appears to have disquieted Sir John very much, and made him take the unfavourable view of the expedition which appears in his letters and memorandum of the 29th August. On the following day, having had reason in the interim to doubt the correctness of this information, his letters take a much more cheerful view of the situation. He considered at this time that the success or failure of the expedition would entirely depend upon the force possessed by the Russians in the Crimea. —ED.

[3] It is not known what use Sir John made of this memorandum. It was probably written with a view to its employment at the first council of war.—ED.

1854. any the enemy would sustain, and possibly (particularly with a combined force), might be attended by failure.

Memorandum on attack on Sebastopol.

"At any place within at least fifteen miles, and probably much more, such a force might be assembled from Sebastopol as would even exceed, numerically, the number that could be put into the boats for the first landing. From the time of the boats casting off from the ships, till they reached the shore in any order, could not be less than half an hour, during which they would be on the water perfectly helpless, and presenting large targets that could scarcely be missed by the field pieces, and even by the riflemen on shore. The loss would be enormous, and the remnant, immediately on landing, would be attacked by the troops previously drawn up, or perhaps lying down under the nearest cover.

"To suppose that the fire from the shipping could prevent these results is quite fallacious.

"To afford a chance of landing with little loss, and to collect the necessary force and means for advancing, the situation selected for it should not be less than fifty miles from the place, and at some point not provided with defences or troops of any consequence.

"To land at a much greater distance might be advantageous in some respects, but would require great means of transport, and afford considerable time for the enemy to make his defensive arrangements.

"To land on the south coast, at from forty to sixty miles distance, would involve the army in an advance along or through a range of mountains, where an impenetrable pass might be met at any step. Nor does it seem to possess any particular advantages for anchorage, landing, or for securing a defensive position to cover it subsequently.

"The most practicable and advantageous place, then, would probably be on the north at Eupatoria. There is there a fine, but, it appears, somewhat shallow, bay, ordinarily frequented by shipping. Some jetties to facilitate landing large stores, and a tolerably-sized town, no defences or garrison at present, and the country behind it, which is not easy to reach by the enemy, fertile. Many resources would, therefore, no doubt be obtainable there.

1854. — Memorandum on attack on Sebastopol.

"From Eupatoria to the south and along the line to Sebastopol, is a narrow neck of low flat ground (probably sand), seven or eight miles long, between a large salt lake and the sea, on which a defensive post could be taken, during the continued disembarkation. When the forces and means were sufficient, the army would debouch in advance, and act against that of the enemy according to circumstances.

"At twenty-four or twenty-five miles from Eupatoria, on the road to Sebastopol, the first river to be crossed would be met with, and from thence there would appear to be several defensive lines of ground that might be taken up, that might be highly favourable to the Russians, and hardly to be forced unless the Allies were in much superior numbers. By that line of coast, however, new communications could be opened with the shipping, at advanced points, in the order in which they should be gained possession of or passed.

"Or the advance might be made from Eupatoria to Simferopol, also about fifty miles distant, and a most important strategical point, since it is that on which all the great routes of the country concentrate. But, again, between that place and Sebastopol the country is manifestly of great strength in defensive positions, and only to be forced by armies of very superior strength to that of the enemy, and this line of advance would entail the necessity for a great amount of land transport to follow the army with provisions, &c., and which it would take long to collect.

"It does not, however, appear at all clear that the Allies have in any degree this required superiority of strength. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe, from reports, that it is otherwise, the lowest estimate giving the enemy about an equality, and many others attributing to them much more.

"Assuming, however, that the Allies should succeed in establishing themselves in front of Sebastopol, we have no sufficient information as to the capabilities for defence which it now possesses.

"Before the breaking out of the war, six months ago, it is believed that its defences on the land side were but small, and almost limited to a large fort, called on the maps Fort Constantine, that occupies the centre of a large plateau on the

1854. north side of the harbour, which plateau may be about one and a half or two miles in extent, from the sea to the harbour, and consequently (with the advantage of this fort, a permanent revetted work) may have been made very strong for the large garrison which is destined for the place.

Memorandum on attack on Sebastopol.

"On the south side it is understood that they have made entrenchments, but it is not known how situated. There are great indications on the map of the existence of a fine position between the valley that runs into the head of the harbour on one flank, and near the Monastery of San Giorgio on the other. It appears capable of being given great strength, although rather extended, not less, probably, than seven miles. Can that, however, be taken possession of by the Allies, and that it be found advantageous to approach Sebastopol on that side, a prodigious advantage will be gained, by obtaining the use of the little harbour of Balaklava, and perhaps one of the bays round Cape Chersonese, for landing siege trains and stores to far more advantage than on the open beach on the north. From that side it is also not improbable that sites may be obtained for batteries, from whence, at long ranges, the enemy's ships, in their man-of-war harbour and the docks, may be most seriously injured. On every account, therefore, it would seem to be advisable to push across to that side, if possible, instead of stopping on the north to besiege Fort Constantine.

"There are two casual circumstances that may prove great impediments to the success of this enterprise. One is the advance of the season. The equinoctial gales may find us in the middle of our proceedings, and may interrupt, for very uncertain periods, the communication between the armies and the fleet. And the other is, that, magnificent as the troops were on coming out, they are now enfeebled and much shaken in body, as well as, it may be feared, in *morale*, by climate, disorder, and the want of excitement created by engaging with the enemy. The diminution of bodily power, and consequent ill-effects of a moderate degree of fatigue, will be a positive evil, and tend to renewed sickness; while the loss of spirits that there is every reason to fear exists, will prevent the exertions necessary to reduce the effect of the other. The disadvantages under which they will labour, if the above remarks be true,

will be soon perceived by them, and create a loss of *morale* that will greatly affect every proceeding. It is not for a moment doubted that in actual contention with the enemy, the British and French spirit and capabilities will glow with as much ardour and animation as ever, but in marching, cheerful submission to circumstances, and the thousand other essential matters on which the success of a campaign greatly depends, such a want of confidence as may probably arise, will be most injurious to the operations. This is virtually a state of demoralisation, even though every fighting property remains, not uncommon under such circumstances, and which will always prevent the accomplishment of any arduous undertaking. 1854.

"J. F. BURGOYNE."

"Varna, 29th August, 1854.

"Everything is in a state of great activity and bustle here, embarking the army. The stores, and Artillery with their horses, are on board, and Infantry and Cavalry commence this morning. It may be presumed that all will be afloat by Saturday. The Engineers are unlucky. One of the ships appropriated to them, and it is that in which the very few officers' horses taken were to go, was run into and had her foremast carried away, and it does not seem decided whether it can be replaced here, and if not, another ship is hardly to be had. Embarkation of the army.

"The great slowness of the operation of embarking, even when at work at *six* piers here in the bay, shews what a formidable operation it is, and how even disembarkations, except for the men alone, must be long.

"The Generals-in-Chief take, I fancy (as they ought to do), the entire responsibility of the main design; and if they have consulted even Brown and Canrobert, it is, I presume, only on some details. It is not to be expected that *I*, coming out so late, and under the repute rather of a professional Engineer than otherwise, should have any opportunity of expressing any opinion upon the great project; nor have I, and I am glad that I have not, for I must confess that I do not understand on what sound principle it is undertaken. This is not the time

1854 — Embarkation of the army.

for discouraging anybody, and consequently I do not hold to a soul, opinions that I may give you at a distance, confidentially. It appears to me to be the most desperate enterprise ever attempted.

"The disembarking from long sea a large force in an enemy's country, must require considerable time, or you must commence your campaign most imperfectly provided. The latter is what appears to be in view at present. The communications subsequently with the shipping will be distant or very bad, and liable to be interrupted by weather in September at any moment. We shall be without a base of operations or retreat. We are to invade, with a very moderate force, one of the strongholds of a great military empire, having, at the lowest calculation, on the spot a force numerically equal to our own, and if of inferior quality, certainly not to be despised, in possession of all the resources of a country manifestly full of capabilities for defence, and with a base of operation on what it now appears, by recent works and occupied position, is become a great fortress, with good defences for a large force, stores, barracks, hospitals, and every requisite military resource. The two armies, French and English, that have hitherto made such a fine display, are, from all accounts, greatly shaken in body and *morale*, retaining, however, I have no doubt, all their fighting spirit. They will, however, not be long in discovering the disadvantages under which *I* conceive they will be placed, and then, although the pluck in actual contention with the enemy will still hold, they will lose all confidence in ultimate success, which will greatly influence their really effective action and perseverance in marching, and the thousand other matters in which, besides fighting, energy is required.

"On the whole, I shall really not be sorry, under my views, if circumstances of weather (which seems to be breaking), or other accidental circumstance, should cause the proceeding to be deferred for this season."

"Varna, 30th August.

"The accompanying note will explain to you the dissipated life I am leading, with dinner invitations every day. We must not boast; but I called on Lord Raglan just now, and

after inquiring how my health had been, he said, '*Well, you certainly are one of the hardiest of fellows.*' The 'roughing it' as yet is not very severe; it seems that there is a very tolerable market, and lots of store articles. Hams, cheese, &c. &c., with fresh milk, bread, eggs, and tolerable mutton and poultry, does not leave room to complain of our fare. 1854. —

"*August* 31*st.*—I had an excellent dinner and bed on board the *Britannia*, where I met my old friend Colonel Brereton (Royal Artillery), and returned here this morning. The Duke of Cambridge has just returned from Therapia, and came and called upon me: the embarkation of the army is pushed on as actively as possible, and will, it is presumed, be completed in a few days. I don't find people very confident of the success of our enterprise at this period of the year; but we do not proclaim our thoughts very loud, except, I understand, the Prince Napoleon, who is said to be furious against it.

"*September* 1*st.*—I dined yesterday with the French Marshal, Duke of Cambridge, General Rose, Colonels Foley, Lloyd, Alexander, and numerous French officers. Compliments paid to me without end by the Marshal and French Admiral, &c. '*It was impossible to believe in my age.*' From old acquaintances,—'*I was looking so well, and so young,*' &c.; and then '*my well-known renommée,*' &c. &c. The Marshal explained to me, in presence of the Duke, his views, acknowledged there were *des difficultés!—des difficultés!!—des difficultés!!!*—and when he came to any one, got rid of it by a passionate bravado that the gallant French and British troops would *écraser* every enemy before them—somewhat after the style of Brown and Jones after dinner in 'Punch:' but '*we were gone too far: the enterprise was pressed upon us in a manner not to be resisted with honour; and such an army could not be inactive for ever,*' &c. &c. I am not inclined to despond, still less to despair; the season is advanced, but at ordinary times September and October are very fine, and if it so prove now, that *difficulté* will be removed. If the Russians are in as small force as some who are considered good authorities have declared, away goes another *difficulté*. If the Russians should be over-confident, and rash enough to give us fair terms on which to meet them, instead of taking advantage of their strong positions, another

Marshal St. Arnaud's opinion of the enterprise.

1854. *difficulté* will not be found. In short, the die seems to be cast, and we must do our utmost to forward the good cause.

Embarkation of the army.

"Our intention is to embark to-day. Both Admiral Dundas and Captain Mitchell offered to take me in their magnificent ships, but I might then be out of the way when wanted, so I prefer joining General Tylden in a transport, where will be our horses, a variety of engineer stores, &c.

"I hear privately that Prince Louis Napoleon is loud against our present undertaking—says that it is a *bêtise*, and that a failure may have an effect on the *dynasty* in France, while it only involves that of a *ministry* with us."

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.[1]

"Varna, 1st September.

"I embark to-day, with all the Engineer head-quarters, in the *Lady M'Naghten* transport, which carries a limited number of our horses and engineer stores—and the whole army ought to be embarked to-morrow—and then for the Crimea! The service is a most arduous one; and success must depend chiefly, I think, on the force the Russians may have in the Crimea.

"The season *may* be unfavourable, as we are approaching the equinox, but in ordinary years they say that September and October are fine months.

"We have no information to be relied on as to the strength or condition of the enemy, or what preparations he may have made by works or otherwise; the power and time they have had, since they must have had a strong persuasion of our intent, may be assumed to be unfavourable, but 50,000 British and French and 7000 Turks, if we once get good footing on shore, are not easily beaten, particularly if the Russians throw away the advantages of the strong ground they possess, to take up defensive positions.

[1] Colonel Matson was Assistant Adjutant-General of Royal Engineers at this time, and conducted the military correspondence of the office of Inspector-General of Fortifications.—ED.

"I do not expect that we shall sail before about the 5th; we shall no doubt be four or five days in crossing; and between the 10th and 15th, we may be deciding upon and trying a landing; and will, before the end of the month, have some idea of the definite results. 1854. — Embarkation of the army.

"Yours, &c.,

"J. F. BURGOYNE."

"*Lady M'Naghten* Transport, Varna Bay,
"2nd Sept. 1854.

"I embarked yesterday with General Tylden and all the Department, except what remains at Varna under Hassard.

"There has been a great difficulty to get horses embarked. At first only one was allowed for a captain of Engineers with a Division, none for a subaltern; but I got Lord Raglan to concur that an officer of Engineers not mounted would be of no use, and therefore in *principle* it was admitted, but in *practice*, with a dearth of horseroom, I do not know how they have managed.

"Captain Burke (88th) came to me yesterday in great distress; he was told off for remaining at Varna with the depôt of his regiment, and was most anxious to go. I wrote to Lord Raglan, telling him that when my appointment should come out, I meant to ask his authority to take Captain Burke as extra aide-de-camp, and that under the present circumstances I wished he would let me take him.

"He answered very civilly that he concurred with me, that so near a relative of so fine a fellow as our Burke had great claims, and that he would agree to my proposal, if, on inquiry, there was no regimental objection.

"Captain Burke trotted off with that letter, and seemed to anticipate little difficulty, and, I believe, is now embarked in one of our Engineer ships.

"I don't know whether I have already mentioned to you that Marshal St. Arnaud told me his views, acknowledged that there were *des difficultés! — des difficultés!! — des difficultés!!!*—but *que voulez-vous!*—we cannot be inactive; the world presses us on to Sebastopol, and the energy of such a force of French and British troops can do great things: that as regards the landing

1854. he and Lord Raglan would proceed and reconnoitre; and he had no desire to commit any violent *bêtise;* and then he finished with the pith of the whole, '*Put yourself in mine and Lord Raglan's position.*'

"Lord Stratford might perhaps be interested with that conversation. The Duke of Cambridge was present.

"If the Russians are as weak in force as some suppose, or if they commit some folly in giving up their advantages and meet us on fair ground, we may do well.

"In answer to a remark made by Colonel Brereton, R.A., that it would hardly be prudent to have only a fleet as a base of operations, Colonel Trochu replied that if William the Conqueror had been impressed with such feelings, he never would have conquered England, but, on the contrary, he burned his fleet.

"Without adverting to the *delicacy* of the allusion, the circumstances were quite different. He undertook a hardy enterprise, but under many favourable circumstances; and the argument is against a principle, and is not to be justified by any one or two instances of success,—it would sanction the most rash and wild undertakings.

"An expedition by troops from shipping is far more difficult proportionately with a large than with a small force.

"To judge of the practicability of a military expedition, it is not enough to be satisfied of the great value of the object, or of the magnificent force which is prepared for the undertaking; the relative power of the enemy must also be brought into the calculation: thus it is not sufficient to point out how desirable it would be to take Sebastopol, and how magnificent a combined force the Allies have in the Black Sea, but the force of the enemy, and natural advantages in other respects, are most essential matters, and are quite overlooked or passed over on surmises contrary to probability, or the general wise observation, that everything is possible to enterprising spirits, and that there can be no military achievement without risk,—maxims very reasonable against moderate odds in numbers and circumstances, but when advanced without any calculation of difficulties, would justify the most wild and ill-judged proceedings."

## *Notes on Landing in the Crimea.*[1]

1854.

8th September.

As soon as the allied fleets appear on the western coast of the Crimea the enemy will have every reason to believe that the attempted landing will be as near Sebastopol as possible, because they must be aware at this season time is precious, and that from afloat we cannot have means of transport for marching considerable distances through the country.

Between Eupatoria and Sebastopol will no doubt suggest itself to them as the space more particularly to be watched on that account, and because it comprises an extent that can reasonably be guarded, and without risk of compromising the retreat of any part of the force, should a landing be effected on any part of the line.

Suppose their force to be at the minimum that has ever been stated, say, 45,000 troops, besides their fleet, the best distribution which it is contemplated they could adopt would appear to be to allot 5000 for the garrison of Sebastopol, to be increased by from 10,000 to 15,000 from the fleet (the Russian sailors being perfect soldiers also), in case the Allies absolutely were before the place, leaving their main body of 40,000 in the field.

Of this force the first stations to be as follows :—

5000 with 16 field-pieces (the assumed proportion of guns) at Eupatoria, the bay of which to have in addition a few heavy guns in battery.

10,000 encamped within five miles of the shore between Eupatoria and the river Bulganak, a distance of about twenty miles.

10,000 on the river Alma, within about three miles of the shore.

5000 on the Katcha.

10,000 in reserve between the above stations and Simferopol.

With such a position, and a knowledge of the most favourable and unfavourable parts for the approach of the boats, there cannot be a doubt but that the enemy, considering the time it would take to bring the ships to anchor and make all the pre-

[1] It is not known what use Sir John made of these notes; but they are interesting as shewing that the Russians might have opposed the landing if well advised.—Ed.

1854. — Notes on landing in the Crimea.

parations for the landing, could meet us at any place on the beach, and during the actual operation, with at least 5000 men and 16 guns.

In presence of such a force it is submitted that a landing could not be effected:—because the troops are crowded on rafts or in very large boats, which are towed on shore by small boats at a rate at the utmost of one mile per hour, probably not exceeding half a mile per hour when keeping order so as to land simultaneously,—therefore they would be exposed for half an hour at least, perfectly helpless, and presenting targets not to be missed within 800 yards to the field artillery and riflemen on the beach; it is not to be conceived how a single boat or raft with troops could escape.

One plea urged against this effect is, that by selecting a point where the armed steamers can approach the beach, which in many parts is very flat, their fire could sweep it and keep it clear of the enemy; such a resource is, however, quite fallacious; it is doubted whether a beach exists anywhere that does not, within 100 or at most 200 yards present, by undulations, much natural cover,—where troops, lying down at least, would not have shelter from the fire of shipping; but a few shovels, in an hour or two, would afford ample cover for men and guns, the guns being entirely masked from the direct fire, while they keep a full opening in a flanking direction, so as to see the entire beach and several hundred yards in front, under their fire, while they themselves cannot be seen to their front.

Should they not have taken these steps, and any part of this coast be left unprovided for, we may attempt the disembarkation, but there will be always the doubt that during the preparations they may have time to bring the necessary force down to oppose it, as our information as to their strength and position seems to be *nil*.

If the arrangements made by them are the same as above described, there would seem to be no resource left but to try for the west or even north of Eupatoria, where, perhaps, they might not be inclined to follow, but that would necessarily lengthen the operation and bring on a long series of marches that, with the few means of transport that could be conveyed by shipping, would be full of difficulty, and could only be over-

come by keeping a constant communication by a parallel movement with the shipping, and favourable winds and weather. 1854.

Notes on landing in the Crimea.

The landing once effected, and the allied army established in the country, the enemy would concentrate and take up positions of defence, it is presumed,—either across the direct approach to Sebastopol, or, leaving that place temporarily to its garrison, fall back upon the line of Simferopol—if there were other forces by which it might be joined—for an attempt to relieve the place, but more probably the former, as by so doing it would continue to act on the defensive,—that is, to receive the attacks which *must* be made upon it, a great advantage in this manifestly strong country; while, by concentrating on Simferopol, they might give us the opportunity of taking up some strong position against their advance on Sebastopol.

It is evident that there can be little chance of success in the undertaking, unless the allied army is in *very* superior force to that of the Russians that will be in occupation of the Crimea.

There are two other adverse circumstances:—1. That the enemy must have had their attention turned to the probability of this expedition for six weeks or two months, with little cause for apprehension elsewhere: and the other, That we have suffered enormously in strength, and it may be feared in spirit, by sickness.

"*Caradoc*, Black Sea, 11th Sept. 1854.

"Our crisis is approaching—the fleet is all under weigh—the weather fine and calm, and we may be landing in the Crimea to-morrow, but more probably next day, as we have yet to join the French fleet, and no doubt communicate with them. The French marshal is very ill, probably in mind as well as body, as it is rumoured that much censure is cast upon him at Paris for the Dobrudsha affair, and it is expected that he will leave, and Canrobert succeed, although there are two senior generals with this army. I think I have already told you that Admiral Dundas at Baldjik took me on board the *Britannia*. On the 8th we joined the French fleet, and after long conferences, the Admiral came on board at 8 P.M., and told me that Lord Raglan wished me to go on board the *Caradoc*, to join in a reconnaissance of the coast of the Crimea, which I did

1854. immediately; and the next morning, very early, the *Agamemnon*, with Sir E. Lyons and Sir George Brown, the *Primoguet* (French steamer), with General Canrobert, Admiral Bruat, and various French officers of rank, the *Sampson* and *Caradoc*, went off. We were off Sebastopol at daylight of the 10th, and ran close along shore, the *Caradoc* with all the admirals and generals, French and English, from Cape Chersonese to Eupatoria, during and after which we had various discussions as to mode of proceeding; the French evidently thinking very badly of the whole concern, but not saying so in direct terms, and proposing one wild or temporising scheme after another, which we had to refute. You will be surprised to hear of the compliments paid me by Brown when the discussions got confused, and without result. He said, '*Here is Sir J. Burgoyne, an officer of experience and knowledge; I am quite prepared to pay great attention to his opinion.*' Upon which I was obliged to explain, in bad French, my objections to General Canrobert's propositions, and to give some ideas of my own, which were in conformity with those of Lord Raglan and Brown, and will, I believe, be generally adopted. We found troops encamped about Sebastopol, on the Katcha and on the Alma, and none further north, in which country, however (that is, north of Alma), there is supposed to be a great scarcity of water. About ten miles north of the Alma, however, is a favourable beach for landing, and where we think that the main body may be disembarked—a great demonstration being made at the mouth of the Alma, and a small distinct body, at the same time, take possession of Eupatoria. Canrobert objected to this, because, he said, we should have three great battles to fight against the positions of the Alma, the Katcha, and the Belbek, while the great superiority of Russian cavalry would act very powerfully on our flanks and rear—the country being the most perfect plain you ever saw. There is some truth in this, except with regard to the three battles; for if we beat them well in the first, they will hardly fight two others so immediately. But it is a choice of difficulties in a most arduous enterprise. In the meantime, his own project appeared to me to be monstrous. It was to land at the Katcha, to throw out two divisions, the one on the right, and the other on the left of the valley (which was to be

Council of war previous to landing.

swept by the ships), under inaccessible cliffs of from 50 to 100 feet high, from whence they were to debouch into the valley in two columns of small front; they would be cut to pieces throughout every part of the process. 1854. — Council of war previous to landing.

"Conceive the effect of the enemy's artillery and infantry fire, in the annexed sketch, on the closest possible columns! Another plan was to land at Yalta, in the midst of the mountains of the south coast—and another at Theodosia or Kaffa, near the Sea of Azoff; at this time of the year, and with 120 miles of prodigiously strong country to penetrate! The *Caradoc* is crowded to the greatest degree, but Derriman has given me his berth in his dressing-cabin."

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"H.M.S. *Caradoc*, Black Sea, 11th Sept. 1854.

"The fleet is all under weigh for the Crimea, which I expect we shall reach the day after to-morrow. The Admiral (Dundas) took me on board the *Britannia*, from whence I joined this ship on the night of the 8th, by desire of Lord Raglan, to accompany him, with Sir Edmund Lyons, Sir George Brown, and some French Generals, on a reconnaissance along the coast of the Crimea, which we made yesterday, during very fine weather.

"After much discussion, I think the proposition affording the best chance of success is likely to be adopted; but it is a desperate enterprise, forced, I believe, on Lord Raglan and the French general by taunts from home.

"Marshal St. Arnaud is very ill, and likely to have to abandon the command just at this moment. Success or failure depends entirely on the force the enemy may have in the country, of which we have no information whatever; but, in that great military empire, it is hardly to be supposed that, their attention being turned very distinctly to the attack about to be made on a great territory of vital importance to them, they should not have thrown in forces greatly superior to what we have in our reduced condition; their circumstances for defence are, in addition, most favourable."

1854. "*Caradoc*, Black Sea, 12th Sept. 1854.

"The Russians may choose between two very strong positions, the one of the Katcha, the other of the Belbek. At each the valley is wide and quite flat; a line of willows marks the course of each river, which (as has been seen from the ships) contain water, and having very little fall, would, no doubt, present a considerable impediment within 600 or 800 yards of the heights. The heights along the left bank of each are more bold and commanding than those of the right, and about 60 or 70 feet above the valley, and as they take a waving course, are well circumstanced in that respect for defence; the tops of these heights are of pretty uniform height, and of flat plains.

"Such are the features, as far as can be perceived, and such would have to be forced or *attempted*, for we could not make a wide movement in flank, even if the ground is more favourable, without losing our communication with the shore. We cannot stop, and have no retreat—*voilà la jolie situation.*

"Somewhere on the coast, perhaps at the mouth of the Alma, we must, I think, try to take up some position, with such field entrenchments as can be rapidly thrown up, and endeavour to cover any necessary re-embarkation, the shipment of sick, wounded, &c., and the covering of depôts of provisions, ammunition, &c., from excursions of Cossacks and light corps that may be thrown on our rear. What strength of the enemy we may find in the country we have no means of even *guessing.*

"From the commencement of the war public report has hinted at the desirableness of an effort to take Sebastopol, and, for the last six weeks, the intention to try it has been declared, not only in the newspapers, but by authority of ministers in Parliament.

"It is avowedly to be the great *champ de bataille*, and there is no pressure anywhere in the south to prevent the enemy from augmenting their forces in the Crimea, from wherever they could be found nearest. In the meantime, sickness has greatly reduced our strength, and the French in a much greater degree; their losses are calculated by many thousands, and I believe the British will be found now to be numerically the strongest of the two. The whole are bodily enfeebled,

and little able to make much bodily exertion; and though I do not question their spirit in a close contest with an enemy, I doubt their retaining the *morale* to bear up against deprivation and hardship, or much self-confidence when they see the situation in which they will be placed, which will appear to them perhaps even worse than it really will be. 1854. State of the allied armies.

"There are, however, among the young men of the Staff, some who are very confident in the great superiority of our troops, and the despicable character they would imply of the Russians. What so easy, for instance, as to entrench ourselves quickly on the coast in a manner to be impregnable to an enemy who could not take the miserable redoubt of Arab Tabia at Silistria? Despising their enemy is the staple argument of these happy people; and for the numbers that can be brought against us, they consider (I do not know on what grounds) that they will not have had time since they could have heard of the danger to prepare many additional means against it. I hope sincerely that their paradise may prove to be that of a wise man, but I greatly fear otherwise. To-day is cloudy and showery, but somewhat squally; the wind being from the north, we do not feel it much, and the barometer is high.

"Colonel Trochu (a high authority among our Allies), talked to me of keeping down the fire of musketry from the cliffs by the Chasseurs' fire from *the boats rowing ashore.* I told him nothing was so thoroughly recognised by us as the absolute necessity for abstaining from any firing from the boats, as it would at once lead to confusion, and that our men were expressly forbidden to load before they got on shore."

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*To* Colonel SANDHAM, R.E.

"Camp, Crimea, 17th Sept. 1854.

"You will find on some of the maps '*Vieux Fort,*' or '*ruins of old Fort,*' on the shore about fifteen miles south of Eupatoria, and about eight north of the River Boulganak. It is about there that the army has landed, and we have now Landing in the Crimea

1854. nearly everything on shore, and, I hope, will press on as rapidly as possible, to reduce the time of the enemy for preparation.

"In case of a re-embarkation of any part of the army here, a strong position between the two lakes might be taken up that would completely cover the beach under the cliff. The soil is a stiff clay, that stands (as shown by the cliffs) perpendicular, a beautiful soil to work in. Everybody is in spirits at the enemy making no show in front, and thus leaving us in full possession of this district, and think that it augurs great weakness. Weak or strong, they might have given us great trouble and delay by a flying corps with light artillery to oppose the landing, and without any risk to themselves, as they would have had a clear and easy retreat whenever they pleased."

"Camp, Kalamita Bay, Crimea, 17th Sept. 1854.

"I landed with the head-quarters of the Engineers yesterday, and we pitched our tents among the head-quarters of the army; the place is about 15 miles south of Eupatoria, and about 35 miles north of Sebastopol; everything is getting on shore as fast as possible, and I hope we may be able to move forward to-morrow, because the less time we can give to the enemy now for preparation, the better. The weather is very fine and not at all cold, and people generally in spirits. I passed a most comfortable night with Stopford in the same bell tent. That we are not very well off for *luxuries*, you may imagine, when I tell you of two excellent reasons given by Maguire for not giving me some hot water for shaving. —'*I can't give you no hot water, Sir John, because—there is no fire, nor no water!*' The fact is, there is no water within some miles of us, and there scanty. After the first day's march, however, we shall get into a country with small rivers, commencing with the Boulganak, about seven or eight miles off.

"The tents are on shore for the whole army, and they feel quite comfortable in them; but it will be impossible to take them forward, except the few that some superior officers can manage to carry.

"Our horses, with Stopford and Ewart, have been gone now two hours, to be watered, and have not returned yet. 1854.

"We are inclined to hope from appearances that the Russians may be weaker than I should have contemplated as possible; *mais nous verrons!*

"You will have heard from Captain Laffan that the Treasury has paid my fees for G. C. B., so that affair is settled.

"I am much annoyed at my appointment to the Staff here not having come out; and I wrote to Lord Hardinge about it, telling him that at present I have no position in the army, and am merely as an amateur. It would almost appear that the more I do, the less consideration is to be paid to me.

"17th September.

"Our work here must be rapid, we cannot linger upon it. If the enemy is weak, as we are apt to flatter ourselves may be the case, from appearances, we shall make as rapid a march as we can, fighting our way to Sebastopol. My wish is, in that case, not to attack Fort Constantine, but to march round to the south of the harbour, abandon our communication with the sea on the north, and establish a new one with Balaklava and the bays between Cape Chersonese and Sebastopol—on that side they seem to be weakest, and any impression on that side would be most effective; but this is looking at the sunny side of the picture. We find an immense quantity of resources in this country, if we could only husband them by a regular distribution of them; but the fashion is to *forage* for whatever can be got; when there are parties to deal with, *we* usually pay for things; when the articles are found abandoned, we appropriate them.

"The French apply the latter system to both cases. Large numbers of bullock, and even horse carts, have been taken possession of, quantities of cattle, sheep, &c., and the country is covered with corn left out in cocks. Water is our greatest want here, and the horses are taken about three miles to a few scanty wells. I hear that large fires are seen to our front, as if they were devastating the rest of the country before us.

"I have just seen at a little distance Cathcart's division turned out, bands playing, and looking as smart as if in St. James's Park, and then form three sides of a square for divine service."

1854.

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"Kalamita Bay, Crimea, 18th Sept. 1854.

"Here we are landing the army as fast as possible (the great body, cavalry, infantry, and artillery are already on shore) about thirty or thirty-five miles north of Sebastopol; you will have later intelligence of our proceedings than I can now give, but I suppose the army will move forward to-morrow, or next day at latest.

"I cannot at all comprehend the apathy of the Russians in leaving us so completely unopposed; a small flying corps with half-a-dozen field pieces, might have caused us great delay, given us much trouble, perhaps subjected us to losses, and at no risk to themselves, as their retreat would have been always safe; they have not only left us unopposed, but with quantities of carts, cattle, &c. &c., available to us, and of the greatest value.

"The Tartar population are most submissive, and in the innocence of their hearts seem to know nothing of war, and do not keep themselves or animals out of our way. Of course we take all we want, and I only hope it is done regularly, and ample payment made.

"I am told that sheep have been bought at *a shilling* apiece, and a country pony for 2*l.*

"We are just getting a flat alongside to take on shore our Engineer head-quarters, horses, and ourselves.

"Our people are in good spirits at the facility of the landing, but we have a very strong country to force, and where the enemy by a little judgment, with a moderate army in strength comparatively with ours, may give us much trouble."

"Camp on Alma River, Crimea, 21st Sept.

Battle of the Alma.

"You will be in receipt of exciting news in this part of the world before you get this; we have commenced by a very brilliant *coup d'essai*, that I think will prove essentially a settler, although we may be pestered by partial affairs, and as obstinate a defence as the enemy can make. I imagine they showed all they could yesterday, for according to several accounts, Sebastopol was drained of troops, and seamen landed

for its garrison, and yet, according to my estimate, they were very weak, I should say not exceeding 30,000, including all their cavalry—others estimate more, and the prisoners say they had 40,000, with 100 pieces of artillery, which I also think exaggerated. Our force was, I imagine, about 50,000, but the columns as they swept over the plains looked very powerful, and we are told that the Russians estimated us at 100,000. The enemy certainly fought gallantly against superior numbers and our superior position in the attack; but I must say that our attack was of a very superior order, in tactics, in steadiness, regularity, precision, and spirit; the contest was at times becoming very close and resolute, but nearly in all, certainly in all of importance, the enemy were forced to turn, everything was under view, and the sight was magnificent. I am told that the few Frenchmen who witnessed our attack were in raptures. We halt to-day, and perhaps to-morrow, to collect reports, renew ammunition, and clear encumbrances; but I am impatient not to give the enemy breathing-time. 1854. — Battle of the Alma.

"Stopford is a very fine fellow, but too anxious to take care of *me*, always on the look-out to prevent my remaining at any point that happened to be a peculiar focus of fire. My grey horse (lent me by General Tylden on account of extreme quietness, almost unpleasantly sleepy and lazy), all on a sudden, just as we passed a place on which was a very smart fire, commenced prancing and pulling, and became so fidgety, that after a time, I changed with Stopford. It was after dark when we got to camp, having been twelve hours on our horses, and this morning we find a musket shot had grazed the skin off one of his hind legs, and it is somewhat swelled, but I hope will not lame him.

"We are all in high spirits at present appearances, and certainly the result, if it turn out as we expect, will show that we have *highly* over-estimated the Russian military power, otherwise the Emperor would never have left this primary substance of his power, Sebastopol and fleet, so meanly protected, after so long a warning of our prepared formidable attack. If we succeed in this final object, our Government, and that of the French, may fairly dictate their terms as to a very inferior State. But it was a lottery whether they would be strong or weak. It

1854. was a matter of chance, and as I think the chances were greatly against us, the greater ought to be our rejoicing in finding it otherwise.

Battle of the Alma.

"Maguire has throughout our marches accompanied me on horseback, which is useful, as it gives me a spare horse; he carries something to eat and drink, holds my horse when I dismount, &c., and being an old soldier, does not quit one under fire, as a civil servant probably would. Yesterday, in the very awkward place where my horse was hit, as well as three or four of the staff and their horses, Maguire dropped his hat, and was obliged to ride back, dismount, and pick it up.

"My light *arâba* (or country cart) broke down yesterday (axle broken) but was brought on. Draffin, however, my Artillery Batmân, has picked up and brought in a small Russian ammunition cart, which I hope to adopt."

"Camp on Alma, 22nd Sept.

"I have little to add to my letter of yesterday, except the awful blow to poor General Tylden. He and I rode over part of the field yesterday evening to make observations for a description Lord Raglan asked me to make of it.

"He told me then that he was not quite right, and had taken medicine.

"During the night he was seized with violent and decided cholera, and now is in the adjoining tent in a most precarious state, but the fury of the attack has subsided, and he has taken and retained some arrowroot with brandy and ginger, but the case is very bad, and he must be removed to the ships by to-morrow morning.

"Stopford and I have been hitherto quite hearty, as well as Major Tylden, De Vere, and Neville. I hope we shall move on to-morrow. I wish Stopford would not take so much care of me in action, but he says that I *like* to be where the fire is most heavy! now that is certainly far from the case, but I cannot keep my attention exclusively turned to where one would be most clear of it, nor would it be very respectable to do so. Where we can do our duty as well in one place as another, every officer and man should take that which is least exposed, as a duty.

"I have sent to Sandham a rough draft of the description of

the Russian position, which I drew up for Lord Raglan,—it is to be given to you. 1854.

"I am just going to Marshal St. Arnaud by Lord Raglan's request, to give him a proposition I have for our advance on Sebastopol.[1] Battle of the Alma.

"I will be obliged to Colonel Sandham to draw 5*l.* from Messrs. Cox, on accompanying draft, and have it paid by some trusty messenger to Mrs. James Maguire, 14, Ebury Street, Pimlico,—her husband is a pensioner, and out with me as a servant; she may be told that her husband is quite well, has been behaving extremely well, and is of the greatest service to me."[2]

"Camp on Alma, Crimea, 22nd September.

"We had on the 20th a really very brilliant action, and it is impossible to regret more than I do the *contretemps* that

[1] This was the proposition for the flank march to the south.

[2] Maguire, a pensioner from the cavalry, and an Irishman, after serving as Sir John's groom for many months in the Crimea, lost his way in returning from Balaklava during one of the most inclement nights of the winter, and was so severely frost bitten that he died a few days after. Although somewhat addicted to liquor, like most old soldiers, he was an interesting specimen of his class, from his contempt of danger and attachment to his master. A letter written by him to his wife, shortly before his accident, will give a better idea of his character than any verbal description:—

"From the Heights of Sebastapool, 27th December, 1854.

"MY DEAR ELIZA,

"I am happey to hear that you are safe out of your truble, and I should like to have the boy named George Sebastapool Maguire; and you can tell him that no one ever cauld his father a coward. You want me to wright every mail; but haveing to lay on the wet ground with onley Robart's great coat and a blankett, in frost, sleet, and snow and rain, you cannot expect me to write every mail. Should aney thing hapen to me, you may depend that Sir John would let you know. He is one of the bravest and best men in the world. I would rather stand on the Hights of Sebastapool until I was frozen into a pillar of ice than I would ask to leave him; and if I had a chance to return to-morrow, I would not go until the Bear is mussiled. Now, my dear Eliza, you must kiss the babs for me, and accept the same. Give my respects to all enquireing frends. I hope to see them again; but shot and shell is so plentiful that life is very uncertain. Sir John cares no more about them than if they ware shooting peas at him.

"Yours truley,

"JAMES MAGUIRE."

1854. has occasioned you to be absent, but the thing was so decidedly impossible that we cannot reproach ourselves on the occasion. The weak must have failed in the life we have led, as many of the strong, even, have been subdued. Stanton could not keep on his horse one day, and is now very far from well. Captain Burke has fever on him, and Ewart and Nasmyth have been ailing.

Battle of the Alma.

"The Russians fought gallantly, but they could not withstand the steady persevering gallantry of our troops. We took a very strong position by a direct front attack, for the French turning it was not sufficiently prolonged to be of other service than the important one of drawing off a considerable force to oppose them.

"*Their* work, however, was comparatively easy, for they gained the heights without much opposition, and then were on even terms with the enemy; while *our* attack was over a river that, though fordable, could only be crossed in broken order, from natural impediments, above which was a fine range of heights, of from 60 to 150 feet high, about 600 or 800 yards distant, and on each flank commanding pinnacles of 300 or 400 feet high. That on the right (the key to the whole) with a steep sloping rise as smooth as a glacis. Midway up it a trench of some hundreds of yards long, for cover, and both sides powerfully flanked by Artillery. This eminence was boldly assailed and carried, and so close was the contest that it was literally covered with killed and wounded, the most advanced of which, Russians and British, were heaped together. It was really a trial of vigour and fortitude, the result of which has made, apparently, a great impression on our French Allies, as it must have done on the enemy, who at length went off in great confusion. As Marshal St. Arnaud said to me this morning, with regard to the action generally, that the moral effect of the day was worth an addition of 20,000 men. The only casualty in our party was Teesdale, broken arm just above the wrist, and my horse, a piece of skin grazed off the hind leg, which made him, usually the most apathetical and lazy of his class, so frisky and pull so much that I was forced to change horses with Stopford. Mine is General Tylden's grey, which I had adopted in consequence of his great gentleness. He is all right now, but has a little more life instilled into him by the circumstance.

"I am inclined to hope that the enemy can do little more now, though it is presumed that they will try." 1854.

Battle of the Alma.

"24th September.

"Our good General (Tylden), who was riding with me on the afternoon of the 21st, and was taken ill with virulent cholera that night, died at 10 P.M. of 22nd, and was buried, with all the form we could give it, in a vineyard, at 7 A.M. of the 23rd, immediately before we marched! Since then we have been going on very slowly, but from 7 A.M. to 7 P.M. making marches of from five to eight miles, chiefly owing to the divided command, and the difficulty of coming to some decided understanding. *I* have been urging a movement round to the south, and to be quick with it, but am met by a thousand difficulties, which I do my best to meet. In point of fact, the thing *must* be done, and the sooner the better, for there were never greater signs of thorough discouragement than are shown by the enemy. Since the battle of the 20th, we have passed ground where they might, by really small efforts, have given us immense trouble, so that I have great hopes that we may force our way into Sebastopol in a few days, if they, or rather *we* would only act with vigour."

Proposition for flank march.

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*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"Balaklava, 27th September.

"I enclose a memorandum,[1] on an idea which I had long entertained, which I presented to Lord Raglan, who would not give an opinion upon it, but desired me to discuss it with Marshal St. Arnaud. The French officers[2] pointed out many

[1] Recommending the flank march to Balaklava. It has been published by Major Elphinstone, R.E., in the official account of the siege.—ED.

[2] Sir John Burgoyne has informed me that all the French staff officers present, including Colonel Trochu and General Bizot of the Engineers, strenuously opposed the project at this time, and brought forward one trivial objection after another, until Marshal St. Arnaud broke up the conference by saying that he thought General Burgoyne was right; that difficulties which appeared great at a distance often disappeared on a nearer approach; and that it was "un mouvement en avant" (a favourite phrase with him); and for these reasons he would undertake it.—ED.

1854. — Flank march.

difficulties (among others that Balaklava was believed to have forts that would be troublesome to reduce, &c.), but I argued that most of them were surmises only, and the Marshal put an end to the discussion by agreeing with me, that difficulties seen at a distance were generally greatly reduced when you came to grapple with them. We had a most severe march, the distance not great, about twelve miles, but the entire combined army, with baggage, &c. &c., on *one* road, part of which (about six miles) narrow cross-country road, between very close and high brushwood, and not a drop of water the whole way. The French Division and Head Quarters, and other baggage, not in till next day. The move, however, is now considered very advantageous.

"Send the memorandum to Lady Burgoyne when you have done with it.

"We are now landing battery-guns here as hard as we can, at a good quay, which we have repaired, with five feet of water close, and they must necessarily be dragged over a great height. I propose, however, that ammunition, engineer stores, shot and shells, &c., should be landed at the nearest bay of those between Cape Chersonese and the harbour, which will be near the attacks.

"The works of defence are not formidable in themselves, consisting of some high masonry casemated buildings, loop-holed walls, and earthen batteries, but with a great abundance of artillery, and a large garrison, probably not less than 20,000, including their sailors, who are also good soldiers. I am to-day to discuss with General Bizot, French Commanding Engineer, on a system of attack.

"Menschikoff professes an intention to return with reinforcements to relieve the place."

"Balaklava, 27th September.

"You must not expect much of a letter, for I am over head and ears in business, as our Engineering operations are about to commence. The fortifications are poor concerns, but the situation is favourable for the enemy. They have an immense force of artillery mounted, and a large garrison, and it is not easy to get up all our means—it becomes impossible, therefore, to judge of the time we may be engaged in the opera-

tion; however, I hope not long. Colonel Matson or Sandham will send you a memorandum I drew up and discussed with Lord Raglan, and subsequently, by his desire, with Marshal St. Arnaud, who, in spite of difficulties suggested by some of his officers, was quite willing to adopt it, because he had previously thought it the right way, and because it was a proceeding '*en avant*' (a favourite expression with him), and here we are, in accordance with the plan, and *everybody* now thinks it the proper course, although we had one march to make of great hardship. As you like to hear of compliments paid me, I must tell you of one or two. The morning we were making the movement, Colonel Trochu, the great authority among our Allies, said to me, '*Quelle belle manœuvre que nous allons faire.*' Perhaps, however, he did not mean to intimate that I was the author of it. Colonel Steele, Lord Raglan's right-hand man, when we got round, and everybody was expressing their satisfaction, said, '*Well, Sir John, we owe all this to you!*' And talking of this and other matters to Sir Edmund Lyons, he said that he had been the day before saying to Mr. Layard: '*Sir John Burgoyne seemed to be gifted with second sight, for everything he had said and predicted had turned out true.*' I am just going out with the French General of Engineers, Bizot, to reconnoitre." 1854. — Flank march.

"Balaklava, 28th September.

"I am desirous of writing you a long letter, but do not know when I shall have the time. Our march after the battle of the 20th was directed to the north side of the harbour first, and I believe that the French idea was to have attacked the North Fort by regular siege. It would have been a work of time and difficulty, and would have led to no decisive result, so after some discussions, it was settled to pass round to front the place itself, abandoning all connection with the fleet north of it, and re-establish it with Balaklava and the bays near Cape Chersonese on the south. An additional reason in favour of this, was that the mouth and valley of the Belbec was under the fire of a battery dependent on Fort Constantine, and our only communication, consequently, thrown back on the Katcha, five miles of steep mountain road. Our wish was to gain the

1854. — Flank march.

Tchernaya river and then up it, but the road and valley across, near the head of the harbour, were far too strong to be forced, or approached very near. The river deep, running close under extremely high, bold, rocky heights on left bank, with a bridge, causeway, and marsh in front, adjoining the head of the harbour. On the right bank, the land was rugged heights without roads. The whole country between the Belbec, the Tchernaya, and the high-road from Simferopol, was closely covered with copse wood (stout trees, about fifteen to twenty feet high, with spreading branches low down). A cross country (woodman's) road was found, by which we joined the Simferopol road at Mackenzie's Farm. That farm is at a very great height above the valley of the Tchernaya. Although only of twelve miles, the march was most severe. The camp from which we started was about two miles from the Belbec, of steep descent the whole way, and from the Belbec to the Tchernaya not a drop of water to be found, except a small bucket or two from a well at Mackenzie's Farm, and the whole army, French and English, cavalry, and artillery, and baggage, *all on one road*, a great part of which was narrow cross-country road. The falling in with some of the baggage (at the Farm) of a Russian Corps added to the delay. The British reached the Tchernaya at nightfall. The French, who followed, remained the night at the Farm, and were not in till nine or ten next morning, nor the head-quarters or other baggage, and we all bivouacked in our cloaks, with no means of securing our horses. During the night, Malta escaped, but we recovered him next day in the hands of some Artillery, by whom, as a prize, he was better provided for, probably, than he would have been with us. After some unnecessary manœuvring and a few shots, we got possession of Balaklava, and everybody now seems quite satisfied that we did the right thing. We are now considering the measures to take against the place, which they seem inclined to maintain manfully."[1]

[1] Sir John, at this time, urged strongly that Sebastopol should be formally summoned, on the ground that such a measure could do no harm, and sometimes led to the surrender of a place capable of resistance.

"Balaklava, 29th September. 1854.

"I do not know when I sent my last letter, nor recollect what it contained; nor do I know when I may be able to send this, but, having a little leisure, I write a line or two. I was in hopes that the Russians would not have made this effort at resistance at Sebastopol; but they seem determined to give us as much trouble as possible, and accordingly we have to land all our heavy guns and siege equipments, and to drag them eight or ten miles over a mountain. This, and having to work on rocky ground, causes much delay, and I fear it will be a week yet, before we shall have been able to batter their walls and works so as to justify us in storming the place. Still I feel that it is, as now circumstanced, an enterprise in which we *ought* to succeed. Siege of Sebastopol.

"To be sure they talk of the beaten army of the Alma being reassembled, with reinforcements, in our rear, but I greatly doubt their being in sufficient strength and confidence to dare to come upon us yet. We are certainly ourselves greatly reduced by the battle, by hardships, and by sickness since, but the French have at Varna some 8000 men, whom they say they have sent for, but they do not appear in the meanwhile. *We* are just joined by the Heavy Cavalry and 1000 Marines.

"Ere you receive this, we shall have made, I trust, some decisive work of it, and I shall be proud should it be successful, as I am made a leading authority for all the proceedings.

"I never felt in better health, and have sustained but little hardship, but am fatigued and *muscularly* feeble by the lengthened work on horseback. Lord Raglan, conceiving this to be the case, has insisted upon sending me up over the mountain in a very light country carriage, drawn by a pair of ponies. I then mount my horse for the work in front, and return in the carriage! I should not wonder if I got into *Punch*, as a sample of the bodily *activity* of a British General![1] I think you never in your life saw so scrubby a looking gentle-

[1] In consequence of this he was afterwards described in England, as habitually using a carriage and unable to mount a horse; although it must have been a matter of notoriety in the Crimea that he had been twelve hours on horseback on the day of the Alma, and for a still longer period on the day of the flank march.—Ed.

1854. — Siege of Sebastopol.

man as I am:—a red worsted shirt, with white buttons, red uniform waistcoat, a broad scarlet worsted band, wrapped by three or four turns round the waist (a recipe against cholera), very much worn undress uniform coat and trousers, a white shirt collar, washed, I believe, without soap and not ironed, a black silk neckerchief which is rapidly assuming a brown tint, a cocked hat, old and tattered, and without a feather. I look for all the world like a shabby Commissary's clerk of the lowest class!

"You will have received the particulars of my new allowances as I. G. F. It is very liberal, and gives me fully 500*l.* per annum additional income, from the commencement of the war, but I am uneasy at being put into no recognised position with this army. I remain, in fact, as an amateur, only that by courtesy they give me rations and forage. I would be quite satisfied with any arrangement they might be inclined to make about the pay, but I have not been able yet to draw the field allowance. I have written to Lord Hardinge about it, but have not had time yet to obtain an answer.

* * * * * *

"I enclose a parcel of rough papers, that may interest you while it clears my case. You will find among them a very nice letter from Mr. Cunard.

"We are in a good house here, but are going up to the camp to-morrow to be near our work.

"I retain Mr. Cunard's letter, because I *may* want to use it. It not only desires the captains of his ships to be attentive to M—— or me, but says that if I happen to know of *any* distressed officer's widow or wife, *I have his authority to order a passage for her.*"

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"Camp before Sebastopol, 6th October.

"Up to our arrival before Sebastopol, everything has prospered to our cause; but here we are in difficulties that I do not see what prospect we have of getting out of. We found the place surrounded by detached loopholed towers, crenelled walls, and earth bastions, with a good many guns mounted, and a

tolerable garrison, said to be 20,000. We began, and have continued landing and getting up siege-guns and train, a most laborious operation, not yet complete; but during that time, the enemy (we cannot invest the whole place) have introduced large reinforcements, supposed to be 15,000 or 16,000 men, have increased their works diligently and mounted an enormous number of guns, probably from the men-of-war, and manned by their sailors. 1854. Siege of Sebastopol.

"We are yet established at 2000 and 3000 yards from them, and can only creep nearer in very small parties down the ravines, the soil very rocky, in *favourable* places only to be sunk about one foot, and the whole surface between the ravines completely swept by their artillery, and the leading débouchés closely commanded by the broadsides of large men-of-war at the head of the creeks, and which we can find no place to bring guns upon, as they lie under precipices. These are monstrous difficulties before *us*, it may be a little better before the French, who have more even ground to deal with, but the number of guns and strength of garrison must be equally against them. Our forces (British) are immensely reduced by cholera, &c. Our infantry not more now than 16,000 or 17,000, and no reinforcements to look to. I do not indicate any gloom *here*, nor do I wish you to promulgate at home these sentiments."

"Camp before Sebastopol, 7th October.

"I am in the agonies of a removal, from one end of the camp to another; some things are *here*, some *there*; my writing apparatus is *there*, and this that I am using is the best Burke can supply, and as I am hurried to be in time for the post, I make use of it.

"The difficulties we have to face here are far greater than I could have anticipated. It would have been unjustifiable to have stormed Sebastopol when we first arrived before it, and obstacles against our taking it increase every hour. The enemy have placed a very powerful garrison in it, said to be nearly as strong as the force we have before it. They have entrenched it all round, and have innumerable guns mounted on the works, probably ship-guns from their fleet, and abundance of ammunition and seamen to man them. The ground which we neces-

1854. — Siege of Sebastopol.

sarily occupy, and that on which we must advance, is most unfavourably circumstanced for us, and is so rocky that it is only in favourable parts that as much as one foot of earth can be excavated. I do not spread these cheerless opinions around, but our position is one of extreme difficulty, and I do not perceive how we are to extricate ourselves. Do not promulgate these opinions to any but those on whom you can depend, as they would be considered very unseemly in me. I was much elated by the success at the Alma and its immediate results, and am grievously disappointed at this bad prospect after it. This is one of the contingencies which made the whole undertaking a desperate one from the commencement, although I did not anticipate the danger to be in this shape.

"Stopford and I continue in excellent health, and I have been much favoured by the apparent good opinions of most people; but if things turn out badly, we shall be sadly lowered in the eyes of the world, and everything will be minutely criticised."

"Camp before Sebastopol, 8th October.

"On our British side of this attack on Sebastopol, we are beset with very great difficulties, and shall hardly be able with every effort to make much progress; the French, however, seem more confident on theirs, and if a good opening can be made there, we will join them in the assault, and back their progress previously; moreover, we have half the front of the fortress to attack, and under the most disadvantages, while we have not one-half of their force! We have a little mountain to get our guns and siege equipments up, while they are on a plain.[1]

Death of Marshal St. Arnaud.

"Poor Marshal St. Arnaud was much esteemed by us all, for his very friendly address to every Englishman. He spoke English very well—an expression he used a few days after the battle was very pretty, I think. He and his cortége on horseback were just parting with our large head-quarters party;

[1] All these disadvantages arose from Sir Edmund Lyons insisting on retaining Balaklava as the English base of operations, and persuading Lord Raglan not to give it up to the French. This unfortunate advice was the cause of nearly all our subsequent misfortunes.—Ed.

after parting with Lord Raglan, he turned round to the rest and said, '*Adieu, Messieurs! I compliment you on the 20th.*' It does not sound to me like perfectly correct English, *mais il mérite de l'être.* 1854. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"When Lord Raglan entered Balaklava, and its little garrison surrendered themselves after a few shots fired, most of the inhabitants had abandoned their houses. Two or three men, however, came out of one, and the head man offered Lord Raglan, on a large wooden platter, a loaf of bread cut into slices, with a heap of *salt* on one side, the old-fashioned symbol of friendship or submission.

"Nobody can be personally so kind as Lord Raglan is to me; he seems to take an *affectionate* care of me; used to insist on my coming up the hill in a light carriage he had, to save me fatigue; never forgets my brandy-and-water, &c., and has now given me a room in his house, the only building in the whole encampment. At the same time he advises with me, and asks my opinion on almost all proceedings, before deciding upon his own."

"Camp before Sebastopol, 8th October, 1854.

"I wrote a letter to M—— yesterday, which will go by this same mail, containing anything but a cheering account of the state of affairs here, and I have no reason to see it in a better light to-day. We threw up a line of trench last night at about 2000 yards from the fair broadside of a line-of-battle ship, moored for defence across the upper end of Man-of-War Creek. It will be easily converted into a battery, and with a heavy Lancaster and 68-pounder naval gun, there is a chance that she may be smashed, or, what would be better, set on fire; but still that will not take Sebastopol, and would be only a little interlude in the tragedy.

"You may conceive one part of our situation when I tell you that our camp, being about 4000 yards from the works (nearer 8000 from the centre of the sweep), we, French and English, occupy about one-third of the circumference, the distance from extreme right to extreme left being a round of not less than seven miles; nor can we run across the chords, as is usual in cases of emergency, on account of the long deep

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1854. — Siege of Sebastopol.

precipitous ravines that cut through all the ground in front of the British part, being one-half of the whole; thus they can bring the great bulk of the garrison against any one part, and have, perhaps, two hours work at it, before it can be effectively supported. The garrison is now very strong. They have Menschikoff and Gortschakoff and Luders, within, which itself indicates a large force. It is probable we could fight a good battle *now* on our ground, if so attacked; but what will it be when we have trenches and batteries to protect, down at the lower ends of the ridges, separated by ravines, and within from 1200 to 1500 yards of their works? While we have all this in front, there is a small flying army, including a large body of cavalry, close on our rear, occupying the Tchernaya River: they retire on any advance upon them and then press on again. We are forced to take great precautions even to preserve Balaklava, which is full of our ships, including the *Agamemnon*, and being so detached and at the foot of a mountain, I do not feel satisfied about its security, and have urged its being as much cleared as possible, and our communication made with the shipping at some bay near Cape Chersonese, which is within a fine position we have, facing the country."

*From* General Sir GEORGE D'AGUILAR *to* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE.

"Brunswick Square, Brighton,
"10th October, 1854.

"MY DEAR BURGOYNE,

"Thank God, you are safe! This glorious action and last countermarch upon Balaklava rings through all England.

"Everybody is charmed with Lord Raglan's despatch, from its clearness and simplicity.

"You cannot doubt how greatly I have been interested in it, or how much my gratification has been increased by the large part you have taken in our success.

"We earnestly look forward to the issue, and trust it will be the forerunner of peace.

"Ever, my dear Burgoyne, &c.,

"GEORGE D'AGUILAR."

1854.

*From* Sir JAMES GRAHAM *to* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE.

Siege of Sebastopol.

" Admiralty, 13th October, 1854.

" MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

" You may imagine, but you cannot exaggerate, the anxiety with which I have watched your movements and splendid successes in the Crimea. I am now rejoiced that you gallantly determined to go out at a short notice, and to take a part under the standard of our friend Lord Raglan. We have not yet heard of the fall of Sebastopol; but I venture with confidence to anticipate that proud result, which has been the grand object of my constant hopes since the first commencement of the war.

" The Balaklava movement was grandly conceived and nobly executed, and deserves to be crowned with the capture of Russia's tower of strength in the East.

" But the entrance into the harbour of Sebastopol, and into the Sea of Azoff at Kertch, must be cleared of the obstructive barriers, and this operation, I conceive, may be performed by divers, and by blasts of gunpowder under water. We send out in the *Prince*, the diving helmets, the galvanic batteries, and the gutta-percha apparatus, for which you made a requisition, and we have ordered Admiral Stewart to forward from Malta a diving-machine which is in the dockyard there, and some of the Maltese divers, who are the most expert almost in the world.

" I hope also to send you in a few days some suggestions of Mr. Rendel on this subject, who, at Portland and Holyhead, has had great experience in submarine works.

" To enable the fleet to winter in Sebastopol, the entrance to the harbour must be opened without delay. To prevent the passage of Russian reinforcements into the Crimea, the Sea of Azoff must be commanded by the ships-of-war of the Allies; their draught of water must be light, but the passage into the sea is not possible until the barrier lately sunk there has been removed. I believe there are some batteries on shore at the Kertch Narrows, which will prevent our diving operations until they have been silenced. When Sebastopol is in your hands, you may be able to detach troops to cover this clearance of

1854. submarine obstructions; but every preparation should be made as soon as possible for this most necessary undertaking. I assume the truth of what we have heard, that Anapa has been abandoned, and that the fortress there has been destroyed.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"The fall of Sebastopol was certain to produce this result. I am sorry that the passage of the garrison of Anapa into the Crimea, was not intercepted by naval means.

"I pointed out long ago the necessity of close attention in that quarter; but some things will miscarry in large operations; your success on the whole is wonderful; and your country is grateful, as you well deserve.

"I am, with sincere regards, my dear Sir John,

"Very truly yours,

"J. R. G. GRAHAM."

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"Camp before Sebastopol, 13th October.

"We are facing monstrous forces and difficulties—that is, not *facing* them all, for we have them all round us.

"The garrison seems to be powerful, and shows great vigour in raising works, mounting guns, and every species of passive resistance, while *we* (the British) are necessarily taking excessive liberties, from weakness of force. We are now endeavouring to keep pace with the French in preparations for the attack, having as much to do with less than half the force, and most inadequate engineer means for so great an attack.

"On the night of the 10th, Chapman opened 1200 yards of trench, and by great exertion sufficient cover was obtained for occupying it in the morning; and Gordon opened about 500 on the succeeding night. The soil is tremendous, and we have not enough gabions to do more than line the spots meant for batteries.

"Batteries for 50 or 60 pieces are now in course of construction in different points of these lines. The enemy fire a good deal, but with very little effect. We have three very small batteries completed and armed for two heavy Lancaster and four heavy 68-pounder guns from the navy, to bear on a great

tower, and some men-of-war; these batteries are at 2000 yards and more distant; the trenches above referred to from 1200 to 1600 yards. The object is to ruin the defences as much as possible, and then I see nothing for it but a desperate assault. 1854. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"The enemy's defences, excepting the Tower, are entirely of earth of very small profile, laid out in salient bastions and redans, connected by curtains and almost covered by guns, supposed from shipping, and manned by seamen.

"Forage is scarce, and so is wood for fuel."

"Camp before Sebastopol, 18th October.

"We made a bad opening of the fire yesterday. We had sixty guns in battery. The French, who had hurried us on by professing to be ready the day before, were to have had more. We opened by signal at 6.30 A.M.; ours energetically, with precision, and good effect; the French in their more deliberate manner (the brass heavy guns cannot be fired quick). At 10.30 A.M. an explosion of a magazine in the midst of the French batteries, which were (necessarily, I suppose) altogether on one knoll, paralysed *all* their fire for the rest of the day, while our guns continued their service strenuously till dark. The French officers passed high encomiums on our artillery for their service. There came a little interlude, in shape of a naval attack, at twelve or one o'clock, on the harbour entrance batteries, which could have very little influence on our more essential operations. I rejoice that no very serious injury happened to the men-of-war. To-day we maintain as little fire as we can help, to husband our resources for to-morrow, when we hope the French will be again ready, and with new batteries. In the meantime, the enemy offer threatening partial advances on our right and rear; but in no case yet, since the day of Alma, have they shown any signs of obstinate opposition to us, except in their innumerable guns in position along the line in our front—those it is impossible to silence by our equally extended parallel line. I am about to propose a more concentrated operation, to be chiefly directed to one part between the French and British positions, as something more defined than hitherto."

1854.

Siege of Sebastopol.

To Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"Camp before Sebastopol, 18th October.

"We continue at our arduous enterprise. It is not a fortress we are attacking, but an *army* deeply entrenched in strong ground, and with an immense provision of heavy artillery.

"Our corps (as I repeatedly assert to Lord Raglan) are doing wonders by their exertions. In a soil where the *rock* shows on *the surface*, and only some inches of soil found in the interstices, they get tolerable cover in one night, and construct batteries, the substantial character of which is proved by the few casualties under heavy cannonading; the sites for platforms, magazines, &c., have to be made good by blasting.

"Platforms, splinter proofs, &c. (those from the shipping being insignificant in amount), are made from the odds and ends of timber and plank collected from houses pulled down; under all these disadvantages the work goes on with rapidity, and embrasures, platforms, &c., require less repair and readjustment during very heavy firing than I ever before knew. Shells have exploded on the magazines without accident, the whole making sound, good work; with half the men, we have, I believe, brought more guns into battery than the French.

"The arrangements and exertions of the Artillery have been, as usual, most admirable, and their active and good firing yesterday drew forth warm terms of admiration from the French officers who witnessed it. The navy engaged in the batteries are equally deserving of praise.

"The affair of yesterday was sadly disjointed. The batteries all opened by signal at 6½ A.M., and ours continued throughout the day with energy and effect. About half-past ten, a magazine in the midst of the French batteries blew up, and their fire was in consequence paralysed for the rest of the day, of *all* their batteries.

"Then the fleets had an uninfluential fight all to themselves, against the outer harbour batteries, at twelve or one o'clock.

"The French are to be re-established, and with new batteries, to-morrow morning, when we shall recommence.

"The Lancaster guns have been quite a failure, the fire from them so inaccurate, that with the broadsides of line-of-battle ships, for targets at between 2000 and 3000 yards, I believe not a single shell took effect; one of the light Lancasters of the siege train burst. 1854. Siege of Sebastopol.

"The modified Madras platform taken out with our artillery failed also, and gave much trouble; they are too refined and nicely bolted, &c., to stand such rough work as this, besides having a very imperfect power of traversing.

"Our magazines have been very successful; while French and Russians have had several exploded, we have not had one, though live shells have burst upon them; and on one occasion a shell burst so near, that a seaman was killed by a splinter inside the magazine.

"I made them adopt very small ones for expense magazines absolutely in the batteries, and larger reserve magazines under the best cover in the rear; the most exposed were thus easier secured, and no explosion could occasion very serious evil, like that of the French on the first day of opening, which did *great* damage, and silenced their batteries for one day."

"Camp before Sebastopol, 18th October.

"I endeavour to write by every mail, however short, for I am full of work, thought, and writing, on the immediate business in hand.

"I cannot pretend to describe it; but it comes very grating to one's feelings, and very hard upon us, to find you '*Gentlemen of England*,' &c. &c., so complacently deciding that Sebastopol is, of course, taken.

"We have, in fact, *an army* immediately opposed to us in the strongest position, and threatening flying corps around us in every direction.

"There will be no flinching on our parts; but our task is a desperate one, and in case of failure, our greatest enemies, I have no doubt, will be in London."

1854.

Siege of Sebastopol.

*From* Viscount HARDINGE *to* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE.

"Horse Guards, 19th October.

"MY DEAR BURGOYNE,

"You have been placed on the Staff of the army in the East as a lieutenant-general, and in case of the absence of the commander of the forces, would be in command of the army.

"You will, of course, name your own staff, &c.

"I congratulate you, the army, and the country, that the step was taken of sending you out.

"You have your difficulties to overcome—the labour of moving the guns, ammunition, and stores, must be very tedious, and time precious, whilst disease may increase, and diminish our means; and it would be serious if to gain the object, great as it is, the force is so greatly crippled as to be unable to resist a Russian force in the field, which is able to move.

"This, of course, we are unable to do *now*, because we have no baggage animals, and people will not understand that this is a primary necessity in the composition of every army.

"Ships being the basis of our operations, on which everything has from the first moment depended, the masterly change of moving the army to the southern side, with the gain of a safe harbour and an easier attack on the ships and the place, has given you immense advantages.

"I don't think the expedition could have succeeded unless this move of converting insecurity into comparative security had been made.

"What do your French allies think of it?

"Ever, my dear Burgoyne,

"Your sincere friend,

"HARDINGE."

*From* Lieutenant-General Sir GEORGE CATHCART.

"Camp, 4th Division, 20th October.

"I turned out at 3 A.M. for the purpose of exploring, but could not see a yard before me; I got forward, however, as

soon as it was light, and had twenty minutes' good observation of the ground in my front before the firing commenced, when I was obliged to give it up. 1854. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"I find the ground much more difficult than I thought.

"The only chance would be by passing by the left extremity of the Frenchman's Hill lines; but there is a ravine which I cannot see between that and the Redoubt.

"Lieutenant-Colonel Horsford went out to explore for me, with some men of the Rifle Brigade who were skirmishing there, but he could not see. These skirmishers say that some men of the 79th got up nearer than they could, arriving from somewhere on their right, and that two or three men from the 2nd Battalion were with them.

"The 79th might tell something about it.

"I hope some Engineer officers are sent out with the skirmishers, to explore and learn the country."

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*From* Captain GORDON, R.E.,[1] *to* Colonel MATSON.

"Camp before Sebastopol,
"October 21st, 1854.

"MY DEAR COLONEL MATSON,

"I cannot enclose you the accompanying melancholy return of the death of Colonel Alexander without sending you a line to accompany it. Alexander was deeply impressed with the view that our army had undertaken an enterprise beyond its strength and beyond its *matériel*. His anxious temperament became excited, and he could not rest. Often he lay down at night in his clothes, and he was in the saddle frequently during the night, and always at early dawn. Still no one suspected that he was otherwise than well. On the evening previous to his death, he complained of a violent headache. He would not remove his clothes and go to bed, but he lay down with his coat buttoned, and with his boots and stock on. At about 10 P.M. he felt a desire to vomit, but could not do so, and then, to all appearance, he fell asleep, complaining of cold; upon which extra clothing was thrown over him. Death of Colonel Alexander.

[1] The late Major-General Sir William Gordon, K.C.B.

1854. — Siege of Sebastopol. At about 4 A.M. his interpreter heard a gurgling in his throat, and roused the doctor, who drew blood from his temple, but could not draw any from his arms.

"He died from over-anxiety; he sacrificed his life for his country as truly as if he had fallen in the field of battle. Sir John Burgoyne having reported to Lord Raglan that the Engineers' operations had been most successfully accomplished, it may, on such authority, be said also that the solid triumph of success was his, though not attended with the *éclat* of victory.[1] I have written to Captain Boyle all these particulars, and I feel that I have lost one of the best friends I ever had, and a commanding officer under whom I delighted to serve. I am put in orders as C.R.E., under the orders of Sir John. It matters not by what name I am called, for there is but one C.R.E., and that is Sir John.

"Our batteries have kept up a fire for four days, and done much damage; but the enemy have larger resources, and can easily replace dismounted guns. The French attack on the left, near to the sea, and they have been rather behind us, having had a heavy explosion in one of their batteries, which destroyed a portion of their works. We have had no casualties in officers at the siege as yet, though the enemy's shot has been flying past us in the batteries in a perfect storm at times. We have been doing pretty well, I trust, as regards our engineer operations, which have been confined to one line of trench, with batteries distant 1300 to 1400 yards from the place; with a couple of more distant batteries with heavy Lancaster and 68-pounders. Of course, we have complaints of many wants, especially of waggons and horses of our own; but still we try our best.

"We are supposed to hammer away from our distant position whilst the French approach nearer and enter the town, at the same time storming on our side. A formidable affair lies before us—a formidable affair lay before us at Alma. The Russians gave way then. Perhaps they will give way again;

[1] All the English Engineers considered the place would have been assaulted on the 17th, if the French fire had not been silenced. The fire of the Russian works in front of the English batteries was completely reduced.—ED.

and that is all that can be said in the matter, I think, for all rules and calculations would forbid the prospect of success. A very short time will decide. So much for our position. 1854. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"Now let me thank you for a kind note received from you long ago. I received the map, and thank you much for ordering it. I thank you also for having ordered me to the East, for to me my service here has been a service of great interest, and I have never had a complaint to utter. All the puerile complaints contained in letters to the *Times* are many of them untrue, and all unsoldierlike.

"We have been wonderfully favoured with fine weather during our siege. Two cold days we had as if to warn us to make haste, but warm days have succeeded them. For a long time we were without tents, but now we all have tents to cover us. I wish I could give you any reasonable account of likelihood of success; this I cannot do, but I am ready to try a storm, having good trust in our troops. The navy had some hammering one day at the monster stone treble-tiered batteries, but not with much success. The sailors, however, have guns in our batteries, and fight them famously after a lively fashion of their own. Jack never puts a grave face on anything, no matter how serious. Major Tylden has taken my place as a director of attack, and Sir John has sanctioned Lovell being employed as brigade major.

"All are well here, especially Sir John, who seems to suffer nothing by being under canvas."

From Sir JOHN BURGOYNE.

"21st October, 1854.

"Events have turned out so different from all the bright anticipations of the speedy fall of Sebastopol, that all your conceptions for our proceedings, military and private, are quite unsuited to circumstances. The ground round Sebastopol is prodigiously strong, and well adapted to defence. The defences of the enemy, as we found them, would by no means justify an assault at the moment, knowing that we had a

1854. Siege of Sebastopol.

battering train at hand. They had a line with towers, loop-holed-walls, and, on leading salient points, redoubts well armed with artillery, and ships of war moored under precipices, and so hid from a distance, but with their broadsides bearing up the ravines of approach. We have landed our heavy guns, and mounted them in battery to the amount, French and British, of nearly 120, including mortars; but in proportion as we have made this progress, the enemy have kept pace with us in entrenching, and, above all, in preparing new batteries; so that they have not less than 300 bearing on our works, and in so large a place their position is nearly parallel, and only in a few small parts subject to enfilade. The work they have done, and the activity with which they keep up a constant heavy fire from an immense number of pieces at once, shows a powerful garrison. In the meantime, their forces outside are close upon us. At Inkermann they hold a position constantly, almost within gunshot of our camp. They have all the course of the Tchernaya River—threaten closely from time to time Balaklava, in which Sir Colin Campbell has 1100 Marines, the 93rd, and in front 4000 Turks, entrenched in an advanced position, and our cavalry. Yesterday the enemy showed some 8000 or 10,000 men before it, who seemed to be received by those that were there before with great rejoicings, and which we consequently suppose to be fresh reinforcements."

"26th October, 1854.

Action of Balaklava.

"The enemy made yesterday an advance towards Balaklava, with, it is supposed, about 15,000 or 20,000 infantry, 3000 or 4000 cavalry, and a good provision of field artillery. Soon after daylight, they advanced upon, and immediately carried, a Turkish position about a mile in front of Balaklava. The Turks are greatly abused for their pusillanimity; they certainly made no resistance whatever, but as certainly they could not have defended it successfully. They occupied what were called redoubts, on four or five knolls across a great and otherwise very even hard plain. They had 700 or 800 men in each redoubt, which were about 1000 yards asunder, and 7 or 8 guns (12-pounders) dispersed among them. The position

from mountain to mountain, about three miles, and no supporting army or force at the time of the attack. The works were in rocky soil, in form of a trench with no obstacle, enclosed all round in the same way, except a good wide entrance. On the rocky heights close round Balaklava were 1100 Marines and one Highland regiment. The enemy drove the Turks off at once, and then pressed on towards Balaklava with their cavalry. The Highland regiment came out, and kept them at bay without even forming square, and subsequently the Scotch Greys made a brilliant charge, while two or three divisions of French and British infantry descended from our position, and the Russians withdrew from the knolls nearest to it, and finally took up a line on another range of heights beyond. In front was an extensive low, flat, even plain, on which were drawn up most of their cavalry with artillery; into this plain, with artillery in front and on each flank, by some excess of ardour, and misdirected or mistaken orders, the Light Brigade of Cavalry made a charge on troops in perfect order, and were dreadfully cut up, probably before reaching their object, and when thinned and in confusion, themselves attacked. Nothing could appear to have been more indiscreet. The fact is, there has been throughout the campaign much dissatisfaction expressed (whether right or wrong) on the way in which our cavalry has been managed, even the cavalry officers themselves considering that it has not been forward enough; the natural consequence is that, in their impatience, they seize upon the first opportunity to make an attack, and if it happens to be injudicious, as in this instance, the effects are very disastrous.

1854. Action of Balaklava.

"Captain Nolan, acting as A. D. C. to General Airey, took down some order to the Dragoons, and, full of a desire for the Cavalry to distinguish themselves, directed them, as from headquarters, *it is said*, to charge the enemy in their front; he joined in it himself, and was killed at a very early period.

"Our people behaved with great spirit, and were among the enemy's guns, but lost about two-thirds of their numbers."

1854.

Siege of Sebastopol.

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"2nd November, 1854.

"As regards our relative state, between the Allied forces and the enemy, we do not progress at all: as we advance in front, they entrench in rear of their lines, and become relatively as strong.

"We receive a few occasional reinforcements; that is, the French do, not the British; so do the Russians, and as we believe (for we have no positive knowledge of particulars) in a far greater proportion. It appears to me that the French are over-cautious, and too much bound by system and ordinary method for our pressing circumstances.

"They have their approaches within 300 or 400 yards of the front of attack, the front works of which are greatly ruined, its guns silenced, the parapet a heap of rubbish, no ditch or obstacle to it or the adjoining line, which has itself great openings in it; and yet they hesitate to storm, or rather take possession of it, while the enemy's interior line is distant. It is before *them*, however, that the work is to do; *we* cannot urge them to what they perhaps deem rash; and I am afraid of their coming with some demand upon us to make a desperate attempt to help them partially to do what seems to be comparatively easy. The only way, I believe, for Lord Raglan to act, not to appear to shrink from taking our part, will be to offer to join with British troops in the assault in front of the French attack.[1] The same over-caution has also been shown by the French with regard to Balaklava, a station of the greatest importance, but, unfortunately, two or three miles in front of our position, and chiefly used by the British, which creates a vague idea, that we peculiarly ought to guard it, without reference to the united interests in one concern, and the great portion of work put upon us with less than half the force of the French. The position round Balaklava is very strong, but with an insufficient force to resist a determined attack by the bulk of the enemy's army. We were in hopes of inducing the French to send down

[1] Before he left the Crimea in March, 1855, Sir John Burgoyne recommended the same course to be pursued when the Malakoff was stormed. —ED.

3000 or 4000 men, as a reserve in it; but they do not think it prudent, but fortify themselves up to the teeth along their main line, and in rear of that out-station, and guard their trenches by at least one-third more men than we should do. 1854. Siege of Sebastopol.

"Hitherto everything has been harmony between us, and the utmost politeness and deference between the two generals, each rather *avoiding* propositions which are perceived to be contrary to the taste of the other; but when difficulties become serious, there will necessarily be bounds to this sort of mutual concession; and I shall dread the first appearance of open differences of opinion.

"I have put a paper into Lord Raglan's hands on the subject of wall pieces (*fusils de rempart*), which, are possessing qualities of which I think they ought to be capable, would have been of great service here. It will be sent to Sir Hew Ross. I doubt any that we have being good; there were two taken from the Russians at Balaklava, quite modern, and worth trying, if they have been sent home."

*From* Sir GEORGE CATHCART *to* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE.

"4th Division, Camp,
"2nd November, 1854.

"MY DEAR SIR JOHN BURGOYNE,

"Although I know little about the scientific part of the business, yet, as having been a careful and somewhat interested observer from daylight to sunset, now for nearly five weeks, of the things going on in my front, and as I at last expect to have the honour of giving the *coup de grâce* with my division, I send you a hasty scratch, merely to explain what I mean, when I say, that supposing the enemy offer resistance, which we should be fools not to expect—though it would be very pleasant to find that they do not—our best hopes of success in making our lodgment in the Redan, in my opinion, rest on a sufficient provision being made in your arrangements for the assault for throwing in at least a couple of battalions into the village marked A, with strict orders not to tarry there, but push on to get round the Redan, and take the flanking guns in flank; then, if we go at the embrasures on both flanks with two other

1854. battalions, giving the salient angle a wide berth—for there is certainly a mine there in front of it—some of us will get in, and, if well backed up, we can stay there; particularly if the French attack drives the people from the Garden battery. What happens next must depend upon what, I fear, we do not know, *i.e.* what is on the other side. No doubt all docks, like the London docks, &c., are surrounded with very high stone walls, and if these are loopholed, as a bit of one I can see seems to be, we must have Engineers to the front to scheme for us.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"The loopholes in the wall, I see, are so high up that we could get safely under them, but we must have help to knock down the walls; and if so, and that we are flanked from ships as well as the White Tower, it can scarcely be one day's work; but the ground being cut into by the man-of-war harbour on one side, and the docks on the other, is narrow, and may easily be held, if the men can get cover. There is a considerable open space, it seems, from a side view we have obtained, between the Redan and the things behind it; the houses in the old village to their right and our left of the Redan, which have been battered and burnt, are so much in the line of our fire that there is nobody there, and the battery among them at the summit is too much elevated to do any mischief at short range; but they may have field pieces which we know nothing about, but against these the houses will afford shelter.

"Yours sincerely,

"George Cathcart.

"*P.S.*—This morning the Russians are working at something still in the advanced work, which is the main object of the French attack, and firing from it occasionally both at the French and us.

"The right face of the Redan has been well repaired in the night, and looks nearly as good as new. They are firing from it as usual.

"G. C."

"8th November.

(*Endorsed*).—"There is a melancholy interest in this letter from Sir George Cathcart, written a few days before he was

killed. No man in the army exerted body and mind more for the service than he did. 1854.

"J. F. BURGOYNE." Siege of Sebastopol.

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"6th November.

"We had a very heavy affair yesterday, the enemy having attacked our extreme right with a force (from the army outside) of probably 40,000 men. Battle of Inkermann.

"As we occupy the right, the British had to bear the first attacks, and the front throughout the day, with some 5000 or 6000 men only: the French came up by degrees in support, but were comparatively little engaged: nothing could exceed the prowess and gallantry of our troops; and there was a great deal of close hand-to-hand fighting: the loss in officers has been very great, and among them two general officers killed and six wounded, an unheard-of proportion; but to be accounted for by our Divisions being now very weak, and a portion only of each brought forward for this occasion, with which proportion all the generals naturally went, so that, including general Staff, there were 15 or 16 generals on the ground, with only 5000 or 6000 men.

"The enemy were completely repulsed, with a great loss, probably not less than 5000 (ours, British and French, very nearly 3000), including some hundreds of prisoners; many think their loss must have been very much greater, but still the advantages of the success were not so great or striking as if we could have advanced upon them, and driven them finally from the base of their attack: this *we* could not do, and the French did not seem to think it prudent. Wagons of gabions were in rear of the enemy, with the intention evidently of taking up a position on the ridge overlooking our right. I consider this action as a most brilliant one; but it tends to show us the power of the Russians, and the terrific position we are in.

"The enemy's army has free and easy communication with the place, and may put in it, to sustain any assault, any number of their best troops.

1854. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"Our attempt must now be so partial, that even should we succeed in lodging ourselves, the ulterior operations, before we could get possession of the harbour or of anything really serviceable, would far exceed our means, which are getting exhausted rapidly, while winter is not *coming*, but *come*, on,—and winter in the Black Sea is terrific to seamen, not from bad weather alone, but almost perpetual heavy fogs!

"I feel that further attempts, at present, to take Sebastopol are hopeless, but I shall not be the first to announce the opinion,—it must be soon evident to all: in the meantime there will be a coquetry between French and English, for fear of being the first to propose a cessation in progress.

"More, however, will be required of us than we can possibly undertake, and, perhaps, that will become the ground for a suspension of operations, but in any way our difficulties will be severe; and as *les malheureux ont toujours tort*, I expect we shall have as little mercy from friends as from foes! In fact we have been engaged in an undertaking for which we had not sufficient means.

"Our force is little more than half of what we have landed in the Crimea! Our losses yesterday nearly one-half of the forces engaged! These are tests at least of the exertions of the army: their leaders will, I presume, be the victims!

"Every hour tends to show that the loss of the Russians on 5th November must have been enormous."

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*Memorandum for* General HARDING, *Deputy Inspector-General of Fortifications.*

7th November, 1854.

THERE is every prospect of our wintering in this corner of the Crimea, without towns or villages to have recourse to, or any resources but what can be drawn from the sea. Our great wants, besides men, arms, and ammunition, will be—

Food and forage.

Clothing, with warm socks, shirts, gloves, caps, &c.

Fuel, which must be imported.

Cover ditto, ditto.

This latter is a most serious item, and for which *we* shall be very much looked to. There is an idea of sending to Sinope and Constantinople for materials, to be worked up here, but time presses, and that operation will be very slow,—witness the time they were at Gallipoli in running up a few sheds. 1854. Siege of Sebastopol.

I wish you would cause inquiries to be made immediately as to the readiest way of making sheds to cover men and horses for a few months, the dimensions that would be most handy, &c. I should think that a frame of timber, lined with plank (Qy. and canvas!), and the roof of tarpaulin stretched over rafters, would answer—a kind of emigrant's house of the most temporary construction—and that large quantities of them could be sent from England.

More officers of Engineers (no one for the present, however, senior to Captain Gordon), and another company of Sappers will be very necessary with this army, and more entrenching-tools (say 10,000) and engineer's stores, particularly sandbags (100,000). Lord Raglan authorises me to make this application.

J. F. BURGOYNE.

*November 8th.*—We are likely to suspend the siege operations; and the artillery, I believe, will have a new battering train from England. We cannot therefore be too much on the alert, or too pressing for the additional officers (not less than six, including those with the Sappers), the company of Sappers, and the tools and stores; independent of the siege, there is a vast deal of field entrenchment work to do. J. F. B.

" 6th November.

" I hardly know how to write to you now, having nothing very cheering or consolatory to communicate. We had a very brilliant action yesterday, as far as the gallantry of our troops was concerned, which could not possibly be exceeded; but we remain under accumulated difficulties, which the amount of disposable force the enemy brought against us only tended to make the more clear, and I see prospects of a winter's campaign or lodgment, which in this country is terrific to contemplate, without towns or villages at our service.

1854. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"The loss yesterday of British was equal nearly to half of the number of troops engaged, and particularly heavy in officers, of whom you will be acquainted with but few. Dashwood, son of our Dashwood and Henrietta Eyre, killed. Colonel Cowell, of the Guards, whose father wrote to me by the very last mail to be civil to, also. Dashwood was frequently with us.

"The Duke of Newcastle has written to Lord Raglan to express his great regret that in his thanks to Lord Raglan and the army for Alma he had omitted my name, when he introduced Sir George Brown's, I being the senior; wants the order cancelled, &c.; but I have remonstrated against so unusual a proceeding.

"The circumstance of Sir George Brown being at the head of the *troops* engaged may be allowed to account for it; and it is to be hoped they will always be ready to do me justice, if this unhappy interruption in our successes does not undo everything."

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"10th November.

"I am much obliged to Lord Hardinge for thinking of my interests. I much fear that as our progress becomes checked you will all become impatient, and think that we are not doing so well as we might.

"Rewards naturally follow *successes*, and as a matter of policy it is right that it should be so. How far we may hereafter meet with success is to be seen, but there will be much hard work to be done, and many hard blows to be received, before we can achieve it. This army sustains such losses that it will not be a question of *reinforcing* but of *renewing* it. To hold our own, and to endeavour to get on, we must have great additional resources sent us in men, artillery, and means of all kinds; and you can never do wrong in sending quantities out on your own impulse, for, like sandbags and a number of stores that we had not specifically applied for just arrived, they are always most welcome.

"At present I have great anxiety about means for sheltering men and horses superior to tents. There is no cover within our lines, and no timber—even for fuel it is very scarce; while

everybody is trying to pile up rough stone walls to obtain a little side shelter. 1854.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"De Vere has just been dispatched with a Commissary to Sinope to endeavour to get timber; and an order is going to Constantinople for spikes, nails, hinges, latches, &c., but I fear these resources will be very scanty and slow to come: 15,000 or 16,000 men are not easily covered.

"The enemy got a thorough beating on the 5th; we have buried some thousands of them; and they have appeared to be so far discomfited by it, that they no longer hold in force the annoying position of Inkermann, but leave us in undisputed possession (which we could not occupy before) of the continuation of our beautiful position up to the very head of the harbour, by which now, for the first time, the investment on the south side may be completed from the harbour to the sea. We have not I think availed ourselves sufficiently of this advantage, but are hanging back in too defensive a line of conduct. I have just given a Memorandum to Lord Raglan, of which I shall probably enclose a copy to you, to endeavour to show our position in its true light.[1] I want to mix up *offensive* measures with those of *defence*. The common language I hear is what the enemy may attempt next, and what we can do to oppose it; but I am all for studying what we can do to strike them. I trust the war may not degenerate into one of great exasperation and mutual barbarities: we have proofs without end that in the vicissitudes of losing and retaking ground, the Russians bayoneted and knocked on the head a great many of our wounded, including many officers, while we have brought in great numbers of their wounded; but it cannot continue to be a one-sided game, and as we receive, no doubt we shall pay. Our two generals have remonstrated to Prince Menschikoff, but whether it will have effect is to be seen.

"The battle of Inkermann (that of the 5th) was quite as hard fought and brilliant as that of the Alma, but will not be so highly esteemed, because the immediate effects are not so striking: our losses are, I believe, heavier, though we had scarcely one-third of the number immediately acting that we had at Alma."

[1] Published in the 'Official Account of the Siege' (Major Elphinstone).

1854.

"12th November.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"The army is now, and is likely to continue, in a terrible state of discomfort; the sky is coming down to-night in one continuous black sheet, overcharged with rain, and occasionally a tremendous gale of wind with it.

"The course of events here looks almost as gloomy as the weather; we have been brought to a standstill, but turn and show good fight against any that attack us,—and our enemies seem to be Legion. Accounts have just been brought by an Austrian vessel, that very large reinforcements—stated to be 60,000—have recently passed Nicolaieff, on their way to the Crimea. I disbelieve it, and consider it a *ruse*. It is to be seen whether the French and we can keep pace with the Russians in adding to our forces. The weather may be considered to affect both parties, but *they* can withdraw for periods to comparatively comfortable quarters, we cannot; and of course during winter there must be great and perhaps long interruptions to our communication by sea.

"The soil here is taking the same consistency of muddy clay as in Bulgaria and Gallipoli in winter, but being generally more rocky, is not quite so deep. We continue a moderate partial fire from our batteries, and maintain our trenches, but otherwise our siege operations are suspended till we get more men, more heavy artillery, and, above all, ammunition, which is nearly expended,—and strengthen our right. I am anxious to push on in advance with our trenches, but our troops are so overwhelmed with duties that they can scarcely give any working parties at all, and our right still remains very much exposed. I am anxiously urging the propriety of *forward* movements, and endeavouring to show they are the *safest*, and have just given a Memorandum on the subject to Lord Raglan, a copy of which I send by this post to Matson, with a sketch, which is ultimately to be put with my papers. General Canrobert, however, and, I suppose, Lord Raglan also, seem to think it more proper to complete our defensive measures on the right first.

Objects to the defensive works at Inkermann.

"I always think that even many liberties may be taken with an enemy immediately after he is under the depression of a

defeat, as he must be, and even shows signs of now; but, at all events, it is not a time for submitting to delays and inconveniences by using extreme caution. Speaking *confidentially*, I think we have lost many advantages by over-caution, and not pressing harder upon the enemy, and that it could have been done without risk: much of this has been owing to the want of one sentiment in the management of a combined force; and in some instances the soundness of my opinions may be disputed: and it is not for me to say, without reason. You will perhaps say, why did you not boldly put in your opinions? But however civil everybody is to me, I cannot be obtruding a progressive course, as circumstances move rapidly on. Occasionally things are done before any contrary opinion can be offered: sometimes I hint verbally at a course to be pursued, and it is not concurred in—I drop it: sometimes I venture, as on this occasion, a statement in writing, with reasons. You are not to suppose from all this that I am prepared to criticise the proceedings,—far from it; but I think we might have been a shade more enterprising in some details of the progress of the campaign. Least of all am I inclined to find fault with Lord Raglan, who is full of firmness, and has always treated me and my opinions with the greatest respect; nor have I ever desired any assault on the place, which would have been an act of desperation."

1854. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"15th November.

"Correspondents will be quoted in numbers by the newspapers, to describe the horrors that the army have been subjected to during the last few days. Rain, wind, and cold! the climax of which, yesterday, in a perfect hurricane, commencing at daylight in the morning, and lasting all day. Tents blown down in great numbers, with an impossibility of raising them again,—and pelting rain and sleet on these high bleak hills,—no shelter,—no possibility of cooking! The tents of Stopford, Burke, and all our establishment, laid low very early. Those two had the resource of cover in my room, and Stopford slept there, and seems lively and well in spite of it all.[9] Personally I have not been exposed to this calamity, but I feel greatly for those who have, and almost ashamed of being exempt from the very general distress.

1854. — Heavy gale and loss of shipping.

This morning it is fine overhead, the wind greatly moderated, the ground all wet and muddy, and the weather very cold: of our ships, which in numbers are anchored on the open shore, I fear several were lost yesterday, and with them probably many important supplies for the army. In addition to our other disadvantages, we are clearly two months too late: if the expedition had started early in July, instead of September, we should now have had two good months before us. A polite letter from Prince Menschikoff to Lord Raglan informs him that by order of the Emperor, Lord Dunkellin will be released when Lord Raglan sends back the Russian captain of artillery[1] whom he offered in exchange. Amidst the severe hardships of such a day as yesterday and the night, the only consolation and resource to the common man is *liquor*—if he can get it; and accordingly, all our establishment were yesterday evening noisy and riotous; and this morning, sundry bottles of brandy are missing from the mass of things lying *perdu* under the blown-down marquee.

"We have just heard from Balaklava that the losses among the shipping have been very great, including a great many lives! In one ship, the entire large stock of warm clothing for the army; in another, ammunition (an essential with us), besides a mass of other things more or less precious: we have still to learn what damage another large part of the fleet, off the Katcha, may have suffered. It is said also that the Duke of Cambridge is very ill on board the *Retribution*. Our last letters, with Lord Raglan's, sent the evening before the gale in the *Arrow*, it is considered by Sir E. Lyons cannot be in time at Constantinople for the French mail, and he is even under some anxiety as to her own safety; as she had twelve hours start and clear of the land, I should hope that she would be out of the great fury of the storm. A natural accompaniment to our exposure to the winter blasts and falls, is the sad effect upon the animals, which are getting miserable, and we shall have many losses among them."

[1] This officer, it is said, on reaching the Russian lines, was placed under arrest, tried by court-martial for misconduct while in command of a battery at the Alma, and shot.—Ed.

*To* Colonel MATSON. 1854.

" Camp before Sebastopol, 15th November. Siege of Sebastopol.

"Reid, from Malta, is taking the course you have been occasionally adopting with so much advantage to us, of sending up matters that he judges will be of service, before receiving any absolute demand, and has thus frequently forestalled the application. He has thus just sent off two 13-inch mortars with ammunition. We are now under great additional difficulty, from the frightfully heavy state of the tracks across the country (made roads there are none), and the very low state of all our horse-power, from exposure of the animals to the inclemencies of the weather; with a rise of 400 or 500 feet for everything to be brought up from the shore.

"In preceding letters, I have recommended a great increased supply of entrenching-tools; not less than 10,000, with other articles in proportion; 100,000 sandbags, &c. &c., also some framed huts, of the roughest and simplest construction, like barns, but tolerably substantial, also a small packet or box (if the latter, with hinges, lock and key) of stationery for myself; platform stuff, and perhaps other items, and I only mention it again, in case any mails should be missing. We are surprised to find that the French pay all their working parties here, of the Line, whether in the trenches or in entrenchments, 50 centimes (half a franc or fivepence) per man, for a tour by day, and 60 centimes for night; I am endeavouring to ascertain whether under a general or exceptional system; but I suspect it is only on this special occasion. Lord Raglan is now giving orders for paying ours at the rates in the Queen's Regulations, as a special case. I am very glad of it, as it will make our duties more popular, and we may expect greater exertions from the men; they are to be paid on a certificate, from the officer of Engineers, that reasonable exertions were made, in which case they will receive the full amount, and I have given instructions that the officers should report if only three quarters or half, or a quarter of what might reasonably be expected, has been performed, and the Commander-in-Chief will order the payment to be in that proportion; this will be less discouraging than mulcting them altogether, and at the

1854. same time prove some check upon inactivity. In a sketch, which I sent by a recent mail, of the position above Inkermann, I believe I have underrated the heights: for instance, the Lower Lighthouse, which I have called, I think, 250 feet, is upwards of 400 in height; my object, however, was more to show the *relative* heights of one ground as compared with another, and is tolerably correct, or if anything, the differences of level greater than what I have expressed. My desire is to establish a battery against the Lighthouse battery and steamer, and to push pickets to the road in the valley and river at once.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"The enemy have not shown a man on the Inkermann valley since the 5th, but as the road is not watched, can introduce individuals and small parties into the place by night; and by stealth, even by day, individuals would not be observed, probably."

"15th November.

"Our troops are so dreadfully harassed by constant duties, including necessarily, from our position, a very large force of covering parties and pickets, that we can get hardly any working parties from the British, and are almost exclusively thrown upon what can be had from the Turks, who are thoroughly inefficient, for one reason and another; still we not only keep up our batteries, but make a little, though very little, progress forward. I have been battling (as you will see by copies of my memoranda, sent by the *Arrow* 11th to 13th inst., and preceding mail, if you get them) against expending all our present time and means in strengthening our position, gained on the 5th above Inkermann, where we are already on ground of great strength, with no enemy in front to threaten it, and where I want that we should push our posts just a little further, so as entirely to connect ourselves with the head of the harbour.

Objections to defensive works at Inkermann.

"General Canrobert and Lord Raglan seem to hold a different opinion, and (I must confess against myself) that I meet no encouragement anywhere; and therefore I presume I must be wrong, but hold to the *monomania*, and within myself still think I am right, even as an ordinary case, but much more so under the difficulties in which we are placed; by my plan we should be threatening, and even acting offensively, without, as I main-

tain, sacrificing a sound state of defence; on the system now pursued, we are on the most backward, and cautious of defensive. 1854. Siege of Sebastopol.

"This, however, is *my* version. I am told in reply, that my proposal would involve bodies too far in advance, where they could not be supported.

"There appears to me to be a want of distinction between attempts that can be made on us by the garrison, and what can be attempted by the army outside. My wish is effectually to prevent any *connection* between them (except across the harbour) and to make even a *combination* of movements difficult, and to face each with means proportioned to the assumed force of each. Don't let me be quoted as criticizing or finding fault. I have in this instance stated my opinion with reasons, they are not considered valid, and I submit frankly, under the probability, at least, that it is rightly overruled."

"17th November.

"The thanks to the army for the battle of Alma, has been revised and reprinted, in order to introduce my name; and with a copy of it Lord Raglan sends me a pretty note, which being written to me from the adjoining room, shows that he means there should be no mistake about it. I enclose both to Colonel Matson, with a request that they will be forwarded to you. Thanks for Alma reprinted to introduce his name.

"Some recent views I have entertained about our proceedings here (always listened to with respect), did not appear to be quite in accordance with the views of the two generals commanding, or of the generals and staff in general, and therefore I was bound to consider that I might be wrong;—to my satisfaction however, I have found congenial spirits among the French Engineers, and a commencement is being made on the system I have advocated. I send many Military Observations to Colonel Matson, and though confidential because frank, and I deprecate exceedingly being supposed to criticize or find fault, I have told him that he may trust to Wrottesley's discretion, who may read them all.

"You will all feel a great disappointment at our difficulties that have arisen since we sat down before this place; after the brilliant view you, in common with all the world, took of our prospects up to the taking possession of Balaklava, it is grievous

1854. to think of the sudden interruption to the success, which was thought so near. To *us* it appears exceedingly hard that in England it should appear so clearly to be an *affaire accomplie*, so that the natural inference must be great mismanagement or pusillanimity on our part.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"Sandham writes me word, that Lord Hardinge said he was in hopes of being able to manage a good-service pension for me up to 1200*l.* a year, and also a certain pension for my family hereafter. This latter would indeed be a great boon; but I feel very confident that all these good intentions will fade away, when it is found that the immediate fall of Sebastopol is not so certain as everybody (when you last wrote) in England still persisted was to be expected.

"I frequently enclose copies of business memoranda that I make out here, to Matson, which are ultimately to be delivered to you. I hope you have that proposing the movement of the armies to Balaklava and south side of Sebastopol."

*From* Colonel MATSON, R.E., *to* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE.

"18th November.

"Lord Hardinge has just been here and desires me to express to you, that he most highly appreciates your great and gallant conduct, and the invaluable services which you have rendered the army, in all the late operations; and that he does not write to you himself as he is so much pressed for time; that he had spoken to the Secretary of War about your staff-pay, and further I was to assure you of his most sincere good wishes, and that he felt the greatest interest in you and all that concerns you."

*From* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE *to* General AIREY, Q.M.G.

"Camp before Sebastopol,
"19th November, 1854.

"MY DEAR GENERAL,

Mem. on outpost duty.

"I am taking a great liberty in offering to *you* a small memorandum,[1] applicable to the practice of treating the service of the advanced posts of this army, where I do not think that

[1] Published in the 'Official Account of the Siege,' by Major A. S. Elphinstone, R.E.—ED.

the definite line that ought to be taken is thoroughly understood. For instance, with regard to the Inkermann position, it seems to be thought that if the enemy choose to hold posts at the foot of our heights, and on the left bank of the Tchernaya there, they must be allowed to do so; whereas I would submit that nothing can be more clear than that it is decidedly our territory by right, and most essential that we should hold it, or at least not allow the enemy to encroach upon it. They cannot approach it, except either over a great open marsh, and along a causeway fully exposed to view, or by a tortuous and most dangerous way from the garrison; while we can be upon it in any force and at any time, down the neighbouring steep slopes, affording a great deal of cover; nor can any fire from the distant battery of the Inkermann Lighthouse or the shipping, prevent our maintaining posts there, under whatever cover can be found on the spot. 1854. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"It may be thought that these posts would be far from support; but by holding the extreme front, at nights in particular, very lightly, by what the French call '*des sentinelles perdues*,' the retreat of the party would be very secure; and for occupation by the enemy, they would be further from support.

"The left bank of the Tchernaya *belongs to us*, for a considerable way up; and if we had enforced our rights earlier, even since the action of the 5th, we could no doubt have secured a quantity of forage (and perhaps other resources), which, it appears, some Russian stragglers—and it is believed unarmed—carried away only yesterday from under the position held by the Guards.

"My dear General,

"Yours faithfully,

"J. F. Burgoyne."

*From* General Airey *to* Sir John Burgoyne.

"Crimea, 19th November.

"My dear General,

"Your memorandum upon service of advanced posts is admirable. I send it up immediately to be carried out, particularly on our extreme right.

"Yours, &c.,

"Richard Airey."

1854.

Siege of Sebastopol.

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"20th November, 1854.

"It is difficult to reconcile the actual moral timidity of some of our officers in the ordinary proceedings of the campaign, with their extreme of heroic dash and courage when absolutely in action. I occasionally find our men crouching under rocks and walls very near our lines, and when I ask why they are not pushed more forward, I am told, '*Oh! the Russians have a post behind that wall, and they fire at any man who shows himself.*' I look round, and I find that the said wall is perhaps a mile from any substantial Russian support, while our picket is within 200 or 300 yards of ours!

"At another time I am told that we do not extend to such an advantageous piece of ground because there is a Russian battery (at probably 2000 yards distance) that fires at any individual who shows himself; thus by sheer show and bullying, they constantly confine us to most inconvenient and disadvantageous limits. The fact is, our people do not understand where their strength lies, and to what extent we can enforce what we desire;—after several remonstrances on this subject verbally, without making myself understood, I at length put on paper yesterday a few short rules as a guide, and send you a copy.

"Under the same kind of feelings, we are anxiously asked by some Generals of Division to fortify their very camps against the garrison! This has occasioned my putting in another memorandum, showing that if the *camps* are in danger, what is to become of our batteries and trenches? and to endeavour to call them back from these habits of looking purely to defensive operations, to the necessity of vigorously pressing as forward as possible to repel the enemy. Sir George Cathcart has been a great loss to us, for while he saw the arduous circumstances in which we were placed, his mind and energies were always at work to consider how to prevent the enemy from obtaining any lead, or mode of progress whatever.

"Sandham counts without his host in anticipating the evils of 'so crowded a garrison under bombardment,' the 'pestilence that would be created in it,' &c. By reference to the map

and its scale, it will be found that the space enclosed within their lines on the south side of the place is very considerable, and immense tracts will be found not covered by any bombardment. We have not fired a shell into the great town, and it would be only waste of ammunition to do so. 1854. Siege of Sebastopol.

"General Pennefather, who commands the 2nd Division, has been to-day to head-quarters, rather angry at my first memorandum, on the outposts, which he says was aimed at him. Nothing could be farther from my intention, for he would be the last man to allow the enemy to take any liberties with his position, but I confessed that something that I had witnessed near his division had given me the idea; but General Airey put him in good humour again, by explaining that my hints were quite general, and applicable to all. In consequence of them, however, and of a conversation I had with Captain Chapman, he induced the commanding officer of the covering party at his attack, to turn away a set of Russian *tirailleurs* who had lodged themselves within 200 or 300 yards of his advanced trench, and had been very troublesome both to us and to the French; and they did it in a very handsome and creditable way. We lost, unfortunately, a most gallant and excellent officer, Captain Tryon of the Rifles, but the proceeding was a very valuable one, and will be a lesson to us and to the enemy also, and will, I expect, tend to check the bullying impudence of the latter. Directly they were driven away, an English working party proceeded to turn their pits into a connected trench, which has afforded cover to some of our men during the day, and will, I hope, be improved, and have a covered communication to it to-night.

"The Admiral is to land forty more 32-pounders for batteries, but I fear it will be a slow operation.

"I hear that some of our London critics, in that confident tone which will perceive no difficulties in our way, talk of the 'facility with which the Russians are beaten.' If the gentleman to whom this sentence is ascribed, had seen on the heights of Alma and Inkermann, and on the spots of other arduous contests, literally *heaps* of dead Russians and British piled one upon another, and in such masses that you could not walk through without treading on the bodies, he would have

1854. seen that it was no such easy matter as he is pleased to consider it while sitting by his fireside.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"I enclose a copy of a memorandum which I have given to Lord Raglan, descriptive of our present circumstances.[1] I have done it to assist him in making his reports to the Duke of Newcastle, and, consequently, only to be made use of as far as he liked. After you have done with the enclosures, taking copies of anything you like, I wish you would send all such papers on to Lady Burgoyne, to add to a collection kept of everything of mine, which I have frequently found useful to refer to. If she has not already got one, let her have a copy in particular of that paper in which I proposed that the armies should move round to Balaklava and the south. In spite of our present difficulties, it is very clear that they would have been greatly increased had we not taken that step."

Sir William Reid, Governor of Malta, *to* Sir John Burgoyne.

"Malta, 22nd November, 1854.

"My dear Sir John,

"Before this reaches you, you will have received by the *Golden Fleece*, the 24-pounders and 10-inch mortars which you wrote about, as well as 18-pounder shot; and ten or eleven 13-inch mortars and their shells went also. I wrote by the French steamer to the Duke of Newcastle a private letter, advising that some more 18-pounders on *travelling* carriages should be sent to you from England without delay. I beg of you to continue to let me know by private letters what you most want, for such letters relieve us from doubts as to what may be useful. I believe troops are what you want most, and we have sent all our Malta garrison, excepting one British battalion and the Malta Fencibles. I had written to the Duke of Newcastle about steam transport, for we must have transport in order to keep you supplied. Fuel you can get best within the compass of the Black Sea. I hope you will begin hutting in the Tartar mode, by cutting into the sides of hills. In that way the soldiers would get more warmth, as the deeper

[1] Published in the 'Official Account of the Siege.'

1854. Siege of Sebastopol.

they sink the nearer they get to the mean temperature of the climate. We are getting platforms made, and I think have now thirty or forty ready to send you. We are pressing the Malta clover for forage for you. General Torrens is with me, doing well and going to England. Colonel Gambier, R.A., in bed with the contusion by a cannon-ball, and goes home. Your son is here. I have sent him your letter, and he will take this. I may perhaps go on board the *Swallow*."

*Memorandum for Lord Raglan given to him on the 26th of November.*—J. F. B.

Camp before Sebastopol, 25th November, 1854.

Recommends approaches against the Malakoff Tower.

I have, as desired, conferred with General Bizot, commanding French Engineers, relative to our future proceedings against Sebastopol, and find that the projects of the French are not in accordance with what I had proposed for an advance on the Tower front.[1]

They do not seem to be at all prepared to assist by relieving us, as I had hoped, from the guard of our left attack, so as to have rendered the 3rd division available for the extension of the attacks on the right, as they declare that they have as much upon them as they can undertake; and that their siege troops have only one day off to one on duty. They say also that commencing on the right against the Tower front, would bring into play a new series of the enemy's batteries, and a renewed contest of artillery, in which the Russians have shown such superior means; that their batteries over Careening Bay command and enfilade the lower part of that valley, and that those on the other side of the Great Harbour would be a great impediment to our progress, so that a new attack, bearing on the Tower front, would be a long affair, and require greatly increased means.

Without entirely concurring in the full extent of these opinions, a great bar is placed upon our commencing the

[1] Sir John Burgoyne's Memorandum of the 23rd November, 1854, recommending that the attack should be directed against the Malakoff Tower, is published in the 'Official Account of the Siege.'

1854. — Siege of Sebastopol.

attacks on the Tower, as I had proposed, not only as it would tend to a conflict of opinions, but that *we* really cannot possibly undertake them with our present strength of British forces, in addition to what we already on our hands.

The French proposition then is, to recur to the former plan of opening a new and greatly increased fire on the Redan and Barrack Batteries on our side, and on the Flagstaff Bastion and adjoining works on theirs, and then storm those two points.

Whatever may be the manner of proceeding, the preparations for that course will always tend to assist the final operation of a storm, and therefore I have instructed Captain Gordon to promote it by forwarding as much as possible advanced trenches on those sides, and by obtaining every useful observation which may assist its progress.

J. F. Burgoyne.

*Memorandum given to Lord Raglan on the 26th of November*, 1854.—J. F. B.

Camp before Sebastopol, 26th November, 1854.

With reference to my memorandum of yesterday's date, containing the result of my conference with General Bizot, as to the future course of proceedings, although I remain of opinion that the approaches on the Tower front would be the most sound and safe system to pursue, I am ready to admit that it would be attended with delay and require much greater means (two very important matters at this time of year) than the course proposed by the French, the objection to which latter are, the great difficulty of approaching the Redan and Barrack Batteries except under much exposure to their fire, and the almost impossibility of ascertaining the absolute impediments that may be in the way of the storming parties, or the precise nature of the opposition which they may meet with: every study and endeavour, however, must be given to remedy these difficulties as much as possible.

While, however, the effort, as proposed, against the Tower, may not be admitted, as a principal measure, I would hope that attempts may be found practicable, and be continued, to for-

ward it at least as an accessory, by persevering efforts to drive the enemy from the ridge on the right (the Inkermann ridge, as we have called it since the 5th of November), establishing detached batteries against any armed ships that may remain at the upper end of the harbour, taking possession of the entire ravine on its left, that may not be too much exposed to the enemy's batteries over the Careening Bay, and establishing some lodgments affording cover, for the security of this side, on both ridges, but particularly on that in front of the Tower. 1854. — Siege of Sebastopol.

The want of numerical strength will be the difficulty raised against even this modified proceeding, but the 1300 men now applied to the pickets or covering parties on that side, if allowed, will go towards this service, and it is so important, that it is well worthy of great efforts and even running some risks to accomplish it.

J. F. BURGOYNE.

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"25th November.

"Lieutenant Martin was dangerously wounded last night at our advanced trench on our left attack. He is a great loss, as he is one (among several) who have been always reported as most gallant, zealous, and energetic.

"I shall probably enclose with this, various rough memoranda and papers, which will explain many matters referring to our proceedings. You may conceive the difficulties under which the Engineers labour, and how poorly our operations show, with a soil of only a light sprinkling of earth over and amongst rocks, exposure to a tremendous power of artillery, the enemy's riflemen allowed to be pushed out generally to within 200 or 300 yards of our advanced trenches, the small stock of gabions we brought expended, and, to crown all, the Adjutant-General telling us day by day, in a cool off-hand way, '*You can have no working parties,*' but to rely on the Turks, the latter being half-starved, killed by the cold, and with whom we have no means of communicating, as the interpreters are mostly inefficient, and, even if otherwise, could not be provided for every distinct party.

1854. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"Let all the documents ultimately, and when you have done with them, be given to Lady Burgoyne.

"It is astonishing what mistakes our people make, and what is more surprising, the French also, in conjuring up bugbears, and reporting impossibilities that the enemy are doing against us.

"Three or four times, formal reports have been brought to Lord Raglan from the French head-quarters, that the Russians are making such-and-such batteries for such-and-such purposes, and that I have been at once able to say was impossible, and which eventually proved to be nothing. Then our people report large bodies of the enemy moving here and moving there to attack us; that they are to be seen carrying up heavy guns to the mountain in front of Balaklava, and all sorts of rash things, on the presumption that whatever they do must be right and quite safe, and that we must submit to it.

"It is astonishing how little they all calculate what the enemy really can attempt, and what, if we know our relative strength and circumstances, they dare not think of.

"We are, I think, making this mistake on a large scale, in the elaborate works we are making on the heights on our right, to prepare against a precisely similar attack to what was made on us on the 5th November, without adverting to the infinitely superior position in which we are now placed, and which, by pushing it a little further forward, would be inattackable.

"I have written, recently, a long confidential letter to Lord Hardinge, and I see no objection to his seeing any of mine to you, if on any occasion you think they would happen to interest him, but by no means to press them upon him otherwise. I hope there is nothing in them that would seem to imply fault or criticism on Lord Raglan, because I have the highest respect for him and his proceedings, and he treats me in the most confidential manner; but he cannot be responsible for everything, and has himself enormous difficulties to contend with."

"26th November.

Recommends approaches against the Malakoff Tower.

"This is a trying time for us all in *morale*. After our great fighting triumphs, to be brought to a check, will, by the public in England, be visited as a very great crime upon some of us, and in my position, as the first Engineer authority,

will no doubt cause a great lowering in reputation! But it cannot be helped; the difficulties we have had, and we still have, to contend with, are very great, and as a combined force we are under very great disadvantages. What the British have in hand greatly exceeds our means at present, and on all proper and prudential grounds, we ought to extend our operations by a new attack on the Tower front on our right, which we have not hitherto been able to look at, because the enemy had the ridge beyond (that which borders the harbour), from whence we could have been enfiladed and even taken in reverse. The battle of Inkermann has now given us full possession of this ridge, *if we would avail ourselves of it;* but we hang back with all sorts of defensive measures, when time and circumstance require that we should push on. I must confess, however, I am singular, and can get no one to follow me in these views. A (*vide* sketch) where we *are*, entrenching ourselves up to the eyes defensively; B, C where *I wish to be*, acting offensively. 1854. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"The French project is to confine ourselves to the Redan and Barrack Battery fronts on our side, and to the Flagstaff Bastion front on theirs; but ours is most difficult of approach to storm, being surrounded by precipices all round, by man-of-war creek, and in front of the Barrack Battery, the only really accessible part being over the open exposed front from our right attacks, which are still distant. An assault, therefore, on our side, confined to this small front, will be most desperate, and therefore, independent of other reasons, I wish to embrace the Tower front also. Our force is very small, and we cannot, with it, extend our operations.

"The French army is being augmented weekly; but we are not so amalgamated as to make this the same thing, because when we want support from them we have to ask for it, and reasons are easily given for assisting us, when it suits their views, but not otherwise. Thus it was grudgingly that they gave us assistance to protect Balaklava, and now they will do nothing to relieve us from the difficulties we shall be under at the assault. Everything is carried on in the most friendly and plausible manner possible, but the work is not, nor ever has been, fairly divided, and a combined army, under the most

1854. favourable circumstances, is not worth three-quarters of the force under one absolute command, that is, as regards us. Three-quarters of our united force, *all British*, could do wonders, while our little addition is to the French of far greater value than their numerical strength, for the same number of French would not do one-half what we do."

Siege of Sebastopol.

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*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"28th November.

Attack on rifle-pits.

"My Memoranda of instructions on taking up ground for pickets has been of much use. General Pennefather has explained to me how, since that, he has pushed out some sentries well in front, along the ridge on our extreme right, to great advantage, and Sir John Campbell, who had hesitated before to drive in Russian riflemen posted in pits, in front of our left attacks (Green hill), consented afterwards, on a concerted plan with Captain Chapman and officers of Engineers, to do it, and it was very gallantly carried into execution on the night of the 20th by 100 Rifles (with a support of 100 more), under command of Lieutenant Tryon, who was, unhappily, killed. The enemy have made several attempts to retake it, and always been repulsed. Till now we have got tolerable cover (though all among rocks and without gabions), and are pretty secure.

"The Riflemen had been a great annoyance to us, and caused us many casualties. The French had also suffered from them, and had formally called our attention to it. General Canrobert was much pleased with the gallant off-hand way in which this was done, and thinking that a great motive with us was to attend to *their* representation, and to relieve *them*, in a very pretty *ordre du jour*, called the attention of the French army to the feat, making honourable mention of Lieutenant Tryon.

"Our Engineer officers deserve great credit in it; for, under my advice, they urged it, assisted to plan it, and immediately commenced lodgments and communications, which have been perseveringly followed since, under great disadvantages of soil, extent, and heavy fire from various directions, as well as active efforts of the enemy to retake it.

"It was here that Lieutenant Martin was wounded two nights ago. I enclose a sketch of it. 1854. Siege of Sebastopol.

"Although these pits (joined now into a trench) are 600 yards from the enemy's main works, which may appear a great distance, they are under fire of an enormous amount of artillery, and some on salient points, almost on their flanks, and the enemy have many places of cover for their riflemen, in front of their lines."

*To* Colonel MATSON.

"29th November, 1854.

"Lord Hardinge appears to have gone out of his way and given himself great trouble to serve me. I wrote him a letter of thanks about a week ago, adding, confidentially, some remarks on affairs here that I thought might interest him. The propositions for allowances to *me* are most liberal, and I hope may be carried out; but that for my family afterwards is worth them all. At my age, life is not only precarious from day to day (and certainly not under its most favourable circumstances in this corner of the Crimea), but at best cannot be of very long duration; and therefore a provision for the family would be a prospective boon that would afford much mental consolation. We are all liable to perils from the enemy; from my position I am much less so than the regimental officers and those of lower rank; but with regard to sickness (and I am sorry to say we have, among the rest, a renewal of cholera coming on), though I have more chance of keeping it off by superior comforts, if it does come in any force, seeing that, under the circumstances of this army, there is no retiring till utterly helpless, the old ones can hardly be expected to get well again, like the young blood. Proposed pension for himself and family.

"I would not have Lady Burgoyne see or hear these reflections on any account, for though they do not affect me in the slightest degree, they would her. Such a service as this, and in mid-winter, cannot be joined in without much personal risk; but I retain, as I ever have done, a kind of buoyant anticipation that I shall get through it, arising from a happy natural temperament."

1854.

" 30th November, 1854.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"As the newspapers were unduly elated for a long time after our brilliant commencement, and would be persuaded that we had no difficulties to encounter, and had only to walk into Sebastopol when we pleased; that it was notorious that the Russians could not fight, as some of them had the impudence to say,—I think it very probable, that in equal ignorance of the real circumstances, they will now be equally depressed, and after so much hard fighting and so much hard weather, may consider us absolutely in danger of being overwhelmed; we are, however, not so bad as that yet, nor I confidently trust ever will be. The enemy have certainly brought forward very large resources and very large forces against us, but certainly not so many as we had been taught to expect, and I can easily fancy that they will not be able to continue the same accumulative course, besides that the season and state of the country must put them as well as ourselves to great inconveniences. They are still able to retain corps (if not very large ones) of observation, close upon our two flanks at Inkermann and before Balaklava, so that we are shut up between two fires, in a magnificent position; except that Balaklava is a little source of anxiety from being so detached, though we have greatly strengthened it, and that I fear we are not so well prepared to oppose a powerful sortie on our batteries as I think we ought to be. I am in continual conflict with our generals of division, who one and all will think their very *camps* in danger, and consequently I fear in case of sorties, will be thinking of their defences there, instead of rushing down at once to save the batteries. To be sure the garrison has not yet made any such attempts, probably because they cannot but believe that they are well guarded, and if so, our ground for their protection is very favourable, and also they might fear from the nature of their works, that if repulsed, *we might follow them in*, and I have strongly recommended that we should be prepared to do so in case of a great sortie. They have made many sorties on the French, as the trenches on that side are easier got at, and they have better lines to cover their retreat.

"Our people, chiefly under the instigation and support of the

Engineers, have made some brilliant advances in front of our left attacks (Chapman's), driving bodies of Russian riflemen from rifle pits 300 and 400 yards in front of our advanced parallel, and forming by degrees tolerable cover and approaches in frightful rocky soil, and without even gabions or sandbags. 1854. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"Whether owing to my preaching or not, I find by degrees a few congenial spirits arising, who encourage the lodgments in advance that I and the Engineers desire. Colonel Herbert[1] (Staff of 2nd division) has just come to me with a project for an advance on the right, that I am delighted with: it is the more provoking not to be more enterprising, because hitherto at the game of 'brag,' we find the enemy, though he fights hard, quite inclined to yield to a persevering pressure on his posts.

"I believe we shall have to take some decided measure for bringing matters to some issue, but can hardly attempt it till we can get a renewed force of artillery up, and that in the present state of the country,—no made roads, and horses and cattle in a most miserable state—is a work of time and difficulty; we, that is, the British, are greatly in want of men for all the work with which we are charged; the French get great reinforcements, and are, I believe, three times our strength, but that does not afford us much relief, it gives *them* an opportunity of taking as much to do as they like, and of the kind they prefer, in reality; although ostensibly everything is assumed to be fair and reasonable."

"2nd December.

"The Russians made a bad hit this morning: they came out at about 6 A.M., and made a brisk attack on the advance on our left (from which they had been driven on the 20th), and drove our advance, who were jaded and not in much force, out of the trench, but it happened to be just as the relief of the covering party had come into the trenches, who rattled down and retook it directly. We lost only five or six men, but the Russians a good many—it must have appeared to them that we were very ready and strong! It was said that the Russians 'relieved' the 50th in the trench, and the Rifles 'relieved' the Russians!

[1] Afterwards Major-General the Hon. Sir Percy Herbert.

1854.

*Memorandum submitted to* Lord RAGLAN.

Siege of Sebastopol.

Camp before Sebastopol, 5th December, 1854.

Sentries at the most advanced stations in front of the British batteries, have been surprised fast asleep by the enemy, and bayoneted; and this circumstance, so derogatory to every military principle, has been excused by the officers, on the plea that the duties are so hard upon the soldiers, that they cannot physically by possibility execute them.

From various quarters and the highest authorities, reports are made to the same effect; and the whole British force is rapidly declining in numerical as well as physical strength, even under the present charge, which it appears they are incapable of maintaining; while at the same time, to carry on the proposed plan of operations with any chance of success, further efforts must be made to gain threatening and offensive advances on the right.

I see no possibility, therefore, of continuing the operations, unless the French army can relieve us from a considerable extent of the duties with which the British are charged, in whatever way may be deemed expedient by the generals in chief. What I would offer for consideration would be that the French should relieve us from the left attack[1] in everything except the maintenance and service of the batteries, which I presume they could not provide for. I am aware that such a mixture of the two services may be inconvenient, though it does not appear to have been found so on a small scale at the Ravine Battery, and it is to avoid greater by any other mode.

J. F. B.

"5th December.

Difficulties of transport.

"We are making anything but satisfactory progress. Our operations have been suspended until we could get more artillery in battery with which to make a greater impression, and more troops for assault. Guns and mortars are coming in goodly supply from the fleet and from Malta, but we cannot

[1] This recommendation had been made previously by Sir John Burgoyne on the 25th November. See his memorandum of that date in the 'Official Account of the Siege,' vol. i.—ED.

get them up from the shore. Our paramount difficulty now is for means of transport; we are on a ridge of heights from 600 to 800 feet above the sea, and from five to eight miles from our port (Balaklava), the whole way through deep mud and clay, without any made road; the weather, torrents of rain, almost unceasing for weeks, with high cold winds, the animals all exposed in the open air, imperfectly foraged, and the whole in the greatest confusion; animals and drivers, on which our very existence depends, ill-managed, ill-used, and driven rapidly to inefficiency. 1854. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"To save conveyance of forage, all the cavalry, and a large proportion of artillery horses, are moved down to Balaklava, still it is with difficulty that the troops can be kept supplied with even *provisions;* a lamentable deficiency of fuel for cooking, and materials for some kind of shelter better than tents, of primary necessity; all too before we can attend to getting up heavy guns, shot and shells. You may conceive the state of our men, and how hard are the duties.

"Two soldiers (a double sentry) on look-out in our more advanced trench in front of our batteries were surprised two nights ago by a small party of Russians, *fast asleep* at their posts, and bayoneted! a most brutal act.

"This serious crime, compromising the safety of perhaps thousands, and so derogatory to every military principle, was justified, excused, by the officers, on the plea that human nature cannot support the fatigues that the soldiers have to undergo; the reports from commanding officers of regiments and generals are to the same effect; the army is sickly to a grievous extent, and is declining numerically as well as physically. A serious representation will be made I hope to the French, that they should relieve us from a considerable amount of our duties, or that we must suspend active operations, still more than at present; *they* however run very cunning, and will limit their assistance to what they find most convenient in quantity and quality. We require large reinforcements of *British* infantry; of cavalry, I hope they will send none during winter. The Turks won't look a Russian in the face here;—they are an encumbrance, and I wish they were all away.

"I can't get the forward movements I want down to Careen-

1854. ing Bay. We think of nothing but defensive works, and I am constantly reminding my friends that we are *besiegers*, not preparing to be *besieged!*

Siege of Sebastopol.

"The French seem likely to get great reinforcements, and to become a large force. It would be far better for the common cause if *we* could be in proportion.

"Colonel Jourjon[1] has just arrived in the Crimea, and paid me a visit."

"7th December.

"To give you an idea of my personal situation here, imagine me in one corner of a whitewashed, barn-like looking room, twice as big as your front drawing-room, with three rattling windows on one side, and two at the end, an opening of about a foot square in the plain face of the middle of one wall, which closes with an iron door, and another immediately below it of half the size, from which are deep openings to the middle of the thick wall, and form a kind of stove. The top of what *was* a card table (the green cloth of which had been glued on, torn off) loose upon its stand, so that when a stranger (for *I* know better by experience) puts his arm upon it, it tilts over with everything upon it; two camp chairs, a stretcher with an air mattress and blankets, and a large packing-case to hold fuel—*when I can get it*—a bayonet for a poker, and a bit of bent iron from Mr. Hart's packing-case for a shovel. Without a book of any description, or resource of any kind but my business, and my own thoughts, here I sit in this wet wintry weather, wrapped up in my cloak, except when I can by luck get a little fuel to light a fire; candles scarce, and for fear of being totally without them, sitting in the dark, buried in my own reflections. Now look at another picture.

"Cold heavy rains, to which the whole of the army, with the exception of Lord Raglan's head-quarters, are exposed in tents, on a country which is ankle deep in mud and clay from the very door of the tents; everything more wet than damp, all

[1] A French officer of Engineers, who had been employed with the English officers of R.E. in designing the works at Boulahir, on the Thracian Peloponnesus. He was a very able man, and much respected by the English Engineer officers.—Ed.

chilly and comfortless. From this scene I retire to a large clean room, thoroughly weather-tight, where I manage by hook or by crook, to get frequently a good fire by husbanding my resources, particularly in the evenings or other times when peculiarly wanted. Though candles are scarce, my friends sometimes get me a few pounds, which sets me up in the world; my bed is warm with plenty of blankets, and there I lie and hear the pitiless storm, unscathed myself, but with much feeling of unhappiness for the discomfort it brings on our companions in the neighbourhood. Every mail brings its set of newspapers, which afford, for a time at least, an amount of interesting occupation and information. Of these two scenes, the second is decidedly the prominent one in my mind; the first is of imaginations, the second of realities! I never cease to feel grateful for the comparative luxuries I am enjoying, though sometimes fearful of not being able to retain them, because I am here an interloper, though Lord Raglan himself shows not the slightest signs of perceiving me to be so. 1854. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"You are forestalling me in my wants and wishes. Yesterday I received two *Illustrated London News*, which were very acceptable, and you could not then have got my letter, telling you that they would be so. It is only a week or ten days ago that I sent a kind of instruction for some warm clothing, and your letter tells me you are already sending something of the kind. I shall rejoice in getting the *provender* you mention, as I can give part to help out Lord Raglan's table, and the heavy drain on it. We expect to see the *Royal Albert* daily; I suppose therefore your box would hardly be in time to come by her. Whenever you happen to have a favourable opportunity, such as that "Captain So-and-so is going out directly to the Crimea, and would be too happy to take out anything for you," always send something, because it is always a delight to receive a reminiscence of home. I don't know how to advise what it should be: a pair of warm gloves, a piece of soap, a new book of note, or any interesting number of a periodical, a jar of preserves or a ham, a little stationery, or anything. It is curious what have been our wants. I have been occasionally in distress for a few sheets of paper, a stick of sealing-wax, a candle, a box of lucifer matches; in short of the oddest col-

1854. lection of absolute necessaries which nobody in England could conceive it was ever possible to want. At the same time, our wants are most uncertain. In comes a ship to Balaklava, full of what the Yankees call notions—that is, everything of commonest use, and we at once obtain a supply; so that, though constantly in want of some very common article, I cannot specify any, and am not inclined to keep a large stock of everything by me. Anything coming from any of you by such chance opportunities, will always cause pleasurable sensations.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"I have had great luck in an opportunity of getting rid of Mr. Peat's pack-saddle. Captain Lushington, R.N., who has charge of the seamen and ship guns landed, was expressing the great distress he was under for want of one, so I made him a present of it. Was not I lucky in getting rid of it so soon?

Courtesies of war.

"A very pretty return of courtesies has passed recently between Lord Raglan and Prince Menschikoff. After the battle of the Alma, and I believe on the field, a dying Russian officer gave a pocket-book containing a quantity of Russian money (notes), &c., to an English soldier or officer, with a request that it might be sent to his mother, at some town in the interior of Russia; and a few days after, I believe at Mackenzie's farm, a packet was found containing a number of Russian bank-notes, and directed to an officer of Menschikoff's army. By the first subsequent flag of truce, which I believe was to ask that Lord Dunkellin might be exchanged, these two packets were sent in to the Russian camp, and no doubt made a favourable impression. A few days ago, Menschikoff sent in to Lord Raglan, with a very civil note, two packets of papers belonging to two of our officers, and which no doubt were of great interest to them, which had been found in possession of a British soldier whom they had made a prisoner. One of these packets which was a will, enclosed a number of letters from the officer's wife, and the officer, in his will, expressed a wish that they should not be read; a desire which Prince Menschikoff stated had been respected, and that they had not been opened.

"Lord Raglan will convey his own and the two officers' thanks to the Prince for his courtesy, and as the common

Russian soldiers are very brutal in their mode of carrying on the war, I have suggested that my lord might give the Russians a little hint, by adding that he and his troops would be always most willing to do everything to mitigate the horrors of war, consistent with a proper execution of their duty." 1854. Siege of Sebastopol.

*From* Sir William Reid.

"Malta, 4th December, 1854.

"My dear Sir John,

"I received to-night your letter of the 19th November; and as you only mention one as received from me, several others could not have reached you. They related to guns, mortars, and ammunition sent to you. I feel it useless to wait until Lord Raglan asks: it is for us to send all and everything which we think may help you in your difficulties. I shall see if I can send you some warm clothing. Along with Admiral Stewart I am contriving trousers, and trying the Malta Nankin blanketing for this purpose. At the Dockyard he is making stoves, and camp cooking furnaces to burn common coal. He has bought up all the planks and boards in Malta for hutting you, and sending tools and nails. To-morrow I am going to get him to make you some chevaux-de-frise. I have recommended the Duke of Newcastle to send you a large supply, to help you to render a few points in Lord Raglan's position strong points of support. A single line may be got through; but two or three deep, entangled together, and put in places covered from cannon, they form an obstacle very difficult to be overcome.

"Forage we know you want much, and I am always urging as much as possible to be sent. If you had more forage we should send Lord Raglan more mules and carts.

"I perceive that the sick and wounded officers carry away a number of effective soldiers from Lord Raglan. You had better mention this fact to his Lordship, although I do not know that it can be helped. It is certainly right to give sick and wounded officers all the care that can be bestowed on them; but still this is a great evil, as it abstracts from the army many of the

1854. very best soldiers. I do not remember what was the Duke of Wellington's rule on this point.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"I hope you may be able to close your investment on your right to the harbour when the reinforcements arrive; for I cannot see what chance of success you have until this can be done.

"I am astonished at the ships not putting to sea when the gale of the 14th was setting in. I believe the wind was southerly, which would have enabled them to gain an offing on the *port* tack.

"Yours sincerely,

"WILLIAM REID."

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"8th December, 1854.

"It seems extraordinary to me, how your London newspapers can be so bold as to have long disquisitions in leading articles, on the course of military events here, without any professional knowledge, and without being at all acquainted with circumstances, founded on pure fancy and imagination.

"Day after day you are told that the assault is to take place on the 5th, or 12th, or 18th, &c. &c., and that there is not a doubt on the result, when there has not been a question about the day for an assault, nor the least confidence expressed that if it took place on that day it would be successful; then you are told that *it is only a question of time*, that the siege works are progressing, and the *breach every day becoming larger*, when in point of fact, the firing has been all but suspended, no breach opened, the damage done to parapets, &c. fully repaired, the works of the place greatly added to, and Sebastopol at the present time stronger than ever it was; in fact, to reduce it, we want much greater means in men, artillery, and all sorts of siege-equipments.

"Pouring in additional French troops will not have the effect; in however great a degree we may be reduced in strength and they increase, they still hold us to a kind of bargain that we must do half the work, and not only half, but the hardest half.

"They are very cordial and very civil, but do not take the brunt of the affair as they ought to do now. 1854. Siege of Sebastopol.

"Reinforcements come to us in driblets—recruits; I see parties every day in camp, drilling at the goose step as an awkward squad.

"By some unhappy arrangements, to such novices have been entrusted outposts, and they have been shamefully surprised, and otherwise disgraced, and they fall sick by hundreds.

"You will think this a grumbling, complaining letter; I am not out of sorts, notwithstanding; while there are many officers and men, probably, in this army who anxiously wish to get home, I myself would not be anywhere but where I am;—not that I would have any objection to pass a week at Christmas, in Gloucester Gardens, but to return here afterwards."

*To* Colonel MATSON.

(*Confidential.*)

"8th December, 1854.

"I find (at 2 P.M.) that I have just time to put in a new despatch into the bag, of which I avail myself. Last night was a sharp frost; to day is fine, but thawing. A sufficiency of fine weather to enable us to get more matters up to camp, would be of great value. The enemy are temporarily drawing off from our rear, I augur from it that they require to attend somewhat to their comforts and necessities, and to return upon us hereafter with renewed vigour, and I also augur from it that they consider the place safe for the present, and I think they are right. It is stronger now than ever it has been. The French, amidst great (and as I think ultra) caution, with regard to attacks upon us from without, seem inclined to press upon us a most desperate one on the garrison; but I do not think that our circumstances are quite so bad as to justify such a proceeding. I believe in my own mind that we ought to wait for reinforcements, in men and all kinds of siege-equipments; but I deprecate what I fear will be had resort to, that the *soldiers* must necessarily be French:—it will not answer the same effect, if all were fairly used, and it will moreover place *us* in a subservient position, in which we may, and no doubt will retain our

1854. reputation for *fighting*, but otherwise in reputation and physically we shall be sacrificed, with all the appearance of candour in a desire to give us support.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"From what I see of the proceedings, we shall be under the greatest disadvantages, if the French force in the combination is vastly superior to ours.

"I should be glad if Lord Hardinge was aware of this opinion of mine, in continuation of what I have written to himself."

*From* Sir WILLIAM REID.

"Malta, 9th December, 1854.

"MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

"I have received your letter of the 26th, and Lord Raglan's note of the 29th November.

"Will you thank Lord Raglan for his Lordship's note to me. We indeed think incessantly of your position. I would have sent the 62nd earlier, and on Admiral Houston Stewart's first suggestion (for he first suggested its going), but I am cautious not to overact the Governor, but consult with the General and Admiral. Although this mode of acting is sometimes painfully slow, it is the best upon the whole for the public service.

"I have written both officially and privately to Sir Robert Gardiner,[1] begging him to send on gunpowder, projectiles, &c., by every possible opportunity to us in Malta, to fill up our void by supplying you.

"And I have written to the Duke of Newcastle, advising His Grace *to send you four or five miles of tram-road.*

"Yours very truly,

"WILLIAM REID."

[1] The Governor of Gibraltar. These letters illustrate strongly the great military value of Gibraltar and Malta, as bases for operations in the Levant and Mediterranean.—ED.

1854.

Siege of Sebastopol.

*To* Major J. W. GORDON, R.E.

" Head Quarters, 10th December, 1854.

" With reference to the Inkermann Heights, I am quite an advocate for putting guns of the most powerful class, and mortars, in and about the battery which the French have constructed against Inkermann Lighthouse and the shipping. The French will not do it, and therefore it must be done by us, if at all; and if I had my will, it should be the first destination for my guns. I do not care a pin about arming the redoubts,[1] for I do not believe they can ever be attacked, and I would not wait even for opening the battery against the lighthouse, before I would advance by a line of trench parallel along the side of the ridge out of sight of it—so much progress would be made, and at very little risk. Though you silenced the Inkermann Lighthouse batteries, from your description you could not prevent their establishing others on the opposite side of the harbour, and yet I would not by any means despair of being able to establish sufficient guns in battery to drive away the shipping; everything else could be done along the side of the hill, out of sight of the harbour and its opposite side. J. F. B."

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" 8th December, 1854.

" General Airey the Quartermaster-General, and Lord Raglan's right-hand man in the direction of everything, has now been laid up so long that I fear it will be considered hopeless to re-establish him here; Captain Hardinge (Lord Hardinge's son) the same, though neither of them as yet have an idea of abandoning their posts. The army is naturally very sickly, and particularly those recently arrived from England. Awkward efforts are made partially to burrow in the ground, and to hut, but there is no wood to form the roofs, and if we had it even on the shore, the state of the country (such as you saw in winter in Bulgaria) and the lack of animals would make it impossible to get it up. I get occasionally a small stock of firewood, &c.

[1] These were the redoubts made after Inkermann, on the spot where the battle was fought.—ED.

1854. up, but it is with great pain, by putting three horses (abreast) to my prize Russian two-wheel cart.

Mr. Fergusson's system of fortification.

"You will perhaps have read in the *Times* of the 18th November, a letter from Mr. Fergusson endeavouring to draw an argument in favour of his system from the events here; but you will easily perceive the fallacies in it. This place is strong from its large garrison, inexhaustible supply of artillery, ammunition, and gunners, rocky soil—its defences generally in a straight line, but divided into prominent commanding salients, which form its most advantageous character; none of the properties of Mr. Fergusson's system; it is the *dispersion* of the enemy's guns that gives them their power, not the *concentration* as in his system.

"Sebastopol is prodigiously strong *in spite of having only earth-works;* if they had masonry escarps and counterscarps on the bastion system, with a few outworks, and with such a garrison, it would be as nearly impregnable as any place could well be. I can only foresee the long operation of getting here (and up the hill) great reinforcements in men and siege-means. The Russians are no doubt making great efforts also; it will be a contest of resources, in which we *ought* to beat them, and should, if we were under a despot, but I fear the vacillation of the multitude.

"Our giving ships, money, stores, &c.; and the French, the soldiers, will be a very bad arrangement, for we shall never get fair play by such a course; if such is to be the case, we had better withdraw our little corps altogether, than remain to be sacrificed at the discretion of the French general, with a loss of reputation in every particular, except in that for fighting, and of that we cannot be robbed.

"Hugh[1] took a long ride with me and Stopford to-day, over part of the battle-field of the 5th, and just before dinner lay down on his bed and fell asleep.

"Lord Raglan came in to talk to me, and I tried to rouse Hugh, but in vain; and when my lord retired, he went out on *tiptoe* to avoid disturbing him."

[1] Sir John's only son, afterwards lost whilst in command of the turret-ship *Captain*. He was at this time lieutenant in H.M.S. *Swallow*, employed in the Black Sea.—Ed.

"14th December, 1854. 1854.

"I send you now a continuation and completion of my hints on the organization of the British Army. Many of these embrace matters that have for years been flitting across my mind, and which are renewed incessantly by what I witness now daily. I can perceive that they are so crude, confused, and inconclusive, that I fear they will carry little conviction in their present state, and I shall not be at all affronted if you and Wrottesley think that even as hints for promulgation in their present shape, they had better be laid by for further reflection and more leisure.[1] Siege of Sebastopol.

"If, however, you think that, even as now framed, they may tend to turn attention to some points worthy of consideration, and perhaps lead to partial improvements, you must undertake a troublesome task in improvement of style, and numerous amendments and alterations. The consecutive arrangement will perhaps require alteration and to be made more connected, and the repetition of statement, and very frequently of words, must be corrected.

"If evils that are not generally perceived as admitting of remedy, are even pointed out so as to set the minds of others at work to find the best remedy, it is so much gain: the remedies I suggest may be objected to, but it is as well to advance them, as they may afford ideas of modifications; the more details are entered into, the more there will be room for cavil, but principles should not be rejected because the details do not give satisfaction.

"I shall not only not be affronted at your not making use of this paper, as at present hurriedly drawn up on ill-digested ideas, but I shall quite expect that you will lay it by; but there are seeds in it for reflection.

"The fact is, there is nothing new in the proposed principle for the Transport. The French have it, as might be mentioned. They have their *Parc du Génie* with waggons, horses (French), and drivers, and would as soon be without them, probably, as be without artillery. The medical department have, besides spring-waggons, fine pack-saddle mules with a frame on each

[1] These notes appeared in the 'United Service Magazine' of Feb. 1855.—Ed.

1854. — Siege of Sebastopol.

side which is either an arm-chair or full-length stretcher. These can be in the field of action: with one patient, the driver sits on the other side; with two, he leads the mule. They have their *équipages militaires*, waggons, horses, and regular drivers, for what corresponds to our Commissariat, so that it is rare to see any natives with transport among them. Their drivers have a very plain uniform, and almost all have a small carbine slung to their backs, which I approve; and most of them a great heavy cavalry sabre, which I do not approve; for, while it is a great encumbrance, of what service can be such a weapon while the men are tacked to a waggon, or when on foot? while the carbine would give them weight and respect among marauders, or troublesome people of the country.

"While all our means of transport at this present time is nearly annihilated, we can see theirs working about like bees. To be sure they are better horse-masters than we are, and under the same system our establishment, under deprivation and hardship, would be greatly inferior.

"If you undertake the task, Wrottesley might ask advice on any point of any one he thinks capable of giving information or good opinions. I do not know if I have made it clear, but it is the deplorable state of our means of transport that I particularly aim at, and that induced me to commence the paper. Owing to it, our troops and many horses are imperfectly rationed, so as to suffer severely in consequence, while we have abundance of food at Balaklava within six miles of the camp; and what is more provoking, we *had* a very good force of waggons, bullocks, camels, horses, and mules, that have been almost entirely annihilated, and more by neglect and want of arrangement that would secure their being properly fed and taken care of, than from other causes. Among the papers sending to Matson is a copy of one I have drawn up, one containing propositions for making the best of our present system."

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"14th December, 1854.

"By dint of constant urging, and the acknowledged difficulties of every course of proceedings, people's opinions

seem to be coming round to my wish to advance along our extreme right ridge (that overlooking the Harbour), as likely to have influential effects. Even General Canrobert, we hear, will forward us by giving *us* French working parties, sending additional forces (another Division) to strengthen that side, and General Rose seems to think that General Bizot, who alone withholds his approval, is actuated by a little jealousy in favour of his own exclusive system. I care not (though I wish we could all agree) provided I get the matter forwarded. I think in my last letter I sent you a Memorandum I wrote on the subject. I am frequently obliged to be diffuse in my propositions and instructions, because there is so much ignorance in the common A B C matters. 1854. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"I have the greatest difficulty in making our Officers of the Line understand the relative power of the enemy with our own, that is, when I can occasionally come across them in some of their misapprehensions. Inefficiency of English outposts.

"They find the Russian sharpshooters well lodged, and powerfully protected by heavy batteries, and of course must submit; but not discriminating the difference, they would allow the same to come to a great distance from their batteries, and lodge themselves within 300 or 400 yards of our strong posts. Yesterday I was in front, on the Inkermann Ridge, at about 2500 yards from the Russian lines, when the out sentries, and even the officer on duty, warned me not to go any further, because the enemy had sometimes riflemen concealed about 300 yards in front. I said it was impossible, or that if it were so, they ought to be ashamed of themselves not to drive them away; at which they shook their heads, and I had no time to make an excursion with them to prove that they were mistaken.

"Our outpost proceedings would be very different if we had the old Light Division, as they were in 1813, to keep them for us; nothing would be more easy to them. We should hear very little of the heavy musketry alarms we now have frequently at night, and the Russians would be handsomely punished for excursions they sometimes make high up deep ravines, without possessing the ridges that overlook them.

"I think I mentioned in a former letter that we did not fire into the town, but I see the newspapers talk of the immense

1854. Siege of Sebastopol.

damage done *in* the town; that either means some suburbs near their batteries, which, of course, have suffered extensively, or perhaps the French have thrown shells into the town (proper), but if the latter, and I have seen them scattering about their fire, I think it is injudicious. My principle is to concentrate all your fire on the influential defences, and immediately in rear of them."

"16th December.

"General Bizot still gives battle about the right. I shall endeavour to enclose a copy of his note of 14th, and my reply. The Head-Quarters here are all with me.

"On what principle are Ross and Gardiner made full generals over me and many others?

"I am not going to make any grievance of it. It does me no harm that I see."

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"10th December, 1854.

"It is just now five o'clock in the morning. An alarm has been brought in from our pickets, that the enemy are collecting, with guns, in front of our right attack; and as those batteries are what I have always thought our most vulnerable point, I have got up and dressed, contrary to my practice on many other alarms that I thought groundless, as they proved to be. This may be the same, but it threatens where I do not like, chiefly because I fear our holding too long on the *defensive* above, when we ought to advance *at once* to save our heavy batteries below.

"While waiting for daylight to contradict or verify the alarm, I commence a letter to you, in return for yours of 23rd. The *Times* is justified, on the reasons it gives, in sounding the alarm for us. Our forces are miserably small, and in an awful state of debility and diminution, but we are not yet in any *danger*. The enemy do not hang so close upon our rear in force as they have till lately, and we are becoming stronger and stronger there. Even if they did, their only communication with the garrison now is across the Great Harbour.

That, to be sure, is quite free, and they have several steamers, some of them large, plying to and fro, with deep water and good wharves, still it is not to be supposed that they would, even for a powerful sortie, do more than add a strong reinforcement to the garrison, not one equal to cope with our whole army; therefore, the worst evil I could anticipate at present would be a temporary possession of some of our batteries, and that I would willingly make great efforts to prevent. 1854. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"While guarding our front to the place, we must not, and do not, neglect to look after our rear, where the enemy may come again upon us at any time, however harmless he may look at present. His base is from Bakchi Serai, and his line of operations along the ridge, having the river Belbec on his right, which takes him down to the ground along the right of the Great Harbour, and the plains of the Tchernaya on his left. On the heights of Inkermann he has constructed defensive field works, and numerous batteries to strengthen, on his side, that position in a great degree, and from thence all the way to Mackenzie's Farm, there is a very bold line of heights, crowned with thick wood, on his left, and with nothing but a few paths and bad tracks across it from the low flat plain that borders the Tchernaya.

"The corps that occasionally pushes forward to threaten Balaklava, may either act from Mackenzie's Farm, or along the Yalta East Coast road.

"These are favourable features for him, even if we were strong enough to attempt to disturb him. I only wish, however, that we had such an army that we could afford to send out to keep his external forces at a distance, while the rest acted against the garrison, which would then be left to its own resources; and this we should have had, if all the reinforcements we and the French have since received, and that are now on the way, had been in the Crimea before the middle of October; a lesson in favour of always employing an excess of means in war rather than nicely balancing them.

"7 A.M. and no attack: 8 A.M., false alarm decidedly."

1854.

General Bizot's Memorandum of 11th Dec.

*Note en réponse au Mémorandum de* M. le Général Burgoyne *en date du* 11 *décembre* 1854.[1]

"Les propositions du Mémorandum de M. le Général Burgoyne en date du 11 décembre, relatives aux dispositions à prendre préalablement à toute attaque contre la partie du camp retranché de Karabelnia qui s'étend de la batterie du redan à celle des casernes, peuvent se résumer ainsi qu'il suit.

"Appeler l'attention de l'ennemi sur la gauche de cet ouvrage, et particulièrement sur ceux qui se rattachent à la position de la tour Malakoff par des démonstrations assez sérieuses pour l'amener à y concentrer ses plus puissants moyens de défense, aux dépens des ouvrages de sa droite; ces démonstrations devant avoir encore pour résultat, d'une part de renforcer les positions défensives de la droite de l'armée anglaise par l'occupation du plateau qui couronne les escarpements de droite du ravin du carenage, et de l'autre de permettre d'endommager, ou du moins d'inquiéter assez par des batteries établies sur ce même plateau les vaisseaux russes réfugiés au fond du port, pour les obliger à l'abandonner et à se rapprocher de son entrée.

"A cet effet et pour contrebattre les feux de flanc et de revers qu'on aurait à craindre, soit des vaisseaux embossés au fond du port, soit des batteries étagées sur la rive nord, on armerait immédiatement la batterie construite par les Français en face du Phare.

"On y placerait 9 pièces dirigées contre la batterie russe qui enveloppe ce dernier, et 2 contre le fond du port. Quelques mortiers, destinés à agir aussi dans cette dernière direction,[2] seraient établis avec un épaulement dans le voisinage de la batterie.

"On porterait en même temps, à 500 ou 600 m. de la tranchée récemment ouverte en avant de la redoute et de la batterie anglaise, une parallèle reliée avec cette tranchée par des cheminements, et s'il était nécessaire, on se porterait de cette même parallèle pour arriver à couvert à la meilleure position à occuper sur le plateau, tant pour agir sur le port et la flotte,

[1] Sir John's Memorandum is published by Major Elphinstone in the 'Official Account of the Siege.'—Ed.

[2] "Not against the ships, but the Lighthouse batteries.—J. F. B."

que pour protéger d'autres cheminements qu'on ferait descendre sur le contrefort de la tour Malakoff, pour venir occuper le mamelon qui s'élève en avance de cette tour, et qui fournirait un excellent point de départ pour une attaque réelle sur cet ouvrage. 1854. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"Je suis loin de contester l'utilité des mesures recommandées par M. le Général Burgoyne, et les avantages d'une attaque régulière du faubourg de la marine, dirigée sur la redoute de la tour Malakoff, qui est évidemment la clef de la position. Il ne peut y avoir qu'un avis sur ce point, mais il y a encore à examiner la question d'opportunité, en tenant compte des ressources de l'assiégeant et de l'époque avancée de la saison.

"Il est vrai que M. le Général Burgoyne borne les opérations à une démonstration suffisamment sérieuse pour retenir sur ce point les principaux moyens de défense de l'ennemi, tandis qu'une attaque véritable serait portée sur le redan et la batterie des casernes. Mais jusqu'où sera poussée cette démonstration, et ne serait-il pas à craindre de faire beaucoup de travail et de perdre beaucoup de temps pour arriver à un mince résultat? car si l'on détourne ainsi l'ennemi de la pensée de renforcer sa droite, on affaiblit en même temps les batteries anglaises de gauche de toutes les pièces qu'on affecte à l'armement de la batterie du Phare et à l'occupation du plateau du carenage: le premier ne saurait être moindre de 9 pièces, dont cinq contre le Phare, deux à gauche contre le fond du port, 'où se montrent les bateaux à vapeur, mais non les vaisseaux,'—enfin deux à droite pour battre l'emplacement du pont détruit du Tchernaya.[1] Quant à l'occupation du plateau du carenage, elle ne me semble pas se contenter d'un petit nombre de pièces, si l'on doit agir à la fois sur le port et sur le contrefort de la tour Malakoff.

"Je ne crois pas d'ailleurs que le moment soit venu de se préoccuper de la flotte, quand on prépare l'attaque de la ville et du quartier de la marine, l'attaque sur la flotte viendrait après. Si celle sur la tour Malakoff ne devait être qu'une simple démonstration, ce serait la pousser bien loin que de descendre par cheminement jusqu'au mamelon qui précède celui de la Tour, et d'y venir ouvrir une parallèle dont il y aurait alors tout lieu de partir pour une attaque réelle.

[1] "Not necessary, in my opinion.—J. F. B."

1854. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"Que si l'on considère la proposition au point de vue défensif, il y a une incontestable utilité à prendre possession du plateau au-dessus du carenage, tant pour empêcher l'ennemi de s'y établir, que pour défendre de flanc le contrefort par lequel il pourrait essayer une nouvelle sortie contre la droite des positions anglaises. En résumé, je crois qu'avant de se prononcer à ce sujet, il conviendrait de prier M. le Général Burgoyne de vouloir bien faire connaître: 1° Quel concours il entend réclamer de l'armée française pour les travaux qu'il propose. 2° Combien il juge nécessaire de porter de pièces et de mortiers de quel calibre sur le plateau qui borde l'encampement de droite du ravin du carenage indépendamment des 9 pièces de la batterie du Phare. 3° Combien il restera de pièces disponibles parmi celles nouvellement débarquées pour renforcer les batteries de gauche et y remplacer les 24 pièces mises hors de service depuis l'ouverture du feu. Avant de terminer, je crois devoir ajouter une observation sur l'interprétation qui a été donnée dans le mémorandum du 11 décembre à l'un des paragraphes de ma note du 26. Je disais dans cette note que les dispositions d'attaque présentées étaient subordonnées à trois conditions essentielles, dont l'une était la destruction préalable de l'artillerie de la batterie du Mât, sur laquelle, disais-je, il sera bien essentiel que trois ou quatre pièces de l'extrême gauche des batteries anglaises dirigent un feu soutenu, concurremment avec celui des batteries françaises, pendant les deux jours qui précéderont celui de l'attaque. M. le Général Burgoyne conclut de là qu'il entrait dans le projet de donner l'assaut en tout état de cause 48 heures après la réouverture du feu de nos batteries; telle n'a pas été ma pensée. L'assaut sur le front des attaques françaises ne doit être donné, selon moi, que lorsque nos batteries seront parvenues à désemparer de leurs feux certaines batteries puissantes de la place, qui croisent à portée de mitraille leurs feux sur les obstacles à franchir. On peut espérer, mais on ne saurait affirmer que ce résultat sera obtenu en 48 heures, et il doit être entendu que cette unité n'a rien d'absolu, et que la durée du feu pourra être augmentée ou diminuée selon l'effet produit, et selon les ressources en munition dont on disposera. On s'est borné à demander deux jours de feu à la batterie anglaise, pour lui laisser la plus grande

action possible sur celle des casernes, qu'elle est destinée à contrebattre. 1854. Siege of Sebastopol.

(Signed) "B. Bizot,
"Le Général comm$^{t}$ le Génie à l'armée française
"devant Sébastopol, le 14 décembre 1854."

*Observations on* General Bizot's *Paper of* 14*th December.*

Camp before Sebastopol, 15th December, 1854.

General Bizot seems to consider that under present circumstances an assault should be accelerated, and that after the result of a cannonading and bombardment from a powerful force of artillery, it may be attempted on the two sides of the south harbour, namely, the Bastion du Mât on the west, and the Redan and Barrack batteries on the east; and he deprecates any measures on the Inkermann ridge or elsewhere, that would create delay, or that would abstract means from the main attack on which he relies. Sir John's answer.

I retain, however, a very strong opinion that such an attack, particularly if unaided by a serious demonstration against the Tower fronts, would, for manifest reasons, be so arduous, and even desperate, and with such chance of failure, as would not justify the attempt, even under the pressure of the advanced state of the season. I would therefore continue to urge the propriety of pushing advances along the Inkermann ridge, and that in front of the tower of Malakoff, in order to threaten the entire line between the great harbour at the Careening Bay and the south harbour, and to be prepared to make any assaults or attacks that may be necessary on that side; nor do I think that such a course will occasion any very great delay, nor abstract from the means that can be usefully applied to our left attack.

With regard to time—as our object consists at first almost entirely in trenches and parallels for cover of troops, and does not contemplate any very near approach to the enemy's lines—a few days, with large working parties, will be sufficient for very forward movements from our present occupation, at between 2000 and 3000 yards from their works, and will at once have a considerable effect; and for the means required

1854. for arming batteries there, they need not be taken from a full supply for every use that can be made of them on our left attack.

Siege of Sebastopol.

On that attack there remain 20 guns of the original set, besides 3 guns and 3 mortars in the Ravine battery, and some on the right attack that bear on the Redan and Barrack batteries; and we have now upon the hill in depôt, ready to be put into the left attack, an additional 21 guns and 7 mortars, making in all nearly 50 guns and 10 mortars, all to bear on that front of attack. It may be considered that this, in addition to the French batteries, will do all that artillery can, towards reducing the fire of the enemy's guns, although it cannot open the works of defence to the storming parties. What therefore is sought for, to aid in the measures on the extreme right, would be the application to this service of some of the many guns and mortars that still remain available at Balaklava.

I do not anticipate occupying the mamelon in front of the Tower as absolutely necessary in the first instance, because I agree with General Bizot that it would require considerable efforts to do so; but as I cannot but anticipate that we shall ultimately be compelled to have recourse to a real attack on that front, every advance on that side will turn to useful account.

My object in proposing batteries against the shipping is to prevent their annoying our flanks, as they have done, and retaining their command over the openings of the ravines; also, because I consider that a serious effect may be produced on them by moderate means, and because I conceive that an impression on them would have a useful moral effect.

I stated 48 hours as the limit for the cannonading before an assault, because I understood General Canrobert to give that as the period for which the ammunition for the French batteries would last.

As regards the means that will be required from the French troops, I consider that 3000 men will be required on the two ridges on our right, for covering and working parties, including our present pickets and working parties, except the pickets fronting the Tchernaya; and it would require the strength probably of one French Division, in combination with the

British force on the right, to provide the necessary force for this service. 1854.

J. F. BURGOYNE. Siege of Sebastopol.

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"21st December, 1854.

"I send you occasionally rough copies of Memoranda and Reports that I have to draw up from time to time, many of which will be incomprehensible to you from not knowing the circumstances, but some will give you an insight into some of our proceedings: when you have done with them, hand them to Lady Burgoyne for deposit, as I may some day like to look over them again.

"I have just finished a very long letter to Lord Hardinge, to whom I write very frankly and confidentially, knowing that I am safe in doing so, and believing that he takes an interest in such communications.

"The enemy made sorties last night on both our attacks, and as they were attended with no result to them except killing and wounding several of our men, for which I hope they suffered also, I call them a failure. There is a good deal of dissatisfaction at the conduct of part of our covering party, which quitted the trenches for the rear unnecessarily,—and we lost several men and two or three officers made prisoners.

"Our covering parties are usually shamefully negligent, and scattered about fast asleep and wrapped up in their blankets.

"Some of you 'Gentlemen of England' talk great nonsense. I see repeated letters in the newspapers, wondering at our stupidity in not occupying the isthmus of Perekop, without knowing anything about it but what it looks like on a map.

"It is untenable; and there is another magnificent road into the Crimea at a distance from the proper isthmus. Then one says: '*Six line-of-battle ships moored on each side would entirely command it;*"—the water on each side is *for miles, only one or two feet deep!*"

"23rd December, 1854.

"I am uneasy about my friends defending me in the *Times* injudiciously: for instance, if they put forward that I originated

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the idea of the movement to Balaklava and the south, it will naturally be supposed that I have been writing home boastingly,—it will be deemed a reproach upon Lord Raglan, and, perhaps, lead to giving him offence. In many ways they may do me great harm by indirect remarks."

"25th December, 1854.

"A happy Christmas and a merry New Year to you and yours.

"I have just been writing to Lord Hardinge; and when on the subject of our defective army transport, I told him that I had sent you a few Memoranda which perhaps you might concoct into an article for a military magazine, and he may possibly apply to you about it. I am in the habit of being very confidential with him.

"I have drawn up a beautiful project of enterprises against the enemy here in the field, but in talking it over with Lord Raglan, who acknowledged the good reasoning of it, we agreed it would need *some* means of transport, and as we have absolutely none available, it must be deferred, and I am keeping it to myself, because if it got out it would be said that here was a project offered but not attended to; and I would not on any account be the cause of any plea for dissatisfaction against him.

"The reasoning in the letter signed 'R. E.' in the *Times* is perfectly correct, and the more I think of it the more I am satisfied by subsequent experience that '*it is frightful to imagine the straits to which the allied armies would have been reduced, had an attack on the north front been persevered in.*"[1]

[1] Sir John Burgoyne was of opinion that, if the allied armies had remained on the north side of the harbour, the enemy would have intercepted their communication with the fleet; and by throwing up entrenchments have blockaded the allied force, and brought their camp under cannonade. To avoid a capitulation, the Allies must then have fought action after action, upon the most unfavourable terms, and with more than doubtful chances of success. It was the fashion at this time to laud up the French Generals to the skies, and to depreciate our own, whose military experience was designated by the cant term "Peninsular prejudices." These prejudices, however, appear to have been of some utility in the Crimea, and if shared by the French in 1870, would have probably prevented the ignominious capitulations of the late war.

In a letter written to the *Times*, in August, 1868, Sir John Burgoyne

## *Project for an Attack upon the Enemy in the Field.*[1]

1854.

Camp before Sebastopol, 23rd December, 1854.

Proposed advance to the Belbec.

In this country the early winter, with its heavy rains and inclement weather, puts an end to all ordinary campaigning operations;—the soil is soaked, and impracticable for carriages, and very difficult for even horses or men to traverse,—no supplies can accompany or be brought up to the army,—carrying tents is impossible, and to bivouac would be utterly destructive to the troops,—but it will not prevent sorties being sent out from a garrison, nor such other movements from being made as are very near the position of the troops.

It is for those therefore that are in mass near their resources to take the offensive against those who may be far from them. We are near enough to ours to resist with success, by due arrangements, any sorties the enemy may venture to make; and it is worthy of consideration whether we cannot, on the other hand, make our sorties upon any parts of the enemy's army that are sufficiently near to us, but must be far from their reserves and support. The state of the present weather, and the impracticable condition of the country, affects the enemy in the field much more injuriously than it does us; he must be debarred from receiving virtually any reinforcements or supplies,

thus expresses himself upon the same subject:—"The possession of the north side would not have given us the possession of the south, in which lay all the resources of the place; and the attempt of the Russian Generals to affirm the contrary is incomprehensible, with the experience before them of the position of affairs after the final assault on the 8th of September, 1855. After that date the Allies held peaceable possession of the south side of the harbour, and blew up the docks at their leisure, without serious molestation from the enemy, although the Russian army at the time occupied the north side of the harbour and all its batteries.

"I fully believe that if my views on the propriety of making the south the point of attack had not been adopted by the allied commanders, winter would have surprised us on the heights of the Belbec, without a harbour, and with a difficult line of operations to defend; and that the safety of the whole allied force would have been seriously compromised."—Ed.

[1] "An idea drawn up and submitted to Lord Raglan; but we found, from the absolute want of any means of transport and the inefficient state of the artillery horses, it could not be attempted at present.—J. F. B."

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which could not possibly traverse hundreds of miles overland from where they are to be collected,—while ours, arriving by sea, are brought daily in any quantity; this is therefore a precious time for us to seek for some opportunity, if possible, of profiting by our advantage. As soon as the frosts set in, which will gradually come down from the north, and be here (according to ordinary seasons) about the middle of January, communications, and of a very favourable kind, will be open to the enemy. I would submit then that by an effort, we could gain some considerable advantages during this favourable period by an advance over the Inkermann heights, straight across the ridge to the Belbec. Judging from the nature of the circumstances of the enemy from every appearance, and even from the indication of the troops very recently sent into Sebastopol, their force on that ground must be small,—they cannot have more than 7000 or 8000 men there, and, probably, not half the number,—the rest of their army being no doubt about Bakchi-Serai, and even Simferopol, that is, distant at least two or three days march of the most difficult kind.

The enterprise would require not less than two heavy days' work. In order to save fatigue, the advance might be chiefly (that is, for the main body and artillery) made across the causeway under the ruins of Inkermann; the only present defence in opposition, the lower Lighthouse battery, it is to be hoped will be previously greatly reduced by the batteries we are now establishing against it: and even otherwise, the movement across the causeway may be made at night. At the same time, or, perhaps better, previously by a few hours, a column may cross the Tchernaya higher up, and gain the upper Lighthouse by a favourable ridge which projects into the valley, from whence it will turn the heads of the ravines, and reach the Post-house, gaining the rear of the whole of the batteries that were intended, when armed, to command the road up which the main body that cross the causeway will advance. That body will proceed by that route to the Belbec, leaving a small corps to take in rear and destroy every battery and post along the north side of the harbour, that shall be beyond the protection of the enclosed and connected works of position on that side, and to keep in check any sortie from the garrison.

This is a first general idea of the undertaking—subject of course to modification on more thorough investigation—if thought at all worthy of consideration.

I conceive that we could afford now 30,000 men, if necessary, for this operation, of which 18,000 French and 12,000 British;[1] a few of the most efficient of the cavalry might accompany them, and a small proportion of artillery; to afford the latter the best chance of being of service, it might be double-horsed, that is, by taking three guns instead of six of each battery, and one or two ammunition waggons for the three, instead of one per gun.

The advantages I should anticipate from this movement would be:—

1. It would be taking the initiative, and showing a spirit of enterprise, which always creates an useful moral effect: it would be giving the law instead of receiving it, as we have been now for too long a time compelled to do.

2. It would enable us to turn and destroy several batteries which have been established on the north side of the harbour, to our annoyance, and which they would scarcely venture to reoccupy.

3. It would cut off for the time the communication between the garrison and the army outside; and, even should we retire within our lines immediately after, it would force the enemy to make most harassing marches and arrangements to re-establish it.

4. It might be attended with some advantages in action against the little corps that might oppose us.

Following the reasoning up a little further, and entering upon anticipations that are worthy of some thought, although they may or may not be realised, I cannot at all suppose that the enemy, even after the frosts set in, can pour that enormous number of troops into the Crimea that they would make us believe, and, above all, provide them with everything needful for an army: not only may we reason by calculation of the thing being almost impossible, but we know by experience, that

[1] "We could not give 12,000, as it would be the whole of our force; it must be more French and fewer British: but 30,000 is over-estimated; 20,000 would be ample.—J. F. B."

1854. Siege of Sebastopol. their efforts have always fallen greatly short of expectation, when prolonged to any distance from the very interior of the empire, and sometimes even there. We may therefore reasonably hope that by the exertions which both France and England seem inclined to make, and our own valour, we may obtain a decided superiority in the field at the proper season; in the meantime we are at the present period gaining head; and it may also be hoped that before another month is passed, we may have a combined force of 50,000 men available for acting in the field, without trenching upon the necessary force to be left before the place. Immediately after the frosts first set in, and before the enemy can have collected any great amount of reinforcements, we might then advance and drive them from Bakchi-Serai and Simferopol, and their depôts at those places; and by so doing, throw their next base of operations so far in the rear as to retard, in a very great degree, any future offensive movements on their side, leaving Sebastopol, if not taken previously, to its fate. Nor need any of these movements check at all the most active measures against the garrison.

J. F. BURGOYNE.

*To* Colonel MATSON.

" 27th December.

Interview with General Bizot. " The result of a long interview which General Airey and I had with General Bizot yesterday, leads us to hope that the French will lend a strong helping hand to make a powerful advance, not as a *demonstration* only, but an *attack*, on the Tower on our right: we to continue on our right and left attacks, and along the Inkermann height, while they take the entire of a new operation down the ridge upon the Tower. At present we are entirely precluded from further approaches, on either of the three sides on which we have commenced, by the posts and rifle pits thrown out by the Russians in front of their lines, and strongly supported by them. The proposed first operation will be by the French driving off the riflemen in front of the Tower, and crowning the height (the Mamelon, which is about 600 yards from the Tower), and prolonging a trench right and left of it, to the ravine on each side. The

ground is so far favourable for it, that the back of the Mamelon, and right and left of it, is under cover from the enemy's works; and when the riflemen are driven in, there will be a natural communication to it unseen, all the way (or very nearly so) along the side of the valley on the right. Having effected that lodgment, and maintained it against the sorties that will probably be made on it, the rifle pits in front of the Redan may be gained, and further advances can be made towards the Redan, as well as on the extreme right to above the Careening Bay; and by adding to the batteries on the three points that envelop the Tower, we may hope to make such impression upon that commanding ground as to enable us to get possession of it. The Tower ground is 50 feet above that of the Redan, and gaining it must have a great influence on future operations. 1854. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"There is reason to believe, however, that the Russian army in the field is entirely incapacitated from further operations, by the season and state of the country, and that they have in consequence thrown a large increased force from it into the garrison. Now, if we could only move out and complete the investment on the north side, it would be a heavy blow to them. I believe we have already nearly enough men for the purpose (and more are coming in daily); but our movements are totally paralysed for want of means of transport, and therefore we are forced to leave them a free communication to and from the place across the harbour.

"28*th*. The French are not quite yet in the force they require to undertake this operation; and *we* must await the slow work of getting up guns and ammunition."

*To* Sir Francis B. Head, Bart.

"Camp before Sebastopol, 27th December, 1854.

"My dear Head,

"When you and I last put our heads together, we contemplated other things than fraternising with the French in the same camp, and mutually supporting each other in the field; but so it is, and the respect that we have for each other is

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prodigious! When I compare our army with theirs, I see much to admire and to follow among them in matters of organization, and much to envy in their habits, and knowledge how to make themselves comparatively comfortable, when our poor helpless creatures are full of miseries. We find our Allies, even as circumstanced here, frequently singing and gay, while for months I have not witnessed so much as a smile on the face of a British soldier—who, although suffering and serious, make no complaints! But carry the comparison a little further—to the spirit and animation and resolute courage in facing the enemy—and, I must say, that highly as I have been accustomed to estimate my countrymen for those qualities, they have greatly exceeded all I could have thought of them. It is not *individuals* among them, but the great body—the masses who in the open field and in broad daylight, rush upon a most determined enemy, as the Russians certainly are, to the closest quarters, without computing relative numbers; trusting to their generals to bring up supports, which they see at the time are not present, and to take care of their flanks, on which the enemy are advancing at the time; and if anything can exceed the conduct of these soldiers for daring spirit in action, and patience under severe deprivations, it is that of the officers!—tending to confirm what everybody in a campaign must perceive —how much depends upon the officers. This service in the Crimea cries shame on those who in England talk of the officers of the army as fine gentlemen, thinking of nothing but idleness and self-indulgence!

Bravery of English troops.

"Our Allies have witnessed the high bearing of our British troops with astonishment, and have in repeated instances, frankly acknowledged, with respect to specific feats, that their men could not have done them; our cool, steady advance, in contradistinction to their own rapid, impatient way of making an attack, is what they can't understand. They are fine, gallant fellows, and come forward handsomely to the scratch; but it is with prudence and a proper degree of caution. They would never (and very properly) have made that desperate and unnecessary attack at Balaklava, which ruined our Light Cavalry; nor do I believe they would have ventured, with so small a force, to have made the almost equally desperate

and very necessary resistance of our gallant 8000 at Inkermann. 1854.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"By some little hocus-pocus, it has happened that *we* have always had the post of honour and danger. On our advance from the landing over the great open plains, we had the left, with our flank *en l'air*, exposed to the whole force of the Russian cavalry, not less than 5000 or 6000 strong; the French had us on one flank, the sea and our fleet on the other; and it has happened since, that with our force gradually reduced to one-third of theirs, we have had the two exposed flanks, Balaklava and Inkermann, to protect, while they were comfortably encamped along the inattackable centre. To be sure they come forward to *support* us; but the brunt of the battle is with us, and they come just in time to carry on a clearly winning game. You will perceive that to resist the furious onslaught of the whole Russian army at Inkermann, we produced all we had that were not otherwise engaged, in the trenches and elsewhere—that is 8000 out of 16,000—while the French had engaged 6000 out of 50,000. We lost 2200, they *return* 1400; but in them is included 500 or 600 at least, killed and wounded in opposing a sortie at a distant part on the same day. We are on the best possible terms, and laud one another abundantly; and, so far from being displeased at what I observe, I rejoice inwardly at the persuasion that the prowess of our troops so far surpasses that of what are justly acknowledged to be among the best in Europe. I must, however, of our Allies say gratefully, that they are most friendly to us. Some of our officers newly landed from England, and by mismanagement marched off from the port in this strange country, just before dark on a rainy evening, soon losing their way, strayed into a French camp, where they were most hospitably received, made as comfortable as possible, and even a few bottles of champagne routed out to regale them with.

"Amidst the vast number of difficulties with which we are beset, by far the greatest—and, indeed, it is the great occasion of most of the others—is our terrible want of means of transport. We are upon a great height, from 500 to 700 feet above the sea, and from 5 to 7 miles from the landing-place, the country of deep muddy clay thoroughly saturated with water,

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without made roads, and amidst almost increasing heavy rains. Our animals, under no organisation or care, have dropped off by thousands; we have but a few left, and those half starved; thus we can only imperfectly get rations up for the troops. Fuel is getting very scarce—warm clothing, blankets, fuel, materials for hutting, guns and ammunition, are at Balaklava, and cannot be got up to camp, where the troops are fully engaged in tours of duty that are beyond endurance, for the sickness is very heavy. Under these circumstances, my mind, among other devices, recurs to your *lasso* system, and it is what has induced me now to write, and I could not write to *you* without being somewhat prosy. The Cavalry have performed here in our distress, the unusual feat of bringing up to camp a good many loads of biscuits, &c., hung across the common saddle of a spare horse; but they could occasionally be of even greater service if they could be applied to draught. The lasso would do that without making them regular *cart-horses*, and I have just proposed to Lord Raglan to get the thing set going by a thorough trial at Woolwich, after which some cavalry coming out here (with Lord Hardinge's sanction), fitted out with lassos, and shown how to use them; and I have recommended, that in addition to other means of obtaining information on its application, the Committee apply to *you* for the best that can be had.

The lasso system.

"Yours, very faithfully,

"J. F. Burgoyne."

"28th December, 1854.

"Don't you feel a little small in your own conceits about me after reading some recent articles in the *Times*, in which my name has been mixed up with ——?

"'That he's as bad as bad can be;
And I am quite as bad as he!!!'

"Among some insinuations, one direct attack is, 'We do not desire to have generals in command, of above seventy years of age.' They are right in desiring to have *qualified* generals, before they have descended much from the prime of life; but I think that Lord Raglan, the hero of the day, is very close upon that age, as well as Sir George Brown, to whom, I presume, they

would not object; and, though I ought not perhaps be one to say it, after a peace of nearly forty years, a little of the *experience* of the former wars is very necessary at starting in a new one. The old gentlemen here, for instance, can set the young ones right in many essential matters, which the latter cannot know by inspiration, and, with *our* army, have little means of learning during peace. A little experience with young blood is decidedly what would be best; and as the war becomes prolonged, the younger ought to supersede the older in commands in the field, but for the present you ought to bear a little with the old ones. 1854. Siege of Sebastopol.

"Promotions for the Alma, &c., seem to be coming in thick, although tardy. All at head-quarters are loud in expressing their satisfaction at Adye's advance to Lieutenant-Colonelcy; and I am pleased at several of our Engineer officers, including Chapman, getting a step. I am also not a little gratified at Burke[1] being made a major; it is a compliment to the memory of his brother, and to me, as well as to himself."

"30th December, 1854.

"In a very cursory glance at the first debate in Parliament, I observe that Mr. Layard says that I was sent out in spring to make a report, but that my report *was not borne out by the results.* What can he mean? I have little doubt but that it was, what has been imputed to me before, that I advocated, under any circumstances, a purely defensive position, by occupying Gallipoli and a line in front of Constantinople, which is quite unjust. When I went out, there was no idea of the extent to which the Allies would assist in the war—the French were supposed to be, and were, lukewarm; then a great difficulty arose about sending out a force without any secure retreat, which might be cut off perhaps by an advance of the Russians to the Dardanelles. Attacks on him in Parliament.

"The purport of my report was that you might secure a safe retreat, and a position from whence you could act *offensively*, if in sufficient force, and by moderate means: in short, a favourable and secure basis of operations; and as such it

[1] Major Burke of the 88th, A. D. C. to Sir John Burgoyne.

1854. was acted upon, and gave advantages and confidence to the commencement of operations; the poor attack made by the Russians on the Danube, and the *subsequent* determination of the Allies to send out a very large army, which perhaps they were gradually led into, by knowing of the advantages of the Gallipoli position, have thrown the use of these early precautions into the background, but they were not the less necessary at the commencement, and when the utmost exertion that was contemplated for the East was some 12,000 or 20,000 men.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"Look over the newspapers, and read the debates at the time, and I doubt if it entered into anybody's conception but that the contest, at all events for 1854, would be carried on entirely on the northern frontier of Turkey.

"I was not authorised to propose a plan of campaign, and to recommend 80,000 men to be sent out, or I would have reported differently.

"The additional Sappers will be of great use, although they may be very young soldiers, and with little field instruction; they can be mixed up with the old ones, and give us numbers for our exclusive service. I wish we had 1000 Sappers here, for our works linger on in a terrible manner. We are absolutely WEEKS sometimes making a small battery!!!

"The huts are arriving, but no officer or description to explain them to us.

"I deprecate strongly the foreign enlistment, as likely to lower the reputation of the British army. A set of vagabonds of all countries, serving for pay, and without any national feeling or prestige. If the 8000 at Inkermann had been one-half or one-third of this foreign legion, we should never have gained the credit we did there. They will never rise to our scale, but we may drop to theirs."

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

1855. "1st January, 1855.

Disputes with the French.

"It is not impossible but that we may come to a regular dispute with the French. I hope it may be avoided, and therefore the less said about it the better.

1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"General Canrobert is, I believe, most anxious to keep on the best possible terms; but having such superior forces to ours, he is thrown into a position that naturally induces him to take a lead, and everything must virtually be dictated by him.

"General Bizot, their Commanding Engineer, is a man of energy and ability, but assuming and dictatorial, and impatient at any difference of opinion.

"His plan requires us to make a most desperate assault upon the Redan and Barrack Batteries, to help the French assault of the town. I think we should fail, and Lord Raglan agrees with me, and I propose, now that we have the opportunity, opening an extended attack on the fronts of the tower of Malakoff on our right.

"General Bizot says it will create delay, leaving the French trenches all the time greatly exposed to insult by heavy sorties, and General Canrobert has written a long formal letter to Lord Raglan, evidently dictated by Bizot, complaining of our proceedings, and accusing me of having encouraged the plan that Bizot requires, and thus leading the French to make all the preparations for it, and then flying off to another project that will create great delay.

"Lord Raglan, seeing that this would be the commencement of a regular disagreement and mutual recrimination, was in hopes, through General Rose, of getting the letter withdrawn, and discussing the matter verbally; and perhaps that may be done, and prevent an open rupture; but unfortunately, it is almost certain that General Canrobert has sent a copy of his letter to France, and therefore we must send a copy, with my answers *seriatim* to each paragraph, to our Government; thus, if we escape open contention *here* for the present, there will be the smothered rumbling of it at Paris and London, and after these attacks, I must be less forbearing in giving my decided opinions hereafter, and more cautious and less frank in consultations with Bizot.

"When we first came before the place, we were, I believe, in very nearly equal force, and we took nearly an equal share in the attack in point of extent of front; since that we have been gradually reduced in strength, while they have been

1855. augmenting; till now they have between three and four times our numbers, and our front at the same time is become more extended, and yet they constantly throw in our teeth that such-and-such operations are in the division that we undertook. When we require assistance, they give it grudgingly, as a matter of peculiar *favour* to us, and only in the extent and in the shape that exactly suits themselves.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"I can only begin my comments to-day; the letter of General Canrobert is a long one, and so must my answer be, so that it cannot go before next post; but in the mean time, if any hint from Paris brings forward a question whether there is any difference, you will be able to explain how the matter stands generally, though not acquainted with the particulars."

*Remarks on* General CANROBERT's *Letter of* 28*th December*, 1854, *given to* Lord RAGLAN.

"Camp before Sebastopol, 1st January, 1855.

"Before answering *seriatim* the subjects of complaint and accusations contained in General Canrobert's letter of the 28th of December, 1854, against the course of proceeding adopted by the British corps d'armée before Sebastopol, it may be desirable to show generally how the matter stands.

"When the Allies first appeared before the place, the state of it was such, that there was no question about storming it. Bringing up the battering train was a long operation, during which the enemy, by energy, and manifestly enormous resources in men and means, added to their works of defence on a very strong position, and mounted an enormous number of guns, which, on the opening of our batteries, it was found they could fully man, and skilfully serve.

"A few hours after the opening of the fire, by an unfortunate occurrence, a magazine exploded among the principal batteries of the French, which paralysed the fire on that side, in a very great degree, for that day, the British batteries necessarily continuing; some moral effect would naturally be created by this misfortune. On the succeeding day, however, the French batteries reopened with animation, and, with those of the British, continued with activity for several days, and until

the available ammunition was nearly expended. The result, however, was unsatisfactory, the enemy had throughout been enabled to maintain his works and power of artillery efficient, the latter being at least double that of the Allies; and it was still the opinion of the generals in command that an assault could not be attempted, and it was proposed to await reinforcements in men and artillery, and then recommence with a greatly increased force. This first attempt was therefore a failure. 1855. — Disputes with the French.

"Hitherto, the ground on which attacks could be carried was greatly confined, by reason of the enemy, with his powerful army in immediate connection with the garrison, having possession of the ridge of heights overlooking the harbour, and bearing powerfully on our extreme right. By the result of the battle of Inkermann that disadvantage was entirely removed; we obtained the power then of occupying that ridge to any extent we pleased, affording an opening for any amount of proceedings against the tower of Malakoff, which is acknowledged on all sides to be the proper point for attack under ordinary circumstances.

"General Bizot, however, proposed on the 26th of November that, under the pressure of our situation, and to save time, all our means should be applied to the original project; that is, to a continued heavy cannonading and bombardment of the town front on the side of the French, and of the Redan and Barrack Batteries by the British, preparatory to an assault on those fronts by the respective forces.

"To this I object, without approaching the Tower fronts, so as to offer a false, but more probably to convert it into a real attack: my reasons are, that notwithstanding the utmost effect that can be produced on the Redan and Barrack Battery front, a variety of obstacles to check and break the storming party will be left in a good state; that a flank attack up the side of the ravine, if at all practicable, would only be so for a very small number of men; that the storming party must advance consequently by a narrow front over an open ground for 800 or 1000 yards (and it is impossible to carry the trenches nearer, without the Tower be approached), on one flank exposed to the fire of batteries from the neighbourhood of the Tower, and on the other, from what are called the Garden Batteries

1855. near the great town; and that the enemy will have in readiness, to oppose an assault made under those disadvantages, strong columns of troops whom we know to be resolute, and well adapted to a close contest; which force will be so much the stronger, because the adjoining Tower fronts will not even be threatened.

Disputes with the French.

"I have known assaults made, and by British troops, under much easier circumstances, and fail, and I never knew one, under as difficult, to succeed: therefore, I am decidedly of opinion that we ought to make strong preliminary demonstrations on the Tower front, with a view to convert them, if possible, into a real attack, even at the expense of further delay.

"I understand the purport of General Canrobert's letter to imply a desire to continue the attacks as proposed by General Bizot; namely, by a cannonading, and then an assault on the Bastion du Mât and the town, on the side of the French, and on the front of the Redan and Barrack Batteries by the British, which had been fully agreed to; and to reproach me for now bringing forward objections to that plan, and proposing a new one, by an advance against the Tower of Malakoff. I have explained above the reasons for this proposed modification on my part, and I consider it quite justifiable to offer it, in consideration of the increase of difficulties in the way of the original proposition, and the facilities offered by the result of the battle of Inkermann for opening a new course. That this alteration must be attended with considerable delay, must be admitted; but I consider such delay, serious as it is to contemplate, preferable to incurring the more serious consequences of the check which I cannot but anticipate now in any attempt to storm the Redan and Barrack Batteries, the enemy being left quite free on the side of the Tower.

"With regard to the apparent inconsistency of my not having proposed this extension of attack on the Tower of Malakoff, when I gave my assent to the original and more confined operation, it is to be observed that, till after the battle of Inkermann (5th of November), we had not possession of the ground necessary for approaching it: the attack according to the original proposition was then imperative, whereas now it has become optional.

1855.

Disputes with the French.

"I think the time has now arrived when the British army ought not reasonably to be considered chargeable with the occupation, and responsible for every operation, on the right of the original line of demarcation between the two forces.

"When the Allies first came before Sebastopol, they were in nearly equal force; and suited to the circumstances of that period; the French undertook the attacks and protection of the ground on one side, the British on the other.

"Since then, the British right became the advanced post for the serious attacks of the enemy's army; the result of the battle of Inkermann has caused a great extension of ground to be covered on their side; and now there is this proposition, to make an additional attack from it upon the place. In the mean time, the force of the British has been greatly reduced, so as to be quite unequal to all these increased duties, while that of the French has been very largely increased; and though aid has been afforded by the French to the extent which has been judged proper by General Canrobert, it seems always to have been considered as a concession to assist the British in what they had undertaken under very different circumstances, instead of an integral part of the proceedings, required by the subsequent course of events.

"If this attack is therefore to be proceeded with, as I would recommend, it must be chiefly executed by the French, the British co-operating to the utmost of their power, which unfortunately is so small, that delays must arise in proportion to the extent of the engagements they should enter into.

"Their desire would be to extend in a small degree the batteries of their right attack, for which they have guns now upon the heights, and available; and to construct and man the batteries and approaches on the end of the Inkermann ridge which fronts the enemy's works; for which, however, the guns, which I conceive should not be less than thirty, are still at Balaklava, as well as all the ammunition for them, and much for the rest; and although every means are exerted for getting them up, General Canrobert is quite aware of the great difficulty of the task.

"Having only 500 men daily available for working in the trenches on the right, and with the difficulties of bringing up

1855. — Disputes with the French.

the guns, it will be perceived that the proceedings cannot be rapid, and how impossible it must be to make any decided engagement as to its rate of progress.

"Under the present doubts as to the future operations, every exertion being still in full force to provide for *any*, it will no doubt be most desirable to decide upon some fixed course to pursue: General Bizot's plan is the more rapid for execution. My objections may be considered exaggerated, and therefore to be overruled—or even if not exaggerated, it may be thought by others, that the risks are worthy of being incurred to avoid what may be considered greater risks and evils by prolonged delays; my own opinion is contrary, and that, serious as those evils are, I do not think that anything short of an impossibility of our being able to maintain ourselves in our present position, would justify our incurring the imminent danger of defeat with great loss, which I foresee in the proposed early assault of the Redan.

"J. F. Burgoyne, Lieut.-General."

*To* Colonel Matson, R.E.

"2nd January 1855.

"The appearance of a discussion between us and the French, which I intimated to you yesterday, was very distressing; but after an explanation which General Airey had in the evening with General Canrobert we are in great hopes that it will blow over.

"Lord Raglan was most anxious to avoid the more or less of a rupture that must have followed an answer to the French general's letter of the 28th, written as it must have been in the same recriminating tone, and sent General Airey with verbal explanations and inquiry; in the mean time, General Canrobert must have been sorry for making this first burst, and was thoroughly conciliating, and willing to come to an understanding how to carry out *my* plan, which they seem disposed to come in to, either to have peace between us, or that they are satisfied it is right, so that we hope now to get on smoothly.

"Unfortunately, he had sent a copy of this angry missive to Paris, and Lord Raglan is sending a copy also to the Duke of Newcastle, and by next mail a copy of my answers in detail; but stating, that hoping the matter is amicably arranged, no notice need be taken of it at home; but the Duke will have the whole before him, in case of any remark on the subject from Paris." 1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

*To* Captain Hon. George Wrottesley, R.E.

"3rd January, 1855.

"I have written to you and M. several times by late mails, and have now just received yours of 17th December, containing many interesting matters.

"I am very glad that you had the interview with Lord Hardinge, and that he was interested in my letter and the plan. Since that I have written to him another long one; frank and confidential, which, I have every reason to believe, I may do with him; fortunately I can do so without a word of disparagement of any of the British Army here—if it were otherwise I would hold my tongue about them; even in the fault I find in the comments on the defects of our organization, which I have sent home, I have no complaints to make against individuals.

"I hope we may be all alive and well enough to make a good start in the spring, and I think we will make a fine thing of the next campaign, if they won't swamp us by the introduction of foreigners.

"The old German Legion were decidedly an exception to what we must generally look to; they had been driven out of their own country by the common enemy, were acting under their lawful sovereign, who was the same as ours, were a national Hanoverian force at war, and more deeply implicated in the success than ourselves, whereas now they will be nothing more nor less than mercenaries. I have no faith in the power of the Russians to bring such hordes of troops against us to this quarter, as they threaten, and as many believe. They can call out their hundreds of thousands of able men at pleasure, and as that is our great difficulty, we fancy it to be the only one with others, but

1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

then think of the operation and cost of bringing them together from distant regions and making an army of them provided with every accessory—then that army so provided, to be moved many hundreds of miles, and when they come here, with a very distant base of operations and depôts, if we once drive them, as I hope we may do early, from Bakchi Serai and Simferopol; that is, these are my anticipations, if we do the thing handsomely, and commence operations in May with 120,000 in the field, well equipped, *surtout* the British, in means of transport, &c., but we have a great deal to do and to get through, before these brilliant prospects can be carried out—we must pass a winter here, take Sebastopol, and get you *thoroughly* well. We must not have a patched-up concern, like what you are exhibiting at present, but something substantial.

"With regard to the Russian forces, and the capability of the Emperor to carry his hundreds of thousands to distant regions, their power, as the result has shown, has always been overestimated. In Poland, perhaps, and near their greatest resources, they can make a great show of force, but one can hardly conceive the means necessary to do it at this distant part.

"The taking of Sebastopol, which has been so flippantly expected since a long time, is a most serious undertaking,—a place having free open communication with a considerable army in the field, a garrison on the most moderate computation 25,000, of which 8000 or 10,000 excellent gunners (seamen) as well as good infantry, an unlimited amount of heavy guns, not less probably than 1500 or 2000 available, and the ammunition of a large fleet and great arsenal; deeply entrenched on very strong ground, and presenting almost a straight line to the besiegers—the depth of winter, no roads, and enormous embarrassments in bringing up anything to camp from the port, are no trifling difficulties to contend with.

"The expenditure of ammunition by the Russians has been extraordinary: the whole surface of the ground from immediately in rear of our batteries to about 2000 yards from the place, is thickly *strewed* with shot (of very heavy calibre), blind shells, and splinters, in a degree that astonishes you, and it is a thing I always recommend an amateur to go and look at; while they are twice as thick along the straight lines of the deep ravines,

one in particular, named by our people the Valley of Death, from the successive bounding of shot along it at the early stages. Considering the immensity of this fire, and ordinarily the accuracy of the practice, it seems surprising that the casualties to men and guns have not been much greater than they have been. Had we had an army to complete the investment, and 120,000 would have done it well, we could have proceeded with great effect. 1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"I have just got a letter from Captain Craufurd, H.M. ship *Swallow*, he says he cannot speak too highly of Hugh, as an officer, a sailor, a gentleman, and a thorough good fellow."

"4th January.

"Some of the newspaper correspondents are likely to do us an immensity of mischief; publicly, by the information afforded to the enemy, and privately, by damaging all our reputations, and, as I think, unfairly and unnecessarily. Newspaper correspondents at the seat of war.

"In Mr. ——— letter, published in the ——— of 18th December, will be found a quantity of details, that will afford most valuable information to the enemy at the present moment, when it can have been easily communicated to him from St. Petersburg,—the weakness of our force, the fatigues to which they are subjected, the sickness, the imperfect supply of rations, want of transport, impossibility of getting up guns and ammunition, want of roads and arrangements, &c. &c. &c.

"He will gain a confidence that will be most injurious to us, and can prepare himself to far greater effect to resist us.

"Is that of less consequence than that the curiosity of the public should be satisfied upon those points? for to argue that it is necessary to stimulate the Government to adopt proper measures, is most erroneous, since nobody can be more aware of what we really do require, and what can be obtained, than we are ourselves, or more constant in making our demands; and it is quite evident that since the country has shown such a determination to carry on the war with spirit, at any sacrifice, the Government neglects nothing that we do require; I consider this a most serious evil in the way of our operations, and I have pointed out to Lord Raglan that he ought to put it forward as one great increase to the difficulties of his position, and he will do so.

1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"It is clear, however, that there is a determination at home that it should be so, and I suppose we must submit. Whatever feelings we may have against a despotic government, it must be acknowledged that it gives the Russians the power of keeping us entirely in the dark as to *their* proceedings; we have nothing to guide us, but the incoherent contradictions, and in many instances manifestly erroneous information, of deserters.

"I could give instances where half the information regarding *them*, afforded by "our own correspondents" on *our* affairs, would have enabled us to make most useful *coups*. One justification they plead is, that if their mouths were shut, you would have it from published private correspondence from the army;—if that is so, where then is the necessity for their elaborate performances? but it is not the case; the ordinary, army correspondence bears on the face of it, wild, incoherent and untrustworthy remarks, written with different feelings and opinions, and in which will be many conflicting statements, while the newspaper-agents make it a business to collect all possible information to which they can systematically give the tinge that suits them, and which of course carries the weight of a degree of authority.

"Facts are sometimes exaggerated, but at others, without doing that, may give exaggerated impressions, such as that on account of our *neglecting* to do such-and-such things, and on account of our *inactivity*, in some given proceeding, the enemy were enabled to do so-and-so,—now the impression conveyed by the terms of *neglect* and *inactivity*, &c. &c., is that they were culpable, whereas in the cases mentioned, they were unavoidable.

"The correspondent of the —— has made one mistake that might be inconvenient to the Russians: in describing a battery that is in preparation as for 26 guns, whereas it is only for seven. I told Lord Raglan, that if he was going to send a flag of truce in soon, he might send to this gentleman to ask him if he would like to take advantage of the opportunity of writing to Prince Menschikoff, to apologize and correct the mistake!"

"7th January, 1855.

"The mails being now twice a week, I cannot have very long letters to write by each, and may occasionally have to

skip. At present the weather is so cold that I go out as little as I can, which gives me the more leisure for writing. Lord Raglan's attentions are unremitting. The other day, saying I was in want of a horse, Lord Burghersh told me that he knew of a very nice one to answer my description, small, strong, active, and very quiet, but his price was 40*l.* or 50*l.*, and I said in Lord Raglan's hearing, that I could not venture to buy a good horse until I had cover for my horses; and without saying anything to me, he told his *Master of the Horse*, Colonel Somerset, to try to find stable room for me! I have the grey still quite serviceable, but I do not like to trust to one. 1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"They say that there is a little appearance of civilization coming on in our warfare, and that some of our out-sentries, and those of the Russians, have been out in the open, within easy musket shot, and have not fired at one another, a thing unexampled hitherto; but in the Peninsula, they were frequently within talking distance, used to get water at the same stream, and interchanged many little civilities; in short, there was no warfare of individuals, or petty and uninfluential conflicts going on; when anything was at issue at the outposts, it was usually done by a wave of the hand, and not by a shot!

"*8th.* I enclose to Colonel Matson, to be sent to you, the Thanks of Parliament, which they tell us here, ought to be kept as heirlooms!"

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"9th January, 1855.

"I think I gave you an account of some rifle pits in front of our left attack, from which the Russians were driven about a month ago, when Lieutenant Tryon, who led the party, was killed; those pits were converted into an advanced trench for us, with a covered communication to it, and the enemy could not regain his hold of it, although he made several attempts.

"The ground being very rocky, no gabions, working parties very scarce, and the enemy's riflemen only lodged at 300 and 400 yards distance on both flanks, to which the ground on each side falls, caused this trench to be a very warm place, and so

1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

many casualties occurred in it, that our people gave it the name of the *slaughter-house*. This having come before me at several times, I as repeatedly recommended decidedly that it ought to be occupied very lightly, even by three or four sentries only, who might be thoroughly covered, just to give the alarm to the covering parties in the rear, on any advance of the enemy, who was instantly to be driven out again; that however often that game was played, it ought always to be to our advantage. The officers would still perseveringly hold it by 100 or 200 men, and once there was great displeasure because that advance was, on a first attack, driven out of it; but when reinforced, soon regained possession.

"I said that it was only wanted for two things: first, to prevent the enemy maintaining a lodgment there, and secondly, as an advanced guard to give security to our batteries in rear, both of which would be as well obtained by holding it lightly for advanced sentries. My recommendations were not attended to, and we continued to lose men there, till at last a reduction of the strength of the covering party led to reducing the strength there; and yesterday a very intelligent deserter who came out, among other matters said, 'You were very wise to leave the trench, for we can't come back to occupy it, and we saw how we must have annoyed your party in it.' And now they tell me at head-quarters, that it quite confirms what I said!"

"10th January, 1855.

Confusion at Balaklava.

"The essence of order is decidedly on the side of the French; that of thorough confusion on ours. At Constantinople, Gallipoli, and Varna, you no doubt had opportunities of observing the difference, but never was it so marked, as in the state of their little harbour under Cape Chersonese, and ours at Balaklava. I have not seen theirs, but I understand that they have a harbour-master who sees to every ship being moored to most advantage for the service in general, while they have along the shore, wharves, store-places, &c., all distributed in the most appropriate manner, and a little town of huts, with shops, &c., arising in a modest way; in short, space is turned to

the best account, and everything is order and regularity, while in Balaklava, business of all kinds and of all departments is mixed up together in the utmost confusion. Carts or animals come down from camp, are kept for hours in wet and cold, before they can get that for which they have an order, and sometimes are sent back empty, because the article cannot be got at, or that the order was signed by Mr. White, whereas it ought to have been by Mr. Brown. I have requested our people to try and get an *engineer* depôt at least, organized with a little more order if they can, but it will be difficult, as we shall require enormous space for our hutting materials, and the depredations for the sake of fuel are terrible. The covering parties and others, in the trenches, are regularly every night pulling the fascines and gabions out of the facings of embrasures, and of parapets of the batteries, and have occasionally attacked the platforms. This is for self enjoyment, and so it is when those in charge of horses sell the corn to buy liquor, but what will be said to numbers parting with their *new warm clothing* to the French, to get liquor from their vivandières!

1855. Siege of Sebastopol.

"It is frequently impossible to get any account of the English stores in a ship, except by going on board, and coaxing some information from the masters. This is accounted for by cargoes being altered and made up indiscriminately at Malta or Constantinople, &c., without any renewed invoice being made."

"10th January.

"This war has been carried on hitherto by the Russian soldiers, with the spirit of savages, bayoneting the wounded, &c. Every advantage is taken for the destruction of any individual that can be reached, and out-sentries and videttes must be either out of gunshot, or well covered, or perpetually fighting duels; so different from the polite system between French and English in the Peninsula, where individuals, or small parties were never molested in ordinary proceedings, when we dipped our cans in the same stream, and a thousand courtesies used to pass between us. It is said that of late in some parts, a little relaxation has taken place, and that a Russian and British sentry have been openly exposed within easy musket-

1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

range without firing at each other. It was said, indeed, that some conversation had passed, which latter Lord Raglan, when he heard it, said he thought had better not be encouraged, evidently implying a fear of a degree of intimacy and cajolery taking place, in which we should have the disadvantage; however when we tried to trace these stories, the only *particular* given of these *tendresses* amounted to this,—that a Russian sentry had shouted something in English, or intended for English, to which the British sentry answered, '*You go to H—l!*'"

"10th January, 1855.

"Lord Raglan has just put into my hands a paper by Lord Blantyre, containing impracticable recommendations for keeping our trenches dry and comfortable; it is enclosed in a note, as follows:—

'Chesham Place, 24th December, 1854.

'MY DEAR LORD RAGLAN,

'I send you some hints from Lord Blantyre on the mode 'of keeping trenches dry. I beg you will give them to Sir 'John Burgoyne, with my compliments.

'I remain, yours truly,

'J. RUSSELL.'

Attacks of the Press.

'Do not mind the *Times*, but continue to do your best.'

"I am just writing a few Memoranda to show that Lord Blantyre's project is not applicable.

"The *Times* to which Lord John alludes, is that of 23rd December, where, in a leading article, is an attack upon all the principal authorities with this army, particularly the Staff and Lord Raglan himself, all of whom are very much hurt at it: the editor says, 'Send out proper and efficient men to regulate everything,'—but who is to select these proper men? The authorities in England thought they were sending out good men at first, and if you change again, on what grounds are you to expect better?

"Though the *Swallow* is at anchor in one of our bays near Cape Chersonese, Hugh has not been able to get up here, but

I hope he will come soon. He has a wild idea of becoming my naval A.D.C., but there is not a shadow of a chance of my legitimately requiring such an unusual addition. 1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"Sir Edmund Lyons paid me a visit this morning, and said that Captain Craufurd spoke highly of Hugh,—'but so does everybody,' he added; 'in fact he is a devilish fine young fellow.'"

"14th January, 1855.

"It seems that others follow 'Omicron' (or perhaps the same under different forms) in attacks upon me, and will gain their objects; it is particularly difficult to meet them, even if it were good policy to attempt to do so, as they deal in innuendoes and in generalities, instead of particulars. When I was in Ireland with the Relief Commission, I was asked from the Treasury what answer they could make to complaints against me in the House: I said, While they are in general terms you can make none, but challenge them to come forward with particulars, and I hoped I would be able to answer them all; but we cannot demand discussions with a newspaper.

"The Civil Engineers do great things, chiefly, however, by an unlimited expenditure; still they do great things, and make great improvements, which we shall be too happy to copy whenever the case requires it: but I think the Duke of Newcastle, &c., are somewhat too quick in adopting their propositions for us, on their own enthusiastic views that what does so well in the midst of the civilisation of Great Britain, will answer under the circumstances in which we are placed here.

"No time should be lost in a thorough good organisation of ample means for army transport, and I hope it will be put into really good hands, and not sacrificed to a plausible design of somebody who may know nothing of what are the difficulties to be encountered in the field: above all things, the men should be of excellent character, trustworthy, well paid, and duly trained.

"14th January.

"The letter signed 'Omicron,' in the *Times* of the 26th December, is full of fallacies and untruths, but will, no doubt, have its effect. The public, under newspaper influence, will Attacks on him in newspapers.

1855. require victims, and as the check we receive is in a siege, a very few plausible remarks will enable them to fix on me as one. You *say* that you enclose a letter very much to the purpose about me, supposed to be by Sir Howard Douglas, but it is not forthcoming—only 'Omicron' and another attack! That is, two doses of the poison, but without the antidote.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"I shall not make myself very unhappy at all the censures heaped upon me, but it *is* annoying, because ordinary readers will not be aware of the fallacies they contain, as I am, nor will anyone desire to be undeceived about them."

"16th January, 1855.

"The snow is knee deep, and the weather very cold, and such as they say is very rare in this country. I sit at meals, and all day, in Lord Wrottesley's fur coat, and only regret, as it is so handsome, that I shall probably take all the shine out of it; but it is in a good cause,—and we rather reverence an article that has been deteriorated in the service: witness my old Peninsula cloak!

"There is mention in your letters of various articles in my favour in the 'United Service Magazine,' 'United Service Gazette,' 'Globe,' &c. I hope copies of them have been sent to me, for I am somewhat sensitive on the subject; and I know that, unfortunately, nobody can be aware of particulars so well as myself, or, consequently, could answer each accusation so entirely as I think I could. Send out any newspaper or periodical which contains any article that you think would interest me, even though not personally affecting me. Periodicals in particular have always a variety to be skimmed over.

Anecdote of Menschikoff.

"A flag of truce occasionally takes in letters from their friends in England to the few prisoners, officers and men, whom the Russians have here. We of course send them as they arrive, but the Russians, in ordinary course, read them before they are delivered. There was one from a young lady to an officer, requesting that when Menschikoff was taken, the officer would send his fair correspondent one of the buttons off the Prince's coat (it was lucky she did not say one of his ears). When the letter was delivered a coat-button accompanied it, and a message from Menschikoff to say that, as some time might

elapse before he was taken prisoner, he thought he might as well forward the object of the writer's wishes at once. 1855.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"I rode into Balaklava yesterday through the snow, with a high wind and a heavy shower of hail; and with my leather greatcoat lined with wool, ankle fur outer boots, and fur neck comforter, was so warm that I astonished everybody I met by asking if it were not thawing very fast?"

"16th January, 1855.

Inventions and inventors.

"I have just read a letter in the *Times* of 29th December, signed 'E. G.,' accusing *me* of throwing cold water on, or rather rejecting, an invention, the principles of which I was too stupid to comprehend,—the whole founded on a complete delusion! If the circumstance occurred at all, the complainant has mistaken somebody else for *me*. I never belonged to, much less presided at, the Woolwich Committee. I have not the slightest recollection of the invention described ever having been submitted to me at any place, and I am fully persuaded that it never was. As to his principle being beyond my comprehension, I must confess that even as now described, it still remains so.

"His shell was, I presume, of cast iron, and if so, it is beyond my comprehension how it is to have its shape altered, and be flattened by hitting its mark!

"If the shell was to be of some more pliant material than cast iron, he would assuredly get into many other difficulties (besides cost) that are also beyond my limited comprehension.

"It would be a most dangerous precedent for Government to undertake to manufacture articles, and make experiments for inventors, each of whom is enthusiastic on the merits of his own design, while it is well known that 999 out of 1000 are unworthy of even a trial: Government therefore never does it but under an almost certain conviction of the success of the article,—but they will try what is brought them by the inventors.

"A great complaint of inventors is that they receive only a general answer,—that their invention is not, in the opinion of the authorities, thought adapted to the service;—and it is wise to give no reasons, as they lead to prolonged and useless dis-

1855. cussions, for no inventor will believe that his bantling can possibly be an abortion.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"It is one of the misfortunes of the positions that I have held, that I have had to pronounce judgment on many inventions, and when it is unfavorable, there is an inveterate enemy made; so far, however, from a predetermination against novelties, I have thought well of, and encouraged the trial of, several that on trial proved to be failures."

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"17th January, 1855.

"With reference to the feelings of disappointment and despondence in England regarding the state of the army in this country, we have two great matters to consider which must not be confounded:—

"One, that Sebastopol has not been taken; and the other, the suffering state of the army.

"I enclose my first rough draft of a memorandum dated 15th instant, which I have put into Lord Raglan's hands, explanatory of our present state, how it has been brought about in my opinion, and a surmise as to what may be our future proceedings.

"I do not know how far he concurs with me; this is a purely military view of the circumstances, without reference to the intense feelings of anxiety and interest we must take in the hardships and sufferings of the troops during the winter.

"I believe that our position before the place has arisen from unavoidable circumstances and a perseverance (to which we were forced) in attempts to accomplish a great conquest with insufficient means.

"Our error has been in being led on by hopes of success with those means, and not foreseeing early how prolonged the operation would be, and thus providing in good time for a residence in this country without resources, during winter, which was approaching. Had we done so, we should have been on the safer side, although the idea would have been thought then to be very pusillanimous.

"If, however, that view had been adopted, and even with vigour, the hardships of the army would have been much alleviated, but still must have been necessarily very great. 1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"We have certainly suffered much from want of organized means with our several departments, and the want of spirit of organization generally; but almost all these wants centre in the great one of *means of transport*; that is so leading a requisite with an army, that its relative abundance might produce most important results between contending armies in the field. Excepting for the Artillery, and I believe a very few with the Ambulance waggons, there was not an animal sent from England to afford means of transport, nor any means for organizing such a service: some carts and mules were collected at Malta, with Maltese civil drivers; a sort of half-measure: and for all the rest, dependence was placed on the precarious expedient of what could be collected in the country; that resource, however, was from first to last extensive, but all went to pieces for want of organization and system. This is the principal matter for attention, and it is far more difficult of accomplishment than it would appear: it is not to raise and collect a large mass of animals and their drivers and attendants, but to organize them in such a manner as shall ensure their *maintenance*, with at least as much care (and it is to be hoped with more success) than Cavalry and Artillery animals: so much must depend on the conduct of each individual attendant, detached as they necessarily must frequently be, that they should be men of the best characters, and well taken care of and remunerated. Want of transport.

"All the arrangements of harness, pack-saddles, farriers, shoeing, veterinary surgeons, saddlers, &c. &c., should be very complete, and of the best; and there can be no reason whatever why country horses and mules should not be bought and used, subject to due care in their selection, to a great saving of expense and a facility of renewals; they would be equal to that kind of work, although not fit for Cavalry or Artillery, and would be inured to the fare of the country, but their attendants and equipments should be brought over with the army, and in a thorough state of military organization; this need not preclude great use being made of a heavier mode of conveyance, such as bullock-waggons, and the other ordinary

1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

means of the country, and in the hands of the natives, for the more remote service and depôts in the rear of the army, but even they should be under an especial superintendence to guard its efficiency.

French system of transport.

"The French have their means of transport very efficient in quality apparently, and probably in quantity; a service that requires a constant supply, such as their Field Engineer Department, has its *Parc du Génie*, carts and horses under its own distinct charge; the rest, including, it is believed, the provision for the sick and wounded, is under the *Intendance militaire*, which it is believed comprehends all the functions of our Commissariat. The French system of method and order wherever they go, is well worthy of our imitation; their little port near Cape Chersonese, as well afloat as on shore, is beautifully arranged for turning it to most account; every arrangement is under an authority, who requires order and precision from every one, while ours at Balaklava is one mass of confusion.

"Still the French have their oversights and inconveniences: the great body of their army is still under the *tentes d'abri* of Algiers, the little triangular tent of which each man carries a portion; and I have heard French officers of rank speak as if his men would be in comparative comfort, if they had our larger round tents, which they have demanded from France long ago, but not received yet. They have also a great advantage here, in a much easier line from their port to their camp, without that great ascent that we have from Balaklava.

"They have also had a vast number more troops available for works of improvement in their camps and in their rear than we have. At the same time it must not be supposed that they are in clover: we understand that their sick list is very heavy.

"If you think Lord Hardinge would like to see this, or my memorandum on our present situation, you may show them, only his Lordship will consider the latter very confidential, as I do not know what view Lord Raglan will take of it.

Cossacks as outposts.

"The Cossack appears to be an extraordinary and most admirable system. Without any very large numbers, they are always round you and close, and prevent you making use of the

resources of the country, unless you advance in compact bodies to which they immediately give way, but hover round *them* also in the same way; there is no shaking them off, no surprising, no moving about except in force. I believe they are now in this way shutting 12,000 Turks up in Eupatoria, the Turks having no cavalry there yet; when they have, they will probably be adepts at the same kind of work. Our cavalry has no idea of it. Perhaps our foreign enlistment may produce us some good really *light* cavalry for this particular species of warfare."

1855. Siege of Sebastopol.

"18th January.

"I this morning rode down to Balaklava to see the barrack-huts lately arrived from England, many of which have been put up there, and I was much pleased with them in all respects, except their not being removable, and some doubts whether the patent felt is the best material for the roofing. The people occupying them, and the doctors who have them for hospitals, say they are very comfortable; they are certainly as light as could well be made."

*From* Major J. W. Gordon, R.E., *to* Colonel Matson.

"Camp before Sebastopol, January 22nd, 1855.

"My dear Colonel,

"I hope you received the summary of our works here, which was sent two mails ago. Since then we have done almost nothing. The weather has been very cold. For four or five days we had severe frosts and snow at last from 12 to 14 inches in depth.

"The thermometer was seen as low as 10°, and in a double tent it stood, between 8 and 9 A.M., at 17°, the tent being well closed, and two people sleeping in it. There was also a good deal of wind during the cold days, and this made the cold still more severely felt. The army suffered greatly. One regiment at one parade, exclusive of officers, mustered 1 sergeant and 7 men. Three companies of another regiment mustered 8 files between them. Many companies are reduced to 7 and 8 files effective each. Some regiments have suffered much more than others, and commanding officers can do a

1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

great deal to mend matters. Officers, however, are but few in some regiments. A regiment close to us had only the lieutenant-colonel and two subalterns for duty. We (Engineers) have sent away a great many sick, and we have many daily going to the doctor; still we have a good force left, and are much better than our neighbours. One cause of this is, that our men always get full rations, well cooked, and they are not so often nor so long out at nights as the Guards. Having a few mules, we also can bring all our provisions fresh from Balaklava, and never have to send our men on fatigue after they have come from the trenches and want rest.

"The army in camp has got up but few huts, and the great body of the men are still under canvas, but there have been a large number of stores supplied to the tents. Charcoal is allowed, but the Commissariat cannot bring it up to camp, and consequently only those who have horses or fatigue parties, can gain the full benefit of this allowance. The fuel principally used by the troops is the roots of trees, which trees have, since the Russians formed this place, been kept cut down, and never allowed to reach above the height of low brushwood, in order to prevent giving cover. I issued 800 pickaxes to the troops lately to help them to pull up these roots, these being the best description of tools to be found for the purpose.

"A great quantity of warm clothing has been got up, and the men have enough of this to keep them warm, but their feet are poorly covered. These swell after long being wet and cold, and the men have no boots but the regulation ones, and they will not stretch, nor keep out wet, and the men cut them to get them on, and they have wet feet for days together. The Artillery, with their long boots, fur caps, and waterproof great-coats are the envy of many.

"Buffalo-robes have been issued as flooring for the men's tents, and sheepskin coats have been issued to officers and men. Of course we have to face much bad weather yet, and we expect some good long, large boots for our men; but we hope that we have had the heaviest snow and the hardest frost of the year.

"Sir John tells you, I suppose, how our enemies fare. In camp we have so many rumours that we are often in doubt.

During the frost we saw that large convoys of provisions reached them. I imagine they are suffering a good deal. They, however, continue to work at their defences. They have large parties daily, weather permitting, and they have now got an enclosed work behind the Tower and one behind the Redan. 1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"They have not made any sorties in force. They fire but little at our works, and we fire far less at theirs.

"Our batteries of right and left attack are just repaired, including a great proportion of new platforms. The new armament has not, however, been brought up.

"The means of transport is as bad as when I last wrote, and in fact worse. The French with horses and men have helped us. They even carry half-way to camp from Balaklava, shot on their backs for us; each man with a 32-lb. shot in a sandbag.

"The French have also just taken a great proportion of our advance guards and pickets to help our small numbers, and to enable our poor fellows to have more rest.

"The Turks have dwindled to but small numbers now. They suffer very much indeed.

"The Civil Engineers of the Railway have arrived, and we hope soon to see the navvies on the plant. No relief that could be named will be equal to the relief afforded by a railway.

"Sir John seems always to be remarkably well. Few of us, however, have the strength we had. The whole army, with few exceptions, have had more or less of diarrhœa, and are consequently more or less enfeebled.

"It is sad to have war after this fashion; but amidst all hardships we have much to be thankful for. The Government have sent us out large supplies of comforts, and private donations have been very numerous.

"There are many complaints about supplies coming too late, and no means of bringing them to the soldiers when they do come; and no doubt to those who are determined to find fault, there are many apparent reasons for doing so. However, there are others, who, when they think of the magnitude and of the novelty of equipment furnished, and of the other difficulties which we have not the means here of overcoming, feel very

1855. grateful for all that has been done for us; and, feeling that, are the more resolved to bear up cheerfully against all hardships, in return for the sympathy which has been bestowed on us.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"Sir John will of course tell you all about the coming events. I can only say that the enemy's batteries are now so formidable, that without the railroad I do not see how we can bring up guns and ammunition in sufficient quantities to silence the guns of the enemy. In my opinion we must attack the Tower as well as the Redan, and to do that, we must still have trenches and large batteries to make and to arm, and at this season of the year this cannot be done, at all events with our army."

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"22nd January, 1855.

Disputes with the French.

"I enclose a copy of a letter of the 28th December, from General Canrobert to Lord Raglan, full of accusations against the British proceedings, and of me in particular. I send also a copy of my explanations to Lord Raglan, who, very prudently, did not take up the challenge by recrimination; but having made General Canrobert understand that great mischief would arise by commencing a system of controversy, sent him a mild explanatory answer, and the matter has blown over; but it is very possible that these differences will be brought forward, and we must be prepared to plead our own cause, which I think is a good one.

"The subjects of complaint, though spun out in a great degree, may be defined under two heads:—

"1st. That the British do not fulfil their engagements of taking the right front of attack from the ravine of demarcation to the great harbour, and are accused (by implication) of trying to impose on the French an undue share of the general operations.

"2ndly. That laid almost exclusively on me; that we recede from the plans originally laid down for the attack, to which we had fully assented; and my explanations refer to these two subjects.

"1st. When we first came before the place we were in nearly equal force, and consequently took a nearly equal portion of the front for attack; subsequently the British were in a gradual state of reduction, while the French were being greatly augmented, so that now they have five or six times our numbers, and at the same time we have *extended* greatly the ground to be occupied, and the attacks to be made on our side; why therefore they should consider so pertinaciously that we are *pledged* to take the same proportion of the work as originally settled, is incomprehensible, unless they impute it as a failure on our side not to have kept pace with them in reinforcing the army, to make it equal to that engagement; but that is not the affair of the officers here, but of the home governments. 1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"We did however persevere till it was unbearable; our men had not one night in three for repose, while the French had their *corps de siége* with moderate duties, and a *corps d'observation* doing comparatively nothing.

"This excess of duties and fatigue also cramped all our siege operations. We could not get working parties, and consequently our engineering works were imperfect and dilatory—another crime brought against us.

"2ndly. We fixed on our first project, because by the force of circumstances we could adopt no other, being limited by not having the place closed across to the harbour.

"The French themselves joined us in acknowledging that the first attempt could not be prosecuted, and that we were to wait for increased means, during which time the place became manifestly more formidable, and the attack more hopeless on the first project; while the result of the battle of Inkermann put us in possession of ground on which new approaches would be very favourable to us; and that led to my proposition for a modification, which is the great ground of accusation against me.

"It certainly involves a considerable delay; the French bring forward against it the state of the season, and the dangerous position of their trenches and batteries,—General Canrobert having confessed to Lord Raglan that the French Artillery was premature in putting all their guns into battery; but the real question is, whether the assault of the Redan and Barrack

1855. Batteries by the British, would or would not be as hopeless of success as I maintain, and if it would, ought we to persevere in trying it?

Siege of Sebastopol.

"I have referred to that matter in former memoranda, copies of which I have sent to England. In one case we incur all but a certainty of a repulse, the consequences of which it is awful to contemplate; in the other, we suffer great hardships and difficulties, but we save our honour, and have a fair prospect of a future—in either case the losses must be very heavy."

"26th January, 1855.

Disputes with the French.

"The French are very angry with us for not fulfilling what they call our *engagement*, to take all the operations on one side of the ravine of demarcation while they take the other; they talk of having I don't know how many *leagues* of trenches, batteries, and parallels to protect, &c. &c.

"Now, I would have you look at the sketch I sent you, if you have retained a copy, and consider the extent of *front* they have to protect, from the Quarantine Bay to the ravine, and compare it with ours, intersected as it is by several escarped deep ravines, while theirs is on one plateau from the same ravine to the great harbour; and then consider that while our force is about 12,000, theirs is about 70,000, and you will hardly believe that they hold it such a hardship and such a favour done us, to relieve us grudgingly of a portion of the duties,—and with regard to their *leagues* of trenches, the *frontage* is the essential ingredient, for the more parallels and works they have to cover that frontage, the stronger they are for defence, and it is by taking the aggregate length of all put together that they make out their leagues.

"Then again, they reproach us with being so far from the place with our trenches, while they boast that they are within 200 yards; but it will be seen that their 200 yards is from a marked salient *out* and almost *detached* work, while we are approaching the body of the place in a re-entering angle.

"There is really nothing to boast of in the way of energy in their proceeding; and even now that they have half-undertaken to make a parallel over a height about 600 or 700 yards in front of the tower of Malakoff, they require of us as a pre-

liminary, that we should establish batteries right and left of it for its support. 1855.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"They won't give us any assistance without close researches into the duties we have, and when it was settled at two nights repose to one out, it was to be stopped, with an understanding if that was exceeded, we were at once to take the duties back; now this barely allows of our furnishing covering parties and pickets; the only working parties being proportions of the covering party that the commanding officer will allow. Our covering parties are, I am satisfied, of not one-half the strength that the French would give for the same charge, while with all the assistance (as they call it) which they give us, they have their siege-corps, who have two nights in bed, and their covering corps, who have nothing to do but to make roads, &c."

"26th January, 1855.

"Lieutenant Drake, R.E.,[1] has just performed a very spirited service.

"Looking forward, as I cannot refrain from doing, to the Allies taking the initiative against the enemy in the field, I requested Major Gordon to get the means of passing the Tchernaya, reconnoitred, and he sent Lieutenant Drake, a few nights ago, with a corporal of Sappers, to examine the river by the broken bridge on the causeway under Inkermann. It is a point that our people seldom approach, not knowing how far the enemy advance towards it at nights from the posts they have on the other side of the valley.

"Mr. Drake had a little raft made of four small casks to pass the river, which in its present state is between 60 and 70 feet wide, 10 feet deep, very steep banks, muddy bottom, and very rapid.

"He took his section across the river, and examined the causeway for 180 yards beyond, where he found a cut of which we were not aware.

"In the meantime, one of his casks let in the water, and in returning, the raft upset. He is an excellent swimmer, and could have got out at once with ease, but he saved the Sapper

[1] The present Major Mervyn Drake, R.E., well known in connection with the National Rifle Association Meetings at Wimbledon.

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also, who could not swim, before he came out, and then, cold and wet (in a sharp frost), he collected and brought back all the materials, so as to leave no indications on the ground; the whole showing a great deal of spirit and persevering energy.

"I have written him a letter expressive of Lord Raglan's satisfaction with his conduct, which he may keep as a testimonial.

"I went round the trenches yesterday with Lord Raglan. After we had passed, a Guardsman, just come out from England, recognised my Lord, and asked his neighbour, '*Who is the other old cove?*' Whom could he mean?"

"29th January, 1855.

General Niel's mission to the East.

"General Niel, French Engineers, who commanded at Bomarsund, and is A.D.C. to the Emperor, is just come out to see how matters stand. He is a great advocate for opening the fire of all the batteries, and then giving an assault.

"The French bear so large a proportion now in the operations, that I doubt whether we ought to refuse to lend our feeble helping hand, therefore we may possibly agree to take our share; and if they will venture largely in an attack upon the Malakoff Tower front at the same time, which he seemed to approve, it will give us a better chance, and if we succeed, it will certainly put us rapidly into a superior position. If we fail, we may perhaps still be able to hold our own, though in prestige and morale we shall suffer greatly. Under all the circumstances, it is possible that this formidable event may be tried, and before very long. I am getting desperate myself; and am almost willing to put our existence upon the 'hazard of a die,' and stand the event.

"The less said about this, except to very confidential ears, the better."

*From* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE *to* Major-General ROSE *at the Head-Quarters of the French Army.*

"Camp before Sebastopol, 30th January, 1855.

"MY DEAR GENERAL,

"From the very imperfect way in which I can express myself in French, I fear that, in the interview which I had

yesterday with General Niel, I did not accurately convey to him my real opinions. I think it probable that he considers that according to my view, it was indispensable to refrain from making any serious attacks upon Sebastopol until the place should be completely invested, and until the spring; which is by no means the case, as I should be much obliged to you to explain to him. 1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"During the first period of our operations against the place we had not forces sufficient to enclose the garrison even throughout the south side, and, consequently, while we were prevented from occupying the ridge of height that descends to the Careening Bay, we could not make advances upon the Malakoff Tower; our attacks therefore were imperatively restricted to the Redan and Barrack front as our extreme right, to which the French adopted the front of the Bastion du Mât on their side.

"It was hoped that the effect of the first cannonading would enable us to storm the place,—considering that the Russian army in the field, which displayed a considerable degree of activity, would probably absorb a full proportion of their best troops, and that the garrison would not be of excessive strength; the result of that cannonading, however, was not so effective as to induce the generals commanding to persevere in the assault, and it was resolved to await increased forces in batteries and in troops, which were still necessarily to be applied on the same plan. It was clear, however, that a loss in the moral feeling of confidence in that system must be the effect of that check on our proceedings; and it became of great consequence to extend the front of the operations if possible, on which account I always had my mind turned towards the Tower of Malakoff.

"The result of the battle of Inkermann opened that field to us; and I at once advocated the propriety of extending our operations to the right as far as the great harbour, and to make energetic advances along the Inkermann ridge, and against the Tower of Malakoff and the entire enemy's left, with a view to include that portion in the assault, to whatever extent the approaches may have been carried, or effect produced, by our additional batteries on it.

"As time progressed, a greater degree of confidence would

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naturally be acquired by the garrison, a greater power of resistance was given to their works, in the additions to which, they were indefatigable; and it was reasonable to suppose that, after the enemy must have abandoned for the winter the idea of molesting us by his army in the field, subsequent to the battle of Inkermann, he would strengthen the garrison, and make it as perfect as possible. An assault upon the Redan, therefore, which from the first must always have been deemed a very arduous enterprise, became then more desperate, and one in which I must confess I entertained no confidence, and therefore I recommended the extension along the right.

"There is a combination of serious difficulties in the way of assailing the Redan, while the Malakoff Tower and the ground in front of it remains totally free and disengaged in the hands of the enemy. It cannot be approached by lodgments nearer than about 600 yards, because it is virtually in a re-entering angle; and the trenches we have, even at that distance, are by their direction unavoidably so exposed from one or the other flank as to be almost untenable,—consequently, the storming party must traverse at least that space exposed to fire from the front and both flanks, nor could it advance but by a narrow front: the obstacles it will encounter at the enemy's lines, though not very formidable of themselves, will create considerable delay to overcome, and must greatly break its order; and the defenders in rear of them are not to be considered as an ordinary garrison of a fortified town, but as divisions of an army in great force, more particularly, as the entire of that allotted for the left of their position will be concentrated on the front of the Redan and Barracks;—even supposing the front line to be gained, the storming party is then on ground still more commanded by batteries on both flanks, each of which is protected by a deep ravine, and works directed upon it; nor have we any right to despise our enemy, notwithstanding the successes we have hitherto met with against them,—they are well equipped, well exercised as soldiers, courageous, and even fanatical.

"It certainly has been an acknowledged part of the plan, in case of an assault, to throw out columns on the flank, by the south harbour, by which to turn the front attacked, and such

would of course take place; but the approaches by that flank are so confined and precipitous, that very moderate efforts by the enemy would render them quite impracticable: it is true that no artificial obstacles have been placed to the approaches on that side, *as far as can be seen*, but the possibility of the attempt is too manifest to suppose that the enemy have not adopted some understood mode of opposing it. 1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"It was on these considerations that I so strongly recommended operations against the Malakoff Tower heights, and to which I adhere, without at all implying the absolute necessity for completing the investment of the place by the north as well as south, however advantageous that would be, if practicable, or the necessity of waiting for the spring.

"I certainly was in hopes, after the battle of Inkermann, that we might *at once* have proceeded with approaches and batteries against the Malakoff, but the proposition did not carry much weight: it was thought more appropriate to commence with greatly strengthening our defensive positions, especially above Inkermann; and the state of the country, and losses in the means of transport, rendered the progress of getting up guns and ammunition exceedingly slow on the part of the British, while their troops were greatly harassed by the fatigues of duties, and could with difficulty be provided with food and clothing, so that notwithstanding the utmost assistance which the French general judged that he could give, the whole proceedings became stagnant as regards progress towards what I have considered the proper course. It is in this state then that we are now to decide on the question of proceeding,—whether on the original and accelerated project of the assaults on the Redan and Bastion du Mât; or what must be the only alternative, waiting for the complete investment of the place, and probably the spring; since my desire of advancing on the right cannot be undertaken by the British, nor, as far as we are informed, likely to be by the French.

"Under these circumstances—the French, by their large forces, having a decided preponderance in the operations—if their superior authorities desire to persevere in the attacks on the Bastion du Mât and the Redan, Lord Raglan may be disposed to give whatever co-operating aid may be in his power,

1855. although I have no authority for saying what may be his feelings: the batteries of our right and left attacks will, however, by his Lordship's orders, be completely armed, and as early as possible, to an amount of about 80 pieces (chiefly of very heavy calibre), including mortars, in addition to the battery which will be ready to open on the Inkermann Lighthouse; but if the assault is to follow, I would still hope that one heavy column may be directed on the Russian left front, to afford some prospect of aid to the assault of the Redan, which I still consider as a very hazardous undertaking.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"I beg to be understood as only explaining in this letter my own sentiments, without pledging Lord Raglan to any of them.

"My dear General,

"Yours &c.,

"J. F. BURGOYNE."

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"30th January, 1855.

"General Niel, French Engineer, who was at Bomarsund, and is now aide-de-camp to the Emperor Napoleon, is just come out on a mission to see what we are about, and I had a long conversation, but seeing that I could not explain myself to him fully in French, and to prevent some mistaken account being given of my opinions, I wrote a long letter of explanation, which General Rose says had a good effect; and they are definitively coming round to my views, on the understanding that we are to help them, as they are so strong, and not they help us!

"The reinforcements we are getting consist of a vast number of recruits—lads who have not been six months in the service, and many have not fired a musket in their lives.

Raw recruits from England.

"I think that we are better without *numbers*, than that they should be so composed; far better to keep them a few months longer in England, though even that would hardly bring them into a state to meet such troops as the Russians. If we affect to despise the enemy to that extent, depend upon it we shall suffer for it—and in *reputation* also: and while we are receiving such appearances of soldiers, they are, by Admiralty orders, withdrawing those fine soldiers the Marines, though we have

a fleet one-third of which would be ample against anything the enemy could bring to sea,—and all on account of a false pride that each man-of-war afloat must be complete. 1855. Siege of Sebastopol.

"It is said that the two Russian Princes are come back here, with orders to do something, we do not know what. We are strong enough to oppose them anywhere to good effect, but must keep a good look-out to prevent a surprise, or some partial advantage being gained.

"General Rose informs me that my letter came in good time to undeceive the French Generals as to my absolute wish to defer everything till spring, &c. &c. They say it is an interesting document; and General Canrobert has requested to have a French translation of it."

"2nd February, 1855.

"The accounts just brought by a spy who was sent to the interior are,—that the Russians have about 7000 men at Simferopol, about 8000 between that and the south coast, which with a small corps on the Belbec and Alma, is probably all they have outside—perhaps 25,000; that they are greatly in want of provisions—and have been forced to send nearly all their cavalry to the side of the Crimea on the Sea of Azoff, for the sake of forage,—and they have been chiefly supported by supplies brought from the very flourishing German colonists north of the Crimea and on the Sea of Azoff, while the transport cattle and horses are dying off fast; that they have 4000 sick at Bakchi-Serai,—and we know that the hospitals at Sebastopol are very full, said to be 6000, besides a number of sick taken care of by the German colonists. The account does not appear to be under any wish to exaggerate, and may be considered very probable.

"The garrison is probably good and strong, but if we could complete the investment on the north side, we should have a fine game; nor can I believe that the enemy can well re-establish his forces to any considerable amount in so distant a position, even for next campaign: is it not likely then that he may be sincere in wishing to make peace before he be further reduced? He has, however, always the chance of our adopting

1855. — the counsels of Messrs. Bright and Cobden, and making a *timid* peace before it is necessary.

Siege of Sebastopol. "Colonel Dacres, commanding Royal Artillery, is going to adopt a proposition of Lord Raglan's that I think likely to be excellent.

"Our batteries are being armed by degrees, and will be completed to about 80 pieces, and till the time comes for opening the fire, may be liable to be for a short period in the enemy's possession by some formidable sortie: it is proposed then to spike them ourselves by wooden spikes, which can be easily bored out, but will no doubt prevent the ordinary spiking by the Russians who always come prepared!

Reasons for flank march. "In what publication, and in what manner, has Sir Howard Douglas made known his criticisms on the Campaign in the Crimea? because the summary of them in the *Times* of 13th, in a leading article, is neither sensible nor intelligible. It would seem that he maintains that we ought to have attacked the north side: that is, as we could not, for want of forces, invest both sides, he would have left the south side open. Such a proposition could be readily confuted. We should have had no port, nor any landing-place nearer than the open beach of the Katcha, for the Belbec Bay is under the fire of the garrison; no position against the army outside; no covering the landing-places; the enemy would have had an equally good communication, at least, with the place, and after reducing the north side *outworks*, we must have gone to the south to get to the *body of the place*.

"It is impossible that he could have maintained such an opinion, which was only worthy of the flimsy Kossuth. Sir Howard's must have been, I think, that we ought to have had forces to invest the place completely, to which, perhaps, he has added that the north would then have been the proper side to attack. It might or it might not, for we have not had occasion to discuss that point, but it would have been better omitted, as not necessary for *his* argument, which is to show that our means were insufficient, for it might raise grounds for unnecessary controversy, but what is worse, it makes an opening which is in some degree taken advantage of by the

*Times* to imply that, even under our circumstances, we judged wrong in coming to the south. 1855.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"I am very glad you have taken up warmly the question of the army transport. It is the GREAT THING needful. With that in proportion, and well regulated, and our soldiers so thoroughly practised with the Minié as to be steady shots, and not waste their fire in the wretched way the great part of them still do,—what would not our army be equal to? I have just drawn up some hasty notes on the subject of a Field Engineer Depôt for wagons, carts, packsaddles, and about 120 horses, which I have sent to Colonel Matson, with a request that leave may be sought to organize something of the kind forthwith.

"I am very glad you are sending the *Quarterly Review* you mention, because I shall not only be glad to read the article on the war, but any periodical of the day is good light reading for occasional half-hours of leisure.

"I think Russia is sincere in her desire to make peace. It is her interest, but our Government do not choose, and if well supported at home, we will make a fine thing of it yet, so *Vive la Guerre!*"

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"2nd February, 1855.

"The impatience of the people in England, and probably also in France, at the delay that has taken place in not getting possession of Sebastopol, when it was so confidently supposed to be in our hands after the battle of Alma; the disappointment in getting up armaments within reasonable time, and the discussions between the French and British Engineers and other authorities, make me somewhat anxious about the amount of error that may perhaps be imputed to *me*.

"I have sent you, I think, almost all my rough copies of the different statements that I have made, and the opinions that I have held, without being able so much as to recur to them on each several occasion, in order to keep up a degree of consistence; but still, as far as I can recollect, I am not aware of turning or deviating, (unless new circumstances rendered it

1855 — Siege of Sebastopol.

quite admissible to do so,) as would seem to have been intimated by General Canrobert, that is by General Bizot through him; and in my letter of 30th January of explanation for General Niel, I think I have continued the same steady line of reasoning that I had always maintained, whether it may be right or wrong.

"It is quite untrue to say that the British Army is entirely dependent on the French. When we started here, we were in about equal force, each, perhaps, 25,000 men, and we took about an equal extent of ground to cover. Since then we are reduced to about 12,000, while they are augmented to above 70,000; and every extension of the operation which they now undertake in consequence, they persist in considering assistance afforded to us, giving rise to the report of the great assistance they render us, and what they do is always grudgingly, and after a long battle and humiliating explanations on our side."

*To* Colonel Matson, R.E.

"5th February, 1855.

The French agree to the attack on the Malakoff.

"The French are, I think, beginning to perceive that they were proposing to make too confined an attack against a great place, and are coming round to my wish of extending it. They have connected themselves by a parallel completely down to the end of the Quarantine Bay, and have full possession of its left flank, and they are constructing batteries to embrace in *their* attack the Bastion du Centre, being that which is beyond the Bastion du Mât, thus they will attack a good front instead of one narrow salient. They profess that they will have 250 guns in battery: and the result of the presence of General Niel, and my explanatory letters for him, a copy of which I sent to you in my last, have led to their full adoption of the project for extending the attacks on the right all round the Tower of Malakoff. I hope to send with this a copy of the note[1] of the consultation of the French Generals on the subject,

[1] This "note" of the conference of the 1st of February is published in the Appendix to the 'Official Account of the Siege.' It quotes Sir John Burgoyne's views, and gives his reasons, in the following concise terms:

"Il résulte des dispositions adoptées en Conseil le 1er février 1855, et

in which we are all now agreed; and I send a few suggestions I have offered to Lord Raglan, which he may adopt as far as he thinks proper, in informing Government of the circumstance. In that note I think they take a proper view of the case, and give good reasons for it, and I think you will find that it is in accordance with what I have been constantly advocating, but which was hitherto received with coldness by General Bizot. 1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"We are arrived, also, at an understanding, that, with the great preponderance of power in the hands of the French, it is they who are to take the charge of additional operations on the right, and for us to give all the assistance we can; instead of what used to be, their bestowing, and grudgingly, assistance for what they would assume it was our duty to do.

"In conversation with French Officers of Engineers, I am very glad to hear them speak of our Sappers as '*de braves soldats, et de bons sapeurs et travailleurs.*'

"These projected operations should be considered particularly confidential, for fear of promulgation in newspapers, and only made known to such men as General Harding, Sandham, Lord Hardinge, and Wrottesley.

"The French have, during the long interval of preparation for further attacks, thought they might occupy themselves in running a double gallery for a mine against the salient of the Bastion du Mât, from a distance of 140 yards, with a view of opening a breach, and destroying fougasses. They profess to attach little importance to it, that it takes but few men, and occupies a leisure time; in fact I think they are a little ashamed of it, as they ought to be, and I have *whispered* as much in conversation, and said that the enemy would easily counteract it. It is, in fact, a heavy undertaking to produce French engineering.

suivant le vœu exprimé par le Lieutenant-Général Sir J. Burgoyne, que des travaux d'approche devront être exécutés devant la Tour Malakoff, afin de pouvoir attaquer, par ce point dominant, le faubourg Karabelnaia, en même temps qu'on donnera l'assaut à la partie ouest de la ville.

"Cette décision a été motivée par la considération des avantages qu'il y aura à attaquer une place renfermant une véritable armée, par un côté de l'enceinte où les colonnes d'assaut pourront se développer à l'intérieur, et avancer dans un ordre résistant, tandis que le côté ouest de la place ne présente que des issues resserrées par des ravins et des espaces étroits."

1855. an insignificant effect against an earthwork, of no great profile, in a large place like this before us.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"They have run their gallery about 80 yards, and the enemy, from behind an abattis, have sunk a small shaft, and fired a *camouflet* that blew in the end of one gallery, and killed two miners. They now think of making some sweep round, congratulating themselves with the idea that the Russians will not be aware that their *camouflet* succeeded so well.

"The fact is, the Russians are not to be despised or trifled with: where they have great means, you must undertake great operations against them.

"Don't give them a chance, by employing little means to gain a great end.

"Colonel Collingwood Dickson, R.A., was wounded yesterday during a reconnaissance, but it is believed only a flesh wound, in the upper part of the arm near the shoulder, and consequently slight."

*Memorandum given to* Lord Raglan.

Camp before Sebastopol, 7th February, 1855.

Sufferings of the troops.

The extent of the complaints against the general and staff of this army, as the principal cause of the hardships and privations to which the British troops before Sebastopol have been subjected, has been illiberal and unjust. The far greater part arose from our being thrown into a winter campaign and siege, in a most disadvantageous country,—much, to the circumstances in which we should be placed not having been foreseen in the autumn,—and much to the notorious want of means and organization of various departments of the British army for service in the field; it may not be denied, at the same time, that very probably some individuals in charge have not possessed the peculiar talent of being able at once to *improviser* a system, that should at least provide the palliative to this latter defect.

Their causes.

With regard to the first two causes, it is certain that the circumstances which have prolonged the operations in the degree that has thrown the combined armies into such hardships and difficulties, were not foreseen, either by the governments at home or by the authorities with the armies; and it

is to be noted, as the British is the only party complained of, 1855.
that this want of prejudging the course of events has been as —
much on the side of the French, by whom arrangements to Siege of Sebastopol.
meet the new progressive state of affairs have been quite as tardy as on the part of the British. It is not uncommon in war, nor, it is conceived, highly criminal, to be impeded in the progress of successes, by finding an enemy in greater power and with greater resources than was anticipated.

The hardships which the troops have had to endure have been terrible, and might have been partly alleviated by a better system and arrangement of means of transport, as well as in hospitals, and for the sick in general,—but to throw them all upon the general and staff is monstrous; especially as the far greater part were the inevitable consequences of the necessity for our keeping the field during a most inclement season, and in a tract of country without roads or resources. The troops themselves are also apt to be improvident and without foresight, and frequently make and exaggerate difficulties. When Lord Rokeby came out, and adverted to the want of fuel for the men,—the resource at the time being to dig up roots of brushwood,—he was told that the brigade (three weak battalions of Guards) had only two or three pickaxes among them; on inquiry, it was found that they had between sixty and seventy, besides as many more out of order!—of the warm clothing issued to the men gratis, a great quantity has been sold by them; and with regard to short rations, occasional wants have been treated as if habitual, and the Commissary's accounts by no means bear out the many complaints made of the issues.

The French have been pointed out to us as models, and well they deserve it, for organization of services for the field, which the British army has never attained; their *Intendance militaire* is far better provided and regulated than our Commissariat can possibly be till the *system* with us is improved; they have a *parc du génie* which our engineer department has not; their principles and practice of order in their depôt stations, are well worthy of imitation: and their hospitals, not only for troops, but their public hospitals in France, are celebrated for precision, complete arrangements, and order. But for the particular service in the Crimea, for which alone the authorities with this army can be

Alleged superiority of the French army.

1855. considered responsible, there is no particular pre-eminence on their side; the body of their army have had no covering but the *tentes d'abri*—a most inferior accommodation to the bell tents, such as our men have, which they are only obtaining now by degrees; their huts are arriving after ours; the provision of warm clothing not to compare to ours; they are equally with us at the present time greatly in want of forage; and whatever may be their receipt of rations, we know that they frequently buy biscuit from our soldiers; they have at times suffered enormously from sickness and mortality, and the horses die by hundreds, and even thousands; but they have not among them a privileged set of censors to put the worst construction upon every inconvenience and evil; nor have they a class of officers who think it becoming to fill the public prints with exaggeration and abuse.

Siege of Sebastopol.

Their greater facilities of supply.

The French have had a much easier communication from their port to their camp, and have certainly enjoyed another very essential advantage in this service, in having very far less duties, and consequently fatigues, during the very bad weather and in so bad a country; and it is that immunity which has enabled them to make roads, and obtain other accommodations, in which we are taunted for not having vied with them, but which was utterly impossible. Why the service was not more equalised is the consequence of a combined army; and the particulars could be readily explained.

"8th February, 1855.

Opinions of the press.

"I fear that you have at length succumbed to the articles of the *Times*, and see reason in some of the complaints: 'Why have we not made roads?' Nothing so easy to you gentlemen of England; it is *only* to withdraw a division from the hill for that purpose. Why, keeping *all* our troops on the hill (except one brigade at Balaklava) the men have been killed by the duties, many of them, not one night in three off; we cannot get men to do the most necessary work in the trenches, as you may suppose from reports almost daily of men killed by shots coming through the *body* of the parapets. Withdrawing a division! why it would be raising the siege!

"Then you say, 'Detach a company of Sappers to keep Bala-

klava clear.' You may think of the want of the Sappers in the trenches, from the above (recollect 80 guns and mortars in battery) and out of 7 companies (another happily has just arrived with General Jones, in the *Princess Royal*) we have 300 for duty—the rest sick or dead; then we have all the hutting on our hands, making and repairing wharves, &c.; we have had a strong detachment of Sappers at Balaklava, but engaged in more important duties than keeping Balaklava clear; they do also get up some storehouses by degrees, from the huts of the heaviest kind. 1855. Siege of Sebastopol.

"I can hardly wonder, however, at anybody being bitter, when I find the Duke of Newcastle as bitter, and under as erroneous ideas, as the *Times*.

"Lord John Russell has evidently imbibed some of the same ideas, but he writes like a gentleman, and I have given Lord Raglan some explanations for him, and I send to Matson a few more that I also gave to Lord Raglan, and which will show you, that as regards *this* service, and the want of *prévoyance*, and the sufferings,—the French, who are held up to us as models, are as bad as we, but have not the same torrents of malice and abuse shot at them;—the amount of duty put upon our comparatively small numbers, while the French, in spite of everything they may say, have been in easy circumstances, has been infamous. 'Parcels for officers taken back to England' is disgraceful to the captains of the ships; no confusion at Balaklava could justify it, and I believe there is regular plunder on board, of such goods, nor can we be at all sure of anything, unless we know of what ships to demand such-and-such description of packages. One of the few well-arranged establishments we have, is a parcels receipt and delivery office at Balaklava, managed by a sergeant of artillery, who receives everything of the kind, registers, and informs the respective parties to send for them. Every seaman that could be had has been engaged acting as artillery in the batteries, and carrying up ammunition. A body of marines were treasures as an addition of excellent troops, but a large number have been withdrawn by order of the Admiralty, in order not to cripple the ships, which have no enemy to meet, and we have instead, raw lads, utter recruits, who require squad drill.

1855. — Transport arrangements.

"Abundant means of transport duly collected and duly maintained *as it might have been*, would have relieved us of half our difficulties. To prove what can be done, Majors Gordon and Chapman have at the present moment mules and drivers that were given over to them for entrenching-tools at the landing in the Crimea, and here they are *now* in good working condition, from having care taken of them, and with their native drivers; they have not lost above one in ten, and those, I believe, stolen from them.

"But only think, with all our losses of animals, we are now out of hay or straw, and have been so for weeks; they have nothing but corn, and it is curious how the poor beasts gnaw the rugs and blankets on each other's backs, wood of all kinds they can get hold of, and even each other's tails; there are said to be hundreds of store ships and transports, wind-bound at the Dardanelles, while we are thus in want, and no tugs apparently available to help them on.

Entrenchments at Inkermann.

"'Why was not Inkermann entrenched?' Because we had not possession of the ground that could be entrenched till we won it at the battle. I proposed long before to General Canrobert to occupy it, we British could not, and he shrugged up his shoulders, and said, '*Mon général, c'est trop loin.*'

"When we had defeated the enemy with great loss from our bad position, and had got an admirable one, the enemy having blown up the bridge, and made the separation as complete as possible between us, then we did entrench in a great degree, very much against *my* wish.

"'Why were the Turks placed in redoubts so far from supports?' There I think you hit a blot, and I would have as little said about it as possible; the result of that particular act was discreditable, but was not attended with any other evil consequences.

"Most other things I think I could defend even from the critics of the Rag. There was a good picture in *Punch* several months ago, of two gentlemen over their wine after dinner, describing how they would take Cronstadt! The spoons and forks were laid as ships and forts, and the thing was made the easiest possible. I recommend that picture to your friends of the Rag.

" 'They are to replace Lord Raglan by one of more ability, energy, &c. &c. &c.' Where is he? Many perhaps exist, but I am not aware of any one who has *proved* himself to possess sufficient qualifications. You must take one on trial. 1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"I think I have already written about the vast importance of admirably organized means of transport, but it is not by a vagabond set of raw Irish lads, that seem to be coming out as a waggon train, half organized, that this will be done.

"I am one of the old gentlemen, and a Peninsular man, but I am sure that I am not against innovation; on the contrary, I feel that we require it greatly; but do not run it to ribbons by bringing out a classical instead of a practical staff, &c.

"I have done all I could to encourage the railway, and I now begin to hope we may get some benefit from it.

"Camp before Sebastopol, 8th February, 1855.

"There have been great complaints of the troops in the trenches, during severe weather, burning gabions, fascines, platforms, and even handles of tools for firing; Sir Richard England was stating to Lord Raglan yesterday the necessity for the troops having a quantity of pickaxes to dig up roots of brushwood for fuel, and added, 'In fact, my Lord, pickaxes are fuel,' to which my Lord answered, "Yes, so they report to me from the trenches!'" Scarcity of fuel.

"9th February.

"The views taken by the people in England on the causes of our misfortunes, are gloomy enough to us here; as it is clear that all of us are considered deep criminals, and we have no one there who knows how to defend us. I have by the mail of yesterday, two letters from friendly disposed and clever men,—and it is evident they both of them think our conduct indefensible; how easily then will others persuade the world in general to the same effect! There has been a great want of *prévoyance* and arrangements, but we have perceived it as well as you, and have done what we could to provide remedies; the want of system is too deep-rooted to be corrected at once, and by those who do not belong to the English views of the war.

1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

Departments. The consequences, however, may very likely reach *me*, and may send me home in disgrace! Whatever implicates Lord Raglan will implicate me, as an avowed adviser, and always with him; and I am not at all disposed to shrink from it. If he is removed, I shall also necessarily be so, as the successor will probably be junior to us both. Another case may arise to let me down (but it is still *down*) easier; by saying that I am old, may be more useful in the War Office, and that there is an able and active officer of rank now out, General Jones. In any way, I shall be much grieved not to see the end of the Sebastopol affair; whatever happens, I have a self-complacency that allows me to feel in my own conscience that I have done all, not only *for*, but *to* the best."

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"9th February, 1855.

"We have just received the English mails up to the 26th January. The reputation of many of us, including Lord Raglan and his staff, and his advisers, among whom I must be included, is evidently at a very low ebb in England, and even our best friends, as we perceive by many letters, do not know how to defend us; it is to be presumed therefore that we shall be run down and disgraced.

"I was going to say that I wish I was in England for our defence, but I do not wish to be away from this service (though I presume that I shall be kicked out) but I wish some one knowing as much as I do, were there."

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"11th February, 1855.

The navvies.

"We have heard such nonsense about the *military* work that the navvies might perform for us; how admirable they would be *in the trenches*, and even how well calculated *to lead an assault*; that, without contemplating any such employments as those, for which they are totally unqualified, I thought

that we ought to show our perfect willingness to employ them to serve with the troops on reasonable occasions, that is *in defence* of positions near which they might happen to be, as the volunteers in England, during the last great war with France. I accordingly, in a private letter, suggested to Mr. Beatty, the principal engineer of the Railway Department, for his consideration, whether he thought well of inviting the men under him, or such as liked, to be enrolled and slightly exercised for any such occasional demand; to which he answered by the letter which I enclose, showing that it was contrary to the intentions, and even almost pledge, when they left England, and I have closed the correspondence by a letter of yesterday, the rough draft of which I also enclose. 1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"This will settle the matter, should any new crime be imputed to the army authorities, for not having employed these *fine manly fellows*, as they will be called, and with justice, to assist in fighting our battles as well as in their valuable work.

"I am happy to say that their railway works are progressing,—every possible assistance has been given to them, even at a great inconvenience to the service of the harbour of Balaklava.

"They have a line of rails, from about the centre of the town to a little way out; from about half a mile further, they will have a very steep slope and a stationary engine, and when workable to the top of the heights, it will be of vast service."

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*From* JAMES BEATTY, Esq., Chief Engineer of the Railroad.

"Balaklava, 9th February, 1855.

"MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

"The subject of your letter was very fully and anxiously discussed in London before I left, and it was determined *not* to arm the men. Employment of the railway labourers.

"They were considered too valuable to be employed as soldiers, and were distinctly told that they would not be called upon to fight.

"I have discussed the matter with my two principal assistants, Mr. Campbell and Mr. Kellock, and these difficulties present

1855. themselves; asking the men to volunteer will be tantamount to a breach of faith with them, as however open we may leave it to themselves to act, it will be looked upon in the light of compulsion.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"The half who are not disposed to join, will be driven to do so by the insinuations and jeers of the other half who are.

"The fear that by attempting to make, as it were, a fighting corps of these men will not disorganize them altogether as useful workmen.

"These difficulties present themselves to us, but any suggestion from you that will enable us to get over them, will receive our very best consideration.

"That a great portion of the men would be willing enough to form themselves into a corps, I believe, and the officers also.

"I remain, yours very faithfully,

"JAMES BEATTY."

*To* JAMES BEATTY, Esq.

"Head Quarters, 10th February, 1855.

"MY DEAR SIR,

Employment of the Navvies.

"The understanding for the services of your men when they left England, of course ought not to be disturbed; but I must confess that, pressed as we possibly might be at the very homes where your navvies might be at work, I should regret seeing 400 or 500 fine fellows like them, waiting the event with their arms folded, instead of having their arms in their hands, against the enemy who dared to approach them, as the Volunteers of old in England, who were composed of the most respectable people of the different places, were prepared to act, or like the present Dockyard Battalions.

"There is, however, much truth in your remark, that if the enrolment were general, it would amount virtually to the pressure of compulsion; and if not general, would act as a stigma on those who declined, and therefore we must think no more of it; but I hope that it will not be thrown in our teeth, among the other crimes that are so liberally imputed to the military authorities here, that they neglected to avail them-

selves of the services of those men against the enemy, when I see strongly advocated the employing the navvies *in the trenches*, and even that they would be proper men to *lead in an assault*, actions that I never contemplated for them. 1855. Siege of Sebastopol.

"There is another matter also that ought to be clearly understood, that if any number of them should, in case of attack, have a chivalrous impulse to take up arms to join us in the fray, the general on the spot would probably order them at once to the rear, because without order, control, or previous exercise, they would be of no service whatever, but rather an element of confusion.

"It seemed to be contemplated, when these men came out, that even after their first specific undertaking was completed, they might be found useful to retain with the army; but their being utter non-combatants, would be a very serious objection to such an arrangement, for we could never expect to have perpetual work worthy of so superior a class, or it might be very inconvenient to have to protect them wherever they were employed; and therefore, except for a distinct great object like that now in hand, it would be far better to avail ourselves of Sappers, who may be turned to account as good soldiers, as well as having a certain skill and aptitude for the work.

"I beg you will understand that my former communication was entirely a suggestion of my own for your consideration, and not to be deemed any more than this, as official reference requiring any official answer.

"My dear Sir,

"Yours faithfully,

"J. F. BURGOYNE."

"12th February, 1855.

"With regard to the quality of our staff, I do not consider it as inferior. I have myself, so long back as in the Peninsula times, considered our staff as very superior to that of other countries for spirit, intelligence, and a proper execution of its duties, and I think the principle of selection from the army in general, far better than having a distinct corps, who *must* On the qualifications of staff officers.

1855. absorb all the appointments, and who are raised alone by pre-eminence in scholastic acquirements; which last is, I think, being carried a great deal too far, and will lead to great disappointment. By that system, many men of very narrow minds, and very unfit for active business, will be found among those who may have passed brilliant examinations as very young men, and are thus irrevocably nailed to the establishment; while a vast number of the most able, namely, those who gain their acquirements later, and have proved themselves capable of anything, and full of many most valuable qualities not included in the studies of the Academy or College, cannot be admitted.

On the qualifications of Staff Officers.

"In the Engineers we have many failures, and I think it very probable that some of them comprehend men who left the Academy with very creditable repute; while many excellent officers among us were not remarkable as youths. But with the Engineers, the apprenticeship of professional study is indispensable, and therefore the distinct corps *must* be maintained, but with the Staff it is not so.

"It is not to be supposed from all this, that I despise elementary knowledge and education; far from it—I think it extremely useful, and would make it a great recommendation, but not the sole criterion. In my opinion, where such knowledge is obtained by voluntary efforts, after leaving the compulsory trammels, it is far more valuable than what is instilled or crammed into youth, and much more likely to be mixed up with other qualities of equal if not greater importance.

"There is another great evil in a standing corps of staff officers, which is, that they cannot ever have the intimate knowledge of details of discipline, regimental management, treatment of soldiers, exercises, &c., and which are most useful to every staff officer: they serve, it is true, an apprenticeship of perhaps two or three years in the line as subalterns, or may be, as in foreign services, a part of it in the ranks; but that is far from giving them that habitual knowledge of details, that is imparted by long regimental service, and more particularly when in command of a regiment.

"Then there is a great outcry about the appointments being by favouritism—young men of family and interest, &c. &c.,—all which is greatly exaggerated. It is very rare to see an

unworthy man so appointed; the great body of Adjutant-Generals, Brigade Majors, and Quartermaster-Generals, are selected for character and qualifications, and when men of rank are put into those Departments through interest, as far as my experience goes, it is only doing the favour where the proper qualities are found. There are in this army three such officers whom I happen to know (there may be more)—Honorable Colonel Gordon, second in Quartermaster-General's Department, Honorable Colonel Pakenham, second in Adjutant-General's, Honorable Colonel Herbert, Quartermaster-General of 2nd Division—and it is impossible to find men more able and zealous in their duties. No general would, for his own sake, appoint an inefficient secretary, and even the aides-de-camp I have almost always seen to be brilliant fellows for their particular line of duty. 1855. — On the qualifications of Staff Officers.

"The business of the Staff was always admirably performed in the Peninsular and Waterloo campaigns. I will give you one instance that I have always held up as a proof of it.

"When the army was in Paris in 1815, at a table at dinner, at which were the Emperor of Russia, King of Prussia, &c., there was a discussion about one of the Duke of Wellington's battles, I believe that of Salamanca; and the Duke offered to show them a review of the event with the British force then at Paris, *at ten o'clock the next morning*—this was in the evening. He immediately sent out his Staff officers to each division, with a very general instruction as to the time and place of meeting, and how to be drawn up. At ten o'clock, his 30,000 or 40,000 were all at the appointed positions in due order, and the entire manœuvres were then gone through, without previous intimation as to what they were to be, by sending out his orders from time to time, and the whole executed, without a check, with the precision with which a single regiment could have manœuvred. No great review by the armies of the other Powers, was made without everything being previously defined in writing, and with signals for different distinct periods: this was decidedly a triumph for the Staff. Military Staff in 1815.

"And what are the *particulars* that justify the lavish abuse of the Staff in the Crimea? If there have been instances (and I am sure I do not know that there have) of some neglect in

1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

the issue of an order or of a route, it has arisen, no doubt, from the first confusion in the multiplicity of arrangements before everything is settled into its proper place; but they would not have been avoided by the regularly educated corps of Staff, and the general service of the Staff here, I will maintain, has been admirably performed since I have joined the army. But these accusations come at the tail of melancholy accounts of the hardships and deprivations suffered by the troops, for all which (as well as, I believe, for *the inclemency of weather*) the poor Staff are by implication made responsible.

"The Duke of Newcastle was wrong in expecting that I should write to him; it would have been very indelicate in me to do so. And taking the view he has done of Lord Raglan's proceedings, I should have been exceedingly committed now, had I been a correspondent of his. Lord Hardinge promised to explain this to him.

"I have certainly written frequently to Lord Hardinge: 1st, Because he was a very old friend of mine; 2nd, Because I wrote chiefly on professional topics which we had frequently before discussed together; 3rd, Lord Hardinge has no control or power over Lord Raglan, and consequently, there was no indelicacy in my doing so."

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"15th February, 1855.

"Jones is in full play here, making himself acquainted with all the circumstances and localities of our position; and independent of his good service qualities, there will be much advantage in having a commanding Royal Engineer of his reputation and rank.

"General Bizot was with me this morning, the first I have seen of him for a long time, and we were quite cordial together. He came to introduce a French Colonel of Engineers, who is just arrived, and who will take command of the operations before the Tower of Malakoff, which I am sorry for in one respect, as it supersedes the Commandant St. Laurent, of

French Engineers, whom I think a superior man, and who got on well with Major Gordon. 1855.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"They are beginning to work at the batteries against the Tower of Malakoff, but, I am sorry to say, have made a fine *defensive* redoubt just in front of the Camp, and want us to make another in our front.

"Lord Stratford has just sent me the Decoration of the Turkish Order of *Nishan Medjidie*, first-class, which the Sultan has conferred on me, and mentions in a P.S. that he is informed by the Government, that the Queen will sanction our acceptance of it.

"I send to Lady Burgoyne through you, by this post, a cover containing the diploma in a silver bag.

"We are, of course, very anxious to learn what will be the future Ministry, and how *we* (the authorities with the army) are to be treated; *I* expect scurvily!"

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"16th February, 1855.

Requisitions by the French.

"General Bosquet, who, being on the spot, has to furnish men for the approaches towards the Tower of Malakoff, has set his face against that attack, and says, I understand, that we ought to have confined ourselves to the original plan against the Redan and Flagstaff Bastions; that, however, is overruled by the last project, and he has been forced to commence. The terms were, that though we could not find men for working and covering parties, we ought to provide guns, ammunition, artillerymen, Engineer officers, Sappers, Engineer stores and materials, &c. In compliance with these conditions, they have exacted from us 150,000 sandbags, 750 gabions, all the necessary platforms, and even tape, cord, and every trifling article that could possibly be required; we have been determined to comply as far as we could, and have furnished almost everything they have asked for, although it nearly beggared us in some matters.

"Our officers, however, have been delighted by the exertions of the French working parties given them, which, they say,

1855. were admirable, and very far exceeded the lazy way in which our soldiers proceed; of course, the French officers were greatly complimented on the occasion.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"Since I wrote my Memoranda on expected attacks upon us, a Tartar spy has come in, one in whom much confidence is placed. He describes the condition of the Russian army outside as frightful, as may naturally be believed; that they have no forage except at very great distances, where they have been forced to send nearly all their cavalry and artillery horses; provisions very scarce, and number of sick in hospital enormous. So much for the great *coups* they are to attempt against us!"

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*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"16th February, 1855.

"A telegraphic message, *viâ* Vienna and Bucharest, has been sent out in all haste to acquaint Lord Raglan, that, from information received in London, it was the intention to attack us from without as well as from the garrison, and early. I give no faith to this whatever; we are very strong in position and in force (the aggregate of French and British). Balaklava, and our siege batteries, are the only points where we are at all vulnerable; both are naturally very strong, but I think might be better guarded, for in both we run a great risk of a mishap by a sudden and furious attack; there are difficulties, however, in the way of the precautions which *I* consider desirable.

"Another reason against the probability of any serious attack from the army outside, is the great difficulty the enemy would have, and probably heavy losses in men and horses, by taking the field while the country is in its present state; to be sure the last few days, without rain, with warm sun and high wind, are drying up the country. All the tolerably firm spots are quite good for man and beast; but the vast amount of deep mud and clay is still very bad, and a return of snow or rain, always to be expected at this season, would make everything as bad as ever.

"The report from Varna now is that the Russians are preparing 40,000 to drive the Turks from Eupatoria. This is more

likely than their attacking *us*, but I have little doubt but that their force would be much smaller. The Turks have 30,000 or 35,000 there, and if well entrenched, and I believe that Simmons is hard at work at it, under Omer Pacha, they will no doubt make a good fight of it, and the very movement cannot be made by the Russians without great losses.' [1] 1855. Siege of Sebastopol.

"16th February, 1855.

"The railway is now completely out of the town, and about half a mile laid down; when it gets to Kadikoi, the first village about half a mile on, which it will in a very few days, I have recommended Captain Keane, R.E. and Mr. Beatty, C.E. to concert how it may be at once made available to carry out to that spot such heavy articles that do not require cover, like the huts for instance, which will not only save the animals, men, &c., coming for them from the camp that distance of bad road, but keep Balaklava, which is dreadfully thronged, free from the encumbrance of all that traffic; and when they get to the next station at the top of a steep incline, which will be worked by a stationary engine, another depôt will be of even much more value.

"In what publication has Sir Howard Douglas expressed his criticisms on some of the military affairs here? because I should like to have answered his opinion that we ought to have remained on the north side. Criticisms by Sir Howard Douglas.

"1. We could not occupy both, and the freedom of communication between the enemy's army in the country and the garrison, would have been as easy by the south side.

"2. We should have had no harbour, but an open beach, whereas we have now Balaklava, and two excellent, well-sheltered bays near Cape Chersonese.

"3. Our nearest communication with the sea would have been at the mouth of the Katcha, for the Belbec is under the enemy's fire, and over a kind of mountain.

"4. Besides that long communication to maintain, we should have had neither there, nor for the camp, any advantageous position of defence against the enemy's army in the field.

[1] This attack took place on the following day, with the result foretold in this letter.

1855. "5. Water very scarce.

Siege of Sebastopol. "6. After gaining the north, we must have recommenced on the south, &c. &c. &c."

"17th February, 1855.

Necessity for improved transport. "Because I denounce the gross way in which Lord Raglan and Staff are indiscriminately charged with every hardship and suffering of every soldier, do not think that I am not aware of the systematic defects in our service. I am as keenly alive to them as any one, and I rejoice that, however the manner in which accusations and abuse are poured forth is disgraceful, still that the great motive for improvement will be so thoroughly impressed upon people's minds, that there will be no stopping it, and we should now all turn our best attention to the discovery of the best mode in which improvements can be effected.

"I fear much jumping at conclusions; that because you put together a number of ill-regulated drivers, neglected horses, and rickety carriages, you have got a waggon train. It is a corps of all others that will require care in its composition, and very well considered arrangements.

"The essentials of every carriage with an army, viz. wheels and axles, should be *very strong*, almost, if not quite, equal to those of the artillery. It is surprising how you see all slight-built carriages on the roadside, with one or the other gone. The shafts in two-wheel carriages break, and it may be a question whether they would not be better, each as a separate stick, inserted and slightly pinned into two square iron eyes, under the body; then a spare shaft could be easily carried, or almost any piece of wood readily supplied as a temporary measure.

"Good country horses of any locality will do well for these services, though seldom for our cavalry or artillery; and therefore, though always accompanied by a first requisite number of horses, let carriages, harness, and drivers be taken for this additional resource, which will give the readiest way of obtaining a large force early, and be very economical.

Organization of transport. "The price given should be such as to procure *good* horses; the first cost is a very small portion of their expense, particularly if sent abroad.

"Let all drivers be LIGHTLY armed (*no revolvers*), and above all things let the whole be neat and creditable, and on a system to encourage a pride and *esprit de corps*. 1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"Stafford O'Brien's speech, though time-serving, and *ad captandum*, will have a powerful effect in putting our hospitals and care of sick and wounded on a good footing; and the amendment should not only be applied to the field, but to home service, garrisons, and colonies.

"There is no matter whatever, in which the French are so superior to us as in their hospitals. They spare no pains and no expense to give the sick the best of houses, excellent beds, ventilation and extreme cleanliness, and every attendance, care, and comfort possible.

"Their civil hospitals at Paris are very superior, and their arrangements in the field and in foreign countries, for the soldiers, are most *recherchés*.

"After the battle of Talavera we remained about a week on the ground; our wounded were put up as well as *we* thought they could be, in some large buildings in the town, and laid on the ground in their blankets. They were necessarily left to the mercy of the enemy and to the number of, I believe, some thousands.

"When the French entered, a general officer visited the hospital and said the accommodation was not at all sufficient for *de braves soldats;* and, before evening, the town was ransacked for mattresses, and the condition of these poor patients was greatly ameliorated in every respect.

"This matter will be peculiarly worthy of the attention of Captain Laffan, in his researches at Paris."

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*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"18th February, 1855.

"The Turks under Omer Pacha, have made a glorious beginning at Eupatoria yesterday morning; and if they continue to repulse further attacks, it will have an immense influence on *our* circumstances; and this, in its first conception, Repulse of the Russians by the Turks at Eupatoria.

1855. will be entirely due to Lord Raglan. It was his proposition to bring Omer Pacha and a Turkish army to Eupatoria; at first coldly received by Lord Stratford, and still more so by General Canrobert.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"The attack of yesterday could not have been very obstinate or vigorous, for it was over at 10 A.M., and the loss on neither side appears to be heavy; but even if the Russians choose to call it a *reconnaissance*, it was a very foolish one on their part, as it must give greatly increased spirit to the Turks.

"Although the weather has been fine for the last few days, and the country drying up rapidly, the exertion to the enemy must have been very great to make the movement to Eupatoria, and no doubt must be attended with great sacrifices. I do not at all believe that they had 40,000 men and 100 guns there, as reported; but if they had half the number, it is a great effort.

"Deserters and spies all agree that their troops are very irregularly provided with rations; and in forage they are extremely deficient, while their sick are very numerous. They may contrive to make a rapid dash, but to *keep the field* against any force that can prolong a contest with them, must be impossible. It will be an utter disgrace to us, if we do not attempt something to aid the Turks by a diversion, which will also greatly relieve ourselves. I revert again to my old project of acting on the Belbec, and if at all possible at Simferopol.

"We have, I think, sufficient force for the purpose; at all events for the first; that is, the French have, and I wish I could hope something will be attempted, but I cannot. It is possible a *reconnaissance* or manifestation may be made; but if from Balaklava, which is the favourite side, it can produce no useful effect whatever. The Russians are fine fellows: they attack the Turks with the bulk of their forces fifty or sixty miles from here, and with a handful of men, they hem in our 80,000, carry off our sentries from within 1000 yards of our lines, fire into our camp, and prevent us using a valuable road that is between Balaklava and Inkermann. I wish this army were all British."

"18th February, 1855.

"I have read over the debates that are yet arrived, on the conduct of the war, and see that *we* are all doomed men.

The conclusion that seems to have been come to finally, is that the errors and cause of every evil were *here* and not at home. 1855.

Debates on the conduct of the war.

"Mr. Gladstone, to be sure, said a few words about Lord Raglan's amiability, that he was a favourite of the Duke, &c.—in short, he pleaded an extenuation on account of former character, &c. *after conviction!* And such a jumble of accusations, and such forced arguments! Lord Grey attributes as one cause of our distress, that promotion is by seniority, and not by selection, (which, by the bye, on some Utopian theory, he flatters himself will be always by merit, and never by favour or interest); to make his argument complete, he ought to show how the selection made was bad, and who would have been better. Take the list through, and I don't know where you could have selected better men; or find names, from Lord Raglan downwards, better received at the time; and as to age, certainly a general from 40 to 50 is as old as he should be; but after a long peace, I would maintain that it is right to *begin* with some of a little experience, even at the inconvenience of their being older, if they be not decrepit, and even notwithstanding that, under a new system, you had plenty of generals who were younger.

"I find '*want of success*' only mentioned once in the House as one of our crimes, whereas that is really the cause after all, and where the shoe pinches. It is the bitter disappointment of this lingering state of hardship and suspense, after you were told day after day that Sebastopol was taken, and would assume that it was so easy; that is an accusation that we might very fairly be called upon to meet. It is too long a matter to be discussed here; but most of the defence I should make might, I think, be culled from my correspondence with the office. Here again the French cannot be brought in against us; the proceedings have in that respect been combined.

Causes of failure.

"The Government, I must say, were very active in ordering out warm clothing and huts; but still, from our own delay in foreseeing the necessity for them, they came late. The same want of foresight would have been a reason for not making a road; but we have a still better—that of no available labour. The troops have not been strong enough to perform even their field-duties, and yet are killed by *fatigue*.

1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"Even that defect would have been remedied had we possessed ample means of transport, *and that we might have had;* there is no reason why we might not have had for our small force, as much means of transport as the French now have for their large one, except want of an organized system, and neglect and bad management of the departments concerned. I am not prepared to say how much is due to each; but I cannot accuse either the Secretaries *for* or *at* War, or the generals and staff of this army, as the great culprits. Suppose, however, all this to have been, not to say better, but well arranged and provided for, our *cold, wet, fatigue, sickness,* and *mortality* would still have been excessive. The Russians, from every intelligence, have suffered immense losses. The Turks *far* exceed any others, and the number of sick of the French has been enormous: 8000 sent away in one month (January), and 2000 in the first week in February. It is difficult now, however, to obtain particulars of the latter, for in answer to queries of a French officer, we have been told that their authorities recommend caution to their people in affording us information that may subsequently be, so detrimentally to their service, published in the English newspapers.

"The French, however, are said to be our masters in everything but fighting. I can see no proof of it, excepting in their complete organization of the necessary auxiliary departments of an army, and their very superior system of order and regulation at their stations, whether temporary or permanent. These are most important, and we cannot do better than follow, or rather improve upon them, which I think we can do; for the rest, they commit quite as many errors as we do.

"What would have been the consequence if *we* had incurred the terrible sacrifice that the French did in the Dobrutcha in July? *Many thousand* men lost in a most frightful manner from some rapid gross mismanagement — and here is the general out again with the army, in full force, who was said to be the author of the calamity.

"When they talk of the heartrending sufferings of our army, there is no denying the fact; but when they assume that it is peculiar to the British, and occasioned by the shameful conduct of individuals in high authority, whether Ministers, or

Generals and Staff, it is false. The far greater part arises from the inevitable consequences of the course the campaign has taken, and the undertaking of a great operation with insufficient means. 1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"It vexes me beyond measure, that nobody in England will see the matter in this, which I believe to be the true light, or is bold enough to make it known. It is above all things of importance to show that it is most unjust to hold up the French as worthy to be our masters, in anything but the organization of their establishments. I consider that we are far superior to them in generals, in staff, in regimental officers (barring grumbling), in infantry, and artillery. In cavalry I think they are superior in most things except dash, and except in the power of horses *when ours are in condition*, which is not long when campaigning. Of the Engineers, we must be modest; but I would not be at all afraid of competing with them, when we have a good moveable train, and plenty of Sappers. Comparison between French and English.

"I abandon the hospitals and medical arrangements and sick from my consideration; it is a chaos I could not embark in, and may well be treated as a distinct matter. There is complete evidence that a thorough reform and organization is wanted there. It is plain that, amidst the general confusion created by *no system*, the department has found itself overwhelmed by the magnitude of its charge, and when they provided, or thought of a provision for hundreds of sick and wounded, thousands came suddenly pouring in upon them. Without going into other matters of the mischiefs that must arise from, not to say the publicity given to, our misdoings and to the frequently exaggerated and unjust accusations brought against the superior authorities *en masse*, but the virulence and persevering industry with which every hardship of the 'poor soldiers' is studiously attributed to the gross neglect of their officers who '*care nothing about them*,' it will be miraculous if it does not raise up a discontented if not mutinous spirit among the men, and make them impatient of privations and sufferings that must inevitably attend upon armies campaigning, however perfectly they may be supplied. It will be argued that, without pursuing such a course, justice could Defective hospital arrangements.

1855. not be done nor improvements made. If it be so, at least let this inconvenience, which is the consequence, be well understood, and also the effects of raising such feelings on the future discipline, well doing, and *success* of the army. I would maintain that if it be decided that it must be so, the British army will decline for many a year, and until those impressions shall die away, will become quite inferior, for any active service, to that of other nations.

Siege of Sebastopol.

Defective shipping arrangements.

"Monstrous inconveniences have arisen from the confused way in which the ships with supplies sent to the army are loaded; for which, *of course*, Lord Raglan and Staff are highly censurable. But either from haste, or economy of stowage, or other reasons, the cargoes are mixed so as to make inextricable difficulties; rice, forage, warm clothing, tents, heavy ordnance, &c., are heaped into one ship, so that it requires five or six departments to clear. One wants urgently an article which is at the bottom, and the others cannot clear the way to it; the consequent inconvenience, confusion, and extra labour is terrible, and it becomes impossible to clear any ship in reasonable time and send her out of Balaklava. This confusion is increased by subsequent alterations at Malta and Constantinople, *of which no account is kept;* the cargo in one ship being perhaps for many places as well as services."

"20th February, 1855.

"The weather came on last night worse for our feelings and comforts than even it has yet been—a heavy fall of snow, accompanied (which it has never been before) by a severe gale of cold wind from the north, which drives the snow into deep drifts, and the snow and wind now continue. This is bad enough for us; but what must it be for the Russians, who have retired from before Eupatoria, and who cannot, I conceive, possibly have reached any quarters, cantonments, or other shelter in the two days. They do not carry tents; their soldiers have no blankets, nor other covering but a threadbare greatcoat: they are stated to be extremely badly off for forage and even provisions: they must have at least from 600 to 1000 wounded with them. The roads now (since last night) are frightful; and from the number of guns said to be with them, besides cavalry, very many horses to take care of. I wish there was

a *Times* at St. Petersburg with the full swing of our noble paper—and wouldn't we read a pretty list of horrors! We are in some alarm about the consequences on ourselves, that is, on the Highland Brigade, which moved forward at two this morning to co-operate with a French corps, which was to have attacked or driven away the enemy's corps along the right bank of the Upper Tchernaya. The weather became so frightful, in the middle of the night, that General Canrobert counter-ordered the movement; and Foley was sent off at 2 A.M. from the French camp, to inform Sir Colin Campbell. He could not find his way, and only got here to Lord Raglan's head-quarters at 4 A.M., when Colonel Somerset was sent off from hence immediately to Sir Colin Campbell, and has not yet (10 A.M.) returned. I do not suppose Sir Colin will have been committed as regards the enemy, but the weather will have been very severe upon his men. 1855. Siege of Sebastopol.

"The French system would delight Lord Grey, namely, that of promoting Generals by *merit*, or, as I should call it, *caprice*. Canrobert has six Lieutenant-Generals under him, who six months ago were his seniors: and General Pelissier is appointed to the command of a *corps d'armée* in which a senior, Forey, commands a Division. Whether from this or other cause, it was currently reported in this PATTERN army, by officers and privates, that General —— had been detected in a correspondence with the enemy, and was to be shot! Whether true or false, this circumstance is not creditable. Promotion by selection.

"Sir Colin Campbell and his Brigade have returned all right, and tolerably cheerful. They took up the ground destined for them, overlooking the Russian camp, where the enemy appeared greatly surprised and scared at their appearance; and then getting their order of recall, returned to camp. The Russians will no doubt be astonished at our taking so fine a morning for such a promenade.

"Omer Pacha's troops at Eupatoria are chiefly Egyptians and Arnauts, and vastly superior to the ordinary Turkish soldiers, whom they affect to despise. They are said to be full of ardour and impatience to go and seek the Russians anywhere. They say to our men—Inglis, *bono*. Frances, *bono*. Turco, *no bono*. Arab, *bono*. They call themselves Arabs."

1855. "Camp before Sebastopol, 22nd February, 1855.

A good servant.

"Lord Raglan has one of the most superior upper servants I ever saw. His name is Ferdinand, a German—speaks English and French perfectly,—of most obliging, gentle, and pleasant manner. He is his valet, and attends to all his personal wants, brushes his clothes and boots, and does all the dirty work himself in keeping his room clean. He is besides butler, and regulates all the table supplies (no easy matter here), the live and dead stock, &c., and waits, and superintends the dinner-table in the style of a butler in a nobleman's family in England; frequently goes himself down to Balaklava or Kameisch Bay (Cape Chersonese), through the mud, to see what he can purchase. Lately, in one of our worst nights, he was coming up with a cart full of provisions and other things, the cart stuck in the mud, and could not be persuaded to move on; he sent one of the men up here to get assistance and more horses, while he remained by the cart, and brought it in about one in the morning. He is always the last up at night, and the first up in the morning: you *never* can call 'Ferdinand,' but he is ready to serve you. He has a miserable little bed, about four feet long, and ill-provided; and the A. D. C.s cannot persuade him to allow it to be improved. When my Lord is called out on any alarm, and stays out perhaps all day, during it you are sure to find the faithful 'Ferdinand' coming up (even *under fire*, as at Inkermann) with a basket of good things for his master to eat and drink, and with a good additional supply for his master's friends. I think you will acknowledge that he is a character worthy of being commemorated![1]

*From* Lord Wrottesley *to the* Marquis of Lansdowne.

"1, Albemarle Street,
"My dear Lord Lansdowne, 22nd February, 1855.

Recall of Sir John Burgoyne.

"I think it right you should know that the family and friends of Sir John Burgoyne, and the members of

[1] On Lord Raglan's death, Ferdinand Roth returned to England, and was appointed messenger at the War Office, a post he still occupies.—Ed.

his corps, are very much hurt—not to use a stronger term— at the peculiar manner in which Lord Panmure is reported to have announced to the House of Lords Sir John's recall from the Crimea. If his Lordship really intended to express that the Government were dissatisfied with Sir John's conduct, there is nothing more to be said, and Sir John must be left to defend himself on his return,—and I have little doubt of the result: but if not, it is surely not asking too much to request Lord Panmure to say so in his place in Parliament. I cannot believe that censure was intended, when I call to mind Sir John's distinguished services, and that there are doubtless many reasons which make his return desirable just now. Moreover I am informed, confidentially, that General Niel, the French Engineer, has just expressed his approval of that mode of attack which Sir John has for four months been endeavouring in vain to persuade Generals Canrobert and Bizot to adopt; and if I am right in my conjectures, it was very unfortunate that Lord Panmure should have associated this recall in his speech with the various measures of reform which he contemplated. My connection with Sir John Burgoyne would perhaps have justified me in putting a notice of a question on this very important subject, on the Minutes; but in addition to the other objections which might be urged to such a course, I have a great dislike to identify myself with that numerous class who seem disposed to find fault with everything and everybody connected in any way with the conduct of the war.

1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"Yours, &c.,

"WROTTESLEY."

*From the* Marquis of LANSDOWNE *to* Lord WROTTESLEY.

"23rd February, 1855.

"MY DEAR LORD WROTTESLEY,

"Lord Panmure was obliged to leave the Cabinet yesterday afternoon, and did not go to the House, so that I had no opportunity of speaking to him after I received your letter, but I wrote to him last night on the subject. Exoneration.

"I am confident the last thing he could have intended was

1855. to throw any slur on Sir John Burgoyne, and I trust any such misapprehension may speedily be rectified.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"For myself I can truly say that there are few persons for whose long services in various employments, ably fulfilled, and for whose high personal character, I entertain more respect and regard.

"Believe me, very faithfully yours,

"LANSDOWNE."

Editorial remarks.

On General Canrobert's complaint of Sir John Burgoyne reaching Paris, it was shown to our Ambassador, by whom it was transmitted to the English Government. It could not have arrived at a more inopportune moment for Sir John's interests, for the English Ministry was tottering to its fall, owing to the complete breakdown of our military organization in the East, the consequent sufferings of our army, and the clamour of the press. A successful blow at Sebastopol could alone save the Government, and General Canrobert's report, besides imputing vacillation to Sir John Burgoyne, virtually represented him as the sole obstacle to an immediate assault upon the place. This was by no means the case, for Lord Raglan fully concurred with him in considering an assault upon the Redan to be too hazardous at this period: nor did General Bizot's proposal imply an immediate assault; it merely attempted to commit us to a project of attack on the original front, involving a prospective assault after the English batteries had been re-armed, and supplied with fresh ammunition,—a work of months with the then defective state of the English transport.

In order to obtain a clearer understanding of the position of affairs in the Crimea, the French Emperor had sent his aide-de-camp, General Niel of the Engineers, on a mission to the seat of war. This General, after an examination of the locality, and of the French and English attacks, pronounced in favour of Sir John Burgoyne's

views, and wrote to that effect to the Emperor Napoleon. 1855.
The English Government began now to think they had Editorial remarks.
committed a mistake in recalling their chief Engineer; and on the 23rd February Lord Panmure wrote to assure him that there was no intention of casting any slur upon him by his recall from the seat of war, but that his services were required at home, and that General Jones was considered competent to fill his place at the head-quarters of the army. In the House of Peers, on the following night, Lord Panmure stated that he "wished to make it clear that the recall of this officer is not from any fault found with him by the Government, but arises from the fact that a younger officer has been sent out to assume the duties of commander of the Royal Engineers, and to assist Lord Raglan with scientific advice, and that it has therefore been thought right to recall Sir John Burgoyne, a man now far advanced in years, from the sufferings of a Crimean winter, to resume his duties as Inspector-General of Fortifications. Therefore he (Lord Panmure) hoped that if the slightest impression existed that Sir John Burgoyne had been recalled under any stigma whatever, it would now be removed from the mind of the public."

The Marquis of Lansdowne then rose, and passed an eloquent eulogium upon Sir John Burgoyne. He said he "had occasion to know that Sir John had, at the earnest request of the noble lord, the late head of the War Department, unhesitatingly sacrificed his own comfort, and every other consideration, for the discharge of the important but temporary duties which were confided to him. In doing so Sir John Burgoyne had, however, only acted in accordance with the whole tenor of his life, which had been a continual sacrifice of his private convenience to the public service. He had done so in a

1855. — Siege of Sebastopol. variety of services, and on great exigencies in the history of this country; he had shown on several occasions the greatest administrative capacity; and he had conducted himself on all occasions with the highest honour to himself and the greatest advantage to the country."

This statement was received with loud cheers.

*Correspondence resumed.*

*From* Colonel MATSON *to* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE.

"Ordnance Office, 23rd February, 1855.

"MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

"Your letters of the 9th inst. I received this morning. I shall send a copy of your defence of Lord Raglan and the Staff to Lord Hardinge. I enclose a copy of a note from his Lordship; and I waited on him, and he desired me to express his best wishes to you, and the great interest he felt in all your concerns. I conclude you will have received your recall about the 27th. I mentioned to his Lordship that I trusted it would make no difference to you as regards the pension of which he spoke some time since; he answered, 'No, certainly not.' He said he was so busy, or he should have written to you himself.

"Everybody is surprised that De Lacy Evans did not defend Lord Raglan and the Staff against the attacks made upon them in the House, but it would not have been agreeable to his constituents, I suppose. Sir James Graham, Sidney Herbert, and Mr. Gladstone, have declined to act under Lord Palmerston.

"Ever yours, &c.,

"E. MATSON."

*From* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE.

"Camp before Sebastopol, 23rd February, 1855.

"According to the last arrangement, the French were to make some new batteries and approaches, and we were to furnish all the materials we could; and you cannot conceive how *exigeants* they have been, and how they try to screw every item of

store they can spy out in our possession. Two notes I enclose will give you a specimen: 15,000 sandbags, 750 gabions, &c., we gave them; and, since that, they found by accident, that we had a few 6-feet fascines, and they immediately demanded them. 1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"General Niel left us, on his return home, about a week ago, and we are astonished to hear that he is now ordered to return and remain till the end of the siege, and is expected back daily.

"The French works are carried on far too elaborately for my taste,—parapets of immense thickness, at 2500 yards from the place, with substantial traverses, and batteries of immense strength and fineness of work: double the quantity of trench, with half the labour given to each part, would be far more useful.

"I was in hopes that Wrottesley saw my letters which I addressed to Colonel Matson on the affairs here, and if he had, he would have known better how to defend me from the accusation of * * * *,—as to my having concurred in General Bizot's proposed attack, and then striking out another—than by denying it; but I shall now request Matson to show them to him and he will see that I adopted the proposition at first, because it was the only one for which we had ground to act upon, having always however hinted how desirable it would be to extend as much as we could; and when we had virtually *failed* in it, which was the result of our first cannonading, and that the battle of Inkermann opened to us the desired field for the operation, I at once recommended that it should form part of the renewed attack, for which we were preparing,—have persevered in it ever since; and the consequence of the recent mission of General Niel, aide-de-camp to the French Emperor, and an officer of high rank and character in the Engineers, has confirmed my view, and ended in the final adoption of it. There was nothing inconsistent in my proceeding from the beginning to the end. Explanations.

"When there was an opening for what I thought the proper principle of attack, and I refused my assent in consequence, to the old one on the restricted scale, General Canrobert wrote to Lord Raglan what I thought a very impertinent letter, accusing us of making a demur to following up the plan to which we had assented, and to make it more palatable to my Lord, laying the blame upon *me*. I was strongly inclined to

1855. make an angry reply, but Lord Raglan more prudently made a modified explanation, and the matter did not lead to a breach between the Allies, as it might have done with one less determined to conciliate.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"In the meantime Canrobert sent his letter of accusation to Paris, *before he got any explanation*, so that it would have appeared to be all well founded, and in that state probably it came to the knowledge of ——.

"All that was very hard upon me: and also that to prevent a quarrel, my explanation, and in fact defence, as it went in, was curtailed, and not so full and decisive as I would have wished it. I was therefore glad of the opportunity of opening a communication with General Niel to clear up the matter. I sent a copy of that letter to Colonel Matson, and also a copy of resolutions subsequently come to by a Council in the French Camp, offered to Lord Raglan for his concurrence, adopting my view completely; and not as a matter of concession, but applying reasons for it even more full than were brought forward by me.[1]

"You will perceive that this is very different from the vacillation of which —— had been led to believe I was guilty.

"We are now proceeding as actively as we can on that plan.

"I sent to Matson also a copy of General Canrobert's complaint, or rather, as I imagine, the one drawn up by General Bizot, or General Trochu, the head of the Staff (whom I believe to be wrong-headed and mischievous), and which Canrobert adopted; and also drafts of my explanations, from which Lord Raglan made an abstract.

"The fact is, we are now in a sad state of dependence; for being a very small force acting in combination with a very large one, we are virtually quite at their mercy; and I cannot say that they are very generous in the use of their power, but grind us down to very hard terms; and at the same time, I have not the consolation of thinking that they are leading us in the course of enterprise that it is in our power (with the *combined*

[1] These resolutions, or *procès-verbal* of the conference, dated 2nd February, are published in the appendix to the official account of the siege by Major Elphinstone, R.E.—Ed.

forces) to adopt, or that I feel satisfied would be adopted, had *we* the preponderating power in so great a degree." 1855.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"It is a very fashionable piece of cant just now, to talk of the poor soldier being sacrificed to *Routine* of Office. 'Why not do as the *Times* agent does, with 10,000*l.* or 12,000*l.* in hand to expend according to his discretion?'

Routine.

"The only alternative, if Public Departments are not to act by '*Official Routine*,' which means, in fact, REGULATIONS, is to give them a latitude to use their own discretion in dealing with public stores and public money; and what is more, the argument, as carried out, leaves to individuals all that discretionary power. A pretty doctrine to preach! If they can show the regulations to be faulty, amend them, by all means, but that is not the outcry, but 'away with all regulations,' or, as they call it, by the less startling name of Routine.

Sickness in the army.

"One of the subjects, not of regret, which it reasonably might be, but of condemnation, is that the army is *sickly*. If these gentlemen imagine it will *ever* be otherwise, I can tell them they will probably be mistaken. It is to be hoped it will not continue to the fearful extent that the hardships of season have brought on, but even the summer in these climates and countries will bring its own maladies, as was experienced in Bulgaria, and they will not be less if accompanied by a campaign!

"I hear that the Duke of Cambridge's Colonel Macdonald, is doing good service in London, by talking sense to the malignants.

"You must remember Captain Conolly at Dublin. He is here Brigade-Major to the Heavy Cavalry; and it is gratifying to hear him talk, not only of the prowess of our Cavalry, but of their superior power, weight, height, and strength: the Russian Cavalry were like pigmies against them, and at the action of Balaklava were ridden and cut literally *down!*

"With us, there is little difference between Heavy and Light."

23rd February 1855.

"Among the clap-trap delusions of the day, is that of raising men from the ranks, to be officers.

1855. "Neither the British army nor the British nation are constituted for such a change.

Promotion from the ranks.

"There is not so aristocratic a nation in the world as the British, and this sentiment is found not alone among the aristocracy itself, but throughout every class.

"The upper class is exclusive, the next in order yields submissively to the rule, and strives to gain an entry by everything but force, into the society above them, and so will each in the orders below endeavour to gain a step, while the lowest look up to the highest with respect, and will ridicule the attempts of those who assume the airs of the superior class.

"Soldiers have not the same reverence by any means for officers raised among themselves that they have for those who are 'born gentlemen.'

"The Irish in particular, have this feeling very strong, and always distinguish with respect the squire or 'real gentleman' from the man of newly-acquired fortune and estate; this may be very degrading, but it exists so strongly as to leave the officer who rises from the ranks in a very invidious and uncomfortable position; from a proud station as a sergeant or sergeant-major, the highest of his class, he finds himself by his 'promotion' put down into the lowest of that he has entered into.

"In means of living he is much worse off; he gains a trifle in income, but his expenditure is necessarily increased in a much greater degree.

"If a single man, he must be put to cruel shifts to live at the mess, the cost of which, with clothing, &c., is so regulated as to require additional means besides his pay; if married, he will be equally badly off to live on his pay with his wife and family, while in neither case can he associate except on distant and reserved terms with the other officers, not from any *hauteur* in the latter, but bred in a different school, they have nothing in common in their manners or ideas.

"All this is so sensibly felt by the men themselves, that many most respectable non-commissioned officers have refused the offered promotion.

"It may be said 'Oh! but all this is very bad, and should be changed.' Messes and uniforms, and modes of living of

officers should be lowered, so that every man could live well on his pay; sale and purchase of commissions abolished, &c.; but this involves the cost of driving the aristocracy and those who have means, away from the army; for it is hardly to be supposed that men of this class would enter into so uncomfortable a profession: and you must do that *first*, and it will not be so easily effected, for it is, as above stated, contrary to the spirit of the population, in which your levellers and equality men are in a decided minority. By starting with giving numerous commissions from the ranks you are beginning at the wrong end, endeavouring to construct an upper floor before you have a basement. 1855. — Promotion from the ranks.

"Then see how this militates against other reforms that have been recently urged as strongly necessary.

"First, the high education system, and that every officer should be well instructed in various branches of knowledge; such attainments *may* be found in many non-commissioned officers, but many distinguished for gallantry, conduct, and regularity, will be deficient in them. Then again, how can the ranks be kept in unison with ages, so that officers may not be too advanced in life when arriving at commands; these men will be in the prime of life, in stations that ought to be filled by youths, and as they rise, will become far too old for their positions; for it is by no means to be assumed that those who may have been found worthy of commissions, will subsequently be found to have claims to a rapid advancement to higher grades, when they come into competition with a superior class of men. It is quite a mistake to suppose that this measure is necessary to obtain better officers, for there are not better regimental officers in the world than those of the British army.

"The service does not require the measure, except on the plea of affording a proper reward for bravery and merit, and it is submitted that this would be far better attained, and with more satisfaction to the parties themselves, by stationary appointments in the military departments, and by pensions.

"Examples in favour of this proposition are drawn from the practice in other countries, but the military is there on a totally different footing; the service is compulsory, and men

1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

of all classes of society are compelled to enter the ranks as private soldiers, and even then, it will be found that habitually the officers are selected from those who have birth and fortune; the principles also under which the officers of those armies are maintained, differ essentially from ours."

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"25th February, 1855.

Failure of the French at the Ouvrages Blancs.

"I sent you a hurried few lines, written yesterday morning, on an attack made by the French on a new work commenced by the enemy on territory that decidedly ought to be ours. As circumstances come to be known, I am sorry to say that it was a complete failure, and the results are likely to be seriously to our prejudice.

"The attack, it appears, was to be made by about 800 or 1000 Zouaves, supported by 500 or 600 of the *Troupes de Marine* (not for service on board of ship, but at dockyards). They were to have driven the enemy out of the work, then to have demolished it, and then returned to the trenches, a Regiment or two of Bosquet's division being out to check any subsequent advance of the Russians.

"The Zouaves made the attack with great gallantry—it is not clear whether they were ever in possession of the parapet of the work—but they were speedily attacked, in their turn, by what is said to have been a very superior force, and were driven away in great confusion, leaving a great number of officers and men killed and wounded, and bringing in from 100 to 200 wounded. They themselves say, as we understand, that they were not supported as they should have been by the Marine Corps; no other attempt was made either on that night or since, and the Russians have been vigorously engaged since in improving and strengthening the work. On the morning succeeding the attack, the bells in the town were ringing, and they were evidently rejoicing in their success!

"The matter is entirely in the hands of our Allies, and we can not only do nothing in it, but must be cautious in our language to avoid giving offence; but I may say to you in con-

fidence, that I think it a very discreditable affair, not because it failed at the first attempt, for the Russians may have been in much greater force than was expected; but in not persevering with the whole force, which was at hand, rather than submit to the serious impression created by being defeated; if not done on that night, it should have been done on the next, even if it required 20,000 men to do it. The enemy now remain in triumph, strengthening themselves energetically in an important position, and having shown a power of resistance, to which we submit, which must create a moral impression on both sides, that may tell seriously on future assaults.

1855.

Failure of the French at the Ouvrages Blancs.

"The poor Zouaves who were engaged, may be said, in common parlance, to have been cut to pieces."

"25th February, 1855.

"You will hear from my note to Colonel Matson of the melancholy affair of the French attack on a Russian advanced work, on the night of the 23rd. I consider it a very serious disaster in its consequences, because no attempt seems likely to be made to retrieve the triumph it gives to the enemy. There is also another disagreeable circumstance attending it, that it shows a thorough knowledge of the best mode of resisting an assault, viz. by holding the parapet by an advanced firing party, but relying for the main effort of resistance on masses of troops in rear, to 'chargé' the assailants in disorder.

"I expect that the disaster of that night, no effort being made to retrieve it, is likely to have an essential moral effect on the spirit of the troops on both sides, at least so far as the French and Russians are concerned. The latter will have gained a great many pegs in advance of what they stood on the 22nd. Lord Raglan, in his official account of the affair, will have taken the first French version, and held it out rather as unsuccessful.

"With reference to the disgraceful condition of the British troops, for want of barracks to cover them; General Canrobert has got a great many out, but won't bring them up to camp, considering it of inferior consequence to many other demands for his transport.

1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"The French General Vinois, whose brigade is near Balaklava, had a pair of favourite bullocks that he petted; one of them strayed a short distance, and was knocked on the head by some of the railway navvies. The driver informed the general in time to catch them, and they were sent to the French guard, as well as a superintendent, who in an impertinent manner attempted to defend them; they got off on payment of 100 francs, and the dead bullock taken away from them, but they will have to submit to a little arbitrary government."

"27th February, 1855.

"You cannot conceive how distressed I am about the failure of the French on the night of the 23rd, and their resolution not to renew the attack. It gives a brilliant triumph to the enemy, and those engaged in it deserve well of their Emperor Nicholas. It prolongs any prospect of our final success in a very great degree, for if we cannot succeed in an assault where so many points were in our favour, how are we to gain the place under far more difficult circumstances?

"We have such a paltry force in the combined army that it has become nearly a French operation, and they carry on their plans without even the *form* of consulting us. If the future campaigns are to be in the same relative scales, I think you will not have many more Almas or Inkermanns to boast of.

"I am sorry to find by every day's experience, that I have by no means exaggerated the brutal feelings of the Englishmen towards their animals. At every turn you meet them abusing by word of mouth and blows, poor beasts who are doing their utmost with loads ill-arranged, and saddles cutting their backs to pieces. I am only surprised that those who have the superior charge allow such conduct without rebuke. Where a man's own animal is concerned, he may interfere, but the motive is clearly then not one of mercy or humanity.

"I hope we shall turn to good account the present popular outcry on the state of the commissariat, army transport, engineers' field train, medical organization and stores, ambulances, &c.

"When we landed in the Crimea, the only means the surgeon attached to us had of carrying a very small packet, was on the back of a Sapper lent him for the purpose.

"Now will be the time to have a good foundation laid for all desirable means. 1855.

"It is surprising the few resources we obtain out here, with great part of the Black Sea, the Sea of Marmora, the Archipelago, the cities of Athens, Smyrna, Constantinople, &c., and their markets open to us, or if that is not sufficient, the whole of the Mediterranean. Countries of millions of inhabitants and with money in our hand to outbid them all, and with only about 30,000 to feed, it seems absurd to be bringing almost everything we eat and drink from England: but it is a more simple operation for a commissary to write home, 'Send me out so many millions of rations, and even corn and hay for the animals,' than to take the trouble of arrangements required to collect resources from near, and considered, I imagine, out of the question, unless a contractor will undertake it. Deficient commissariat arrangements.

"Draffin[1] is well, and is making a little fortune here; he recently sent 50*l.* home to his wife. One of his resources is dealing in horses. He buys up good ponies, and sells them at an increased price to the commissariat. He always has his eyes about him, and early on the morning after the battle of Alma, he took one of the horses out, and brought in a strong Russian artillery two-wheeled cart, for which I gave him a sovereign, and have used the cart ever since.

"One horse will draw it well on good roads. I now put in two and sometimes three, to bring up things from Balaklava."

"28th February, 1855.

"We have just received your letters up to 16th. I hope you are well embarked in researches for organizing the means of transport, at least for the Engineers, and that you will make it a model for others. I am rather inclined at the first blush, to like the idea mentioned by Matson, of having *German* drivers. The great difficulty I have apprehended, has been to get men who will really take care of their animals; and if by Germans is meant Hanoverians, such as we had in the Peninsula, or others of the same stamp and character, men who had individually and almost universally *an affection* for

[1] A gunner of the Royal Artillery, and batman to Sir John Burgoyne.—Ed.

1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

the animal; we might get an invaluable corps of drivers; for I believe, even in other respects, Germans in general to be a spirited military race, and easily managed under a regular system and good treatment.

"The project you have sent for the capture of Sebastopol by an overpowering embankment carried over it, certainly made me *laugh*, for it is beyond *smiling* at; another gentleman proposed as the simplest thing in the world, to carry a large gallery of a mine under the place, and blow it all up!!—if forced to choose, I should be somewhat puzzled which to take of the two; according to Mr. ——'s own view, the embankment would be nearly the height of St. Paul's, and if he inquired of Messrs. Brunel and Stephenson, they would tell him something of the means and labour of effecting it; the section of ground, however, is quite erroneous; the town and works are as high as anything within 1500 yards of them, and from thence a very gradual rise back; to be sure there are intervening valleys and ravines which would not help him. Among other means of opposing him, what would he do if certain mines of gunpowder were laid under the line his embankment passed over, secured from wet, and to be fired, not under the head of his embankment, but more in rear,—if that was not sufficient, we could give him a few more puzzlers. It would be curious to collect the various ingenious projects that parties have taken a great deal of trouble with—Lord Raglan has had many!

"I believe it is perfectly true that parties have been occasionally all the way from the camp to Balaklava, in the most frightful weather, for things that regular intimation had been given should be furnished them, and then been told that the arrangements were not ready, and they might return to camp!

"The misfortune is, that no one in authority has yet sprung up of capacious administrative faculties. Some immediate distinct case of mal-arrangement occurs, and they take the greatest pains to meet it; whereas what I have always wanted, is to act on the mass, and on *principles* instead of on distinct *instances*.

"If you find a man acting injudiciously with regard to the transport or other matter, it is doing very little to set that

individual to rights; but give out a few general principles for the whole, and make some one person responsible—that was Napoleon's system; he issued a decree specifying as plainly as possible the general principles of what he wanted to be carried out, and then finished by "*And baron or marshal —— is charged with the execution of this decree!*

1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"The Duke of Wellington, on the other hand, went a good deal into details; but then he worked them out, and sifted them well with the officers of departments."

"28th February, 1855.

"You show your usual good sense in being entirely of my opinions about the Staff, and I hope you will put in print an advocacy of them, and let —— enter upon an amicable discussion on the other side; I don't know what *his* principles are, but if they are in favour of the young gentlemen from college *versus* the soldier of experience and ascertained intelligence and conduct, I am quite at issue with him.

"Mr. Russell, in the letter published on the 12th, seems to imply that I have been urging an assault of the place, which is not the case, nor has *any one* yet advocated such a course, though General Bizot wants prospectively to put us upon an assault that I remonstrate against. The repulse and utter failure of the French on the night of the 23rd, is most disastrous for us all; it has enabled the enemy to take up a most triumphant position, physically and morally, and will oblige us to develop more time and means than till then we thought would be requisite.

"Our weather has become quite mild, yesterday was even very warm, and all agree that our people are getting up. I asked General Pennefather just now, whether the troops were in spirits, and he said that the men always had been in good spirits, and now even the officers were getting better; he said that he had seen our hospitals at Scutari, &c., and that they were beautifully arranged and comfortable.

"I cannot suppose they would do anything so outrageous as to recall Lord Raglan; but if they did, where is the much younger man (one *sine quâ non*) to succeed him? There are, no doubt, many competent, but as yet there have been no

1855. means of finding them out: the only one who had an opportunity of showing superior talents, is now no more—poor Sir George Cathcart! Sir Colin Campbell is a very fine, gallant, and good fellow, and admirable for commanding a brigade or division, but I doubt much his having the comprehensive mind required for a general-in-chief.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"I am very glad you called upon Admiral Dundas and Lady Emily, and I hope you will continue to pay them every respect, for he was very kind to me, and both of them to you.

Recall to England.

"I am just interrupted by Lord Raglan, who brings me an order he has received, to send me home to take my duties in England, General Jones having arrived out here—implying of course that he has been sent out to supersede me—I shall be home soon after this letter."

*From* General NIEL *to* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE.

"Devant Sébastopol, le 28 février 1855.

"GÉNÉRAL,

"J'ai l'honneur de vous adresser la note que vous avez demandée hier sur la marche des attaques contre le faubourg Karabelnia. Elle reproduit le projet auquel vous avez donné hier votre approbation, et qui aura, j'espère, celle de Lord Raglan. Je crois, d'ailleurs, que dans l'état actuel des choses, il n'y a pas d'autre solution. J'attends, avec un bien vif désir qu'elle arrive sans retard, la réponse affirmative qui nous est nécessaire pour continuer nos travaux dès que le Général Canrobert en aura eu connaissance.

"Agréez, Général, l'expression de mes sentiments bien dévoués,

"Le Gén$^{al}$ de d$^{on}$ NIEL,

"Aide de camp de l'Empereur en Mission."

*Notes sur les Dispositions à prendre pour l'Attaque du Camp retranché de Karabelnia.*

28 février 1855.

French project of operations.

SANS reprendre à son origine la série des propositions qui ont été échangées et discutées pour arriver à faire concourir avec

1855. — Siege of Sebastopol. French project of operations.

l'attaque préparée contre la ville par l'armée française, celle du Camp retranché de Karabelnia, et pour régler la part à prendre dans cette dernière par chacune des armées alliées, on se bornera à rappeler que l'attaque anglaise qui devait primitivement être dirigée sur le grand Redan et la Batterie des Casernes a été jugée ensuite par Monsieur le Général Burgoyne fort difficile et fort hasardée, en raison du peu d'effet obtenu par le feu de l'artillerie de l'assiégeant, et de la grande distance à laquelle on se serait vu forcé de lancer les colonnes d'assaut; le logement des tirailleurs russes sur le Mamelon qui précède celui de la tour Malakoff, ne permettant pas de prolonger les cheminements de la batterie de droite anglaise sur le grand Redan, à moins de 700 mètres de distance de ce dernier. M. le Général Burgoyne regardait en conséquence comme indispensable l'occupation préalable de ce mamelon, et pour faciliter cette opération qu'on devait d'ailleurs pousser s'il était possible jusqu'à une attaque réelle sur la tour, il avait été convenu qu'on commencerait par établir sur le plateau du carénage, une batterie de 15 pièces, et dans la tranchée avancée de la batterie de droite des Anglais, une autre batterie de 8 pièces, destinées l'une et l'autre à croiser leurs feux sur le col qui sépare les deux mamelons, puis à venir en aide à la batterie de droite anglaise, pour contre-battre celles de la redoute Malakoff.

Depuis l'ouverture de ces travaux, exécutés d'une part par les Français sur le plateau du carénage, de l'autre par les Anglais, avec le concours de 200 travailleurs français, pour l'établissement de la batterie de 8 pièces sur le contrefort descendant au grand Redan, l'attaque sur la tour Malakoff se trouve placée dans des conditions beaucoup plus difficiles, et telles peut-être, qu'on sera forcé de renoncer à la conduire plus loin que l'occupation du Mamelon, par suite de l'établissement d'un ouvrage de contr'approche que l'ennemi est venu asseoir à l'extrémité du plateau du carénage, sur la croupe du contrefort qui tombe au débouché du ravin dans le grand port, et qui place aujourd'hui la tour Malakoff dans un rentrant inabordable par des cheminements à moins de 400$^{m}$ de distance, et reporte au grand Redan le véritable saillant de l'enceinte du Camp retranché. Cet ouvrage nouveau, puissamment soutenu par les bâtiments de guerre embossés dans le grand port, par les feux

1855. — Siege of Sebastopol: French project of operations.

de la pointe du Redan du carénage, par ceux de la redoute Malakoff, et surtout par les nombreuses batteries élevées sur la rive nord du grand port, et qui battent à revers ses approches sur toute l'étendue de 1000$^{m}$ qui le sépare de notre établissement sur le même plateau, pourraient sans doute être enlevés de vive force : mais au prix de pertes considérables, et il est à croire qu'on ne réussirait à l'occuper, ni d'une manière permanente, ni même pendant le temps nécessaire à son entière destruction. Il faudrait donc, pour décider l'ennemi à son abandon, revenir à la charge autant de fois qu'il s'y représenterait, et l'intérêt qu'il y attache doit faire supposer qu'il mettra une grande obstination à s'y maintenir.

Dans cet état de choses, et en prévision de l'obligation où l'on pourra se trouver de borner l'attaque sur la tour Malakoff, à l'occupation du mamelon situé à 600$^{m}$ en avant, il convient de tout disposer, suivant les premiers projets de M. le Général Burgoyne, pour pousser en même temps, et aussi loin que possible, les cheminements d'approche sur le grand Redan, que cette occupation va rendre praticables, et de se mettre ainsi en mesure de lancer à petite distance sur ce saillant et sur l'enceinte attenante, les colonnes d'assaut. Il n'est pas à croire que cet assaut puisse être donné dans le but d'enlever immédiatement et de vive force, le Camp retranché : les défenses intérieures qui y sont organisées feront juger sans doute plus sûr et plus prudent de s'y avancer pied à pied, à moins de facilités imprévues, qu'on saisirait évidemment si l'on trouvait jour à pénétrer plus loin ; mais en admettant que l'on doive commencer par s'établir dans le Redan même, on trouverait sur les pentes opposées et dérobées à la tour Malakoff, les moyens de se couvrir contre les vues éloignées du boulevard de la ville, et de faire abandonner la Batterie des Casernes prise à revers à petite distance et sous un grand commandement. L'attaque de la ville, conduite parallèlement sur le Bastion du Mât, se trouverait ainsi dégagée des feux de flanc de cette dernière batterie disposées pour l'arrêter dans sa marche sur les retranchements intérieurs du boulevard.

En résumé, on demanderait que des dispositions fussent prises par l'armée anglaise, pour qu'aussitôt après l'occupation du mamelon en avant de la tour Malakoff, par les troupes françaises,

les cheminements sur le contrefort de la batterie de droite des Anglais soient poussés en avant sur le Redan, et aussi près que possible de cet ouvrage, en vue de donner l'assaut sur cette partie de l'enceinte du Camp retranché, assaut qui serait donné par les armées alliées, dans des conditions de concours à régler ultérieurement. 1855. Siege of Sebastopol.

Devant Sébastopol, le 28 février 1855,

Le Général commandant le Génie,

B. Bizot.

*To* General Bizot.

"Camp before Sebastopol; 2nd March, 1855.

"Mon Général,

"In reply to your letter of 28th February, I hasten to send you a memorandum of my opinions on the present state of affairs. Sir John Burgoyne's objections.

"Although not quite in accordance with your Note, I hope it does not so essentially interfere with your propositions, as to create any great difficulty.

"Lord Raglan is acquainted with my views, and concurs in them.

"Agréez, mon Général, &c. &c. &c.,

"J. F. Burgoyne, Lieut.-General."

*Memorandum on* General Bizot's *Note of 28th February.*

Camp before Sebastopol, 1st March, 1855.

I understand General Bizot's note of 28th February, to imply a renewal of the earlier project of attack on the Redan and Bastion du Mât, with the addition of crowning the Mamelon in front of the tower of Malakoff, everything otherwise remaining as at present.

That would certainly afford a power of carrying lodgments and approaches much nearer to the Redan, preparatory to any assault or lodgment; which assault however would, in my opinion, be still subject to the difficulty to which I have hitherto

1855. considered it liable, namely, little chance of success, if the Malakoff Tower fronts were left in a state of security.

Sir John Burgoyne's objections.

The enemy having been able to establish himself towards the end of the ridge on our side of the Careening Bay, has increased the difficulties of the reduction of the place considerably; so long as he holds that point, he renders any attack, or even appearance of real attack, upon the tower of Malakoff, and from thence to the Careening Bay, almost impossible,—and by that bold measure, he gains besides a triumph, that must have a great effect upon his own confidence in a power of resistance, if it may not act injuriously on the *morale* of the Allies.

I should therefore hold it to be expedient to drive him from that post, by whatever may be conceived the best means, before attempting any assault or lodgment on his lines at the Redan: that is, I still think that we should adhere to the project contained in the French Note of 2nd February, 1855, which would render necessary the dislodging him from that advanced position.

I do not perceive any insuperable difficulty in even now carrying on approaches much further towards that point.

If to be approached by degrees, two other measures would tend towards its isolation, and very much weaken the situation of the force for its protection, and lessen its confidence: one, to drive away the shipping and steamers from all the upper part of the harbour, above and off the mouth of the Careening Bay; and the other, by advancing along the left side of the Careening Bay valley, to the Mamelon.

The first will require some guns (probably even two may be sufficient), on the brow to the right of the present most advanced French parallel, to act in conjunction with those on the battery that is already established and armed, opposite to the lower Inkermann Lighthouse.

With regard to the approaches towards the Mamelon: it is probable that a site might be found somewhere on their right, for a battery that, with little exposure to the enemy's batteries, would greatly command the whole of the valley down to the Careening Bay.

On the accomplishment of those measures, I apprehend that the reduction of the new lodgment of the enemy would not be

difficult, and the advances towards the Redan might be carried on at the same time,—that is, as soon as the enemy's advanced riflemen shall be compelled to retire, by the advance towards the Mamelon. 1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

There will still be a difficulty to be provided for; the advances to close on the Redan, will require an addition of at least 1000 men in the trenches of the right attack, for guard and working parties: the strength of the British army will not admit of their taking this increased duty, but it is hoped that it may be obtained from the French as a joint corps, the British taking the front and the works, as it is their operation, and the French acting as a support in case of serious sorties.

J. F. BURGOYNE, Lieutenant-General.

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*De* Général BIZOT *à* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE.

"Devant Sébastopol, 3 mars 1855.

"MON GÉNÉRAL,

"J'ai donné connaissance à M. le Général-en-chef Canrobert du mémorandum en date du 1er mars, que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser en réponse à ma note du 28 février. Le Général me charge de vous prier de vouloir bien transmettre à Sa Seigneurie Lord Raglan, l'expression de son désir de voir discuter la question que nous avons traitée, dans une conférence à laquelle assisteraient en présence des deux Généraux-en-chef: d'une part, vous, mon Général, le Général Harry Jones, et le Général Sir George Brown commandant les troupes qui se trouvent sur le terrain de l'attaque; d'autre part, le Général Bosquet commandant les divisions françaises qui concourent à cette attaque, le Général du Génie Niel (aide de camp de l'Empereur) et moi. Conference of French and English officers.

"Si Sa Seigneurie veut bien accepter cette proposition, je vous demanderai de me faire connaître le jour et l'heure à sa convenance, où la réunion pourrait avoir lieu *le plus prochainement.*

"Veuillez agréer, mon Général, l'assurance de mes sentiments respectueux et dévoués,

"GÉNÉRAL B. BIZOT.

"Monsieur le Lt Général Sir John Burgoyne."

1855.

Siege of Sebastopol.

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

" 3rd March, 1855.

" After the awkward occurrence of the enemy effecting a lodgment at the end of the Inkermann ridge over the Careening Bay, I had a conference with Generals Niel, Bizot, and Jones, and requested to have the propositions of the two former in writing, on which I sent General Bizot a Memorandum dated 1st March, copies of all which are enclosed, except the French notes, for which I doubt whether I shall find time for this mail.

" It will be perceived how affairs are becoming perplexed, and are getting worse by the Russians having since pushed a trench, to crown their side of a little valley that lies between their new lodgment and the French parallel, and almost midway between them, which strengthens their position very much.

" Their great support to do all this is caused by the fall from the French parallel towards the point, owing to which the whole of the ground is exposed to the artillery of the Malakoff Tower line on one side, and heavy batteries they have established, and are augmenting on the north side of the harbour, on the other.

" It is that which has made the French Engineers hold, that they could not advance beyond their present parallel.

" I think they could; that is, as a lodgment to hold infantry, because the batteries on one side are about 1200, and the other 2000 yards off, and though on higher ground, not with a very great command.

" The Russians made use of a *ruse* which has rather amused us. They sent a formal message to propose a flag of truce, and suspension for one hour the next day, to bury some dead French in front of their new lodgment, which was agreed to, and French and Russian officers walked very courteously in front in company over the ground, without finding a single body. The thing appeared strange, but was unravelled by their commencing the next night the lodgment in front, above described as on the brow of the valley, the capability and site for which was a matter of interest for

the Russian Engineers to examine, and which they effected no doubt during the pretended search for men to bury. The most amusing part is, that in proposing the flag of truce, the Russians were very complimentary to French valour, of which the latter were very proud." 1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"3rd March, 1855.

"You will have heard, long before this, that I have been ordered home, on the plea of General Jones being here, and my being wanted to return to my office in England. Return to England.

"This would be all very natural, though very disagreeable; but coming at such a moment of outcry for getting rid of everybody who has '*so mismanaged matters with the army*,' will of course lead to my being considered the commencement of the clearance; and coming without the slightest acknowledgment of my services in this country, bears on the face of it a symbol of dissatisfaction with them on the part of the Government. This may affect my continuing in the office of Inspector-General of Fortifications, because, now I have a Battalion, according to the Regulation, I ought to be no longer I. G. F. unless by a distinct reappointment. If I am to be allowed to drop away from the Service in that way, it will be a very heavy blow upon us financially; and publicly I think I could render them useful service yet: but Lord Panmure may perhaps think that having the opportunity, he may as well make a clean sweep of me at once. I have no grounds yet for other conduct towards him, than paying courteous attention to all he may require of me; but I am by no means prepared to go further, and truckle with abject submission, to beg to be allowed to continue. This will go by the mail of the 3rd, and at present my plan is to leave this by the next Packet, (of the 6th) by which I shall no doubt write again. By whatever Packet I go, I shall not be nearly so quick as the letters, and may have occasion to stop at Constantinople, or Malta, or Paris, for a day or two.

"Lord Raglan told me that he was very sorry to lose me, and that I had been of great service to him."

"P.S.—I AM NOT OFF YET! Lord Raglan told me last night, he should like to detain me for a little time, 'if I had no objec- Detained by Lord Raglan.

1855. — Siege of Sebastopol. tion.' I told him that I had most decidedly none. So here I shall remain at a kind of single anchor. At least it is complimentary to me on the part of my Lord."

"4th March, 1855.

"What my destination is to be, whether for a short or long time still in this army, I cannot at all say now, but I must suppose that the 1st of April will probably see me on my return, if not much sooner. Lord Raglan detaining me, without the least hint given by me, is certainly a point in favour of my fair fame; he only, however, limited it to a little further development of our proceedings, and so I presume he has explained it to Lord Panmure. Among others who do not *congratulate* the army and the country on my being withdrawn, I understand is Mr. Russell, who tells Stopford that he has not only never abused me, but that he has written in his private letters, that others were wrong in doing so.

"I showed the 'Hints from the Crimea' to Colonel Steele, and he was so much pleased with the article, that he asked me to give him that number of the *United Service Magazine* on my going home, which I did directly, having wafered into the book at the end of the article, the remarks of the *Globe* upon it. I told him that you would be much flattered by his good opinion of it.

"General Estcourt also read, and expressed himself much pleased with it, and said you ought to continue them.

"With regard to my being ordered home, though personally unpleasant, it was not an unnatural arrangement to make, now that Jones is come out; and even that was so far accidental, that his first destination was a specific one—for the command at Constantinople. The next serious question, however, is whether Lord Panmure means that it should be under an implication of dissatisfaction, which of course it will be, as it has been unattended with any complimentary acknowledgment; and still more if he does not mean to re-establish me as Inspector-General of Fortifications. All this is of course a subject of anxiety to me at this moment.

"The weather has become quite genial, the country drying up and covered with yellow crocuses.

"Any officers here who think it quite as well that I should be away, would naturally hold their tongues to *me;* those who regret it, tell me so, and I must say that they are numerous, and warm in their expressions. Major Burke, one of whose occupations, I believe, is to go about the camp singing my praises, brings me an account of the terms of regret and surprise it has occasioned among many. The officers of Engineers express their satisfaction at my proceedings, and regret for my departure: so that I do not think that I am in bad odour out here generally, whatever I may be at home; and even there, those who ought to know most of the nature of the business here—Lord Hardinge and the men in the I. G. F.'s Office—would, I think, be inclined to uphold my reputation, even if the Minister-at-War lets me go out of employ. 1855. Siege of Sebastopol.

"We have just got your letters up to the 19th, but none of you can fathom yet the designs of Lord Panmure as regards me: the simple notification of the fact,[1] without accompanying remark—*and among measures for the improvement of this Army* —that he had recalled me is, of course, implied censure; and I am very much inclined to be very indignant, but that will do me no good, nor anyone else harm."

*Memorandum laid before Conference of French and British Generals, on 6th March,* 1855.

Camp before Sebastopol, 6th March, 1855.

Sir John Burgoyne's project of attack.

THE question of the course to be pursued in the progress of the attack against Sebastopol, now that the enemy have seized on the end of the ridge to the right of Careening Bay, is very grave.

So long as they hold that position, it is impossible to persevere in the attack proposed by the French note of 2nd of February, to which a general concurrence had been given; and it seems to be more difficult than ever to attempt to make an assault or lodgment on the Redan, while the enemy shall thus remain in triumphant and secure possession of the Malakoff Tower.

[1] In the House of Lords, on the 16th February.—ED.

1855. Being still confined to operate against the south side only, where we have established a very large number of guns in battery, we must continue to progress in our undertaking, however difficult, and it is now again for determination in what manner it is to be carried on.

Sir John Burgoyne's project of attack.

Under the impression that there are differences of opinion as to the best mode of proceeding, I would submit mine with diffidence. As no plan can be adopted that does not involve some very arduous enterprise, I am myself inclined to believe the one most likely to be attended with good effect would be to storm the newly-established position of the enemy, with a view of driving him entirely off the point.

With respect to the probability of success in this assault, the enemy has come out of his position to a distance of 800 yards, across a valley, and offers us battle on our own ground, placing himself almost in a *cul de sac*, and with works that are not yet of great self-defensive power, with the only advantage (the amount of which may be differently estimated) of a distant fire from a very powerful artillery from each flank, at distances of 800 or 900 yards on one side, and 2000 yards from the other, as well as from intervening armed steamers in the harbour.

The attack being made at night, I do not conceive that this distant fire of artillery could impede the operation to any essential effect, although it would occasion, probably, a number of casualties among the supporting bodies in the rear.

As there is every reason to expect that the defence would be vigorous, and maintained by a considerable force, the attack should be a very determined one, with heavy bodies of troops and large reserves: not less than 10,000 men being in close readiness for immediate action, and another 10,000 under arms in the rear, to be brought up, if required, for attack or defence: the determination, in short, being to carry the position at any cost, and to drive the enemy throughout from the whole of that point of land.

I should not expect that the enemy would have on the ground, a force exceeding, at most, 3000 men, which, however, he might reinforce during the action; but I should be inclined to say, that in the event of our complete success, (and by

employing plenty of troops we ought not to entertain a doubt of our success) the more men he had the better, as in such a position, with a most disadvantageous retreat across a causeway, his loss would be proportionately enormous. 1855. — Sir John Burgoyne's project of attack.

The renewed inspection of the ground, in company with Generals Niel, Bizot, and Jones, on the 5th, has confirmed me in my opinion, that such an attack, as above described, would be greatly facilitated by two previous measures. One, by the establishment of a parallel across the ridge, about 700 or 800 yards in front of the Victoria Redoubt: its right on some quarries over a small ravine, and its left in a line with the parallel of the British right attack, with a battery on the right salient point (where are the quarries), which battery, it is conceived, might be so placed as to be little exposed to those of the enemy, while it would flank the whole of the enemy's side of the valley of the Careening Bay, and a great part of the valley itself, and thus act powerfully in preventing sorties in force, by day, for the recovery of the position; and by night, it is presumed that the Allies may always be in sufficient force in the neighbourhood, to prevent him from re-establishing himself. The second measure is, to construct a battery on the brow on the right of the advanced parallel, to drive the enemy's steamers below the mouth of the Careening Bay. It would not require many guns, and if they are somewhat dispersed, and well covered from the side of the batteries of the north shore, they would be little liable to injury.[1]

A great objection is raised as to the propriety of the storming of this position: that even after driving the enemy from it, the Allies could not retain possession by effecting a lodgment, exposed as it is to a commanding fire of very powerful batteries, from the front and from both flanks. That is a matter of which I am by no means convinced.

The object being not for any positive use of the ground by the Allies, but merely to prevent the enemy being established upon it, I conceive that as soon as every defensive character given to the enemy's lodgment upon it shall be removed, the

[1] These works were constructed eventually, and the Russian works stormed in the manner here recommended, as soon as Marshal Pelissier assumed the command of the French army.—Ed.

1855. enemy can be driven away from it by night as often as he shall make the attempt to regain it, having advanced sentries at that time, to give notice of his approach, and that the advantage of circumstances in these contests will be with the Allies. Nor do I conceive that he could attempt it by day, without experiencing heavy losses.

Sir John Burgoyne's project of attack.

This supposes no lodgment being made on the ground in front of the present advanced parallel; but I cannot think that such lodgments are impracticable.

Although the ground is exposed to batteries on one side from the Malakoff Tower, and on the other from the north shore, it is only the very crest that is seen by both; and, therefore, approaches carried along the sides of the ridge, will only absolutely need cover from the one that looks upon it; and in this way lodgments, which may be very useful in defence, may be applied and very lightly occupied, except when actually attacked. Shot and shells may be dropped over from the side which does not see these works, and may occasion a few casualties, but such fire could never be effective, nor impede any essential service required of them.

Another great difficulty to be overcome is in the rocky soil, which would greatly impede these approaches; and it may be conceded that they could not be made, in one night, available for covering parties during the day; but they would be of use after the very first, and each succeeding night would improve them, until they had sufficient strength given to them.

It would probably be very difficult, from the direction given to the enemy's new works, to make an absolute lodgment on them, or even to destroy them, under the heavy fire that would be directed upon those precise places; but every cover gained at all in advance of the present parallel (the more so, the better), would render a re-occupation of the site by the enemy more difficult.

J. F. Burgoyne, Lieutenant-General.

(*Endorsed.*)—A translation in French read to the conference of Generals on 6th March.

J. F. B.

Camp before Sebastopol, 7th March, 1855. 1855.

*Notes of a Conference, held on the evening of 6th March, at the British Head-Quarters, to take into consideration the future proceedings against Sebastopol.* Conference of French and English Generals.

PRESENT:

Field-Marshal Lord RAGLAN,
General CANROBERT,
General Sir JOHN F. BURGOYNE,
General BOSQUET,
General Sir GEORGE BROWN,
General NIEL,
General BIZOT,
General H. D. JONES.

No other proposition having been offered, Sir John Burgoyne presented, in a Memorandum, his own opinion, that the most eligible course to be pursued would be to storm the enemy's new lodgment in front of the advanced parallel on the Inkermann ridge, with a view to driving him effectually off that ground.

In that Memorandum, he explained that our position was arduous, and any course of proceeding must be attended with difficulties, which might be objected to; but that altogether, they were fewer by the course he proposed than by any other. He endeavoured to show that the objections raised to that course were not of the importance attached to them, and that the proposition of the French Note of 2nd February, which had been generally concurred in, could only be pursued by forcing the enemy to abandon the advantageous position which he had seized, and the continued occupation of which must be considered by him as a triumph.

The French Generals did not consider Sir John Burgoyne's proposition or his reasonings well founded, but recommended a recurrence to the original project of confining the attack on the right of the Man-of-War Creek (Port du Sud) to the Redan and Barrack Batteries, which, indeed, is the only course left, if the enemy be not dislodged from his new position.

General Jones so far coincided with them as to think less of

1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

the difficulties of succeeding against the Redan, even with the Malakoff Tower attack abandoned, than were anticipated by Sir John Burgoyne. The proposition of the latter being thus overruled, it only remains to proceed against the Redan, with every precaution and means that can be applied to it.

J. F. BURGOYNE.

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"Camp before Sebastopol, 7th March, 1855.

"Lord Raglan, Canrobert, Bosquet, Sir George Browne, Niel, Bizot, Jones, and myself, had a conference on the 4th instant, as to the course to be pursued under the new circumstances of the enemy having seized and remained in occupation of the point of land at the end of *our* Inkermann ridge; and came to no result but that we four of the Engineers should inspect the localities together, which we did on the 5th. On the evening of yesterday, we had another meeting, and no one else being prepared with any new project, I submitted my opinion in a translation of the note or Memorandum, of which I enclose a copy. The French officers, however, were not moved by it, and (very courteously) objected to my reasoning altogether, and as the alternative, had only to return to the old plan of our advancing towards the Redan, while they do so on the town, and storming, either for penetrating through and through, or only so far as to make a lodgment. To facilitate our advance, they are previously to crown the Mamelon in front (about 600 yards) of the Malakoff Tower, so as to drive in the enemy's *tirailleurs*, which will enable us to carry our approaches much nearer to that work; as Jones is inclined to encourage that idea, and they are so determined now to leave all to our right in the state of complete security, which the new lodgment gives it, I think it probable that the course will be according to their desire. I doubt its success, and the consequence of failure will be, that we shall be again driven to act on the defensive, and compelled then to acknowledge that we *must* wait till the army can take the field, and make a successful campaign against that of the enemy in the field, so

as to shut the Garrison up altogether. It may be said, the same would be the case in case of failure by my mode of proceeding; but I consider mine to be more practicable, and one (by proceeding against the Malakoff Tower) that can be persevered in, foot by foot, to the last, whereas a failure on the Redan is, I think, final." 1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"7th March, 1855.

"The 'astounding' news, as Sir Edmund Lyons calls it, of the sudden death of the Emperor Nicholas of Russia, certainly surprised us yesterday evening, just at the end of a conference which we held here, at which were present Lord Raglan, Canrobert, Bosquet, Sir George Brown, Niel, Bizot, Jones, and myself. Death of the Emperor Nicholas.

"Our idea is that it will facilitate the making of peace, though the Russian negotiator will, in the first instance, have orders, of course, to continue under his former instructions, and that some time will be required, during which there will be many a broken head about Sebastopol. The object of this second conference within a few days, was to endeavour to decide upon the best course of proceeding under our new circumstances.

"My own fate remains suspended, and though it goes very much against the grain to do anything that may accelerate my departure, I shall feel bound to beg Lord Raglan not to increase his embarrassments by keeping me longer than he thinks necessary, against the order of Lord Panmure. All these causes for agitation keep me from writing in the same light spirit I have before."

"8th March.

"We just receive your letters to 23rd February, and I have one from Lord Panmure to do away with any idea of the slightest censure being intended by my removal; that is satisfactory. As to any hint of the *slur* passed upon me, a direct answer can now be given on authority, and it puts me in a much better position on my return."

"10th March.

"*My* movements still doubtful; by the mail that leaves this on the 13th, I may know more. It is not improbable that

1855. I may return *viâ* Vienna, under the *secret* view of *accidentally* meeting Lord John Russell there, and giving him information respecting the army here that may be of interest to him; at Paris they have plenty of French information, and mine would be neither required, nor perhaps welcome."

Siege of Sebastopol.

*To* Colonel MATSON.

"Camp before Sebastopol, 9th March, 1855.

"Lord Panmure has written me a very civil letter, to disclaim any intention of casting any slur upon me; and as the die is cast, and I perceive that confusion will arise by having two high Engineer authorities together, I shall now encourage Lord Raglan to let me take my departure at once, and therefore it is not improbable that I may be in Pall Mall early in April. It is not impossible but that I may return *viâ* Trieste and Vienna, but I shall have other opportunities of writing to you on these matters.

"Jones visited our attacks a few days ago, in company with Generals Niel and Bizot. These French generals, I hear, expressed satisfaction at the quantity, as well as the quality of what we had done. I must say, I think it is surprising, considering the difficulties the Engineers have had to encounter.

"The result of leaving the Russians in possession of the point they have seized on our right, is that no absolute attack on the front, from the Malakoff Tower to the great harbour, is practicable; and we are reduced, as a matter of necessity, to proceed against the Redan, without any co-operation on that side; I am urging, therefore, as vigorous measures as possible being directed there.

Artillery practice.

"Some disappointment was created some days ago, at the practice from three 32-pounders of ours, which were opened from an excellent battery about 300 feet above the water upon a Russian armed steamer at anchor in the harbour—the distance about 1800 yards. About 60 rounds were fired, of which 5 or 6 only took effect. Colonel Dacres says he thinks 10 per cent. fair practice; but, with so large a target, should it not have been more? I am sure the practice I saw from

Dover heights at a *buoy* moored beyond the new jetty, appeared to be very superior." 1855. Siege of Sebastopol.

*From* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE *to* Lord PANMURE.

"9th March, 1855.

"MY DEAR LORD PANMURE,

"The letter of the 23rd February, which you have been kind enough to write to me, has been a great relief to my mind; for, without being conscious of the cause, the dissatisfaction which I considered that I must have given to Government, and particularly to one of your Lordship's character and station, certainly made me very uneasy.

"Personally, it is anything but agreeable to my feelings to quit an army that is in activity against the enemy; but I must allow that the arrangement you make is a very natural one for the furtherance of the service generally. I shall return to England with every desire to forward your views to the utmost of my power, and to afford you every information I can, and in the most frank manner, regarding the circumstances of this army; but assuredly the public press err greatly, and the public have been much misled as to the extent of blame they have thrown on individuals, on account of the hardships of the troops, and the want of a more rapid successful issue to our arms here.

"In consequence of a change in our course of proceedings, that it is necessary to take into consideration, by reason of a bold advance of the enemy on new ground, in front of a line of works made by the French, Lord Raglan has detained me for a short time; but though he is good enough to say that I am of use to him, I will not on my part encourage anything tending to prolong this alteration in your arrangements, and therefore I shall expect to leave this for England very shortly.

"Your Lordship's faithful servant,

"J. F. BURGOYNE."

"9th March.

"General Jones does not see the difficulties to assaulting the Redan and Barrack Batteries that I anticipate. He and I

1855. get on perfectly together; but are each now in an anomalous position, that would assuredly create confusion. Under the order from Lord Panmure, I must go home; the proceedings against the place, although they will soon resume more activity, must linger yet for some time; therefore under all the circumstances, the sooner I go the better, and I am beginning to be impatient to depart, though with a heavy heart!

Siege of Sebastopol.

"I wish with you I could have written confidentially to any of the ministers of influence during the last few months, but I had no degree of intimacy with any.

"Your state of feeling in England is running greatly to riot, and adopting as it does a vast number of popular prejudices and fallacies, artfully applied to current events, it will be very difficult to control them, and to get back to reason.

Hasty reforms.

"I fear also that you will be moving forward too inconsiderately, with the reforms of the army. Many means must be added to the military field resources, and much new organization is necessary; and what is bad is, that it must be done *rapidly;* but each step requires much consideration, and that does not seem to be understood, and I fear the men selected for these reforms, however good they may be, feel too confident of their powers, and overlook many difficulties that will arise in practice. Now what I would wish, would be that in the first place, they should acknowledge that it is not a thing to be made perfect at once; that they should study each matter as much as time will allow before they begin, and ultimately prepare people's minds for improvements that will be required subsequently. I don't know whether you understand my meaning.

"I perceive —— is in great wrath at an officer of artillery being added to your commission for examining the French field engineer equipments. He is wrong—these mixtures are not bad, whether for artillery or engineer subjects; if you cannot agree on them, you must make your separate reports. As regards carriages and horses and drivers, the artillerymen *ought* to have experience, and many have, but it is so confined to their own habits, to which they get bigoted, that they would assimilate everything to it; thus the late Colonel Colquhoun, though a clever man, would insist that the best carriage for engineer tools and stores, would be one of the artillery field ammunition

waggons, that is, a carriage uniting the greatest weight to the smallest and most inconvenient capacity." 1855. Siege of Sebastopol.

"12th March.

"After much coquetting about my departure, and my preparing for it for this next week, it seems to be now decided (so far as such matters in such times can be) that I leave this on Tuesday 20th, to arrive at Constantinople on 22nd, and leave it again by the Trieste packet on 26th; and if so, and stopping 2 or 3 days at Vienna, I should be in London, I presume, about the middle of April; but I shall have opportunities of writing twice more from this or Constantinople, and also *en route*.

"I have various conflicting sentiments agitating me on the occasion:—great regret at leaving the army thus in face of the enemy; and at the same time, vexation at seeing things so differently managed by our Allies to what I think right; but they will have their own wilful way, which General Jones is more calm in conceding than I can be, and if anything could reconcile me to quitting, it would be, not to become a party either acquiescing or otherwise to such proceedings.

"From the tenderness Lord Panmure, &c., feel for *my great age*, I suppose you will expect to see me return with a tremulous, weak voice, without teeth, and on crutches; and their kindness to preserve me from the bitter keenness of a Crimean winter, comes strange to us in the middle of March, with the thermometer at between 50 and 60 degrees in the open air.[1]

"The Vienna route will not delay me more than a few days, and I take it as a measure of policy; whether it will answer any contemplated object is yet to be seen."

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"12th March, 1855.

"However disagreable to quit the army here while in active operation, I do not wish to linger on in the anomalous position in which I now find myself. Jones is being led rapidly into the full charge of every engineer operation, and any inter-

[1] Sir John alludes here to Lord Panmure's speech of the 23rd February, in the House of Lords, of which an account has already been given.—ED.

1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

ference on my part may lead to a confusion in orders and opinions. I am also greatly opposed to much of the mode of proceeding by the French, which we cannot however influence, and on which Jones feels hardly called upon to give opinions so openly as I do; so that altogether I have rather urged my early departure, in compliance with the orders of Lord Panmure; but Lord Raglan has very kindly by a little gentle indirect pressure, rather detained me as yet; it seems however now finally decided that I shall go by the packet of the 20th.

"I think I gave you an account of the enemy having come out boldly, and taken possession of the point of the ridge running down from our position to the Careening Bay, and of the unsuccessful attempt of the French to drive them from it.

"On the 6th, we had a meeting of generals to consider the course to be pursued, when I put in a note urging the propriety of peremptorily driving them off, even then, by a *coup de main*. I was however overruled by the French generals of engineers being decidedly opposed to it; and as it was thus determined to leave them in possession of that point, which they have ever since been earnestly engaged in entrenching, and on which they have now powerful batteries mounted in a forward position, any attack upon the Malakoff side becomes impracticable, the resolutions of the French note of the 2nd February nullified, and we are reduced as a matter of necessity, to recur to General Bizot's old favourite plan of restricting the efforts on our side of the Man-of-War Creek, (Port du Sud) to theRedan and Barrack Batteries. Our nearest approaches are however 600 or 700 yards from the Redan, and we cannot get nearer, on account of the Russian *tirailleurs*, who are pushed out 700 or 800 yards in front of the Malakoff Tower.

"The French, however, undertook to crown the height or Mamelon, which is 600 yards in front of the tower, by a parallel; but would not attempt it, till we had batteries constructed and armed right and left, to cover the work, which did not appear to me to be necessary. I had proposed *months ago*, and would have done it if I could have got working parties,—to have struck out from under cover of the Careening Bay ravine, a parallel of support about 500 yards on our side of this Mamelon,

to be connected on the left by the right of Gordon's attacks, that would have greatly facilitated the advance on the Mamelon. At length the French determined to adopt that preliminary course in addition to the batteries; however the thing was delayed so long that the Russians, emboldened by their previous success, came out a few nights ago, and have been ever since entrenching themselves *on the Mamelon*, and where they still maintain themselves to the great disgrace, as I think, of the Allies; it is in fact a new era in the art of sieges, that we are now learning: namely, allowing a garrison to come out in the middle of a siege, and entrench themselves, by opening new ground, at from 600 to 1000 yards of the place.[1]

1855.

Occupation of the Mamelon by the Russians.

"The French were to have opened their preliminary parallel, the night before last, while we were to have prolonged that on our right, in advance of theirs; after dark, they intimated that they found they could not get their alignment, and ours was alone proceeded with; last night however they opened theirs, and ours was continued.

"The Russians obtained a very little triumph over *us* (British) last night; the soil was so bad that the trench we had opened was not tenable the next day (yesterday), and at nightfall, an enemy's party were beforehand with us, and carried off a parcel of our gabions before our men entered. One of their party was caught in the act, but it does not appear clear whether he did not linger after the others, on purpose to be taken.

"This ought to be considered a lesson to us, and a rule should be established, that, in the case of unfinished trenches, to be resumed on subsequent nights, possession should be taken if not in force at least by sentries, with a support ready in case of necessity, as soon as it is dusk, and before dark.

"At Badajoz, owing to similar neglect, a French Sapper came out at dusk, before our party set to work, and altered the direction of the white line which had been left on the ground, so as to bring the work to an enfilade from the place, had we not altered it again."

[1] Counter-attacks are not uncommon at sieges, but there is no previous instance of them, at so great a distance from the place attacked.—Ed.

1855. "13th March, 1855.

Strength of British force in Crimea.

"The statements made by the press in England, repeated in Parliament, and uncontradicted by Ministers, of the dreadful condition of this army, strike us with astonishment here; but the fact is, that you are bullied in England by popular outcry, against daring to contradict any of these bold assertions, because you know that it would lead to public execration, and it would be held out that you treated 'the horrible sufferings of our poor sacrificed soldiers' with complacency! It has been stated in the newspapers, and by many Members of Parliament, that by the middle of March, or in about a month of the period of their speeches in February, there would be no British army left in the Crimea! I have accordingly begun to analyse the real state of the case, and I think you and your friends will be rather surprised to learn from my first inquiry, that including officers, sergeants, drummers, and rank and file, we have now here, or in Turkey, 28,028 EFFECTIVES, besides 4,713 sick present: that is, fluctuating sick, most of them with not very heavy complaints; the accompanying return will show how these numbers are composed. It is the fashion to talk of the army as consisting of 10,000 or 12,000 men, that is, taken from the complaining letters published by the newspapers, the number of men up at camp taking duty in the trenches, exclusive of cavalry, artillery, and even the force at Balaklava for its security; and now fine mild spring weather is come on, the force is perhaps rather on the increase than diminishing, as more men come from hospital than go into it. As soon as a new organization for the field shall come into operation (and taking advantage of the present readiness in the country to make ample provision of everything, that will be done early), a great number of those returned as '*Otherwise employed*,' and '*On command*' will rejoin the ranks; and you will find an army of at least 24,000 or 25,000 men ready to take the field, from '*the miserable remnants of the British army* NOW *in the Crimea;*' and I can assure you that the men are beginning to look tolerably hearty and cheerful again. Hitherto, they have been seldom disturbed in wearing their sheepskin coats, fur caps, or anything they thought would add to their comfort.

Now you see regiments and detachments turning out in most respectable order, in their red coats, and looking the fine British soldier again; Sir George Brown has even begún to call for the stiff stock to be resumed! 1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"By the bye, with regard to the feelings of the soldiers, I have observed that they seem to have the greatest delight in getting rid of the stiff stock and the shakos; and I think substitutes might be applied for both, that might be sufficiently soldierlike and handsome, and far more convenient and comfortable.

"The above is a more cheering account than you have been accustomed to contemplate. Is it possible that Ministers are not aware of it, and do not see it in that light? At the same time I am, like everybody else, fully sensible of the hardships and severe sufferings that the troops have undergone."

*To* Colonel MATSON, R.E.

"15th March, 1855.

"Whatever it may be to my own personal feelings, it will be quite as well for the public service that I should hasten home, for I am becoming quite impatient at the course of proceedings by the French, differing so entirely as they do from my ideas, and utterly spoiling my pet project against the Malakoff Tower.

"First, the enemy was allowed to establish himself at the end of the Inkermann ridge, on what I maintain was *our* territory, in a position that every day shows to be more important; then they have been allowed to commence a similar operation on the Mamelon, 600 yards in front of the Malakoff Tower. After establishing a parallel somewhat more than 500 yards from that advance of the enemy, the French found a number of rifle pits at less than 150 yards from them, from which they made a formidable attempt last night, to dislodge the enemy. They had *many thousand* men out, to support the operation, and field pieces, &c., but the result was—a failure! at least I cannot call it otherwise, when I find the enemy this morning, firing away from the same rifle pits. There was a

1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

great deal of firing for a few hours, and some fighting, for I hear the French had 100 or more wounded, and there they are, as before; and General Niel comes to me this morning, pointing out the difficulties of making any impression on the Malakoff: that if taken, as proposed in a very good Memorandum by Jones yesterday, it would be impossible to make a communication to it, &c., chiefly, by his own acknowledgment, arising from their post on the Inkermann point over Careening Bay. I cannot at all admit his view of it to be correct, although no doubt the difficulties are greatly increased now; the enemy challenges us with so much boldness and arrogance, that we ought to feel bound in honour to fight it out with them.

"If the attack on this side had remained with us, whether successful or not, we would have carried it on very differently; and if I could have had my own way, and our force had been 5000 or 6000 men more than it was, I am much mistaken if I would not have been in possession of the whole of the ridge above the Careening Bay more than two months ago, as I think I must have written to you at the time, and I think of the Mamelon, in front of the Malakoff as well. There is no contending these matters with them; they have it in hand, and must work it their own way, but it is hard upon us to be thus tied by the heels.

"With an immense army, we are bullied in every direction by a few sharp-shooters! *Our* men (the British), I am happy to say, seem to be as anxious for a fight as ever."

"13th March, 1855.

"I am glad to perceive by your letter of the 2nd, that Wrottesley had an opportunity of enlightening Lord Panmure upon some affairs connected with the siege here.

"Hugh writes me word that he has had great '*fun*.' The *Swallow*, with other ships, seems to have been engaging some batteries at Soujah, in which they sustained some damage, but it does not appear what was the object, and whether it succeeded.

"Ships *versus* batteries, for no other motive but to see which will hit the hardest, will never be very profitable to the former.

"The French and Russians have been for the last two or three nights, contending for a few rifle pits at 100 to 200 yards from the new parallel made by the former; and after several drawn battles apparently, the French claim to have succeeded last night in gaining their point in one sense, but admit that the enemy have taken up another favourable line, on one side. It is poor pettifogging work, the end hitherto generally terminating in favour of the Russians. It is extraordinary how little they meddle with *us*, though as much exposed, and very weakly guarded as compared with the numbers of men put into the trenches by the French; but in point of fact, they have never had a chance in any attempt they have ever made upon us. In our poverty, we have bullied them with very small forces. A guard of only 700 or 800 men at each attack, separated from each other by a deep ravine, and a very long way from supports; with 80 pieces of artillery, and their ammunition to protect, in face of a garrison of 20,000 men, is fearful to contemplate; and the most mischievous effect must have been produced by a letter published in the newspapers, describing the very number of our covering parties, which we, and probably the garrison, have read long ago.

1855. Siege of Sebastopol.

"There is no change made at present in my intention of leaving this next Tuesday, the 20th, and proceeding, as I before mentioned; such busy scenes are however going on here, though not on a very large scale, that I never feel sure of going on any particular day.

"Lord Raglan has just come into my room, and has given me the letter of the 1st of March from the *Morning Chronicle*, cut out of the paper, and apparently sent to him by somebody. He says that his wife and daughters are dreadfully cut up by the abuse of him, and we can hardly wonder at it, when we recollect that two or three months ago, they were cheered at the railway-station, as the relatives of the hero of the day!"

"17th March, 1855.

"Since I wrote on the 15th, the French have made some little progress, but very little, and have had some night affairs with the bold Russian advances, in which they seem to have got a little the best of it, but nothing at all spirited has yet

1855. occurred on our side, though a hint given to the French officers by Jones and me that we thought Lord Raglan would like to have some British troops joined in any attack on the Mamelon, I expect will be accepted, and if so, the proceedings will probably be more *decided*, either for good or for bad.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"*Our* works go on extremely well. I went with Lord Raglan a day or two ago to the advanced works, and a new battery on our left attack; and yesterday we went over our advanced battery and parallel on right, that which connects with the new French parallel, and he was much pleased with both, and said that he should mention to Lord Panmure the progress made as very creditable, and the works as of a superior character.

"Poor Craigie was killed in a most unfortunate manner on his return from the trenches, by a splinter of a shell that burst a long way from him.

"The enemy have hitherto shown much more respect for the British approaches than for the French; they seldom molest us seriously, and whenever they have done so, or that we have chosen to interfere with them, it has always been with complete success on our side."

"I am not aware of anything likely to detain me from going on the 20th. Lord Raglan, however, keeps muttering, 'Unless anything particular happens before then.' I have gradually withdrawn from all business here, except occasionally visiting the trenches, &c., and making my remarks. I don't agree in the proceedings of the French, who now have the principal work in hand, and I shall only add an element of confusion by remaining, so have come to the pitch of being almost desirous to be off."

"Camp before Sebastopol, 19th March, 1855.

"The French attacks on the right, towards the Malakoff, continue to linger in a way that *we* cannot understand; and a strong feeling is arising among the British, (soldiers, I fear, as as well as officers), that they are allowing the enemy to maintain a very undue superiority, which will be very serious if it should grow into a subject of reproach. Many of their own

officers are heard to murmur at their proceedings; but of course, if *we* began to talk openly, they would all turn against us. I have several papers that have passed on the subject of the operations, but must keep my copies by me during the journey, in case of having to enter into particulars at Vienna, &c. We hear that the Zouaves (who are very fine fellows) say that in conjunction with British troops, they could do anything, but that they have no confidence in some of their own." 1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

*From* Lord RAGLAN *to* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE.

"Before Sebastopol, 19th March, 1855.

"MY DEAR BURGOYNE,

"I send you, according to your request, a copy of Lord Panmure's despatch, desiring that you would return to England, it being considered essential that you should resume your important functions as Inspector-General of Fortifications.

"I cannot allow you to take your departure, without expressing to you the great regret I feel to be deprived of your services, my deep sense of the value of your assistance throughout the arduous enterprise in which this army has been engaged during the last six months, and my sincere conviction that your conduct of the operations of the siege of Sebastopol, affords abundant proof of your great ability and experience, and of how much may be effected by science under the most unfavourable circumstances of ground, and with very limited means as to men, the strength of the army having been at no time such as to admit of your being furnished with as large working parties as you could have employed with advantage.

"Trusting that you will reach England in good health, and that you will find your family well on your arrival, I remain, with every sentiment of regard and respect,

"Yours &c.,

"RAGLAN.

"Lieutenant-General Sir John Burgoyne, G.C.B."

1855.

[*Enclosure.*]

"War Department, 16th February, 1855.

"My Lord,

Recall to England.

"Major-General Harry Jones, of the Royal Engineers, having been appointed to the Staff of the army under your command, and it being essential that Lieutenant-General Sir John Burgoyne should resume his important functions as Inspector-General of Fortifications, I have to instruct your Lordship to direct Sir John Burgoyne to return to England with all convenient despatch.

"I have, &c. &c. &c.,

"Panmure.

"Field-Marshal the Lord Raglan."

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*From* Major-General Harry Jones *to* Sir John Burgoyne.

"Head Quarters, 20th March, 1855.

"My dear Sir John,

"If there is any one individual in this army who will regret your departure more than another, it is myself. After so long an acquaintance, and after so many years acting under your advice and counsel, I shall feel deeply your removal from among us. The responsibility which will attach to me makes me feel still more the loss I shall sustain by not having the benefit and advantage of referring to you for advice. I shall always most gladly receive from you anything which you may consider desirable to communicate for my guidance.

"Wishing you a good passage and a happy meeting with your family, to whom remember me most kindly,

"My dear Sir John,

"Ever yours sincerely,

"H. D. Jones."

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"H. M. Ship *Banshee*, Black Sea, 21st March, 1855.

"Yesterday morning when I left the camp, it was cloudy, rainy, and blowing a gale of wind. I got on board the *Royal*

*Albert*, dined with Sir Edmund Lyons, and embarked on board this ship at 9 P.M. and put to sea; a beautiful clear starlight night, and the wind quite moderate; and this day is quite fine: we expect to reach the entrance to the Bosphorus during the night, and to anchor off Constantinople early in the morning. Everybody was civil at parting, Lord Raglan particularly so. 1855. — Departure from Crimea.

"Sir E. Lyons was full of attentions, as he always is; and, one of the last things, said, '*I will look after your son.*'

"And thus I take my leave of this service, which has been a very interesting one; and I wish I could have seen it out!

"My object in this letter is to give you notice that I am actually on my way."

"British Embassy, Constantinople, 25th March, 1855.

"I am here passing a very idle time, and am quite impatient to be again in progress. Absolute *far niente* in a strange house and strange place, is very irksome.

"Lord and Lady Stratford, as well indeed as everybody else, are very civil, but there is little in the current of their ideas that interests me, or in mine that can interest them, excepting always Lord Stratford's interesting accounts of the affairs of Turkey.

"Major Burke lives at Missirie's Hotel, dining here occasionally.

"Lord Stratford has arranged with Ali Pacha that I, Burke, and Draffin, go in the ship with him on Thursday (29th), as he expects; and as his mission is to the Conference at Vienna, he can hardly defer it long. I presume that we cannot be much more than six days going to Trieste direct.

"I have been over the hospital at Scutari, which is in excellent condition, and the sick seemed to be most carefully attended; the deaths are not one-tenth what they used to be, and the general cast of countenance of the patients was that of people rather gaining ground than in a state of despondency."

1855.

*From* Lord RAGLAN *to* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"Before Sebastopol, March 26th, 1855.

"MY DEAR BURGOYNE,

"Being on the point of sending a messenger to Vienna, I avail myself of the opportunity to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd, which reached me this evening, and to thank you very much for the kind expressions it conveys.

"I am very glad if I conduced in any way to your comfort, in exchange for the invaluable assistance you afforded me; and I can assure you, with perfect truth, that while your departure is considered by me a great misfortune publicly and privately, it is regretted by all, and particularly by every member of my family. In short, you have left quite a void amongst us.

"Stopford will, I hope, have kept you *au courant* of what has passed since you left us. Our trenches were very roughly assailed on the night of the 24th, and Majors Gordon and Tylden exerted themselves exceedingly. Gordon's wound is slight, and he was sitting up to-day. Captain Montagu, although taken prisoner, is unhurt, and has been very kindly treated.

"I would suggest that you should draw Lord John's attention to what the French are doing at Constantinople.

"Lord and Lady Westmoreland will, I am sure, be delighted to see you.

"Believe me, very faithfully yours,

"RAGLAN."

"British Embassy, Constantinople, 29th March, 1855.

Answers to criticisms on the Royal Engineers.

"I conceive the 'R. E.' who takes up the cause of the Engineers against Lord Grey, is Wrottesley, and he has adopted the proper arguments. It is a clear misapprehension to suppose that the Russians have found out an improved system of fortification and defence, in their resistance at Sebastopol. The defence by an army of a comparatively narrow front, in a strong position, each flank on the sea, and the communication to the rear open, is totally different from a fortress. A few days' work even may make such a position unattackable!

"The criticism on the batteries at Plymouth alludes to one

in particular on the point above the narrow entrance into the Sound. 1855.

Answers to criticisms on the Royal Engineers.

"It is to act against shipping: on the side of a steep height of 300 or 400 feet high. If placed on the top of the hill, it would be too high for effect, and too distant; if at the bottom, it would be too much exposed to the heavy battering from powerful ships; it is, consequently, at about 100 feet up, and in order to be enclosed against a *coup de main*, and to protect the gunners from rear, *must* have the gorge considerably raised,—this makes the eyesore called a shell-trap: but at that height the fire from the shipping would be most ineffective, if it could be directed upon it at all; during the action, the shells would go into the buildings, where they would expend themselves with very little effect against the gunners,—the battery therefore would be perfectly efficient for its required object.

"I am afraid I shall not be too late for the Committee of Crimean investigation, and as I shall be opposed to many a popular fallacy, I must expect to be sneered at as one of the old impracticables! Pray collect for me a few dates. Lord Raglan's despatches will furnish them.

"The day we took Balaklava.

"Of the reconnaissance a few days afterwards.

"Of opening the trenches.

"Of opening the batteries.

"Was it the next or second day the French reopened?

"Battle of Balaklava.

"Do. Inkermann.

"I see among the grievances, that of bad tools brought up, on which I may have questions. Ask Colonel Matson to have for me the result of inquiries made on a similar complaint about a year or two ago, when I believe they were examined and reported upon: also what was done when I wrote to him about defects reported by our officers before Sebastopol. Query, are the tools for Pioneers of regiments supplied by the Ordnance? I believe *not!*

"I cannot now reach London before the middle of April."

1855.

Siege of Sebastopol.

*From* Viscount HARDINGE *to* Colonel MATSON.

"Horse Guards, March 30th, 1855.

"I return the papers with many thanks.

"They prove that the counsels of Sir John Burgoyne have more vigorous good sense in them, than the vaunted science of our French allies.

"Let me know when you expect Sir John, that I may greet his arrival with the least possible delay."

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"Austrian Steamer *Africa*, Archipelago,
"1st April, 1855.

"I am lost in astonishment at the much more than ordinary civility and courtesy of Lord and Lady Stratford, particularly of the former, who is habitually of an austere manner: he was throughout quite friendly with me and most confidential.

"Major Burke and I embarked about 4 o'clock yesterday afternoon, and found Ali Pacha already on board, but contented to wait for Lord Stratford's despatches, which did not arrive till six; in the meantime, various great men came off to take leave of the Pacha; the Seraskier, the Grand Vizier (Redschid Pacha), &c.; the latter offered to give Stopford and Burke the Turkish Order, which I told him would be received by them as a great honour, and by me as a great favour. We sailed at 6 o'clock, got through the Dardanelles early, and by 10 o'clock this morning, were past Tenedos, and we are now running before a strong fair wind down the Archipelago, with every prospect of a quick passage. We are sumptuously accommodated and provided for on board, and Ali Pacha, who speaks French very well, is good-humoured and most courteous."

"Piræus (Athens), 2nd April.

"We had a capital run yesterday, and had we perseverod, should have been well forward this morning; but it blew hard with a rough sea, and the Pacha desired the vessel to be laid in quiet under the land for a few hours; we then started again,

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Siege of Sebastopol.

but the wind increasing, we put in here till it moderates, which is very provoking, because the wind is fair, and the weather otherwise not bad. It is not the way *we* do business, to admit of such interruptions to obtain some personal comfort;. but perhaps he has no occasion to hurry."

"4th April. At Sea.

"We left the Piræus early yesterday morning, and got on very successfully till abreast of Cerigo, when it got a little rough again, and we put into the Bay of Seroi opposite, for the night; started again this morning at 4 o'clock, and as the weather is now very fine, although the sea somewhat rough, I do hope we may have no more interruptions, having already lost two complete days."

"7th April.

"We are just going into Trieste, when I shall put this into the post on my arrival. We have had a good and agreeable voyage, barring the loss of time. The Pacha is an enlightened man, and has been most courteous to us."

"Vienna, 10th April, 1855.

"Our present intention, and I see no reason whatever to expect any change, is to leave this for Prague by the six o'clock morning train to-morrow, and I may very probably cross over from Calais on the 15th, or even, by possibility, by the night-packet of 14th.

"Our sea voyage was very favourable, except as regards needless delays in putting into ports for shelter from some rough weather; we got through Trieste and the posting and railway journey here, with perfect success. On arrival, we found at the station, Lady Westmoreland's carriage, to bring us to the hotel (Archduke Charles), where she had bespoke rooms for us. I called at the Embassy in the evening, and drank tea there. Burke and I dined there yesterday (and do so again to-day), and we went to the Opera with Lord Westmoreland, Lord and Lady John Russell, &c.; in short, nobody can be more civil than they are. At dinner, Lady Westmoreland had a small decanter of brandy placed by me, and said, 'There is your beverage.' I asked her how she found out that, and

1855. she said that Lord Burghersh had particularly enjoined her to let me be provided with brandy-and-water at dinner. Lord Burghersh indeed appears to have recommended me strongly to them all.

"I have met Lord John Russell several times, and had one distinct conversation with him; but he seemed to be pretty well aware of all I could say that was of particular interest to *him*.

"To-day an Austrian officer of Engineers or Artillery is to accompany me on a visit to the Arsenal, which I am told is worth seeing."

On Sir John Burgoyne's arrival in London, he found a letter waiting for him at his house, from the Prime Minister, bespeaking his attendance, and he had barely time to greet his family, before he was hurried off to Windsor, to attend the Councils of War held there during the French Emperor's visit to this country.

Council of war at Windsor.

These councils were attended by the Emperor Napoleon, Marshal Vaillant, the Prince Consort, Lord Hardinge, Sir John Burgoyne, and the War Committee of the Cabinet. The subject of their deliberations was a plan of operations proposed by the French Emperor, to be directed by himself in person, at the head of a second army, for the transport of which the English Government were to provide the necessary shipping.

Sir John Burgoyne was summoned to Windsor on two occasions, to take part in these deliberations. On his return from the second of these visits, another note from Lord Palmerston was put into his hands:—

"Piccadilly, 19th April, 1855.

"My dear Sir John,

"I wish you would meet me and Lord Hardinge, at Lord Panmure's in Belgrave Square, No. 23, at half-past nine this evening; we want to discuss a little more the proposed mili-

tary arrangements for the Crimea, and to settle something finally with the Emperor before he leaves London. 1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"Yours faithfully,

"PALMERSTON."

As foretold by Sir John Burgoyne, difficulties had so multiplied upon the French, by their refusal to storm the enemy's lodgments, called the Ouvrages Blancs, that General Niel had officially reported to Paris, that the place could not be taken until completely invested. On the receipt of this information, the French Emperor determined to proceed himself to the seat of war, and take command of additional troops to be sent for this purpose. On the arrival of Sir John Burgoyne in England, he found the Emperor on a visit to the Queen, and in personal communication with the English Ministers on the proposed expedition. His plan, which was laid before a Committee of the Cabinet by the Prince Consort, has been given at length in Bazancourt's 'History of the War'; and a review of it by Sir John Burgoyne, will be found in the *United Service Magazine* of June, 1856. In this article, the project is described as follows:—

"The Emperor assumes the relative forces to consist of 100,000 French, 25,000 British, 15,000 Sardinians, and 40,000 Turks—in all, 180,000; and the Russians to have 120,000, including 15,000 in front of Eupatoria; the siege of Sebastopol being then well advanced; and he considers it absolutely necessary to engage in operations against the enemy in the field;—and here commences the first ground for discussion. During the operations of a great siege, we shall find from experience, that the object has always been to make that undertaking the primary consideration, and to act only defensively against any army the enemy might have in the field, to the extent of preventing his disturbing the siege from thence. The French Emperor's project.

"If the enemy's army cannot be thus resisted, the siege is

1855. necessarily abandoned, and the forces collected for operating in the field—as was done with admirable effect by Napoleon I. when besieging Mantua.

The French Emperor's project.

"No such case, however, existed at Sebastopol. The Allies held a position which might be considered, with their forces, impregnable, and which completely covered the siege, with a base within it from whence every supply could be obtained; the result of the siege was, therefore, a certainty, as the event proved.

"Having, however, adopted the view that it was necessary to take the offensive against the enemy in the field, the Allied armies were to be divided into three bodies: one to consist of 30,000 French and 30,000 Turks, to watch the place; the second of 25,000 British, 15,000 Sardinians, 5,000 French, and 10,000 Turks, to act defensively on the Tchernaya, and to co-operate, in case of need, with the active army; and the third, of 65,000 French, to be an army of operation, to act on the rear of the enemy; of the latter, 25,000 to be landed at Alouchta, and to be joined by 40,000, who were to move along the south coast from Baidar."

Sir John considered the proposal to be dangerous, as giving the Russians the central position, and forcing the Allies to act on a wide circumference; nor did he conceive the complete investment of the place to be absolutely necessary: but if it were decided that the place must be invested by a second army, he was of opinion that the safest and most military course of proceeding would be to act from the existing base of operations against the enemy's communications. Should the Allied commanders resolve to act on a double line of operations, which he strongly deprecated; the least dangerous course, he considered, would be to advance from Eupatoria as a base, the latter town being then in possession of the Turkish army under Omer Pacha, and strongly entrenched. Acting upon this advice, the English Ministers wished to discourage the project as much

as possible, and requested Sir John Burgoyne to draw up for them a reply to the Emperor's suggestions. 1855. Siege of Sebastopol.

The objections raised to this proposal, added, it is believed, to a reluctance to hand over to him the supreme direction of the operations, including the command of the English and Sardinian armies, induced the French Emperor to renounce his intention of proceeding in person to the seat of war.

*To* Sir FRANCIS B. HEAD, Bart.

"Ordnance Office, Pall Mall, 22nd April, 1855.

"MY DEAR HEAD,

"I arrived in London last Sunday evening, having returned viâ Vienna; and since then, as you may suppose, have been in a turmoil of business, and unavoidable occupation of time. For two or three days I was engaged in affairs connected with consultations between the French Emperor, Prince Albert, and our Ministers, relative to the operations in the Crimea, and was obliged to go twice to Windsor.

"You have been very kind in trying to keep me right with the men in authority and the world; but the fact is, censures that the press and parliamentary partisans choose to pass against any person (usually on very fallacious grounds) are irresistible; any defence comes in feebly and makes no impression, while the attacks repeated, directly and indirectly, become impressed on people's minds as facts, even in spite of the most erroneous principles with which they are combined. The charges against me have been so vague that it is impossible to meet them; the insinuation, I presume, is that Sebastopol has not been taken owing to the incapacity, or want of energy, of Sir John Burgoyne, which cannot be refuted, although it might be denied.

"I was very sorry that circumstances led to my being forced to leave the army before the end of all things. It was not an unnatural arrangement; yet it is not agreeable to find statesmen putting it prominently forward among the first measures for the

1855. *improvement* of the condition of the army in the Crimea. Every week has opened our eyes more and more to the capabilities of defence of Sebastopol, and to the increase of difficulties arising from a combined operation. The mixture of forces of different nations is a monstrous evil, not to be corrected even by making one General supreme.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"Yours, very faithfully,

"J. F. BURGOYNE."

*From* Sir HARRY JONES *to* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE.

"Camp before Sebastopol, 24th April, 1855.

Progress of the Siege of Sebastopol.

"I presume by this time you are again seated in Pall Mall. I have written regularly, addressed to Matson, which letters will put you *au fait* of what has been done since you left us: our status at present is, that after firing away nearly all our ammunition, we have reduced the enemy's fire without silencing it, for as fast as a shell falls into their work, so sure is a shot to be fired from the precise spot where it would be expected that no gun could by any possibility be serviceable. The French are within 40 *mètres* of the Garden Battery, and suffer much from vertical fire and sorties; they have knocked the Battery du Mât nearly down, and notwithstanding it appears nearly a mass of ruins, still the enemy fire from it; in fact the Russians fire from some guns from every work which existed when you left. The Mamelon still remains with the Russians, and they fire an occasional gun from it; the slope in front of it is now occupied by the Russians, who have a parallel in front of the French one, and from the entrenchment on the right flank of the Mamelon running down to the ravine on our right, they have made a communication to the parallel of the pits; the French have not attempted anything on their left, but have been trying to push on upon their right; they have lost more men in front of the Mamelon than they would have done, had they taken possession of it at first.

"I have been steadily working up to the quarries in front of the Redan, and am now within 50 yards of them, but am stopped by the fire from the Malakoff, which sees my right

flank, and the Mamelon is also on my flank, but has not yet fired upon me. It is now proposed to open the fire again, and to assault: this is the point we have arrived at, but the details have to be settled, and the taking of the Mamelon appears to be too much for Canrobert to swallow. I do not expect that any more will be determined on before the Mail goes out. We have carried on our flying sap admirably, with great credit to the officers employed on it, but not without loss. Owen has lost his leg, and Baines, although doing well, is still weak. King is dead, so that our numbers are thinning fast. I shall be glad to get the re-inforcements ordered: the Sappers have suffered a good deal, but have been exerting themselves nobly, and gained great credit. Tylden appears to be in the thick of everything, and fortunately has escaped unscathed; he had his stick broken, upon which he was leaning, and three balls through his coat the night we took the Rifle Pits and established ourselves in them." 1855. Siege of Sebastopol.

*From the same.*

"28th April, 1855.

"After having fired away for seven or eight days, we were obliged to slacken for want of ammunition; having replenished our batteries, and having things ready to recommence, and arrangements made with the French for assaulting the outer line of works, Lord Raglan received a communication from General Canrobert, which has led to a postponement until about the middle of May. In the mean time, we shall go on advancing our batteries; but the Russians will strengthen their interior defences, which are formidable enough at present.

"The Russians work hard in the town, and appear to be inclosing the old town, so as to make it a sort of second fortress. Notwithstanding the tremendous fire which has been poured upon the Garden Batteries and Battery du Mât, the Russians still fire from them, and have pushed out some rifle-pits between their works and the French advance, which, I believe, is now within forty *mètres* of the edge of the ditch.

"The rifle-pits in front of our right attack are being joined

1855. by trenches, and will require some fighting to turn the defenders out of them. The foot of the Mamelon has a regular parallel, and a communication by a trench from the top of the hill to this parallel. What Canrobert proposes to do, nobody among us can tell; he has always been alarmed at the idea of attempting to establish himself upon the Mamelon. Yesterday, at a review of the left *corps d'armée*, he made them a speech, and told them that he would be in Sebastopol in fifteen days' time!!! The season is now advancing, and something must be done.

Siege of Sebastopol.

"Omer Pacha, who was here, was suddenly recalled to Eupatoria; he took part of his force with him, and the remainder, I believe, are now *en route* for Kamiesh, to follow him. Lord Stratford arrived yesterday, and, I understand, goes away to-morrow. I am just going to start with him and Lord Raglan to the front.

*From the same.*

"Camp before Sebastopol, 5th May, 1855.

"I had intended to have written fully to you upon all that is passing, but early this morning, General Niel was sent by General Canrobert to confer with Lord Raglan upon the proposed operations, which has detained me so long, and so near approaching the closing of the bags, that I cannot do more than say that our siege operations have been confined to the constructing of batteries in advance of the original ones, and all armed with 8-inch and 10-inch guns. Additional mortars have been placed in battery, so that we shall have about thirty-six in addition to the heavy armament. We lose a few men daily, chiefly by splinters from shells, and the stupidity of our men, who will not use the sand-bag loopholes, but persist in firing over the top of them.

"The French have had some sharp work this week on their left attack, near the Bastion Central; they have advanced 150 *mètres* there—both parties are now so close, that a move in advance ought, and must soon take place. I have written a Memorandum on the subject, recommending that the French should immediately take the Mamelon, and we make a lodgment upon the Quarries in front of the Redan. How this will be received I

do not know. All their thoughts appear to be turned towards the investment, as if that would instantly relieve us from our very close proximity to the enemy's works. The French keep up a heavy fire night and day, so that the Battery du Mât and Garden Battery get well peppered; still the Russians contrive to return the fire. 1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"An expedition is gone to Kertch, 3000 English under General Brown, and 7000 French. I have sent Major Gordon, Stanton, De Vere, and Pratt, with a detachment of 30 Sappers, a battery of Artillery, and 50 Dragoons; both admirals and ships of the line are gone with it."

*From the same.*

"15th May, 1855.

"I have just received yours of the 27th ultimo, and am very glad to learn by it that your reception at Court, and by Ministers, has been so satisfactory and complimentary.

"I wish it were possible for me to give you any satisfactory or positive account of our intended operations. I say intended, because it must be presumed that something must be done beyond the limits of the position we have so long occupied. All we can muster for a field force will be about 60,000 bayonets, French and Turks. There have been several plans proposed, but which will be selected it is difficult to say; altogether our prospects in the Crimea appear to be surrounded with difficulties, both present and prospective. Our siege operations are nearly at a stand just now. I believe the French have very little ammunition; at any rate, they have fired very little during the last week. I have been pressing and urging the French to advance and take the Mamelon, but in vain. The days are very hot in the trenches, and the nights getting short—both very unfavourable for us."

*From the same.*

"2nd June, 1855.

"Since my last, I really have nothing to communicate that is interesting; we have done nothing in our attack but

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strengthen our parapets and improve the cover, with the sole exception of extending a trench round the crest of the hill in front of our left attack, which is very difficult, and attended with danger, as the enemy from the Redan and Garden Batteries pour grape, shot, and shells upon the workmen all night long, and we generally lose some men there every night; still, we get on by degrees, and in a few nights more I hope to have it completed.

"When General Pelissier took the command, I understood from him, and Lord Raglan the same, that he would advance and take the Mamelon immediately. After two conferences we can learn nothing further. All this is very annoying, and damaging to both armies.

"There was an advance made last week to the Tchernaya; the Russians retired hastily, but since resumed their positions in front of it, and have even fired upon the French when watering, and killed two horses. Emboldened by this success, they have since advanced into the plain in front of their Inkermann position, and will, I have no doubt, drive the French from the river.

"Canrobert has resumed the command of his division, and, I believe, is supposed to command the force on the Tchernaya, but it being composed of French, Sardes, and Turks, there is some difficulty about it.

"Omer Pacha has resigned, in consequence of some of his troops being ordered to Constantinople, to aid as a foundation for the Turkish Contingent—from all I hear that job is not likely to work well, or be of any use in the present war, if they can even get them to make a respectable appearance.

"The French are constructing some large redoubts about two and a half miles in advance of Kamiesh; the object is not very clear. To hold the position, a very large body of troops will be required; it is of great length, and the features not by any means bold or commanding. Without peace, I do not see my way out of the Crimea. Here we are in June, have done nothing towards the capture of the place as regards field operations, and as to passing another winter here, that must not be thought of.

"Lord Raglan has had a communication by telegraph from

Lord Panmure, relating to the employment of navvies for trench work; this we have objected to. Mr. Beattie, the Railway Engineer, has sent home a very good paper, also objecting, although he was offered the command of the corps, who were to be employed under my orders. 1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"By accounts just received from Kertch, I understand your son has been distinguishing himself."

*From the same.*

"9th June, 1855.

"We opened our fire on the 6th, in the afternoon, and continued until six the following evening, when the signal for the assault was given, which was executed with great gallantry both by the French and English. The Russians tried several times to drive us out of the Quarries; we retained them, but with great loss, forty officers killed and wounded; the number of men I do not know—some hundreds. Assault on Mamelon and Quarries.

"The sketch with the weekly report will shew you how we stand now. The fire from the batteries was tremendous; it is now slackened a little. The French are erecting two heavy batteries upon the Mamelon, and losing a large number of men. I believe that as soon as these batteries can open against the Malakoff, we shall move forward. The enemy's parapets are all terribly disfigured, but their fire will never be completely silenced until we shall get inside their works. Up to this moment, 12 A.M., our present attack has gone on very successfully, and I trust ere long to send you an account dated from Sebastopol itself. We do not see much movement of troops either way. Wagons, as usual, coming into the town.

"We opened 158 pieces of artillery."

*From the same.*

"16th June, 1855.

"I have scarcely time to do more than to communicate the following. Our batteries recommence to-morrow morning, and on the following morning, we are to assault the place on

1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

several points. We take the Redan, as previously arranged; the French taking the Malakoff. This evening, the arrangements are to be finally decided upon by General Pelissier with Generals Niel and Thierry.

"The French bring forward nearly 50 additional pieces of artillery, and we have added 11 to our fire.

"The Mamelon is studded with artillery, and no doubt the vertical fire will be tremendous. We are now within 200 yards of the ditch of the Redan; what the Russians are doing inside, it is difficult to say. We know they are working hard, as we see strong parties marching up there every evening. It is reported that great sickness prevails in the town, and that the garrison are much dispirited; a few short hours, and we shall know more about it.

"The advantages of our new position have been in every way very great; it was a long time before we could get any move made in that direction, but when ordered, it was well done.

*From the same.*

"19th June, 1855.

General assault on the 18th June.

"A general attack took place yesterday upon the lines of the place, extending from the Redan to the Carenage, on the extreme left of the Russian works. The attack was to be made in several columns: two or three on right of the Malakoff, who, after entering the place, were to turn to their left and attack the rear of the Malakoff works, whilst a strong column was to move in on the left of the Malakoff at the same time that the English were to attack the Redan.

"General Pelissier made the arrangements for his columns, and 3 A.M. was the hour named. It was considered that from the tremendous fire we had thrown into the Russian works, and the cessation of their fire, their guns were nearly all silenced.

"The assault took place and failed, with very great loss. The fire of heavy grape which the enemy brought to bear on our troops, rendered a retreat necessary. The French column which attacked on our right, got into the outer line, but not

receiving support from their own columns from the right, and a large body of the enemy in column coming to attack them, the General commanding retired, and so the affair ended. The two French columns on the right went to the attack long before the signal was made, which prepared the enemy, and the hour ordered was two hours sooner than had been originally named. Of course the effect will be very bad, and we shall still have difficulties to contend against. The French are to work up against the Malakoff. 1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

"As to the town being attacked, I believe that has never been intended by General Pelissier. Although so long so near the Bastion du Mât, no attempt will be made to get in by that side; in fact, I do not know what they intend to do, beyond renewing their attack as arranged for yesterday. I got a slight wound in the head from a grape shot, nothing of consequence."

*From the same.*

"18th August, 1855.

"Long ere this reaches you, the intelligence of the attack by the Russians on the 16th, will have been made known to you. Battle of the Tchernaya.

"Some days previous, information had been received which left no doubt that an attack was to be made, and the 13th was the day named. It was known that Gortchakoff had received reinforcements, and that the Divisions of Grenadiers from Poland had reached Simpheropol. Of course we were all prepared on the mornings of the 13th and 14th, but nothing was to be seen in the enemy's camp denoting anything unusual. The 15th passed off quietly, but at daybreak on the morning of the 16th, the position of the Tchernaya was attacked in great force by the Russians. The Sardinians were driven off the hill, in the first instance, which they held above and in advance of the Tchorgoun, where the Russians used to be, and where the approaches down the hill are so plainly visible from our ground.

"The main body pushed down to the two bridges, soon carried that of Tractir, but not before they had been beaten

1855. — Siege of Sebastopol.

out of the Tête de Pont twice: they then advanced to the Canal, for crossing which they had brought portable bridges both for Infantry and Artillery. It was here that the great affair took place; several battalions of the French behaved most nobly, and, I am told, charged the Russians with the bayonet, and drove them back. Whilst this was going on, the Sardinians were playing their part uncommonly well: they also charged with the bayonet, drove the Russians back, and regained their position on the height above Tchorgoun. The Artillery did tremendous execution upon the retreating Russians, across the valley, who went off in great disorder; and no doubt, had the French moved forward, the Russian position of Mackenzie's Farm might have easily been carried. The Russians lost near 6000, and have upwards of 1800 wounded in the French Hospital. There are some prisoners, but I do not know the number."

The following memorandum was drawn up by Sir John Burgoyne, in reply to very discouraging accounts from the seat of war, sent home by the English Commander-in-Chief.

Sir JOHN BURGOYNE *to* Lord PANMURE, Secretary of State for War.

Ordnance Office, London, August, 1855.

*Memorandum on the position of the Allied Armies in the Crimea.*

Memorandum to Lord Panmure, Aug. 1855.

THE slow progress of the siege of Sebastopol is discouraging; and the more so, as the ultimate successful result of the war, and even the safety of the combined armies, may be said to depend upon the fall of that place.

If the siege were abandoned, the military prowess of the Allies would be disheartened and disgraced, the enterprise could not be renewed, and every effort in the East would be paralysed for the future; nor is it easy to perceive any hope, in that case, of being able even to withdraw the army from the very dangerous position in which it would be placed.

Deeply involved as they are in the undertaking, the Allied Powers must at all costs proceed with it, and never flinch from progressive attempts against the place till final success. Even if it be considered a forlorn hope, there must be no question of a retreat, which could only be most disastrous, and occasion a far greater expenditure of men and means than a determined perseverance. 1855. Siege of Sebastopol.

I cannot, however, conceive the case to be by any means so desperate.

The enterprise has been, no doubt, one of vast difficulty: no less than besieging *an army*, which was posted under most advantageous circumstances, occupying a large space, which was covered by a moderate extent of front on a very strong position; the soil very unfavourable to the attacks; one side in perfectly open communication with the country, in which was another large army in the field; and in the place, all the resources of a large and peculiarly abundant naval arsenal.

Still great progress has been made in the attack; and though the advantages above mentioned still tend greatly to retard the approaches, and the serious failure on the 18th June to damp the confidence of the troops in assaults, it is to be presumed that the vast means that can be applied by the Allies to the attack, must enable them ultimately to force an entrance into some influential part, the most advantageous being decidedly the Malakoff.

By concentrating every means and device against that devoted point, while others are only threatened, although vigorously, it may be expected to fall, in spite of every exertion of the enemy, in which he must sustain immense losses.

It is impossible to overlook the prodigious disadvantages under which the military condition of the Russians must now labour; their losses in the battles, in the course of the siege, and by sickness, must exceed those of the Allies; their artillery and ammunition, in the expenditure of which they have been so profuse, must have an end, or be inconveniently reduced; they are deprived of any communication by water, and of the resources derived from the Sea of Azoff; with only the very long and difficult land communication by which to obtain provisions and every object of necessity for the troops;

1855. sick and wounded accumulating in what must be a frightful degree. Their distresses must be enormous, and to which only an infatuated reverence for an absolute power that is almost esteemed holy, could enable troops to submit. However their feelings may be maintained, they must be physically reduced to a degree to afford us encouragement for the future.

Siege of Sebastopol.

The very desperate attempt quite recently made by the enemy, on the powerful position of the Allies on the Tchernaya, would indicate that such is most probably the case.

In this particular, the Allies are far better circumstanced, having a free communication, and large fleets, by which to obtain reinforcements and every needful supply, and for the removal of incumbrances. Thus, if it is to be a contest of means and exertions, the Allies ought to have a decided advantage.

Some extracts from private letters, written by him from Osborne and Paris at this time, will be found interesting. At the latter place, he was officiating as juror of the Great International Exhibition of that year.

"Osborne, 12th August, 1855.

Visit to Osborne.

"The party here is small, the only visitors, as far as I can perceive, being the Duchess of Kent and Duke of Cambridge and their suites (Sir George Couper and Major Clifton), Colonel Alexander Gordon, and myself. I had to take Lady Desart in to dinner, and to sit by the Queen, who was very gracious, and seemed to know everything, even that I had brought down a plan of the attacks of Sebastopol, which we had just received from General Jones; asked me if my son-in-law had not returned from the Crimea; whether I had not been to Paris as a juror, &c., in short, entered into the sort of conversation that is usual with well-bred people not so high in station. With the Prince, Duke of Cambridge, and Colonel Gordon, Crimean affairs of course engrossed the conversation.

"3 P.M.—I am under some embarrassment as to old engagements, all of which must give way to the pressure of the august authorities here. I have just had a rather long con-

versation with Prince Albert, and should have been engaged to have attended him to-morrow to Portland, but that there is to be a Privy Council to-morrow, to arrange the Queen's speech for proroguing Parliament on Tuesday; accordingly, he seems to have fixed on Tuesday to go to Portland, but is to let me know definitively later in the day. 1855. — Visit to Osborne.

"Under all circumstances, I must write direct to Colonel Yorke to say I cannot go to Woolwich on Wednesday, but if Thursday will do as well, I will arrange it so.

"The Duke of Cambridge and Colonel Gordon have very neat miniature medals and clasps (Crimean), which the latter told me he got (paying for them) at the same office where they gave him the large ones.

"The Queen remarked to me that I had not mine on, as they had. I told her, what was the fact, that it was my misfortune, not my fault; but that I had laboured, without effect, to fix it on my coat, until I was afraid of being too late."

"Osborne, 20th August, 1855.

"I write this on the information that a letter sent by 9 A.M. to-morrow will be delivered the same day in London.

"I was, as is my wont, in plenty of time for the train at 1 P.M., and found myself in the carriage with a party of four French people, two gentlemen and two rather good-looking ladies: one of the former, unhappily but good-naturedly, thought he would patronise me, but his conversation, partly from my indistinctness of hearing, and partly from his indistinctness in English pronunciation, put me on a most uncomfortable stretch of exertion to be polite: however, he happily got to a nod, which gave me an opportunity to encourage a drowsy fit, from which I took care not to revive. Our passage was so rough, even between Southampton and the Isle of Wight, that there was a great demand for basins among the lady passengers; I dozed through it, and in my meditations a horror struck me, that though I had brought the appropriate tight-ancled trousers, I had not put up with them the accessary accompaniments of black silk stockings and evening shoes: so I sought for them in the shops of East Cowes. After a great search, I got at last a pair of the largest-sized lady's stockings,

1855. — Visit to Osborne.

and a pair of high instepped thin shoes; it enabled me, however, to conform to the prescribed costume, though if any one had remarked them, they would assuredly not have asked me who was my shoemaker, unless for the purpose of avoiding him!

"Lord and Lady Palmerston are the only guests here. I sat at dinner next to Miss Cathcart (Maid of Honour), seemingly a very nice girl.

"The Queen, as usual, very gracious. She remarked on the Prince having made some observations on our works at Portsmouth; and I took the opportunity of telling her that His Royal Highness was determined not to let us go to sleep, at which I thought she seemed amused."

"2, Rue Jean Goujon, Champs Elysées,
"Paris, 23rd August, 1855.

Juror of Exhibition in Paris.

"I saw and spoke to Lord Cowley for a few minutes, and saw Lord Clarendon, who quite concurs with me. I am just about to send him a copy of my paper.[1]

"I go this evening to the Hôtel de Ville in full fig. What shall I do to put on my orders? I fear they will be in very *dis*orderly fashion.

"I met Sir Joseph Oliffe at the Exhibition, and had my say with him; he did not seem inclined to recommend anything in my apparently robust state of health.

"Tell Stopford to write to Colonel Sandham to say that I am anxious to have any results he can give of the best mode of pitching double tents, and of flooring them.

"I do not enjoy Paris at all without some of you as companions."

"25th August, 1855.

"After a Reception which Prince Albert gave to the British Jurors yesterday morning at St. Cloud, he had me in for a private conversation on Crimean affairs, in which we appear to be quite of the same opinion. I think Lord Clarendon had shown him my paper. The French military authorities here, however, seem inclined to keep clear of me,[2] which does not in

[1] His memorandum given in page 298.

[2] They looked upon Sir John as the prime agent in preventing the French Emperor proceeding to the Crimea.—Ed.

the least affect me. General Canrobert, who is made much of here, is perfectly civil and cordial when we happen to meet. 1855. — Visit to Paris.

"The great party at Versailles last night, was the finest thing I ever saw. It beat the Hôtel de Ville to pieces. The supper in particular, in the Salle du Théâtre, was the most brilliant thing possible. I was in a doorway at one time, close to the passing procession of Royalty, but not observed by any but the Prince of Wales, who, after passing, turned round with a little smile of recognition. The Empress looked very ill in health. We did not get home until 4·30 A.M. I kept, and am still keeping to the last, all my decorations on my coat. I only received the invitation on return home at 6 P.M., and we set out at 7·30.

"I cannot shake off my character of Tom Fool. (More people know Tom Fool than Tom Fool knows.) I told a shopkeeper in the Rue St. Honoré, of whom I bought some articles, to send them home to me; when I gave him the address, 'Le Général Burgoyne,' he said, 'Oh! then you are Sir John Burgoyne!' I confessed that I was so. How did he know anything about it?

"From the satisfied manner with which the shopkeepers always receive my money, I strongly suspect that they are cheating us in a peculiar degree just now."

"28th August, 1855.

"It is impossible in this bustling place, seldom coming home to a distant out-of-the-world part, and with the dread of having to mount *au quatrième*, to write letters with any satisfaction by a post closing at 4 P.M. One must always have something prepared previously, and, consequently, cannot send late intelligence.

"*Galignani* of to-day, with reference to the *fête* at Versailles, after mentioning General Canrobert, says, that 'General Sir John Burgoyne, another Crimean officer, also drew much attention,' or something of that sort; but I will endeavour to get you the paper.

"I dined to-day with Mr. Vignoles, who is staying at the Hôtel Bristol.

"To give an idea of the feeling in Paris among the lower orders, in favor of Louis Napoleon, a driver of an omnibus said to

1855. — Visit to Paris. an Englishman the other day, with reference to the revival of the bodies of troops of the 1st Napoleon, '*What can be better! Here we have the Old Guard and a new Paris!*'"

*From* Major-General Sir HARRY JONES.

"Sebastopol, 15th September, 1855.

"MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

Capture of Sebastopol. "Sebastopol was taken by the point you always indicated—the Malakoff. The French had worked up so close to the edge of the ditch, that they had no difficulty in rushing up the exterior slope, which had been made practicable by the immense quantity of shells which had been thrown upon and into it; and further, the time of assault being unusual, (midday) the Russians were not prepared for them: still they made a good resistance, and the French lost a great many men. They also succeeded in carrying the Little Redan, and forced themselves on to the rear line; but here they were met by a formed body of Russians with field-pieces, advancing; this obliged the French to retire; they fell back into the Little Redan; there they were exposed to the fire of a Russian battery, which soon compelled them to retire; the Russians followed, and retook possession of the work. Such, I believe, was the state of affairs at sunset, after a tremendous struggle. Upon the whole, the loss amounts to upwards (as they say) of 8000—5 generals killed, and 13 wounded. Our attack upon the Great Redan succeeded; but after having established ourselves in force, the men could not be got to advance, and, subsequently, fell back, after losing about 2000 killed and wounded,—a very large proportion of officers. There was no difficulty in the advance, the ladders were easily put down and moved across the ditch, the profile of which was not anything beyond a respectable field-work. To our surprise, on the Sunday morning, we discovered that the enemy had retired. It must have been a sudden resolve, for the magazines, &c., were not fired, notwithstanding that fuses and wires were carefully laid down for that purpose; their batteries and works had been made as strong and secure as possible; bomb-proof cover for the men stationed in them

had been made, covered with timber, part of men-of-war's masts, some 20 inches in diameter, and covered with earth as high as they could, as also great parados traverses: the men-of-war were sunk during the night, and on Monday seven steamers, the last of the Black Sea fleet, were also committed to the deep. Abundance of artillery has been found in the batteries, and a tolerable supply of ammunition and powder. It is fortunate for us that the place was surrendered, as the features of the ground are very favourable for internal defence. The docks are apparently well-built, but I am inclined to think will be found mere face-work, judging by the holes I see made in the principal walls of their great buildings, and the mortar appears to be of a very inferior quality. We are sinking shafts to blow up the docks, and afterwards to destroy all the public buildings and quay-walls. The Russians blew up Fort Paul, which appears to be nothing but a heap of rubbish. Fort St. Nicholas they set on fire, but no explosions have taken place! it was reported, and still believed, that wires were laid from it to the north shore. The Russians are busy on the works of Severnaia, and erecting batteries immediately opposite the town, which I expect they will make a very hot berth, as soon as they have moved all the provisions, &c., out of our range. They are said to be transporting everything to the Inkermann Mackenzie position. We have got beautiful weather. I am obliged to close, having received a summons for the bag.

1855. Capture of Sebastopol.

"Faithfully yours,

"My dear Sir John,

"HARRY D. JONES."

*From* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE *to* Lord PANMURE.

"Ordnance Office, 17th September, 1855.

"MY DEAR LORD PANMURE,

"Will you excuse me for offering a reflection on the present posture of affairs in the Crimea. I do so with some deference to prevailing and almost universal opinion, which, contrary to mine, seems to run on what are to be the next active operations to be carried on against the enemy there.

Letter to Lord Panmure on state of affairs in Crimea.

"I feel no doubt that the Allies are in superior numerical

1855. force to the Russians, and, as we know, composed of troops of a superior description; we have confidence in our generals, and if anything vigorous is attempted on our part, we cannot doubt but that the result will be brilliant; and yet, though I have hitherto been an advocate for more enterprise than hitherto pursued, I cannot but think that our true policy *now* is to be cautious.

Letter to Lord Panmure on state of affairs in Crimea.

"The Russian army in the Crimea has changed condition with us; it is *they* now that are in a precarious position, from which I do not see that anything can relieve them but some desperate attempt meeting with partial success. Their great effort must be to get out of the Crimea with as much military honour as they can, but inevitably with great losses.

"It appears to me that our game is to press as close upon them as we can, but never to make any attack except where we have got great advantages, to look out for the strongest defensive positions in our rear to resort to in case they turn upon us, which it will not be easy for them to do when once on their retreat. If they still hang on for a time with a bold countenance where they are now, for the chance of some favourable event, let us be patient, they must go before winter, and then will be our time to make play on their rear-guards. The course for the Allies to pursue, it appears to me, is that adopted by the Duke of Wellington at the Lines of Lisbon. When he saw that the French *must* retire, he would not compromise his forces by any general attack upon them, but pressed upon their rear-guards, over which he gained many advantages, but always manœuvring with his columns so that if the enemy had attempted to concentrate to give him battle, he had some strong position in his rear which he could have obliged them to attack. The Russians may perhaps make an orderly retreat as far as Simpheropol, but their progress between that and Perekop will be most difficult if the country is, as I believe, without any but small supplies of water—passed over in ordinary times, on that account, by only small bodies at a time;—if so, and that they be somewhat pressed, to retire *en masse*, they must make forced marches, and carry water with them: and supposing they should be put to such a contingency, their difficulties and sacrifices will be very great; and by giving

them no opportunity of extricating themselves, or even gilding their pill of disaster by some hard-fought action (even though an unsuccessful one), the result will be more effective, though it may be less brilliant. 1855 — Letter to Lord Panmure on state of affairs in Crimea.

"The north side of Sebastopol is no longer a fortress, it is merely the right side of their position, as the south side is the left of ours. I presume that we shall establish batteries, especially of heavy mortars, against it, as we have nothing better to do with those pieces and their ammunition; but it will be merely to torment them on that ground, from which they can hardly get out of range, as we can on the south; but they have no interest now in keeping any large force in that space, and it must fall, or rather be abandoned, when the army retires. Above all things, what I (in my presumption perhaps) deprecate most, is the idea of a wide movement from either Eupatoria or the south coast: any such detached corps must be handled with great caution, for fear of being compromised by a concentration of the enemy's forces on it.

"If a small force is so employed, it may be opposed by a moderate but superior strength detached against them, the remainder holding some strong defensive position; and if a large one, it might weaken our main body too much, unless it is satisfactorily established that we have a vast superiority of force, which is very likely the case, and then we can hardly go wrong by any course of proceeding.

"My dear Lord Panmure,

"Your faithful Servant,

"J. F. Burgoyne."

"Office, Pall Mall, 3rd October, 1855.

"My dear Lord Panmure,

"Judging from letters which I have received from Sebastopol, I conceive that there is an impression that the Russians are preparing the north side for defence as a fortress, in order to keep the Allies for as long a time as possible from the use of the great harbour; it may then be necessary to look forward to such a contingency, and by due preparations on our part, I would not anticipate any good result to them from such a measure.

1855.

Letter to Lord Panmure on state of affairs in Crimea.

"The courses they may pursue are, I think, as follows:—

"They may find it necessary to retire from the western and southern side of the Crimea. To effect this, I should expect that they would commence by sending off previously as many encumbrances as possible, establish depôts at regulated stations in their rear for their consumption on the march, and make the final movement when inclement weather, and breaking up of the roads, would become great impediments to our following in sufficient force to make any impression.

"In this case they may leave a garrison in the position north of the harbour which they are supposed to be now strengthening with all their means; the Allies would then be naturally in possession of the ridge between the Belbec and the Tchernaya, and that position as a fortified post, would be left to its own resources.

"Should the enemy's general resources be sufficient, contrary to expectations, to induce them to endeavour to retain their present hold throughout the winter, I conceive that the result would lead to greater sacrifices on their part than on that of the Allies, arising from the greater difficulty of obtaining supplies, nor do I conceive that they could possibly remain in effective force along the position between Mackenzie's Farm and the north side of the harbour; they were not able to do so during the last winter. On their abandoning that position, or leaving only a show of a force upon it, I presume that the Allies would at once advance on that side, and occupy the best defensive position, having its left on the Belbec, if a more forward movement were not practicable or advisable; thus, in the first place isolating the fortified post on the north of the harbour, should a garrison be left in it.

"In any case, it may be presumed that the enemy would anxiously seek for any opportunity of falling upon any detached and unsupported corps that might be within reach of an active spirited enterprise.

"Although all these operations contemplate the taking the field, yet it will be in the first instance by movements of no great extent, and such as it is impossible to suppose that the armies are not by this time provided for; the Belbec itself cannot be more than ten miles from Balaclava, and the country

1855. — Letter to Lord Panmure on state of affairs in Crimea.

above it is well wooded; there ought therefore to be no difficulty in providing for the part of the army so engaged, provisions, floored tents, etc., etc.

"I now beg to revert to the Engineer question of the means for reducing the northern position, if it be left with a garrison as above supposed, and which was the cause of my now troubling your lordship.

"Should the apprehension be really entertained of a possibility of the enemy endeavouring to retain a hold of the position on the north side of Sebastopol harbour, we must be prepared to enter into another siege operation for its reduction; but it would be of a very far more encouraging and advantageous character than that which has just been terminated; and in order to bring it to as speedy a result, and to make it as little arduous as possible, all the battering trains and their means should be so placed as to be readily brought up; when the space that could be possibly occupied by the enemy being confined, and without bombproofs, except what could be partially applied on the spot, and all communication cut off with the country, the whole of the interior would be so overwhelmed by bombardment and cannonading by means far surpassing what are usually brought against such a position, and in which the navy could cooperate, that the advances would be considerably facilitated, and the garrison soon placed in a most deplorable condition; whether a large or a small force were left, the disadvantages (though of a different nature) would be great, and I should anticipate a comparatively very easy success.

"Having a possibility of this proceeding in view, it would seem to be desirable to retain and organise the necessary Artillery and Engineer forces, in a state to pursue it with vigour.

"One very important consideration will be, particularly the largest bombarding means that can be possibly made of service along the south side, where it can be obtained and supplied with least difficulty, and as it seems to be the policy of the enemy at present to refrain from drawing on a fire, it may be a question for the Allied Generals whether it be equally advantageous on our side, or whether we ought not with our ample means to commence and continue to disturb his operations."

1855. In November of this year, he received a summons to spend the anniversary of the battle of Inkermann at Windsor Castle on a visit to the Queen.

Visit to Windsor.

"Windsor Castle, 5th November, 1855.

"I arrived here about half-past five. It is now six, and you cannot think how sumptuously, and even more than that, how comfortably, I am put up,—a bed-room and dressing-room adjoining, and on the other side of the bed-room a sitting-room, all most comfortable, and with excellent fires; writing apparatus very complete, and everything one can possibly want, except books, which in my hurry I neglected to provide myself with, and we do not dine till eight; but I have some papers with me, and many things in my mind to be written, so I shall not be without useful occupation; but a book would be agreeable for an occasional refreshment. A gentlemanlike foreigner (but speaking perfect English) the groom of the chambers, has just called to tell me the dinner-hour; and, to my inquiry how, in this pile of buildings and labyrinth of staircases and passages, I should find my way, he said he would come for me at eight. He asked if I would take a cup of tea, or anything, and I have accepted the tea as a *luxury*, for; * * * had provided me with a basin of excellent mulligatawny soup for my *wants*."

"Windsor Castle, 6th November, 1855.

"I took the Duchess of Athol in to dinner yesterday, and had myself to go round, and sit immediately on the right hand of Her Majesty, who was gracious and condescending as she always is, and talked about officers who had been in the East, asked after my son-in-law, &c. I told her what Hugh had mentioned about the Russians at Kinburn, killed by their own officers, which she said was very shocking.

"The guests here are, the Duchess of Kent, Sir George Couper and attendants, General Bentinck, Colonel Hamilton (Guards), Colonel Poulett Somerset (aide-de-camp of Lord Raglan), and the Duchess of Athol—whether any new ones come to-day, I do not know.

"The Queen wore the *red* ribbon (she usually wears the

blue), and told me it was in compliment to the day, being the anniversary of the battle of Inkermann. Talking about the Crimean medal and clasps, she took hold of mine, and said that the reverse (Fame crowning the Warrior) was thought pretty; I said that it might be so, but that the other (that with the Queen's head) was what we were most proud of. 1855. — Visit to Windsor.

"After dinner, Colonel Biddulph, at the head of the table, gave 'Success to the Allied Armies in the Crimea,' when we all stood up, Her Majesty also.

"This morning, at nine o'clock, we had prayers, fifty or sixty people present, in the Castle Chapel, and then breakfast.

"The Prince is gone to town, but will return early, when I am promised an interview in the afternoon, to explain about our progress with the works of this year's estimate; those of Portsmouth are greatly in arrear, and unfortunately are those immediately under his own eye, and he is rather angry about it, as he says very truly, that we are losing the money voted for them.

"I don't know whether I shall be able to offer to his perusal my memorandum on the general principles for defences; what I feel a difficulty about is, giving up, even for a few days, the only copy we have.

"I return to town to-morrow morning.

"There is a picture, I hear, of a pretty girl meeting her lover, who has just returned from the Crimea, and who has his face, of course, quite hid in beard, whiskers, and moustaches. She exclaims, 'Though lost to sight, to memory dear!'"

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*From* General Sir GEORGE BROWN *to* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE.

"Nice, 12th December, 1855.

"MY DEAR BURGOYNE,

"In my retirement here, I scarcely know what is passing in the rest of the world; a *tenpenny postage* seems to have silenced most of my ordinary military correspondents; but I have been struck with an excellent paper published in the *United Service Gazette* of the 1st instant, on the subject Letter from Sir George Brown.

1855. — Letter from Sir George Brown.

of the Crimean campaign, and siege of Sebastopol, which I observe is attributed to you, and I trouble you with this note to assure you that I concur in every word of it. Nothing can be more preposterous than all the nonsense that has been published on the subject of what is called 'earth works,' as if any rational man would be satisfied with such temporary expedients when he could employ masonry; but we wanted, and still require, such sensible and temperate statements as this, in order to disabuse the public mind on the whole subject of the campaign, for the world has been so misled by the representations of the press, that instead of getting credit for one of the most glorious enterprises in which the British army ever was engaged, and for its gallantry before the enemy, and the patience and endurance it has shewn under the greatest privations, there seems to be some reason to apprehend that the statements of the newspapers may be taken for history, and that we may be handed down to posterity as a pack of dolts and blockheads, utterly ignorant of our professional duties, and incapable of managing our own affairs without the aid of the correspondents of the public press!

"I am quite sure that you are right in what you state in regard to the flank march from the Belbec, and although I know some of the naval authorities think otherwise, I feel sure they could not have landed our siege train, or been sure of the supply of the army for a single week, without first having possession of the harbours. It is all very easy to speculate now on what might have been done in this respect, but people should recollect the difficulty that actually occurred in landing the field guns and horses on the 15th September on the smooth beach at Old Fort! So it is in regard to the proposal to assault the place at once, and without waiting for the siege guns. I care not who or what he was who may have advised such a measure, but it *was*, and still *is*, my opinion, that with the enemy's ships in all the creeks, and artillery not subdued, we should have been beaten back, and there would have been an end of the expedition, if not of us all!

"No, I don't know that we were guilty of any serious blunder, or that any important mistake was committed, unless it was in not immediately following up the blow at Alma.

1855.

Letter from Sir George Brown.

"Had the 3rd and 4th Divisions been at once pushed on with Prince Napoleon's Frenchmen, I have no doubt *now* that we should have captured nearly all their artillery at the Katcha, and probably disorganized their whole army; but as you observe, that would not have admitted us into the town, and still less into the Northern Forts, which are enclosed works of regular construction. At Alma, however, as on every other occasion of the sort, we were not aware till afterwards of the extent of mischief we had inflicted on our enemy, who took the precaution to draw so formidable a screen of cavalry along his rear, that we could see little or nothing of the condition he was in during his retreat.

"I am one of those who shall ever grieve for our unfortunate repulse and failure in the assault on the Redan, because it seems to have had the effect of transferring the prestige from us to the French. We shall hear nothing more of *their* disgraceful failures at the '*ouvrages blancs*,' and if peace were to be concluded to-morrow, they would undoubtedly claim all the merit of our successes to themselves. How different it would have been if they had come to terms at Vienna?

"I shall always regret, therefore, that Simpson did not slip another Division at the work, and capture it at any price.

"I am here on account of my poor wife's health, who has been very much ailing; but as for myself, I have never been an hour ill since I saw you! Indeed, I am as well, as active, and as able to undergo privation and fatigue as I have been at any time during the last ten years, and I have told them that I am ready and willing to serve, but they don't seem disposed to accept of my services at any price, and I feel myself discarded and laid aside as of no further use.

"I trust they may find their account in employing younger men than you and I, but I doubt it!

"My dear Burgoyne,

"Ever yours sincerely,

"G. Brown."

Contrary to Sir John Burgoyne's anticipations, the Russians retained their positions in the Crimea through-

1855. out the winter, and the inactivity of the Allies during this period was incomprehensible to him. It is understood that Marshal Pélissier reported that the Russian positions were too strong to be attacked from our existing base of operations; but they were at the same time so extensive, that it was hardly possible to conceive that the enemy could be in sufficient force to oppose a vigorous movement on every point of so long a line, if the Allies had taken the initiative. On the 16th January, 1856, Sir John Burgoyne writes to Lord Panmure:—

"I am fully persuaded that the enemy now holds but a very precarious tenure in the Crimea, and that, at very great efforts and sacrifices; but this tenure it is of immense importance to him to retain to the last, on account of the different impression it makes in the eyes of his own people, of the Allies, and of the world in general, as to whether he can or cannot resist this first great enterprise of the Allies against him.

"I presume that in this relative position, we should hardly give up our advantages by not pursuing that object of gaining forcible possession of the Crimea, for the commencement of any new undertaking; particularly as the one cannot in my mind be very far distant.

"Of the different courses to be pursued, one is, the armies remaining as at present, holding each other in check, both in very strong positions, but that of the Allies more compact, with any amount of resources they require brought close to them—sick and incumbrances of all kinds removed to other regions at will by the same means—they have great advantages over an enemy, whose communications with the rear are infinitely more difficult, which disadvantage must be in a state of progressive increase, by the rapid exhaustion of the resources that are nearest, and by the drain on every part of his own territory within reach, and its consequent distress.

"It is certain that so remaining would be a sure game, and that finally (and the event could not be very far distant) the enemy must abandon the country (or very much reduce his forces, and then be driven out), after sustaining very great

losses, not only military but national, as regards a district of considerable extent in his rear, comprising the interesting German colonies, which have been for so many years fostered and flourishing. 1855.

"Such a course, however, would not suit the temper of the times, nor perhaps be thought consistent with the honour of our arms; and therefore we are, it is presumed, to take more active proceedings, notwithstanding the greater risks to be incurred, and the much greater expenditure of life and funds that they will entail."

He then proceeds to discuss the different courses of action proposed. But almost simultaneously with the date of this letter, negotiations for peace were set on foot; and an armistice shortly afterwards put a stop to further military operations.

For the sake of convenience, it is considered advisable to sacrifice chronological arrangement at this point, and insert here the rest of the documents relating to the Crimea.

"War Department, Whitehall,
"17th February, 1857.

"MY DEAR LORD PANMURE,

"I beg to return the extracts from the despatch of Her Majesty's Consul-General at Warsaw, dated 1st of November, 1856, detailing remarks by Prince Gortchakoff on the Crimean campaign. Prince Gortchakoff's remarks on the Crimean campaign.

"I take quite a different view of those remarks from the impression made by them on General Mansfield.[1] I consider them neither candid nor just, but at the same time precisely what I should have expected, from the opinion which I had formed of the Prince, from some slight intercourse with him, when he was in England a few years ago; when he appeared to me to be a man of experience, ability, and superior military knowledge, but with a show of candour and almost bluntness of manner, to have adopted, apparently on system, a course of

[1] Now Lord Sandhurst.

1855. communication with others, that should obtain the most useful information, while imparting the least.

Prince Gortchakoff's remarks on the Crimean campaign.

"If the Allies lost opportunities, as so freely detailed by him; under a similar scrutinizing spirit, the Russians will be found to have done so: for where there are so many ways of acting as in a campaign, it is usually not difficult to shew subsequently—with a full knowledge afterwards of every circumstance of both armies—how proceedings might have been better conducted; but even then frequently with injustice. It is only in England that no allowances are made, and the worst construction is put upon every act of its own officers; and this, readily adopted by enemies and rivals, causes the military reputation of the country to suffer very unduly.

"I have ventured some remarks on Prince Gortschakoff's statements:[1] they are somewhat long; but it is necessary to give reasons in answering positive assertions that are made in so plausible and authoritative a tone.

"Your Lordship's faithful Servant,

"J. F. Burgoyne."

*To* A. W. Kinglake, Esq., M.P.

"War Office, Pall Mall,
"12th October, 1863.

"My dear Mr. Kinglake,

Letter to Mr. Kinglake.

"I would most willingly contribute any information in my power, that would enable you to render your historical details as correct as possible; but I was rather in the position of an occasional adviser, than a positive active agent in carrying out the different operations in the Crimea, and am not at all aware of the kind of matter that I still retain in my memory, that would be of interest to you.

"Most of my written opinions and suggestions are introduced, perhaps too diffusely, into Major Elphinstone's 'Engineer Operations of the Siege.'

"I have no doubt whatever that the date, 21st September (the day after the battle of the Alma), was that of my Memorandum recommending the Flank March; and on that day or

[1] Published in 'Military Opinions of Sir John Burgoyne,' Bentley, 1859.

the next, Lord Raglan sent me to propound it to Marshal St. Arnaud, with whom I had an interview, in presence of the Head of his Staff, General Bizot, Commanding Engineer, &c. After I had made my explanations, and answered some few expressed doubts and questions, I was gratified by the Marshal announcing at once, and without conferring with his officers further, that he concurred, and consented to join in carrying the proposition out. 1855. Letter to Mr. Kinglake.

"The cause of the delay of two days on the Alma, was clearly to embark our wounded and incumbrances, and to prepare ourselves for the further advance, and for the total abandonment of that line of communication: and I may say that we did not suffer by that delay, for after discontinuing any pursuit on the day of the action, a more rapid advance on the following days would have given us no advantage.

"It has been supposed by some that we might have forced our way into the place at once; but against such an idea, it must be recollected that the whole of the Russian army, one not very inferior to our combined force, had retired into the place; that it was there joined by about 10,000 seamen who, in the Russian service in particular, are well exercised as soldiers; that the positions round the place were very strong, and while compact for the defenders, were extended and separated by deep ravines to the assailants; that they were extensively armed by guns from the men-of-war, and that we should have had to make the attack without any reserve, depôts, or retreat; and in a country with the military features of which we were entirely ignorant.

"The safety of Sebastopol must have been a matter of first consideration with the Russian commanders: and yet after the two or three days they had for consideration, they withdrew from the garrison into the interior, a very considerable force, estimated by us at the time at 15,000 or 18,000 men, with which we were very near coming in contact on the flank march, which certainly implied that even then, they had left an ample garrison in the place for its immediate security.

"Indeed it has always appeared to me, that the Combined Army, instead of being open to any accusation of timidity, deserved great credit, under all the circumstances, for the

1855. — Letter to Mr. Kinglake.

boldness, almost amounting to rashness, with which they threw themselves into the Crimea, and the tenacity with which they maintained their hold, and persevered throughout the winter in their enterprise.

"I make these few remarks in answer to your specific inquiries, on the impulse of the moment, and without knowing how far they may coincide with your studied researches on the subject, and I will only add, that it is impossible to overestimate the evils of a combined army in the field, and still more, if with a divided command; and that, without reference to persons, for let the two generals be perfection in ability and courtesy, the evil would still be enormous.

"My dear Mr. Kinglake,

"Yours, &c.,

"J. F. Burgoyne."

*To the same.*

"War Office, London,
"26th October, 1868.

"My dear Mr. Kinglake,

"I can only repeat to you my wish to assist as much as may be in my power, whether verbally or in writing, to enable you to record with correctness the events, and the reasonings upon them, of which the world are looking forward to you as the historian; but I feel that I am under many drawbacks. My memory is not very perfect in details, and I should have a difficulty in attempting to wade through documentary references to refresh it; I must, therefore, confine myself to impressions which I retain as to leading circumstances.

"To be frank also with you, I feel a difficulty in the great regret I have experienced, at the very low opinion you have so forcibly expressed of Marshal St. Arnaud, and other high French authorities, and which I by no means entertain.

"I have really and uniformly experienced so much courtesy, amounting, if I may so believe it, to friendly interbourse, from French officers of all ranks, with so much more of even deference to my opinions than I had a right to expect, that I have really a great respect and most kindly feelings for them, and would most unwillingly be quoted as at all inclined to criticise their

proceedings. St. Arnaud himself, though certainly vain and ambitious, I admired as a man of energy, and good judgment in military affairs. I am also strongly persuaded of the very great advantage of our maintaining the most amicable feelings we can with the French nation, which, of course, requires our attention in dealing with the merits and character of individuals of note. 1855. — Letter to Mr. Kinglake.

"After this confession, I will venture on explanations such as you may require, and that I hope you will not consider as in contradiction to it, or that might be produced against these feelings of mine.

"I do not quite understand the point you would raise on the Memorandum of the conversation held with Lord Lyons; it was much earlier than the 21st that I adopted the idea of the propriety of taking Balaklava as our basis of operations, and I was not aware of Lord Raglan having had any hesitation about it. Whatever may have been the questions raised for acting on the Belbec, I have never from the period of the battle of the Alma, seen the slightest reason to doubt but that what has been called the flank march was decidedly the best course that could have been adopted; and that no attack of any field work on the Belbec, or other proceeding at that time, could have improved our condition so far as to render any other course desirable.

"The question of not following up the victory of the Alma, has been frequently adverted to with some censure. I mentioned in my last, that there was no great advantage to be gained by pressing on an advance on the next day; but I must say that I felt some disappointment that, in the ordinary course, the retiring enemy was not pursued on the day of the battle itself; not that it would have been attended with an effect of any consequence, because he retired in good order, the country was open, and he had a good force of cavalry, in which the Allies were almost totally deficient; but it was hardly creditable to us that he should go off so totally undisturbed, and certainly my impression was that this little pressure on his retreat ought to have been done by the French. They had been earlier in action, and had come to a lull in it, which made them more fresh; they had suffered less than we,

1855. — Letter to Mr. Kinglake.

and were nearer to drop on the retreat of the enemy; so that, had it been an united army of one power, that would have been the portion that the general-in-chief would naturally have pressed on in pursuit. Though all this was my *impression*, I will not say that some good counter reasons might not be shewn against it.

"In my first letter, I doubt whether I entered fully enough into the reasons for our not advancing on the 21st. I stated generally, that besides saving our wounded from the irruption which the Russians with the cavalry might have made in our rear, or the very dangerous alternative of leaving a considerable detachment which would be unsupported, to protect them, the new preparations for advancing included the very important items of provisions and ammunition; for it must be recollected that we had no means of transport at the time, and the beach by which we communicated to the shipping was a few miles off.

"I am not sure that I ought to venture so far, but I am inclined to believe that you attach too much consequence to remarks made on the impulse of the moment at very exciting periods—to hasty opinions given, or even notes written, as circumstances arose, and before they were fully developed, and where the country, and the way it was occupied, was quite unknown. It is, perhaps, hardly reasonable to draw any conclusions, or to pass judgment on sentiments that might arise in the mind at such moments, and which are subsequently found to be erroneous.

"With regard to Todleben's history of the siege, from a remark made by Colonel de Struve, I fear it will not be out for three or four months.

"Yours, &c.,

"J. F. Burgoyne."

*To the same.*

"War Office, 4th March, 1865.

* * * * * *

"Neither through Lord Raglan, nor from himself, had I any intimation that General Cathcart was of opinion that we

1855. — Letter to Mr. Kinglake.

could '*walk into the place*,' otherwise most assuredly I would have entered into the subject with him.[1] It is probable that Lord Raglan and he may have discussed the point together. I was quite of opinion then, as explained in my military opinions, and nothing has in the slightest degree shaken it since, that any such attempt would have been thoroughly unjustifiable.

"General Cathcart, according to the note from which you quote, seems to have had an impression that the assault was practicable; it may have been a first evanescent idea of his, or it may have been on thorough conviction, on consideration; but it is impossible to reason on it, without knowing all the grounds on which it was founded. His desire to call attention to a '*weak point*' in the enemy's line, is much too vague.

"The fact is, there is no weak point, in its restricted sense, in an entrenched position of an army in the field; there may be defect in general arrangement, which may be called the weak point, and be taken advantage of; but at Sebastopol the general position of the Russians was excellent, and it was very generally strengthened by works and other obstructions, and cover. If there were points less protected than others, which was no doubt what was alluded to by General Cathcart, they would be remedied by the distribution of the troops.

"It is a great mistake to estimate the value of defences, without reference to the service they are to perform; a description of entrenchment forming part of the defensive line of an army may be most powerful, which as insulated works would be utterly insignificant.

"The Americans have made this mistake in their boastful comparisons of the strength of Fort Fisher and the Malakoff.

[1] Lieutenant Ravenhill of the Royal Engineers, brought a letter from Sir George Cathcart, which reached Lord Raglan at 8 P.M. on the evening of the 27th of September, in which Sir George proposed to push the Fourth Division into the suburbs at a spot between the Malakoff Tower and the Careening Bay, which he considered a weak point, and asked for two additional Field Batteries to support the movement. Lord Raglan objected to giving the necessary orders without previous consultation with the French Head-quarters. It appeared afterwards that Sir George Cathcart was not aware, when he made this proposal, that guns were mounted on the Malakoff.—ED.

1855. — Letter to Mr. Kinglake.

"Now that we have Todleben's account to refer to, and are better acquainted with the means possessed by the Russians for resisting our attack on the Crimea, I am more than ever satisfied that, instead of being reproached for not having done more, the Allies deserve great credit for having done so much.

"That the Russians should be willing to join in any outcry tending to our disparagement, I can understand, but I am surprised at their doing it in this instance, as, if what they assert is well founded, it would be most disgraceful to their arrangements and to their boasted prowess.

"Yours, &c.,

"J. F. BURGOYNE."

*Rough Notes on* TODLEBEN'S 'Défense de Sébastopol.'

Notes on Todleben's 'Defense de Sébastopol.'

TODLEBEN, as is natural, does his utmost to glorify the acts of his countrymen; from beginning to end, nothing on their side was ever wrong or faulty. On all occasions, he applies the very common practice of the historian of one side, of giving a maximum of forces and means to the adversaries, and a minimum to his own side; and there are evident shewings that he has partialities, and some little feelings of jealousy, in his comments on the enemy.

In the siege of Silistria, not the slightest compliment is paid to the Turks for their defence, in which circumstances that cannot be disputed were recorded at the time, quite in accordance with the habitual tenacity with which they are celebrated for defending the most imperfect works. This seems ungenerous, however much the Russians may affect to despise them.

In comparing the forces on each side, at the invasion of the Crimea, battle of the Alma, &c., the Turks are counted with the Allies at 10,000 men, in a mass with British and French, making up a gross number of 62,000. Surely this is unreasonable, after the manner in which these same Turks are despised on other occasions, as in 'L'affaire Tchetate' (page xix), where 18,000 Turks are defeated by 2,500 Russians, and the contemptuous way in which they are spoken of in other places.

Nothing should be taken with greater caution than criticisms, after a campaign, as to what such a general ought to

1855. — Notes on Todleben's 'Défense de Sébastopol.'

have done. Many circumstances, of which the critic is quite unaware, may have made the suggested proceeding very objectionable, if not perhaps impossible, and then its assumed success is problematical.

At page 21 he gives a tabular view of the Russian forces: *En Crimée*, 39,000; on north coasts of Black Sea, which may be deemed supporting, 32,093; on coasts of Sea of Azoff, Don, &c., 46,000.

In January, 1854: "Batteries for defence of the Harbour completed,—mounted 592 guns,—the fleet consisted of 14 ships of the line, 7 frigates, 11 steamers, and a considerable quantity of smaller vessels,—they carried in all 2,000 pieces." These are very large means of artillery, besides the advantage of a large arsenal.

Page 121.—"*L'opinion généralement admise sur la difficulté d'opérer une descente en forces considérables.*" Prince Menschikoff, admitting the difficulty generally entertained of a descent in force, feared that the Allies, to facilitate a sea attack, might land some small forces to take possession of some of the most advanced batteries on the coast,—as if such a thing were possible in face of such a garrison.

Page 122.—"*Nous ne pouvions abandonner la conviction que les Alliés ne sauraient se décider à débarquer en Crimée un corps considérable, et à le jeter ainsi imprudemment dans une contrée presque dénuée de ressources pour l'entretien d'une armée, et où l'eau potable elle-même ne se trouvait qu'en insuffisante quantité.*" Not so easy an enterprise then!

"*Cependant au commencement du printemps, le prince Menschikoff imprima une nouvelle activité aux travaux de fortification de terre, pour la défense du côté sud, n'ayant d'ailleurs en vue à ce moment comme pour le passé, que de garantir la ville contre une tentative de descente, opérée par un faible corps de troupes.*"

Here, then, are six months, with considerable means for a "*nouvelle activité*," to improve the land defences, and notedly on the south side, shewing that there was the favourable side for attack; and was it reasonable to expect a landing and attack on shore, against a powerful garrison and large fleet, by a "*faible corps de troupes?*"

1855. — Notes on Todleben's 'Défense de Sébastopol.'

Page 123. Guns from the fleet were landed early for arming the fortifications. In the middle of April, a battalion of Sappers arrived at Sebastopol, and was employed at the Fort du Nord. &c., &c.—that is, five months before the landing, and with, it is presumed, the large working parties that might have been given. The Fort du Nord had, therefore, not been neglected.

Pages 124 to 128 contain a description of the land-defences, including the Malakoff Tower.

Of 24-pounders and upwards, 145 guns were in battery on the land-defences on the south side, and independent of the north.

Altogether there is proof of a very respectable state of defences, when the Allies arrived before the place.

Page 140. All the troops in the Crimea in September, 1854 (when the Allies landed) *ne dépassaient pas* 51,500 men, and they were dispersed all over it. "*Il en résulte que le prince Menschikow ne pouvait concentrer dans les environs de Sébastopol plus de* 30,000"—and why not?—the distant parts required slight guarding,—the time occupied in landing the Allied Army, the telegraphs on the coast, &c., would have enabled a greater concentration by tolerable management; at all events, after the landing was declared, these 51,500 could all be made available for Sebastopol or the field; and there was a week from the time when the point of attack was defined, before the battle of the Alma.

Of these 51,500 troops, 2675 were cavalry, and 1264 cosaques, and there were 88 pieces of artillery, manned by 1702 gunners.

Page 141. "*En sus des troupes de terre, le prince Menschikoff avait à sa disposition la majeure partie de la flotte. Dans les équipages de la flotte, on comptait* 18,501 *men*, including 416 officers, 357 musicians, &c., and 2729 *matelots libres*," exclusive of the crews of the ships.

It is repeated several times that the Russians could not believe that the Allies would land in force in the Crimea, particularly at that late period of the year.

Page 156. He seems to consider the choice of the landing-place by the Allies judicious.

Page 177. The Russian force collected at Alma, was 33,600 men, and 97 guns.

1855.

Notes on Todleben's 'Défense de Sébastopol.'

Page 180. That the Allies decided on attacking the front and *both* flanks at Alma is hardly correct,—the British was essentially a front attack, and not "*pour tourner le flanc droit de la position.*"

Page 188. Of the French (at the Alma) he says, "*voulant éviter une lutte corps à corps, ils accueillirent notre attaque de la mitraille,*" &c. &c., an insinuation which, even if admissible when addressed to his own countrymen, becomes an idle braggadocio, when writing a history for the world; the same may be said of any attack where the assailants are repulsed before coming to the bayonet.

Page 233. He deems the north front quite assailable, taking it up piecemeal in a pettifogging way,—showing how this portion of its front was weak, and that afforded cover,—instead of the broad feature that it was a good position generally, of limited extent—flanks secure—entrenched with one established fort on the commanding ground, and thousands of men working night and day upon it, and defended by an army; and then, if the Allies succeeded, what did they gain?

Page 234. ". . . . . *il est certain que si, après la bataille de l'Alma, il eût marché immédiatement sur la position du Nord, il n'eût pas alors rencontré la moitié des ouvrages de défense qu'on eut le temps d'ériger depuis,*" &c. Here then is a confession that the works were worth something; and if we had so advanced, we should have found the whole army of Prince Menschikoff there.

Then, as regards the practicability of an immediate assault. Why leave 16,000 men in a place that could be so easily taken by a *coup de main?* and this number is exclusive of the troops on the north side, and all the sailors of the fleet.

On 30th September, the garrison was reinforced up to 24,000.

When, on the 10th October, the Russians found the French opening trenches, they were in ecstasies at not being attacked by a *coup de main;* that is, long after getting the above reinforcement, and with 21,230 sailors in addition.

On the 17th October, when the Allies opened their first fire, the garrison amounted to 32,000—an army! and that is exclusive of the sailors, who in the Russian service are all drilled as our Marines.

1868. At the period of the battle of Inkermann, the Russians had an army, including the garrison, of 100,000 men, exclusive of the sailors.

*Some general reflections on the Crimean War.*

Reflections on the Crimean war.

THE circumstance of no magazine belonging to a British battery of siege having been blown up, either in the Crimea, or the Peninsula, may be attributed in some measure to good fortune, because such a casualty must occasionally take place, notwithstanding the best arrangements; but even making every allowance for good fortune, it must have been chiefly owing to good construction by our engineers, and to the care and coolness of our artillerymen in the use of them.

Unjust reproaches have been lavished on the Turks for losing the redoubts (if redoubts they could be called) in front of Balaclava, on the 25th October. The Turks were at once condemned for cowardice on this occasion, and thus became completely out of favour; but where their conduct elsewhere had been so good, it would have been as well rather to look for causes for this failure, than to pass such sweeping censures.

*Inkermann.*—A great mistake was made in not following the retreating enemy, by *clouds* of skirmishers well supported, in spite of the enemy's covering artillery. Losses in such operations are not to be reckoned positively, but comparatively, and that of the Russians would have been far greater than ours, in this instance.

In the same battle, Sir George Cathcart's flank attack ought not to be condemned because it was repulsed by greatly superior numbers. Such flank attacks have a great moral effect, and force the enemy to keep considerable forces employed to resist them. They also are of much use in checking an advance, of which a good case in point was seen at the battle of Talavera.

I have always held a strong opinion upon the impolicy of so much time and means being given to strengthening the position on the heights, after the battle of Inkermann. The enemy had received a decided repulse, and all our strength should have been applied to offensive measures, instead of defensive ones, which more naturally are undertaken by the defeated party.

At Balaklava, on the 25th October, the Russians might have been attacked in general action with advantage. 1868.

J. F. B.

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"8, Gloucester Gardens, Hyde Park,
"London, 12th July, 1868.

"MY DEAR MARSHAL CANROBERT,

"I hope that you will allow me, as an old fellow campaigner, to appeal to one for whom I entertain the highest respect, for a testimony on some matters connected with the war in the Crimea. Letter to Marshal Canrobert.

"A continuation of its history by Mr. Kinglake, an author of considerable notoriety, has just been produced, after many years of travail, and is likely to revive many of the sharp censures and recriminations, that were prevalent and so much to be deplored, when the occurrences were recent in people's minds, and which I had earnestly hoped had died away.

"Mr. Kinglake has continued to adopt a number of what are in my mind, thorough fallacies on several of the military events. He is imbued with partialities towards some, and strong tendencies to censure others; and being a popular writer, is, unhappily, likely very much to mislead the public mind, unless his statements shall be in some degree controverted.

"Since the publication of his first volumes, he has had the Russian account of the war to refer to, and he adopts its views, in *toto*. According to him, all the performances of the garrison were in the highest degree creditable, while the conduct and judgment of the Allies were on many occasions quite otherwise; my own impression, however, is that each nation, Russian, French, and English, worked arduously and honourably; that there were no such great palpable errors committed by either, as it has been attempted to charge upon them: and that each army deserved well of its country.

"I now come to the point on which I most particularly desire to appeal to your kindness for a candid answer.

"Mr. Kinglake argues that the Allies ought, immediately upon their arrival before it, to have assaulted the south side of Sebastopol by a *coup de main;* that Lord Raglan proposed it, but was prevented from carrying it out by the refusal of the French generals, added to objections raised by me.

1868. Letter to Marshal Canrobert.

"The fact is, that as regards myself, no suggestion or idea of the kind ever came before me for an opinion; if it had, I should undoubtedly have opposed it in the most unqualified manner, as thoroughly unjustifiable; and I do not believe that Lord Raglan ever himself seriously entertained the idea.

"What I seek from you is, to be good enough to inform me whether, as a matter of *fact*, Lord Raglan ever made such a proposition to you; and whether, as a matter of *opinion*, you, or any officer of rank and repute with the French Army, at all advocated such a proceeding?

"Mr. Kinglake founds his opinion of the propriety of such an assault on depreciating passages in General Todleben's 'History,' expressive of the inadequate condition of the place, in troops, armaments, and works, even against an immediate assault,—passages which are utterly inconsistent with his own enumeration of the forces in the place, the vast resources of a great naval arsenal and dismantled fleet, and the exertions avowedly entered upon for months before, for its improvement, by thousands of workmen, on a peculiarly advantageous position.

"I would not venture, my dear Marshal, to give you this trouble, had I not reason to rely on your constant courtesies towards me.

"My dear Marshal Canrobert,

"Yours very sincerely,

"J. F. BURGOYNE, Field Marshal."

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"Paris, le 18 juillet 1868.

"MON CHER MARÉCHAL,

Letter from Marshal Canrobert.

"Après vous avoir remercié pour le bon souvenir que vous voulez bien me garder, et que je suis heureux de vous rendre, j'ai l'honneur de répondre à votre question.

"Non; Lord Raglan n'a jamais proposé au Général Canrobert de donner l'assaut à Sébastopol immédiatement après l'arrivée des Alliés devant cette place, et par conséquent le Général Sir J. Burgoyne n'a pas eu à appuyer de son avis, un refus que je n'ai pas été appelé à faire.

"Je saisis avec plaisir cette occasion, mon cher Maréchal,

pour vous adresser avec mes sentiments de haute considération, l'expression de mon affectueux dévouement. 1868.

Letter from Marshal Canrobert.

"Maréchal Canrobert.

"G. C. B.

"A Son Excellence le Maréchal Sir J. Burgoyne, à Londres."

*From* Major-General Arthur Taylor, Royal Artillery.

"Waterford, 15th August, 1868.

"My dear Sir John,

"I must write and tell you with what pleasure I read your letter in the *Times*. I have often been made angry by the oracular wisdom of our civilian instructors on this point, and but a day before leaving London, when Kinglake's No. 3 volume was triumphantly waved over me as shewing how right my opponents were, I said I did not care a bit, but was as convinced as ever that Lord Raglan never contemplated such a piece of 'head or tails' folly as an immediate assault.

"You will understand how satisfactory it was after this to find your letter to justify my convictions. I wish you had heard what I did when I accompanied Sir Colin Campbell to Berlin in 1856, to give the present King of Prussia the Grand Cross of the Bath.

"One of his visits of ceremony was to Baron Usedom, who had assembled a large party of generals to meet him, and a pretty severe cross-examination he underwent at their hands. He was required to give his own impressions of the first assault, and he also repeated a good deal of what Vinoy had told him (they were very intimate).

"When he concluded, Usedom looked round and said, 'Now I think I can shew Sir Colin Campbell something that will greatly interest him;' and opening a drawer, produced a piece of manuscript: 'this,' he said, 'is an extract of a letter written by Marshal Pelissier the day after the fall of the south side' (I think he said), 'and I should like to read it to you.'

"Now I can give the precise substance of it, and not far from the words: 'The man to whom we owe our success in

1868. the assault on the Malakoff is the Russian General Todleben, who by closing it to the rear, enabled me to hold it when we had once got possession of it.'

"How a man who showed so much intelligence in every other respect could have committed so grave an error, I am at a loss to understand; but I am credibly informed that, had the time permitted him to do so, it was his intention to have done the same by the Redan.[1]

"This I think is valuable as shewing the estimate formed by Pélissier of the comparative difficulties of the two works interiorly; of their external difficulties I should imagine there could be no question.

"My dear Sir John,

"Yours, &c.,

"A. TAYLOR."

*Rough Notes on* KINGLAKE'S 'Invasion of Crimea.'

Notes on Kinglake's 'Invasion of Crimea.'

IT is very unworthy of a history of a campaign or a battle, to fill it up with personal anecdotes, that from their very nature must be on very imperfect information, and in a tone manifestly to raise some, and decry others: a thousand circumstances may, and do happen in a field of battle that, taken abstractedly, or without full knowledge of details, may be most unjustly quoted to the disparagement of an officer. His regiment, or brigade, or division, has advanced a little more rapidly than the general line, or the latter may be obstructed by what did not affect him, and he makes a somewhat premature attack.

[1] In closing the Malakoff to the rear, General Todleben merely followed the practice of all Engineers, past or present, which consists in occupying the dominant points of entrenched lines, by enclosed works; the reason being, that if this is not done, the assailant may carry the key of the position from the flanks and rear, by columns sweeping round from the contiguous works, after the latter have been stormed—General Pélissier looked at the question from one point of view only,—as it affected the method of attack employed by him on the 8th of September, without considering that other projects of attack might have been equally successful under other circumstances;—and the discussion shows how easily the dictum of a successful general may injure the reputation of even the most eminent military engineer, with a public uninformed in military matters. —ED.

Again, the supporting body may be unexpectedly obstructed, or judiciously arrested for gaining order, or by some sudden demonstration of the enemy which may prevent its being brought up so early as otherwise would have been desirable. Many circumstances of these kinds will occur, without a fault anywhere, but which may so easily be worked out on paper and theoretically, as errors. So complicated and difficult are the affairs of war, where everything is to be decided in a moment and on uncertain data, that the merits of the greatest generals have been estimated by one of themselves, as those of the one who committed fewest errors. 1868. — Notes on Kinglake's 'Invasion of Crimea.'

Why, with the malicious feeling of decrying individuals, go into circumstances regarding them that have no reference to the war? In such a history as this professes to be, why harp upon the private character or previous days of St. Arnaud, &c.? Who could have borne a worse character than Julius Cæsar, but who would fill his pages on the war in Gaul with that?

Chapter III. on the influence of the press and the *Times*—clever.

If the author's exaggerated abuse and panegyrics had been omitted, and his diffusiveness in dissertation not duly bearing on the subjects—and want of military knowledge remedied—a very pretty history, with about half the writing, might have been the result.

Volume III. Chapter II. A pretty account of the action of Giurgevo on the Danube, and some very just remarks upon the propriety of endeavouring to organize and make use of the people of the seat of war when friendly, instead of despising them, as Lord Raglan is stated to have done with regard to the Turks, who constitute admirable materials for brilliant soldiers.

Terrible evils of an army of combined forces of different countries, and under independent generals.

I never could understand the grounds of the French Government, for placing Colonel Trochu in a position of such trust and influence.[1]

[1] Sir John looked upon Colonel Trochu as the evil genius of the whole expedition, and it is probable that Colonel Trochu returned the compliment. He was one of a class very common in the French army, who

1868. — Notes on Kinglake's 'Invasion of Crimea.'

Volume III. Page 16. On Marshal St. Arnaud's refusal "*to go on with the campaign* AS HITHERTO PLANNED."

So far as there was *any* plan then on the part of the French, it was an elaborate plan of a regular siege of the Severnaya Fort, drawn up at Varna by General Bizot, Commanding Engineer; and therefore, not, as implied, one for an assault at once.

Page 23. A whole tissue of errors and false reasoning respecting the North Fort. "*An octagon fort surrounded by a ditch and glacis,*" to which should be added, of permanent construction, with revetted escarps and counterscarps, and flanked ditches, "*being commanded and looked into from the ground by which the Allies might approach it,*" may in some degree have aided the Allies *in a siege*, but not as regarded a *coup de main*, which is here the question; "*that the fire of the French and English ships could be easily brought to bear upon it,*" is utter nonsense—it was on a height, and at some distance from the sea, with intervening forts on the shore, which were subsequently proved to be very powerful. "*That there were only twelve out of all the guns then arming the fort itself, which could be brought to bear on the approaches by which the Allies might advance:*" by "*the approaches*" was here clearly meant the approaches to the edge of the ditch; and where were the rest of the guns "*then arming the fort,*" but in the flanks, &c. round the fort, where they should be for the best defence—there is no emblem of weakness in this remark!

Page 24. "*Prince Menschikoff had deliberately renounced the idea of venturing his army in any encounter on the north of the roadstead,*"—therefore, it is argued that the Allies ought at once to have attacked it; but could any one, then or now, suppose it possible that he would commit so absurd, so pusillanimous an act.

It was not a question of venturing his army—for one quarter

obtain their positions on the Staff by passing high in the examinations of the military schools, and was considered the *beau idéal* of a staff-officer amongst the French. He was a complete theorist without any practical knowledge of war, but being esteemed to be high in the confidence of the French Emperor and Marshal Vaillant, possessed great influence at the French Head-quarters. I believe it was the example of Colonel Trochu which confirmed Sir John in his extreme dislike of examinations as tests for the military service.—ED.

1868.

Notes on Kinglake's 'Invasion of Crimea.'

of his army would have been ample to make the position impregnable against a *coup de main;* and in Chapter x. it is shewn clearly, that so far from being abandoned, it was most powerfully provided for.

To go on *seriatim* with the deceptive reasoning about attacking by a *coup de main* the north side or Severnaya.

Page 41. Mr. Kinglake has no right to talk so contemptuously of a "*two-gun battery*" recently thrown up, as if that were the only reason, having the effect of "*scaring the Allies from their purpose.*" Taking the whole position, powerful as it was by nature and art, and the means of the Russians into consideration, the French officers were thoroughly justified in objecting to an assault.

Todleben confesses to have had 1500 men at work during the preceding ten days, improving this narrow position, on the ridge of which was a considerable permanent work of old standing; nothing could be more derogatory to the Russian army, than to suppose it could be possibly taken in so summary a manner. One argument made use of is the inefficiency of its garrison in numbers, (though the 11,000 men confessed to is not bad for the frontage of 1760 yards) and quality; but in the event of such an attack, which must necessarily have been totally insulated, it is impossible to suppose they would not have plenty of troops, and of their best, to defend it.

Page 45. "*Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons had come to the same conclusion, that an attack on the north side was perfectly feasible, and ought to have been undertaken.*"—When did they come to that conclusion, and after what *reconnaissance*, and on what grounds? I doubt the fact altogether.

Page 45. "*The hindrances that stood in the way of the enterprise must have been as clearly apparent to the general officers while planning at Varna as now.*"—Certainly not. The place could hardly have been deteriorated, but might well be improved, as it actually was: and after all, what was the impression at Varna? Why, that this Severnaia would require a regular siege, for which an elaborate project was drawn up.

Page 48, Note at bottom.—"*Sir John Burgoyne argues on the ground, now known to have been unfounded, that the position was defended by an* ARMY."

1868. — Notes on Kinglake's 'Invasion of Crimea.'

I maintain still that there was an army in Sebastopol, confessedly by Todleben's own enumeration; and I could not then, nor can I now believe, that the Russians would not make use of it to resist any attack, particularly one that must have been made under such disadvantageous circumstances.

Page 67. "*Accordingly, on the morrow of the battle on the Alma, he*" (Lord Raglan) "*requested Sir John to put his opinion*" (for the flank march) "*in writing.*"

If *Lord Raglan's* opinion is meant, he certainly did no such thing: the opinion originated with myself, or if Lord Raglan or any one else had held the same before I promulgated it, nothing of the kind was ever intimated to me.

Page 75, Marginal Summary. "*Critical position of the Allies.*"—Page 76. "*Cause which brought the Allies into an imperilled state.*"—Page 77. "*Circumstances to which they owed their immunity.*"

How is all this—the Allied forces all being well together in the open field—to be reconciled with the censures on them for not undertaking the most desperate enterprises on account of the *depressed state of the enemy?*

Page 57. "*The plan now proposed*" (that is, the flank march) "*was nothing less than that in the presence of a Russian army, the Allies should break into a slender column, with a depth of many miles, and in that state defile, for two whole days or more, round the eastern side of Sebastopol.*"

Such was NOT the proposed plan—there was no necessity for so clumsy a way of moving the army.

There was nothing in the nature of the country, and in that fine season of the year, to prevent the Allies moving in as compact order as could possibly be necessary, and the composition of the army was particularly favourable for it; for its sick and wounded, and all incumbrances except what are immediately indispensable with a manœuvring army, were embarked to be conveyed round by sea; and all this in face of an enemy, who had been very recently defeated!

I see nothing whatever of a hazardous character in the flank march.

In this pretentious work which assumes to record great events, trifles quite unworthy of notice are harped upon, with

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Notes on Kinglake's 'Invasion of Crimea.'

prolonged dissertations and comments: such as how an advanced guard of very moderate strength pushes forward somewhat far from support, and on a sudden finds itself in presence of a body of the enemy! and what is more, the Commanding General, anxious to gain a knowledge of the country, happens to be with it.

Well! What is there so extraordinary or terrific in all this? In such case, what occurs? The party which happens to be the strongest, (though it cannot be aware of that till it takes time for observation) will scarcely think it necessary to waste its strength, by galloping over the country after some 20 or 30 men, without any definite object; while the weaker puts a good face on it, and without retiring, if not attacked, sends to the rear for support; and the game of the campaign goes on. Such circumstances will be frequent in all campaigns.

Or, a body of cavalry is ordered to proceed to a certain village named on the map. The village itself happens to be found to be at the bottom of a ravine, and the cavalry may be, therefore, for many hours in that awfully perilous position!

In a country new to the party, the village is named clearly to designate about the direction and distance that the general wishes the cavalry to be, and it is for its commanding officer to look to taking up the ground properly, and to his security; and no doubt he did so. But after all, nothing occurred in consequence, and however a lesson might be drawn from such a circumstance in an elementary military work, it is quite superfluous in the history of a great war, on which it has no influence whatever!

Kinglake is so diffuse, and enters into so many details, accompanied by very fallacious reasonings, that the refutation of them all must necessarily be very diffuse also.

Page 59. "*To avoid the attack of the Star Fort, the weakness of which was known, and go off to confront things unknown,*" &c. The weakness of the Star Fort as an insulated work *per se*, did not prevent *the position* being most formidable, and we know well that the south was not provided with *any* permanent work except the Malakoff Tower.

Page 68. The note at the bottom of the page, assuming Sir John Fox Burgoyne's reasoning to be incorrect, is quite

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unsound itself. Sir J. F. Burgoyne's position is, that even if Fort Severnaia was taken, the garrison would not lose its communication with the country; and certainly that would have been so, because to the last the Allies never had sufficient force to complete the investment of the place. Throughout, it is by no means clear what the advocates of the assault on the Star Fort would have done afterwards, even if they had succeeded in taking it; there is a sort of vague implication that it involved the fall of the place, whereas it would have been only the capture of an outwork, on a side on which no further progress could be made.

Page 107. Extraordinary discrepancies of the author.—After alluding to Lord Raglan virtually having the leadership of the flank march, he says, "*The effect of the change showed itself in the speed and the firmness with which it was executed,*" and this, after a fallacious showing of all sorts of assumed mistakes and mismanagement in details.

In all services, the seamen of men-of-war are drilled more or less to soldier exercises, but in that of Russia, it is carried to a greater extent than in others; in confirmation of this, it is believed that the Russians have no corps of Marines, the sailors being equal to do their duties; so that the embodied seamen of the fleet at Sebastopol, for the service of the garrison during a siege, where there could be no occasion for refined manœuvres in the field, were in fact perfectly efficient troops.

This is acknowledged in page 128; and in pages 129, 130 and 131, &c., distinct resources to a vast extent are enumerated.

Chapter IX. commences by describing how the Allies, by taking possession of some road, might have cut off the communication of the Russians with the interior, as if there were no other ways out; but at length, apparently tired of commenting on the weakness of the enemy, and the brilliant feats, (such as taking the Severnaia, the strongest side of the place, by a *coup de main*, and so cutting off the communication with the interior) open to the Allies, the author now shews how Menschikoff, by delaying on the road near Mackenzie's Farm, might have cut the Allies to pieces. In short, if Mr. Kinglake had only been the general on either side, the other would not have had a chance! but the whole of his arguments on both sides are thoroughly fallacious.

Chapter x. After a warm eulogium of Todleben, which nobody will dispute, the effects of the flank march are referred to; it was perceived it seems from a lofty building, and (page 188) it is observed that "*It followed that the Severnaya which before had been regarded as doomed, was now safe, and that the danger had all at once shifted from the north to the south side of the place;*" and then comes the terrible circumstances of the small garrison on that side: as if the Severnaya at which *it would now appear* a large force was posted, and very properly, at the time, were 40 or 50 miles off, instead of being merely *across the harbour*, and the troops could be transferred from one to the other, as stated in page 130, "*in half an hour.*" 1868. — Notes on Kinglake's 'Invasion of Crimea.'

And here again we are struck by the inconsistency, that the north, stated previously, to enforce the argument, that the Allies ought to have assaulted, as being unprovided and abandoned to its fate, *now* turns out to have the most powerful part of the garrison in it! and the south now threatened is in despair at being so weak; and because the two commands had been made independent of one another, and that Admiral Korniloff, who was in command of the Severnaya, *might* have refused to send any reinforcements to the south, notwithstanding that the Allies had abandoned his side. As a matter of course he did otherwise, and it is almost childish to pass a high encomium upon him for so acting.

Korniloff was no doubt a fine energetic fellow; and not only detached the great bulk of his force from the north to the south, but accompanied them himself; and was placed by the other two independent authorities, (for there was a general in distinct command of the army), in chief command of the whole garrison.

Pages 195 and following, are devoted to the consideration of the defence of the south side. The same efforts to diminish the available forces and resources of the garrison; the number of men reduced to what happened to be posted within given limits, without reference to others, that were perfectly available, Mr. Kinglake himself calls the garrison (pages 226 and 227) 25,000 men, and surely in such a position, that is emphatically an army; the length of line assumed to be open to attack, without reference to the much smaller limits which the Allies had the power to invest with their force, and consequently

1868. — Notes on Kinglake's 'Invasion of Crimea.'

really threaten; the boasted (as it may be called) want of works on the line of defence, after an acknowledgment of having had for many months, thousands of men engaged upon them; and no reference made to the advantages of the garrison in having to defend distinct ridges with favourable undulations for their occupation, the intercommunication between them being, as they got nearer to the shore, low and comparatively easy; while to the Allies, they were in deep ravines difficult to traverse; no reference to all the available resources in having artillery from the fleet, while the Allies could have then nothing but a few light guns of field artillery. But they either did not see all these advantages, or wished to blind the world to them, to enhance their own merits and heroism; and all their assertions are adopted by Mr. Kinglake and some others, in their ungenerous efforts to deny the merits of their own countrymen.

Page 236. It is stated in one part, (in reference to the immediate assault of the place) that Sir J. Burgoyne supported his opinion against it, by "*arguing that an immediate assault would cost the Allies a loss of* 500 *men!*" As if I could have advanced such an absurdity! At a loss of 5000 men, a *successful* assault would have been cheap; the question was not as to loss, but to the chances of *success.*[1]

In one part, Mr. Kinglake insinuates that Sir George Brown's opposition to a proposed measure, was *because* it had been suggested by Sir John Burgoyne, and "*that he disliked the sensation of being directed and propelled by an officer of engineers.*" Now the fact was that Sir George Brown was on the most friendly terms, and complimentary courtesy to Sir John Burgoyne personally, and certainly was not the man to oppose measures, merely because they were advanced by any particular individual or class.

Over and over again as the story progresses, the author recurs to the great error which he attributes to the Allies, in not having at once stormed the place; how it had been (note on page 333) "*lying at the mercy of the Allies,*" &c., before "*the moral strength of the Russian troops lost at the Alma, had been restored,*" &c. (page 343); and this reasoning he justifies, not by *facts*, but altogether by quoting the unreasonable or politic sentiments of

[1] The last assault on Badajoz cost us 3000 men.—Ed.

despondency as to their state, expressed in some of their own writings; and which, if really felt, were quite unworthy of them, considering the real relative position and powers of the two parties.

From pages 245 to 259 are devoted to Mr. Kinglake's reasoning against the opinion of Sir John Burgoyne as to the impropriety of assaulting Sebastopol at once, when the Allies came before it.

Very many of his arguments are merely a repetition of an assertion by one, against that of another, on which both may maintain their opinions; such as whether 25,000 men to defend one line of positions of a given extent, can be called an army, or considered like the ordinary garrison of a fortress; whether the Russian seamen of their men-of-war are to be deemed a sufficient armed force for defence in such positions; whether the nature of the position, in bold ridges with deep ravines, following by an undulating surface down to the shore, was in favour of the attacking or defensive body, &c.; but there are still some points raised that may require further reasoning upon.

One objection (page 246) is, that there is no reason in the argument against the assault, on account of having no retreat in case of a repulse, because that was inherent in the entire expedition, the battle of the Alma, &c.; but the difference is great. At the Alma, the Allies had a fair field, and a superiority of numbers, and properly, and indeed necessarily made an attack and as great an impression as they could; whereas when they had faced the place itself, the difficulties and chances of failure were much greater, and they had a choice in the course of proceeding.

Then again, as regards the presumption on the part of the Allies as to the probable force of the garrison, independent of what could be *actually* observed. Certainly, fully aware as the commander of the Russian forces must have been, that the great aim of the Allies was the capture of Sebastopol; could it be supposed but that his primary consideration would be to leave a garrison on which he could depend, for its security against any very rapid attack; and that he would have taken away with him what would be unnecessary for that purpose, but would

1868. form a basis for an army in the field which could be subsequently added to, and act with much greater effect on the rear than by sorties from the place on their front, and that was the line he took.

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Page 251. The Allies were not to suppose that the industrious labour that they perceived on the part of the garrison, was to enable it to give them a "*warm reception*," but *might be to deter them from assaulting at once by a show of energy and resolution*; and this is given as one of the reasons for immediate assault.

Then comes a long list of the inconveniences that must be the result of the delay, which may be admitted, but is beside the question, which is, whether the probability of success would justify it or not? Among the inconveniences enumerated is, that the Russians would be more rapidly and effectually reinforced than the Allies, the "*soundness of which*," it is added in a note, "*was proved by the results*. Now in this, the result proved quite the contrary; for the effort at Inkermann and every other by the Russians, was unequal to prevent the capture of the place; and it is somewhat curious after treating of the vigour and great power of the Allies, as compared with the poor, weak, demoralised garrison, in justification of the assault; we have here (page 255), a passage in which the former are spoken of as "*having at disposal a few weary and too often sickly men*," as compared with "*the thousands of strong healthy sailors, and bands of dock labourers, all well supplied with good clothing and shelter*," and in the way of guns and appliances, a similar advantage.

Page 264, and eight or ten succeeding pages, are full of comments upon General Canrobert's refusal to concur with Lord Raglan's proposition to make the assault; and we have it in direct terms, from Canrobert himself, that Lord Raglan never made such a proposition to him at all: and I always fully believed that such was the fact.

In Chapter XII. are again, comments upon the advantages that would have been gained by the Allies, by taking the place by assault at once, which are quite unnecessary; the same might be advanced in treating of any siege or enterprise against any stronghold,—the only question is that of the *practicability*

of such a course,—the probabilities and relative results of the attempt. 1868.

Notes on Kinglake's 'Invasion of Crimea.'

We have then, again, enforced upon us the matter of the error committed by the Allies, in not taking up a position at Mackenzie's Farm, and thus cutting off all communication between the place and the country, which it is assumed would have been attended with striking effects—and here we may remark, *en passant*, on the inconsistency, after bitter censures on the flank march altogether as a whole, a desire to shew how it might have had such a striking effect:—but the argument itself is unsound. The road by Mackenzie's Farm was undoubtedly the main road of communication from Sebastopol into the interior, but it was not the only one: there was still the route from the north to the Belbec, the Alma, and Eupatoria, &c. That by which the approach was actually made, and all the country to the south between Mackenzie's Farm and the sea for a great extent, was perfectly practicable.

There can be no doubt but that *had the Allies been strong enough*, an army of observation stationed about Mackenzie's Farm, in addition to the forces required for the reduction of the place, would have been a very appropriate measure, but to have placed one there, under the circumstances, would have been to paralyse every effort against the place, and to have jeopardised the very safety of that body itself.

Among the disadvantages adverted to in my letter in the *Times* of August, 1868, is that great one of the divided command, consequent on a combined force of different nations; but there is to be added to that, where the action of army and navy is closely connected, the disadvantage of the independent commands of those two services, even though belonging to the same nation, which however well disposed may be the commanders of each, and however harmoniously they may act together, must necessarily give rise to the necessity for discussions, delays, and occasionally misunderstandings.

In many, perhaps most, foreign services, a supreme chief commands both army and navy: in the British service this is never admitted; the utmost that can be attempted is full control by the naval commanders over all that is afloat, the propriety of which is clear and undisputed; and a similar pre-

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rogative by the army over land or sea forces serving on shore, to which, however, when it affects them, the naval officers will sometimes demur.

There is not a doubt but that the garrison of Sebastopol, from the first to the last, had ample means to make a brilliant defence against the power of the Allies, although the Russians have thought it worth their while to raise capital by endeavours to shew that it was otherwise; and our English historian, Kinglake, has been so ungenerous as to support them in this false reasoning.

If they really believed that they were on all occasions in such desperate circumstances, it only shews how men who are *physically* brave, as the Russians undoubtedly are, can be *morally* without a proper degree of confidence.

They are thus described by Mr. Kinglake as on all occasions in despair at their position, and thinking that the Allies were about to eat them up, but resolved heroically to die at their posts, while really they had the power in their hands, which they exerted, to make a very good fight.

The kind of *moral* courage here alluded to is of the greatest value, and is one of the most essential qualities found in all the generals and admirals in command who have performed great actions, and may be illustrated by the words of Sir John Stuart, who—when in command in Sicily with a very moderate force, and threatened by a formidable French army on the opposite coast of Calabria, being warned by some of his officers of the many disadvantages under which he laboured—said that he was quite aware of them, but, he added, he could also see many disadvantages that his enemy had to contend with! This is what those who have not similar energy never think of, but always magnify, in their own conceptions, the facilities and means of the enemy! J. F. B.

These notes on Todleben's and Kinglake's histories were written when Sir John Burgoyne was upwards of 86 years of age.

## CLOSE OF THE RUSSIAN WAR.

THE Crimean campaign will be ranked hereafter as one of the greatest military enterprises on record. In the great continental wars of Europe, it is comparatively easy to march large bodies of men across a neighbouring frontier, supported by great trunk lines of railway, and operating in the most productive regions of the world. In the Crimean war, the forces employed were transported 3000 miles by sea, landed in a desolate and remote corner of a country totally destitute of resources; maintained throughout two winters by supplies conveyed by sea; and yet finally succeeded in reducing to submission the greatest military power of the age. 1856.

In an undertaking of the arduous and hazardous nature of the Crimean campaign, a single fault of strategy, or even a serious check to the operations, must have entailed the loss of the armies engaged; and operations of this character, which were successfully carried out to completion without any misadventure of importance, must have been directed by more than usual military skill and prudence.

The generals and staff of the French army consisted of a number of young men, who had risen to their posts mainly by an active support of a new dynasty; they had seen nothing of war on a large scale, their only knowledge of military operations being derived from the desultory warfare in Algeria, against semi-barbarous

1856. tribes. This disadvantage was so strongly felt in their own army at the period when orders arrived for the invasion of the Crimea, that it was not uncommon to hear French officers openly state their opinions that they had no confidence in their generals or superior staff, for the direction of such an operation, but that they placed their dependence on the generals of the English army, who had seen war on a large scale.

It is now known, from authentic sources, that the whole Russian army of Bessarabia was in full march for the Crimea, four days before the battle of the Alma was fought, the infantry being conveyed in wheeled carriages, in order to expedite their arrival as much as possible; and when the unexpected strength of the Russian position before Sebastopol caused the first check in the operations of the Allies, and gave time to the Russians to bring up their reserves from all parts of their empire, the situation of the Allied forces became very critical, and would have proved disastrous, had it not been for the strength of the ground on which they were encamped.

This feature of the country had been pointed out to the Allied commanders by Sir John Burgoyne, in his memorandum of the 21st September, where he recommends the flank march. He states:—

"There is every reason to believe, from the appearance of the maps, and from what may be expected to be the formation of the ground, that there is a very strong position between the sea at Balaclava and along the valley of the Tchernaya, that would most efficiently cover the Allied armies during the operation, but is too extensive to be taken up by the garrison."

At the date of the battle of Inkermann, the Russian troops in the Crimea exceeded 100,000 men; those of

the Allies, at the same period, amounting to little over 60,000. If the latter force had been detained up to this date on the north side of the great harbour, occupying the faulty position extending from the Belbec to the Alma, it is hardly possible to exaggerate the difficulties in which they would have been placed.[1] Nor would these difficulties have been much lessened by the early capture of the northern forts; for subsequent events shewed conclusively that the fall of these forts would not have entailed that of the works on the south side of the harbour, the Allies having occupied the town without hindrance, after the 8th September, 1855. 1856.

In order to capture the arsenal therefore, the Allies must have made a difficult flank march in presence of an enemy, who in the mean time would have received large reinforcements, and recovered from his defeat on the Alma; and who, divining the intention of the Allies, no other course being then open to them, would have made preparations to obstruct the movement. Nor is it easy to understand how any garrison left behind in the north forts, could have been supplied with provisions from any point nearer than the embouchure of the Belbec; and this would have entailed the occupation of the ridge between the Belbec and the Katcha, after the capture of the North forts, in order to cover the only landing-place for the purpose—an undertaking far beyond the means of the Allies, if operations were attempted at the same time against the south.

These considerations would probably have set to rest

[1] The ridge between the Alma and the Katcha must have been occupied, in order to cover the landing of supplies at the mouth of the latter river,—the embouchure of the Belbec being under fire of the Russian works. And if the Allies had been detained so long in this position, a very probable contingency, Sir John Burgoyne considered their communications with the fleet would have been interrupted.

1856. the controversy respecting the advisability of making the northern forts the point of attack, had not the Russian Prince Gortchakoff enunciated an opinion that the Allies committed an error in abandoning their position on the north side of the harbour; but the military critics who have adopted these views of the Russian commander, have not given their readers the grounds on which they were based, beyond quoting the argument that the Allies, by remaining on the north side, would have intercepted the main road of communication into the place from the interior. As other means of communication would have been open to the enemy, this is obviously no answer to Sir John Burgoyne's query, "If we had taken the north fort, what should we have gained by it?" and it is probable that Prince Gortchakoff's argument, if more fully stated, would have been, that the Allies by moving to the south, relinquished the military key of the country. This would be valid criticism, if the object of the enterprise had been the conquest of the Crimea, and is so far in accord with Sir John Burgoyne's views that the latter always held the opinion that, had the means of the Allies in men and transport been sufficient for the purpose, the Russian army should have been followed up and dispersed before any operations were undertaken against Sebastopol; but such extensive military operations were not within the scope or means of the allied expedition, which was limited by its nature and the season of the year, to the rapid capture of the Russian arsenal by a *coup de main*, or if this should be found impracticable, by means of a short siege operation or *attaque brusquée*.[1] The enemy, however, was found to be too strongly posted to be dis-

[1] Owing to the poverty of our military vocabulary, it is necessary to describe both these operations by French words.

lodged by these means, and the original undertaking proved abortive; but this failure, owing to the Allies having, on the advice of Sir John Burgoyne, taken possession of the strong position above the Tchernaya, was not in its ultimate effect detrimental to their cause, for the efforts made to relieve the place crippled the military resources of the enemy, and the barrier thus opposed to the force of Russia, shattered the armies of her colossal empire as the breakwater dashes to pieces the billows of the mighty ocean. 1856.

The point however which has been most debated is whether the Allies could have stormed the Russian works on the south side of the place, on first coming before them. The Russian general of engineers states they could have done so, and founds this opinion on the insufficiency of the defences, and the discouragement of the Russian officers and troops; but even General Todleben appears to limit the period during which the place was open to assault, to the short interval which elapsed before the garrison of the north forts was ferried over by the steamers to the south side, *i. e.*, to the period of time actually consumed by the Allies in their flank march, and before a new base of operations had been established. Certainly, no general would have been justified in attempting so formidable an enterprise under such circumstances, even if the division of the army into independent commands had not rendered any such sudden energetic resolution impracticable.

In the arguments employed respecting the insufficiency of the defences, an important consideration is overlooked by most critics, in the well-known fact that where large forces are operating against each other, it is not an uncommon occurrence for an army to take up a position, which without any aid from entrenchments, is adjudged

1856. to be unassailable; it is not therefore sufficient to point to the defects of works of defence on a given line, and assume from this fact alone that an enemy's position can be stormed by an attack in open force; the ablest generals have found it necessary, at times, to renounce a direct front attack upon such positions, and to dislodge the army opposed to them by a flank movement, threatening its communications. There is ample evidence of great inherent strength in the Russian position at Sebastopol, and their flanks and communications were safe from molestation.

The question as to whether an enemy's position is assailable in front by open force, is one essentially of opinion and experience, and of all the officers engaged in the operations on either side, none could have had the experience bearing on this point, of Sir John Burgoyne. He had taken a part himself in ten assaults of fortresses, or of intrenched positions; and to use his own words, "I have known many military operations much more easy than this fail, and I have never known anything approaching to it in difficulty to succeed." Nor would his opinion have been liable to be biassed by personal considerations, for as the acknowledged author of the flank march, it was his interest that the Allies should have pushed into the place at once; he had in fact everything to gain and nothing to lose by such an attempt, for the responsibility of failure would have fallen on the Allied commanders.

It will be seen from the correspondence which has preceded that, partly owing to the division of the Allied forces into independent commands, and partly to his long experience of war, and the consequent deference paid to his opinions, Sir John Burgoyne held, in many respects, the same position during the Crimean cam-

paign, which Count Moltke occupied with the Prussian head-quarters during the late war; but there was this essential difference in their stations, that Count Moltke, acting under the immediate orders of his own sovereign, held a plainly defined position as head of the staff of an homogeneous force; and his sovereign, raised by his rank above personal considerations, could give him publicly the credit due to him as his military adviser; whereas the services of Sir John Burgoyne in a somewhat similar capacity, although liberally acknowledged by Lord Raglan, were never known to his own countrymen; and while his secondary position in the eyes of the world prevented him from obtaining any public appreciation or applause, the French commander-in-chief, on the first symptom of disaster or difficulty, threw on him the blame of failure, and the English ministers, following suit, cast a public slur on his military reputation, by recalling him from the seat of war at a most important juncture. Without the prestige of command or credit of success, the responsibility of failure was thus thrown upon his shoulders: it was a heavy burthen to bear; but the old soldier had been brought up in a school of self-abnegation and loyalty, and sacrificing his personal feelings to public exigencies, never allowed a word of complaint or remonstrance to escape him. 1856.

The events of the war which succeeded his recall, and the final result of the attack on Sebastopol, had so completely vindicated his military judgment, that Ministers felt themselves constrained to make some reparation to him for the mode in which he had been treated. Difficulties, however, presented themselves, in the dissatisfaction felt in this country at the failure of the English assault on the Redan; a failure which, occurring simultaneously with the striking success of the French against

1856. the Malakoff Tower, had seriously compromised the honour of the English arms.

The discontent of the English public at this juncture, was reflected in Parliament and the press; the debates had, at no period of the war, been so acrimonious as during the early part of the session of 1856; and Ministers considered that it would be inadvisable to ask Parliament for any pensions, as rewards for services rendered during the Crimean war.

These circumstances created much difficulty in adequately rewarding Sir John Burgoyne. He had been a Grand Cross of the Bath for many years, and he had consequently, up to this time, received no distinction, or mark of approbation whatever, from his own sovereign for his services in the Russian war; but after some indirect negotiations on the part of the War Minister to discover whether he would accept the distinction, he was offered a baronetcy by Lord Panmure.

It has already been shewn that junior officers of engineers to himself had been created baronets for the Peninsula campaign, nor can this distinction be considered as any promotion in the case of an officer who possesses the broad ribbon of the Bath; but Sir John himself did not care whether he was called a baronet or a duke, so long as some public acknowledgment of his services was made on this occasion; and he felt that the dignity, being hereditary, might be of service to his only son, a young officer then in his twenty-third year, who having distinguished himself early in the naval service, had been decorated with the Victoria Cross, and begun a career carrying with it the promise of a brilliant future.

"Belgrave Square, 30th January, 1856. 1856.

"My dear Sir John,

Offer of a baronetcy.

"It affords me much pleasure to inform you that in consideration of your long and faithful services to the Crown, and which were latterly performed with such important results in the Crimea, the Queen has been graciously pleased to signify her will and pleasure to bestow on you and your heirs the dignity of a baronet.

"You will value this mark of your Sovereign's favour more as a recognition of your services than in any other light, and as such it affords me personally the greatest satisfaction to be the channel through which Her Majesty's pleasure is made known to you. On your signifying to me your acceptance of Her Majesty's most gracious offer, I will take steps to have your patent prepared.

"I am, &c.,

"Panmure."

"War Department, Pall Mall,
"30th January, 1856.

"My dear Lord Panmure,

"I lose no time in expressing to your Lordship, and through you to Her Majesty, my most grateful acknowledgment for the honour of the Baronetcy which she has been graciously pleased to offer to me.

"I accept it, with feelings of peculiar satisfaction, as a distinguished mark of Her Majesty's approval of my zealous but humble services.

"Your Lordship will, I hope, allow me to add how much I am flattered by the part your Lordship must have taken in this high compliment paid to me.

"I remain, &c.,

"J. F. Burgoyne."

"Horse Guards, 9th February, 1856.

"My dear Burgoyne,

"My many occupations have prevented my congratulating you, hitherto, on the honour the Queen has been pleased

1856. to confer upon you, in testimony of your long and honourable services, and of the last labours you underwent for your country, when you went out without a moment's delay to the seat of war. Your counsels would, in all probability, if earlier followed, have ensured the capture of the key of the enemy's position, which your eye had from the first detected.

Offer of a baronetcy.

"Believe me, &c.,

"HARDINGE."

A few days after the receipt of Lord Panmure's letter, Sir John Burgoyne thus announces his proposed distinction to Sir John Montagu Burgoyne, of Sutton, the head of the Burgoyne family.

"War Department, Pall Mall,
"4th February, 1856.

"MY DEAR BURGOYNE,

"Lord Panmure has announced to me Her Majesty's intention to confer on me the dignity of a Baronet, an honor entirely unsolicited by me. The notification is chiefly valuable as an avowal of what they are pleased to consider my services, among which that in the Crimea is specifically mentioned in his Lordship's letter, thus doing away with an impression I had before entertained that nothing of the kind was acknowledged.

"I am certain of *your* friendly feeling on this as on any matter that interests me, and I can assure you that there is no desire on my part to encroach upon your superior station as the head of *the old illustrious family of the Burgoynes.*

"Yours very faithfully,

"J. F. BURGOYNE."

The reply to this letter is not forthcoming, but the mode in which it was received may be judged from a subsequent letter, in which Sir John describes a meeting with Sir John Montagu Burgoyne at the United Service Club.

"8, Gloucester Gardens, 13th February, 1856.

"Of all my friends on this occasion decidedly the most warm, and delighted about it, is Sir John Burgoyne. I met him

yesterday at the Club, and when I mentioned the matter of *the Arms*, he shouted at an idea of objection or difficulty; told me to be particular about the *Talbot*;[1] that there were but two families who had that particular Talbot—one, Palmers, and the other, Burgoynes;—said he would try and find a copy that was drawn and emblazoned by the Dowager Lady Burgoyne, who was said to draw beautifully, and if he could, would lend it to me. He is one certainly of most kindly feelings; and talked of the *honor* and pride they all felt in me." 1856. —

In reply to a letter from Mr. Bentley, the well-known publisher, urging him to write a history of the Crimean campaign, whilst the events were fresh in his memory, he writes:—

*To* RICHARD BENTLEY, Esq.

"8th February, 1856.

"MY DEAR SIR,

"I am very grateful for your congratulations on the honour that is promised to me, and I feel them to be a great compliment from one of your intelligence and influence in the world. The distinction is chiefly of value by the flattering manner in which the announcement was conveyed to me by Lord Panmure, as what was due to me, for what he was pleased to term my services in the Crimea and elsewhere.

"To write on military events in the Crimea, as you kindly urge upon me, would require more leisure than I can give it; and I feel that I could not express my own sentiments and judgment on many occurrences, without offending private feelings, and perhaps public interests, in a manner that would bring me into collision with persons and parties for whom I entertain great respect, and entail on me more embarrassments than I feel inclined to encounter just now.

"My dear Sir,

"Yours faithfully,

"J. F. BURGOYNE."

[1] The heraldic cognizance of the Burgoyne family.—ED.

## NATIONAL DEFENCES.

### 1856 TO 1868.

1856. DURING the Russian war, Mr. Brunel, the eminent civil engineer, had brought under the notice of Lord Palmerston some ingenious and novel ideas for a gunboat covered with armour plating, to be propelled by jets of water, and the Premier had referred him to Sir John Burgoyne for an opinion on the project. On the 29th December, 1855, Sir John writes to Lord Palmerston:—

"I had yesterday a long interview with Mr. Brunel on the subject of the proposed gunboat. I think it far the best thing of the kind that has come under my notice, and having no reason to doubt the calculations which he says he has made as to weight, buoyancy, draught of water, &c., I am very much impressed with the idea that it might be very effective for many services.

"There are, however, some great difficulties in proceeding with it, arising from his thorough independence, which rather requires that he should be courted, than merely given permission to work out his plans, and his great dislike to negotiate with the authorities of the Admiralty, whose judgment it is presumed, must be consulted on such a matter."

The invention appears to have been rejected by the Admiralty, and in reply to a letter of thanks from Mr. Brunel, in which the writer describes Sir John as "*the*

*first professional man of high official rank he had met with, ready to assume the possibility of a man who is neither R.E. nor R.N. having an idea worth attending to,"* the latter writes:— 1856.

"My dear Mr. Brunel,

"Your interesting letter to me has too long remained unanswered, but I have been out of town, and your own frequently intense occupations will suggest excuses for occasional delays in following up matters in which we may feel a deep interest. Military and civil engineers.

"You do me justice in conceiving that I am alive to the very great advantages we might derive, in the naval and military, engineering, and artillery branches, if we could obtain the *studied* ideas of men of eminence in civil professions: the latter are much the most experienced in the application of the far greater part of the machines and contrivances with which we have to deal, but there are many reasons why we do not obtain this in operation,—which would be so desirable.

"First, there is our own jealousy, pride, and conceit, of which you all complain, and with much reason, originating in a false idea that we should be admitting a culpable want of knowledge in our own business by obtaining assistance from others; then another false conception, that because in all these things there are certain military considerations involved, of which civilians must be comparatively ignorant, therefore it is only a military man can devise them, whereas it is generally much more easy for us to make you masters of the military conditions, than to obtain from you what is necessary for the rest.

"At the same time, there is usually great fault on the side of the civilian projectors; they put us down for a set of ignoramuses, and do not admit that there can be any military considerations that can be of the least consequence, or that they do not know by intuition. Hence the most outrageous propositions, which the projectors, however, cling to with pertinacity, and call us bigots, narrow-minded, and fools, because we will not adopt them. You can have no idea of the quantity of wild and undigested propositions that are made to

1856. — Military and civil engineers.

us. I can assure you that the fall of Sebastopol was quite a relief to me personally, by putting an end to the continuous stream of projects for 'taking Sebastopol at once,' with which I was inundated,—a great many by mining, either to blow up the whole place, or to pop out by an opening into some sly corner of it; several by different appliances of balloons; one for carrying on an enormous embankment, such as you make in railways, to walk over forts, batteries, valleys, and houses, &c.

"The fact is, a sudden thought strikes a man, and he considers the matter settled, without taking the trouble to study and analyse it; and even men who may be very able in their own line, fail in that way.

"If we could get clever men to set their minds to the improvement of objects connected with our services, who would not jump at once at conclusions, but would listen to observations that *we* could make from essentially military experience, and would then take the trouble to consider the subject in its different bearings, we ought to (and I for one always would) make great efforts to court such assistance as of the greatest value.

"I believe this to be quite the case with you; that you have formed some valuable ideas, and are quite inclined to take into consideration, for working them out, all the data that can be given on points with which it may not be within your power to be otherwise acquainted; and I wish your propositions were more in my own particular line, that I might at least have them fully put to the test."

Experiments on the employment of iron for embrasures.

In July, 1856, Sir John proposed to Lord Panmure that a systematic series of experiments should be made, with a view of discovering the best method of employing iron for the protection of the embrasures of batteries. His memorandum states:—

"It having been proved, by experiment, that certain combinations of thick iron plate and timber will afford such resistance to shot, as to lead to the construction of floating batteries so covered; I would submit that it would be very desirable that the Select Committee at Woolwich should

ascertain, by trial, how a similar system might be best adapted to the parapets of batteries on shore, where they might be particularly useful in batteries against shipping, for the external openings for the guns; and by giving the cover at those parts the least degree of thickness, enabling the muzzle of the piece to be more protruded, and the external opening to be of smaller dimensions. 1856. — Experiments on the employment of iron for embrasures.

"As weight, and some other considerations which must be attended to in the vessels, will not affect the constructions for the land batteries, a greater amount of resistance may be sought for in these trials."

At the same time he drew up a paper, in the form of a circular, to several eminent ironmasters and civil engineers, explaining the required object. These documents, and the replies to them, were afterwards printed at the War Office, and distributed amongst the members of the Ordnance Select Committee; and from the data thus obtained, a series of experiments were set on foot, which have resulted in placing this country far in advance of others in the application of iron to the protection of works on shore. Among the replies received by Sir John on this occasion, was one from Mr. Brunel, which is worth quoting:—

"August 29, 1856.

"My dear Sir John,

"The experiments you propose are certainly exactly those which ought to be tried, and I shall feel in some degree compensated for the something more than disappointment I felt at my proposal being burked, if I can now in any way forward yours. I have thought a good deal over this particular mode of protecting guns for sea defences, and have endeavoured to learn what have really been the results of the experiments that were made. You are aware, probably, that we—the English—have made some similar experiments.[1] Sir Baldwin Walker showed me, in strict confidence at that time, the drawings and reports Letter from Mr. Brunel.

[1] Up to this time, the experiments had been confined to iron backed with wood, for the protection of ships.—Ed.

1856. of these experiments, which corresponded pretty nearly with what you cite as the French results.

Letter from Mr. Brunel.

"My impression, derived from these and other experiments, was rather that a mass and weight in the piece struck, *proportionate* to the mass and weight of the piece striking, was essential, and that very probably large plates would be found necessary; but that smaller but thicker lumps would be found the cheapest and easiest way of protecting a surface, the embrasure, or mouth-piece, being, however, a thick plate with a hole in it, unless when you can oppose any *oblique* surface to the shot. I doubt the advantage of the wood backing, for reasons which I should like to explain to you.

"As to the thickness or the nature of the iron or other material, wrought-iron I believe will be found the best. Rough and unscientific as it may seem, I am strongly of opinion that almost blind experiment is the only course. We are too ignorant to have any science in the question, although, of course, the experiments may be more or less sensibly conducted. There are two or three manufacturers who can best turn out large thick plates of wrought-iron. I would not begin with anything less than 8 inches thick, certainly not less than 6 inches, and say 4 feet square, weighing 2 to 2½ tons each.

"The experiments have hitherto been all made with things that they ought to have known must break, and have proved no more than throwing stones at a window would prove.

"I would also strongly advise the trial of the effect of shot upon tough cast-iron of sufficient thickness, say 2 feet to 3 feet. An entire embrasure, with its proportion of face, could be cast *in situ*, 2 feet thick, for the same cost as that of a coating or skin of wrought-iron of 6 inches.

"A few experiments to commence with, judiciously selected, might point out the direction of the further experiments; but I should like to talk the matter over with you; and if I can assist, as I probably might, in obtaining the material from the right makers, or in determining what can and what cannot be made, I shall be most happy to do so.

"The Admiralty treated me and my proposals only in their ordinary style, and therefore, as I consented to go to them, I

had no right to complain. From the moment I agreed to go into their sink, I knew the matter was at an end, and it was so —that is all. Going to the Admiralty with a proposal for an improvement, unless it is proposed by some nobody of whom they cannot be jealous, and whom they know they can bully or defraud, is like putting a lighted candle into a bucket of water, —except that it does not even make a fizz—it simply goes out. 1856. Letter from Mr. Brunel.

"I am, my dear Sir, &c.,

"I. BRUNEL."

In a letter of instructions written this year to Colonel Robinson of the Royal Engineers, the British Commissioner for laying down the N.W. boundary between the English and American territories, Sir John Burgoyne anticipates the difficulty of defining the centre of the channel between Vancouver's Island and the mainland, which subsequently led to the disputes between this country and the United States, respecting the Island of San Juan. Island of San Juan.

*To* Lieut.-Colonel ROBINSON, C.R.E., Newfoundland.

"War Department, Pall Mall.
"12th September, 1856.

"MY DEAR COLONEL,

"Having been consulted by the Foreign Office, respecting an officer of Engineers to form part of a Commission, in conjunction with one from the United States, to define the boundary on the North-West of America (south and east of Vancouver's Island), I at once recommended you to be the Chief Commissioner, as one who had taken the principal part in a similar operation on the North-East, which had been satisfactorily executed; that you were well qualified for the task—firm in attending to the interests confided to you, while thoroughly forbearing and conciliatory in manner and expressions. Of course you will not consider anything certain, or to be formally acted upon, until you receive official intimation; but it is not improbable that by this same mail you may have some orders on the subject, and, as time presses,

1856. — N.W. boundary line.

you will no doubt have to proceed on the mission direct from Newfoundland, and we must do what we can to consider the best means we can devise to send out to assist you; you will yourself, as soon as you can form any judgment in the matter, inform us here of any particular points you wish to be attended to, or anything that you think might be of use to send after you, by any mode of conveyance you may suggest.

"As far as I can now understand, the operation will be essentially different from your last.

"The principal feature (if not the only one now,) will be to define with precision the point on the shore of the Gulf of St. George, which is struck by the line of the 49th degree of latitude, on which a substantial column or mark is to be erected, and which, of course, there will be endeavours to indicate also by landmarks, bearings, or other ineffaceable natural objects, for recognition at any future time; and from that mark, or opposite to it on the same parallel, to define '*The middle of the channel which separates the continent from Vancouver's Island, and thence southerly to the sea.*'

"By channel, of course is meant the main navigable channel; and as from the Gulf of St. George, for a considerable distance down, there seem to be many islands, there *may* be a difficulty in reasoning upon what is to be considered the channel that is to be the boundary. The nearer to the mainland, the better for the British interests, probably: the further from it, the better for the United States.

"Our Government has proposed, I see, that generally, the line of navigation shown on Vancouver's Chart, should be followed, as well as it can, as a general basis; for it was probably hastily done, and without any minute examination, and as stated, would seem to give us a superior number of small unimportant islands, but to the United States one large one; but the United States' Government do not appear to have answered that point. You will have, as you are aware, a keen people to deal with, who strive, on system, to obtain the greatest possible advantages for their own country, however remote or insignificant these advantages may seem at the present moment; so you must expect a contest in any doubtful case of any bit of a mudbank!

"I shall endeavour to collect the best charts and books to send out to you; on instruments I shall consult Colonel James, the head of the Survey. I propose to ask for a naval officer to be attached to you, one conversant in naval surveying, soundings, &c. You will also pick up maps, books, &c., at New York. 1856. N.W. boundary line.

"I hear no mention of striking the line of boundary (which is that of the 49th degree of latitude) into the interior; and if at all, it would probably be only for a short distance at present.

"Yours, &c.,

"J. F. BURGOYNE."

The increase in the military estimates after the Crimean war, and the presence of Lord Palmerston at the head of the Government, gave hopes that an effort would be made in earnest to place the country in a better state of defence. In his endeavours to bring the question under the notice of the authorities at this time, Sir John Burgoyne obtained the influential support of the Prince Consort, who amongst his numerous acquirements, had attained some proficiency in the study of fortification, and took considerable interest in the matter in a professional as well as national point of view. Lord Palmerston also took more than a mere general interest in the subject, and like the Prince Consort, required the principles on which each work was designed, to be explained to him. Home fortifications.

*From* Viscount PALMERSTON.

"Piccadilly, 2nd August, 1856.

"MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

"I wish very much to have a meeting with you at the Ordnance Office or at the Treasury, to go over with you all the plans of the defensive works at home and abroad, now in progress of construction, in order that I may understand cor-

1856. rectly the principles on which they are to be constructed, and the time within which they are to be completed. And I should like also to have explained to me the qualities and character of some works which have been completed, but which have been criticised, such as the Gosport, the Isle of Wight, and the Plymouth Forts, including Picklecombe, and the Fort at the eastern side of Plymouth Sound.

The Prince Consort and Lord Palmerston on the defences.

"Would any day in this next week suit you better than another? Wednesday or Thursday would suit me.

"Yours faithfully,

"PALMERSTON."

*From* Colonel the Hon. CHARLES PHIPPS.

"Balmoral, October 6th, 1856.

"MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

"The Prince has directed me to remind you of a conversation which he had with you at Osborne, relative to the general plan of the fortification of Portland and of Plymouth. You have so many things passing through your head, that these may have escaped your memory; and as His Royal Highness hopes to see you shortly after his return south, he thought it better to recall them to your recollection.

"Sincerely yours,

"C. B. PHIPPS."

*To* Colonel the Hon. CHARLES PHIPPS.

"War Department, Pall Mall,
"20th October, 1856.

"MY DEAR COLONEL,

"With reference to your letter, reminding me of the Prince's desire relative to the works of Portland and Plymouth, which I have delayed answering because you seemed to be then on the point of leaving Scotland, I beg that you will inform His Royal Highness, with my dutiful respects, that the principle impressed on me by His Royal Highness of having a complete project prepared for those stations (as well as others) is thoroughly recognised by me. Lieutenant-Colonel Owen, who

is my Deputy in the Fortification Department, is assisting in carrying it out, by engaging officers for each locality expressly on the work; but it is one of much intricacy and labour, and requiring time, particularly in a place of the extent of Plymouth, and in the consideration of which such various views may be taken. 1856. — The Prince Consort and Lord Palmerston on the defences.

"Yours, &c.,

"J. F. BURGOYNE."

Taking advantage of this favourable state of affairs, Sir John drew up, in November 1856, a complete scheme for the fortification of our naval arsenals, which afterwards formed the basis of the recommendations of the Royal Commission of 1860. This paper, which was printed at the War Office, proposed works for the defence of the home ports and arsenals, costing in the aggregate 4,000,000*l.* Project for national defences.

The garrisons necessary for these works, including Scotland and Ireland, he calculated would absorb 64,400 men, exclusive of the commercial ports, which must chiefly rely on local forces. And he thus sums up his statement:—

"This number would appear in the aggregate, to be a very large drain upon the available military forces; they will not, however, require to be always at their posts, but under arrangements by which they could be thrown in, to a certainty, before an attack could be made on the place. For instance, the full garrison for Chatham (6000 men) could not be required before an enemy had completely forced the coast defences of Kent, and that the moveable army was acting on the defensive in the interior.

"Many organised and armed bodies, that would be inefficient for a manœuvring army in the field, would be very appropriate for the fortifications; such as the Pensioners, the Dockyard Battalions, and corps of Volunteers. With regard to the latter, it is earnestly to be recommended that the earliest

1857. opportunity be taken to promote their organisation, especially within a belt of some miles round the coast; not to act generally in the field, as seemed to be the idea when invasion was threatened in the French revolutionary war, and which would certainly prove a failure; but for local service, never many miles from their residence—as near as possible on the admirable system of Militia in Jersey and Guernsey.

Project for national defences.

"I would submit the observations contained in this paper, as indicating a minimum scale of defences for Great Britain and Ireland; and adjusted so that every part should be in a relative proportionate condition; and so that, by the best, but at the same time reasonable provision and arrangement for the maintenance of a constant proper supply of arms, ammunition, military equipments and stores, and the adoption of a system of raising with rapidity, organised bodies of Militia and Volunteers, in addition to troops of the line, the country should be in a comparatively satisfactory state of preparation at home to meet the breaking out of a war, in the present state of Europe. Should a superior degree of precautionary measures be subsequently considered necessary, the first establishments here proposed are calculated for a basis for future augmentation to any extent."

Education of military officers.

In 1857, he published a pamphlet entitled 'Army Reform,' with a view of combating the prevalent rage for extending competitive examinations in scholarship to officers in the army. Wishing to elicit the opinions of independent literary men on the subject, the editor sent a copy of this pamphlet to the late Mr. Charles Dickens, who returned the following reply:—

"Tavistock House, 8th November, 1857.

"My dear Sir,

"I have only come back to town within these few days, and am sorry to tell you that, although I find your note awaiting me, I do not find Sir John Burgoyne's pamphlet, which seems, in a great accumulation of far less interesting matter, to have lapsed into the limbo of lost things.

"If you can, without inconvenience, send me another copy, I should be very glad to see it. I highly respect Sir John's experience; and I think the examination of officers in scholarship one of the most singular absurdities of the day. 1857. — Education of military officers.

"With kind regards to Mrs. Wrottesley (shall I ever have the pleasure of acting with her, I wonder?) allow me to remain,

"Very sincerely yours,

"CHARLES DICKENS."

One of the results of the Russian war had been to liberate the Danube from the control of the Russian power, and the free navigation of that river formed one of the principal stipulations of the treaty of peace. An International Commission had been appointed in 1856, to take measures for the improvement of its navigation; the intention being, that the expenditure on the works should be advanced by the various Powers concerned, under a guarantee for repayment from charges to be laid on the shipping. In the course of their deliberations, three professional men had been consulted by the Commission, all of whom took different views of the measures necessary for removing the obstacles to the navigation, the divergence of their opinions going so far, that each advocated the improvement of a different mouth of the river: the English engineer preferring the St. George; the Russian engineer, the Sulina; and Captain Spratt, the English naval surveyor, strongly advocating operations in the Kilia mouth. The mouths of the Danube.

These opposing views had brought the Commission to a deadlock, and the papers were referred to Sir John Burgoyne, by the English Foreign Office, in 1857. The effect of this reference was to introduce an additional complication into the question, for Sir John at once declared that the views of all the professional advisers of the Commission were erroneous; and as his opinions

1857. on the subject of bar harbours are, it is believed, original, and the problem is one of considerable interest, it will be well to give them in his own words.

The mouths of the Danube.

*Memorandum on Harbour Works.*

Memorandum on harbour works.

With regard to the opening of Bar Harbours, as a principle, my strong impression is that there is a great fallacy in promoting what is called a *scour* for the purpose. On the contrary, I consider everything in the shape of an accelerated and increased mass of current, such as is caused by the rush of great rivers through comparatively narrow openings into the sea, is prejudicial; and the reason seems to be obvious, that this current, brought up at once by the great bank of comparatively still water of the sea, naturally deposits all the matter it brings with it, and thus forms the bar.

The rivers that give the best entrances for shipping, are those which have great bell-mouths, by which the flow of the large mass of tidal waters from the sea counteracts the sharp current of the river, and enables it to flow in and out in a smooth, even course; while those that have narrow entrances into the sea, will have bars, which will be bad in proportion to the narrowness of the mouth, and the volume of water brought down by the river.

Thus the Nile has an enormous flow of water into the sea, with no extra width at the mouths, and has bars on which there is not more than seven feet depth of water.

An instance of the inadequacy of promoting a scour for the removal of a bar, may be observed by what took place at the mouth of the Adour, near Bayonne, in the South of France.

That river, with its limited width of channel into the sea, had a bad bar. To remove it, they carried out two parallel piers beyond it into deep water; the old bar was certainly cleared away by the scour, but a new one formed at the new mouth. A second time they renewed the operation, but still with the same result!

There may be, and no doubt are, cases where the commercial interests of the locality are so great, as to justify the course of maintaining an improved depth over the bar by constant or

periodical dredging; but it is working against the efforts of nature, which is always to be avoided as much as possible. 1857.

Memorandum on Bar harbours.

My principle would be, where it could be done, to establish a harbour near the river, and make the navigable communication, by locking up from it, into the deep water within the bar.

Nature has provided for this in Egypt. There the fine harbour of Alexandria is about twenty miles from the Nile; and becomes its port by a canal.

On this principle, if a great river entered the sea by several mouths, all of which had bars—like the Danube, for instance—instead of battling with any one of those bars, I should rather seek for the mouth most favourable, and adopting that as my harbour, damming up the passage of the river through it, and then from that harbour, (to the deepening of the bar of which by dredging, there would be no counteracting effort,) lock up into the river through gates.

Besides what takes place with regard to the mouths of rivers, the back-waters of great inlets of the sea may act injuriously, if the passage in and out is very narrow.

An ample mouth, in proportion to the inward space, where the tidal water flows smoothly in and out, is the most advantageous. A narrow channel to a great interior expanse, to and from which the current is accelerated, is the worst.

As an instance, I may quote an inlet from the sea at Ballytiege, in the south of Ireland, which formed a large shallow lake, communicating with the sea by a long narrow channel. It became an object to reclaim the whole of that lake from the sea, by a dam across the upper neck of the channel.

This was a simple operation; but a doubt was expressed whether the prevention of the scour by the rush of the outward current from the lake, which was very rapid, would not injure the little harbour and landing-quay that were in the channel. Those who had charge of the undertaking thought not;[1] and as the value of the landing-quay was very small as compared with that of the reclamation, the work was proceeded with, and the quay, instead of being injured, was benefited.

The lake was so large that it never had time to fill; and thus, when the tide was at its full height at the mouth, it was

[1] Sir John himself, as Chairman of the Board of Public Works.—Ed.

1857. — Memorandum on Bar harbours.

some feet lower within, and only came to a balance and to a fall from within, after the ebb outside had fallen between two and three feet; but when the dam was completed, the tidal water flowed gradually in and out, and there was a gain of that height at the quay.

On this same principle, I would not act up to the ordinary system of encouraging the additional scour that the ebb tide will give at the mouth, by objecting to the reclamation of mud-banks in the interior of great harbours; but would rather diminish the interior space, so as to render the flux and return as smooth and even as possible.

The Port of Glasgow is another case in point; by narrowing by embankments parts of the channel below the town, to effect certain improvements, there was a reduction of the actual rise of the tide at its quays of between two and three feet, which, however, has been more than compensated for by dredging.

Danube commission.

The Danube Commission, however, upheld their own views, and on a further reference made to him by the Foreign Office in November, 1857, Sir John Burgoyne writes:—

"I continue to hold a strong conviction that no mode of directing the current of the river through any regulated artificial channel of outlet, will remedy the defect of a bad bar; and the differences between the Commissioners on the selection of the mouth, will probably afford an opportunity for calling for other opinions of highest professional authority of the different countries, on the facts and circumstances which must now be amply recorded, before entering on a work of such enormous responsibility."

Conference at Paris on Danube works.

In pursuance of the suggestion contained in this memorandum, the whole question was referred, "*ab initio*," to an international technical committee of engineers, held in Paris, which was attended by the late Captain Fowke, of the Royal Engineers, on the part of Great Britain. At this conference, Captain Fowke propounded the views of Sir John Burgoyne, and after some discussion, these

were adopted in principle by all the Commissioners present; but the Danube Commission still adhering to their opinion that any other plan but their own would be impracticable with the means at their disposal; and their differences respecting the selection of the mouth having been removed by the choice, from political reasons, of the Sulina branch, the original project of promoting a scour of the river, by confining the channel between parallel piers, has been carried out. It has been since officially reported by Lieut.-Colonel Stokes, the English Commissioner, that this operation has been successful, "the depth of water having been increased from 10 feet to 16 feet between the piers;" but as this will always be the first effect of promoting a scour, it remains still to be seen whether the improvement will be permanent. It is fair to observe however, that there is a littoral current running across the Sulina mouth, which Colonel Stokes considers will be sufficient to prevent the formation of a new bar at the extremity of the Sulina piers; and he justifies the proceedings of the commission on this ground.

1858. Conference at Paris on Danube works.

Some correspondence which passed at this date between Sir John Burgoyne and the Prince Consort, will further exemplify the interest taken by the latter, in the art of fortification.

"Osborne, July 23rd, 1858.

"MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

"I send you an extract from a letter which I received from the Duc de Brabant, referring to a conversation which he has lately had with General Todleben, thinking that it might interest you, and the more so as the imaginary fort spoken of, resembles very much our new forts for Gosport. Would you show it also to Major Jervois?

"Ever yours truly,

"ALBERT."

1858.

"8, Gloucester Gardens, Hyde Park,
"July 24th, 1858.

—

"SIR,

Remarks on General Todleben's views on fortifications.

"I beg to return my humble acknowledgment for your Royal Highness's letter of the 23rd, with the very interesting remarks of His Royal Highness the Duke of Brabant, on the observations of General Todleben on fortification.

"I must say that I entirely agree in the tenor of the opinions of the General, in considering that those Engineers are wrong, who adhere so pertinaciously to the old open bastion systems of Vauban.

"Certainly something better may be devised; but the great changes that are from time to time suggested, must be received with caution, and will require much consideration and experience before they can be implicitly relied on. The error of originators of new systems of fortification is, in finding it comparatively easy to remedy the well-known defects of the old systems, without being well aware that their novelties may involve as great, or perhaps greater evils, in other shapes; and this is almost invariably the case with projects by men who have no military knowledge or experience; indeed, even good military engineers frequently find, after the construction of their works, that they have overlooked some injurious result that was not apparent on their paper design.

"I have long been of opinion that works of fortification should be devised according to *principles*, and not according to *systems*; the latter require the ground to be made to suit the works, while, by principles, the works are adapted to the circumstances of the ground. As Todleben says, "*Les ouvrages doivent être disposés d'après le terrain.*"

"For close self defence against assaults, I consider the *caponnière* better than the bastioned flank: it gains interior space, is more economical in construction, and will, when effective, remain longer intact; but it must not be placed at the retired ends of long lines, and thus exposed to be battered by shot dropped over the distant covering counterscarp, although not absolutely seen[1]; and there will be danger of its being ruined

[1] The caponnière is placed in this faulty position in the German system of fortification: to avoid the disadvantages here named by Sir John Burgoyne, the English engineers place the caponnière at the salients of their works.—ED.

by bombarding, for even good bomb proofs of masonry can be destroyed or breached by vertical fire, when seen, or when their precise position is known. 1858.

Remarks on General Todleben's views on fortifications.

"Counterscarp defences for a ditch were in much favour at one time; but the communications to them are very difficult, and they are readily destroyed by a few explosions of the besieger, when he is on the glacis.

"Detached forts, such as sketched by the Duke of Brabant in illustration of General Todleben's idea, and as we are putting in practice in front of Gosport, I think will prove powerful; intervening curtains, or defensible covered communications, can be added at any time, of a field-work profile; and we have one important advantage in our line, namely, in deriving the main opposition to the approach to any one work from a powerful flanking fire from the others that are collateral; while the whole being in a straight line, it is not easy to see how the besieger can place counter batteries for direct fire against the flanks.

"All this, and General Todleben's doctrine that "*le secret de la défense réside dans la force de l'Artillerie*," and his field pieces to oppose the assault, seem to be very applicable to entrenched camps and very large places; but a new study will be required for small places, such as represented by Vauban's hexagon, &c.

"I ought to make many excuses for troubling your Royal Highness with these desultory remarks; but I have been urged thus to trespass, by your Royal Highness's condescension in communicating with me on the subject.

"I have the honour to be,
"Your Royal Highness's
"Obedient and devoted servant,
"J. F. BURGOYNE.

"His Royal Highness the Prince Consort."

In 1858, occurred what Mr. Cobden has styled "the third panic;" but there was this difference between it and the former panics of 1846 and 1852, that Ministers

The third panic.

1858. The third panic.

were much more affected by it than the public and the press, owing to private information which had been received, of extensive and secret preparations for war, on the part of the French Emperor. An attempt had been made on the Emperor's life by Orsini and other Italian refugees, whose conspiracy had been planned and partly carried out in this country; and the failure of the prosecution of one of the principal conspirators in London, and the threatening language held in consequence, by some of the superior officers of the French army in addresses to the Emperor, had provoked irritating discussions between the two countries. A bill brought in by Lord Palmerston's Government, on the failure of Dr. Bernard's prosecution, to alter the law relating to conspiracy in this country against foreign potentates, had been thrown out by a combination of Conservatives and ultra-radicals, and Lord Derby's Administration had come into power by defeating the Government on a question intimately affecting the personal safety of the Emperor Napoleon. The situation was critical, and we were probably only saved from war by the good temper and firmness of the French Emperor. The French ambassador, M. de Persigny, who had compromised his Government by some violent expressions, was recalled, and Marshal Pélissier, who it was expected would be popular in this country, on account of his services in the Crimea, was sent in his place. Notwithstanding these conciliatory measures on the part of the French Government, it was evident that a storm was gathering; and as the object of the mysterious military preparations of France could not be discovered, the English Ministers were in consternation, and a secret committee, consisting of the Duke of Cambridge, Lord Seaton, Sir John Burgoyne, Sir Fenwick Williams, Sir James Scarlett, with Sir

Henry Storks acting as secretary, was convened, in order to consider the best means of preparing against a rupture with France, without creating alarm. 1858. Secret committee.

The military condition of Great Britain had slightly improved since the Crimean war; but we were involved at this time in a formidable insurrection in India and a war with China; and the force available for the field in Great Britain consisted only of:

| | |
|---|---|
| Cavalry | 4,900 |
| Guards | 5,090 |
| Infantry of the Line | 10,134 |
| Embodied Militia | 17,476 |

Of less efficient troops available for garrisons, we had—

| | |
|---|---|
| Depôt Battalions | 9,114 |
| New Battalions of the Line | 7,645 |
| Disembodied Militia which had received some training | 46,000 |
| Pensioners | 15,000 |
| Yeomanry | 10,000 |

All the important naval stations abroad required augmentation to their garrisons, and it was considered that 34,600 was the minimum force required to garrison the English arsenals and the Channel Islands. If the enemy should possess, even for a short time, a naval superiority in the Channel, it was calculated that 100,000 effective troops would be necessary, in addition to the garrisons above quoted. It will be seen therefore that the deficiency of troops was alarming, and it was agreed on all sides, that four months would be the least time necessary to place new recruits into the ranks.

Sir John Burgoyne took this opportunity to urge again his favourite scheme of enrolling volunteers for local

1858. service; and this suggestion, it is believed, formed one of the recommendations of the report of the Committee, and was acted on by the Government in the following year, when hostilities broke out between Austria and France.

Secret committee.

On the completion of his labours on this Committee, he compiled a Memorandum on "Some popular fallacies with regard to our security against invasion," which was submitted to the Secretary of State for War, and circulated as a confidential document amongst the members of the Government. A letter from Sir Benjamin Hawes, the Under-Secretary for War, shows the anxiety of the Government not to create alarm at this juncture:—

"War Office, June 26th, 1858.

"My dear Sir John,

"I send you a printed copy of your paper.

"General Peel proposes to send a copy to Lord Derby, and perhaps to the Cabinet.

"He also proposes to send copies to Her Majesty and the Prince Consort.

"Beyond this, at present, he does not wish any copy should be issued. Indeed, he does not wish that anyone else, at present should see it.

"Very sincerely yours,

"B. Hawes."

The following definition of his opinions relative to the danger of invasion, was written at this time, in reply to a letter addressed to him by a lady:—

"It is so late that I have only time to give a very hasty and unpremeditated answer to your somewhat unfair question, '*whether I think we are safe from invasion in our present condition.*' In the first place, the line I take is to avoid giving a direct opinion on the point, but to state facts, on which it is

for others to adopt opinions, and thus evade the accusation of avowedly advancing a panic without reason. In the next place, if we say the country is in danger, it would be construed as implying a matter of *probability*, and that I do not think is at all the case; and it is probabilities that are argued against us by the improvident; but as regards perfect *possibilities*, we are decidedly exposed to them; and with such terrific results, we ought not to be exposed even to possibilities that are clearly manifest. With many a less precaution than we take, the burning down of our houses would not be at all probable, but we very properly provide against such a *possible* contingency, by using every means of prevention, and we insure, on account of the extent of the misfortune, should it possibly occur." 1858.

In the latter part of the same year, Sir John Burgoyne was employed on a complimentary mission to Paris, to present to the French Emperor, the funeral car of the First Napoleon, which after the great Emperor's burial at St. Helena, had been sent to England, and stored for many years in the Rotunda on Woolwich Common. The car in question formed an interesting relic of Napoleon, as it had been his ordinary carriage during his captivity at St. Helena, and on his death had been fitted up as a hearse, to convey his remains to the grave. The French Emperor at this time, was forming a collection of Napoleonic relics at the Invalides in Paris; and a foreign visitor to Woolwich having brought to his notice the fact of the existence of the carriage, the Emperor had expressed a wish in a private note to possess it. This letter was shown unofficially to a member of the English Government, and it was determined to present the carriage formally to the Emperor. The mission was a somewhat delicate one, owing to the susceptibilities of the French nation on the subject of St. Helena. Mission to Paris.

Sir John performed his task in a manner which would

1858. — Mission to Paris.

not have disgraced a veteran diplomatist. His speech, on delivering the car to Prince Napoleon, who represented the Emperor on the occasion, was as follows:—

"Her Majesty the Queen of England, desirous of offering to His Imperial Majesty a relic which she is aware must be of interest to France, has directed me to bring to Paris, and place at the disposition of the Emperor, the funeral car which conveyed to his first tomb, the remains of the illustrious founder of the Napoleon dynasty.

"The admiration which, as a soldier, I entertain for the eminent military genius and achievements of that great warrior, renders it particularly gratifying to me to have been selected by my gracious Sovereign, to fulfil this honourable mission."

Lord Cowley, the English ambassador, complimented Sir John on the ingenuity with which he had avoided the word St. Helena, and inserted a reference to the Napoleon *dynasty*. His private letters from France during this mission, give an account of the Emperor's court at Compiègne.

"Hôtel Windsor, Paris, 5th November, 1858.

"We have got through all our official business rapidly, and I think, well. Our voyage down Channel in the night was as smooth as in the river.[1] We entered Havre just in time to save the tide,—were waited upon by the commandant, and Marshal Vaillant's aide-de-camp,—had a long promenade and drive over the place, and at 7 P.M. I gave the whole party, French and English, a dinner at the principal hotel. In the meantime, the car was landed and conveyed to the railway. At 10 P.M. we left by the mail train, in a carriage ordered expressly for us all, and arrived in Paris at 5 this morning, Marshal Vaillant's A.D.C., M. de Chamberet, and Colonel Stanton, saw the car taken to the Invalides, and unpacked.

[1] In H. M. S. *Vivid*, Captain Dunn.—Ed.

The Wrottesleys and I, and the navy captains, came direct from the railway here, and found all ready for us, excellent apartments, fires, &c., and we had tea, and retired to bed. 1858. Mission to Paris.

"At 11 o'clock, I was roused by the A.D.C. with an intimation that the car would be received by Prince Napoleon at one o'clock. Accordingly we got up, dressed in our finery, and were all ready in time. At the Invalides, it seemed entirely an assemblage of military men. I made my little speech to the prince, to which he answered, in a complimentary manner, that the Emperor was pleased to receive this friendly offer, calculated to cement the happy union between the two countries, and that he was gratified at the selection of myself to convey it, &c. The *invalides* wheeled it away, and I and my party retired. I afterwards called on Lord Cowley, who was kind and agreeable as usual. We wrote down our names at Prince Jerome's and Prince Napoleon's, tried to find the Generals Niel and Ardant, and altogether have done a deal of work. I am to see Count Walewski, the Foreign Secretary of State, at 12.30 to-morrow, by appointment.

"6th. Count Walewski received me most courteously, expressed the Emperor's pleasure at receiving the car,—his Majesty's entire satisfaction at the selection of the officer charged with the mission, and repeated twice, at different times, that they were much pleased with the *paroles* I had addressed to the prince on the occasion. Finally he told me that he had received a telegraphic message from the Emperor to say that he would receive me at Compiègne, on Monday and Tuesday; that he was going himself by a special train at 3 P.M. and that I had better accompany him, and it was so arranged."

"Palais de Compiègne, 8th November, 1858.

"5.30 P.M. Just arrived. We could not have been less than thirty or forty guests for the palace, in the railway. Count Walewski took especial care of me, or I should have been puzzled where to go on every occasion. I was in the same carriage with him and his wife. At the Compiègne Station, were some six or eight *chars à bancs*, each with four horses and two postillions; the party scrambled into them as fast as they could, Life at Compiègne.

1858. and we drove at a good pace through the town to the château, which is on the very skirts, and at the end of one of the streets.

Life at Compiègne. On alighting, we all went up a grand staircase and into a great *salle*, in which were some twenty servants in green and gold liveries. As each party approached, a gentleman-usher (as I suppose him to be) referred to his list, and called out the name of the servant who was to show the individual or party to their apartments. To my horror, when I came up to him, he asked me for my aides-de-camp. I told him that they were not mentioned in the invitation; he said, '*Ah, nous les attendions.*' I was so sorry, but it was not my fault. My apartment is really magnificent: a large bedroom superbly furnished, and a still larger sitting-room, fully as grand. I am asked what I would like for breakfast, and at what hour, and I am now about to prepare for the 7 o'clock dinner. The walls of my rooms have some fine pictures on them—handsome clocks on the mantelpieces, not for show only, but giving the right time. Good fires in the rooms, as you may suppose.

"Midnight. The Emperor and Empress most kind and gracious to me; there were 60 or 70 at least, at dinner. I took out the Countess Walewski, and sat between her and the Empress. The only other English person of the party is Lady Mary Craven, a daughter of Lord Hardwicke, tall, young, fair, and very handsome. The Emperor told the Empress across the dinner table, that he was sorry he had not known that I had two A.D.C.'s, or he would have invited them; and later in the evening an A.D.C. asked me their names and address, and said he would telegraph for them directly to come to-morrow morning in time to hunt, and they would stay the night. I hope they will come.

"After dinner, we adjourned to the Empress's drawing-room for coffee. The court seems to be very lively here. After coffee, they had quadrilles and waltzes in one of the drawing-rooms, which was without a carpet. The music, a piano-shaped barrel organ, if it may be so called, having no barrel, but in lieu of it, sliding flat pieces of wood with little pins like the barrels of the organ; it is loud and somewhat harsh, but the music well arranged and correct, and apparently good to dance to. In the same room was a writing table, newspapers, chess tables, &c.

Then on a very pretty little stage in another room, some of the company dressed up as marionettes, and went through a short piece very well and very comically—then dancing again—ices, tea, and we broke up a little before twelve. 1858. — Life at Compiègne.

"I had a long conversation with the Emperor, as we walked together up and down a long drawing-room, on Sebastopol, General Niel, our early projects for defensive warfare only, when on my way out to Turkey the first time; rifled cannon, &c. One of the Emperor's A.D.C.'s talking of General Niel's book, said that he found from it, that from a very early time I had told them that Sebastopol must be taken by the Malakoff."

"Palais de Compiègne, 9th November, 1858.

"Wrottesley and Stanton arrived at 11.45 this morning. Breakfast was ordered at 12. The ladies and gentlemen in their hunting uniforms; and wearing cocked hats, *à la Louis* XV. Imperial stag hunt.

"We set out for the *chasse* in eight *chars à bancs*, some with six, others with four, capital horses, and lots of outriders, huntsmen, &c. I went in a *char à bancs* with Count Walewski; we talked about the Crimea, and I mentioned that I was the oldest man of all the armies there engaged; he said '*Ah! oui, vous en étiez le Nestor*,' which, as Nestor was notoriously the wisest of the chiefs, I took as a pretty compliment. We drove about five or six miles to the *rendezvous de chasse*, where was a large assemblage of spectators in a great circle. The Emperor and some ladies and gentlemen here mounted their horses; among others, Wrottesley and Stanton had each a capital horse of high spirit. A stag was sprung, the riders followed the hunt through the avenues at a rattling pace; the carriages, under the direction of *piqueurs*, who were on the look-out, dodged about, and from time to time got near the sport, which finished by the taking and killing of a magnificent stag with enormous horns, in the middle of a *carrefour*, the carriages getting up very soon after. They lighted a large fire by which we warmed ourselves—wine, cakes, and rolls, were spread out in profusion on table cloths, laid on the ground; the foot of the stag was presented by the Emperor to Lady Mary Craven who had ridden gallantly, never far from the Emperor, through the whole day; Madame de Persigny

1858. — Imperial stag hunt.

and two or three more ladies, also rode hard and well. The carriages were again filled, and we were in the château soon after four o'clock. The *chasse* altogether was very successful, and interesting in its old forms. The handsome and fantastic costumes, numerous attendants, great horns blowing, the crowd at the *rendezvous*, the fine open carriages driving up and down the avenues, the horses galloping, finally the death of a large stag, and the *curée* in the great courtyard of the palace at night, when the stag is given to be eaten by the hounds, by torch-light; all composing a series of magnificent *spectacles*.

"At breakfast I took out Madame Persigny, and at dinner, Madame Walewski again, each time sitting on the left of the Empress, Prince Murat being on her right. I saw the little Prince Imperial in the morning, when he was brought down to see the *cortége* set out. He appeared to be a very nice, upright, healthy, and intelligent child; but I thought, even already, looking contemptuously at the caresses of the ladies who surrounded him.

"We are to start for Paris to-morrow by the one o'clock train, and as that would not admit of our attending the great breakfast, which is at twelve *nominally*, we are to have one at eleven in my apartment."

"Hôtel Windsor, Rue de Rivoli, 11th November, 1858.

"We finished at Compiègne as we commenced and continued throughout, surrounded with every possible luxury and attention; and the greatest courtesy from the Emperor, on taking leave the evening preceding our departure.

"It was provoking missing the dinner with Marshal Vaillant, who had invited us all for Monday, and who had asked a number of people expressly to meet '*le Général Burgoyne*,' among others General Niel, who absolutely had to come in from the country for the purpose, but it could not be helped; on receiving the commands of the Emperor, I was forced to send an excuse to the Marshal.

"I have drawn up a little report of the result of my mission, and have addressed it to Lord Cowley, and through him to the Government.

"General Ardant has just paid us a long visit; he is very friendly personally, but is rabid about the manœuvres of England; he says that we are determined to rule Europe and the world, and that the French are very indignant at it. I told him we had precisely the same idea with regard to France. I was glad to find that he had a decided opinion that it would be a most serious thing for France to go to war with us, as we should at once set all Germany on them. If this is the opinion of the French Government, it accounts for their courting a closer alliance with Russia. 1858.

"2 P.M. General Niel has called, and remained for about two hours in animated conversation. He seems to be full of life and spirits, and quite different from the gloomy and anxious General Niel of the Crimea, in January 1855.

"We propose to-morrow to go to Chantilly, to call on Lady Cowley, and return in the afternoon."

"Paris, 15th November, 1858.

"We made a most successful visit to Chantilly. Lord Cowley's carriage was waiting for us at the station, about four or five miles distant. We were received in the most kind and cordial manner by Lord and Lady Cowley. We remained at the château for two hours and a half, had a good luncheon with them, and were back at our hotel at six o'clock. We met at Chantilly, Lord and Lady Clarendon, who were very friendly, Lord Alfred Paget and his wife (the whole party being bound to Compiègne to-morrow), and Colonel Claremont.

"We found among the papers on the table, a *Court Circular* (newspaper) of the 30th October, giving under the head of 'Eminent men of the day,' a full history of my career in life; so if you want such an interesting specimen of biography, you must order a copy.

"Monsieur de Chamberet, the aide-de-camp who met us at Havre, has just sent me a present of a 'History of the Invalides,' written by himself."

It is believed that the following minute by Sir John Burgoyne contains an account of the earliest proposal for a *mitrailleuse*.

1858.

"Sir CHARLES SHAW'S *Battery of Musket Barrels.*

"War Office, 2nd December, 1858.

"To the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR,

First suggestion for a mitrailleuse.

"Having examined Sir Charles Shaw's proposed new implement of war, I believe that it may so far be found applicable to boats, fortifications, and forts, and perhaps ultimately in some degree in the field, that I would recommend a thorough trial of its principles.

"The machine as now exhibited by Sir C. Shaw, consists of 24 Enfield rifle barrels fixed in a row on an iron frame, ill-contrived, heavy and clumsy, and mounted on a light carriage with two wheels.

"Sir Charles is quite aware that it would admit of many improvements, but is not prepared to undertake them.

"Should General Peel consent to a trial by a new construction at the expense of the War Department, I would submit for consideration a system that would greatly facilitate the experiment, while I believe it would much improve the general arrangement of the implement.

"I would propose then to confine the machine to a frame containing 4 barrels only, as the unit of the implement, which could be multiplied at pleasure by very simple means. The manner of mounting also for conveyance, or for the field, might be left for distinct after consideration.

"The frame should be as light as possible, consistent with strength, firmness, and durability.

"Each barrel easily removeable if required.

"Breech loading may be considered almost indispensable, either by Restell's, which is a favourite system with Sir Charles, or any other.

"The firing might be either by distinct barrels, or simultaneously, at pleasure; and if there could be any contrivance to relieve the shock of the recoil, it might be advantageous.

"The frame to turn a little in front of the line of gravity on a hinge or roller on an under-rest, the elevation or depression on this hinge could be by a screw, or on a graduated segment

marked to degrees and distances, and fixed to the rear end of the frame. 1859.

First suggestion for a mitrailleuse.

"The length of an ordinary musket-barrel is regulated by the requirement of its having with the bayonet a given amount of projection in front of the soldier; this would be unnecessary with this machine, and therefore it is apprehended that these barrels, retaining the same bore, might be shortened by as much as perhaps 6 inches; and by using a slightly increased charge, be equally powerful; the inconvenience of having a different cartridge would be of less consequence, and in case of any temporary deficiency, the ordinary soldier's cartridge would be applicable at a very small diminution of power.

"The above suggestions, however, would be for the consideration of the officer charged with the superintendence of the machine, in concert with Sir Charles Shaw.

"J. F. B."

Rifled field artillery.

In June, 1859, Sir John Burgoyne made a proposition on the subject of rifled field artillery, so novel in its character, and so different from the views at that time in vogue, and still held, it is believed, by artillery authorities, that it is worth recording. His proposal may be briefly summed up as follows: that the largest proportion of rifled field artillery should be of a very light calibre; *i. e.* that the gun should be reduced to a size not requiring more than two horses for transport; and he justified the proposition on these grounds.

The old descriptions of field-pieces were formerly 6-pounders, and were gradually augmented to 9 and 12-pounders; not on account of the weight of shot hitting a heavier blow, which would be worth nothing against troops, but to obtain superior ranges, low angles of elevation, and precision of fire, all of which are now as good with the 3 as with the 12-pounder; while with the 3-pounder, the weight of the piece, and, what is of much more consequence, that of the ammunition, is so

1859.

Proposal for a new system of field artillery.

much less, that two horses will transport as many guns and rounds of ammunition, as would require six in the other case.

He calculated therefore that, with the same number of horses and rounds of ammunition per gun, he could carry in the field three 3-pounders as against one 12-pounder; and that the fire of the former would be far more efficient, and the pieces be much more readily and quickly brought into action, and manœuvred.

The Ordnance Select Committee however rejected the proposal *in toto*, on the ground of the loss in the power of the shell, and the effect in hitting guns and carriages. And certainly the practice of the present day is against the proposition, and tends to make field artillery heavier instead of lighter.

To the last, however, Sir John Burgoyne considered his views to be sound. He denied the great value attached to shell fire as opposed to solid shot, inasmuch as the assumed effects of shell were based on experiments in peace time, when the range was accurately known, and the shell made to burst at the right moment; and that the practice was very inferior in the confusion, hurry, and smoke of real warfare. Admitting, however, the full value of shell fire, as represented by the artillery authorities, he was of opinion it would be preferable to construct a gun especially for shells, similar to the old howitzer,[1] than attempt to combine the effect of every kind of projectile in one gun, as proposed by Sir William Armstrong, and adopted, as he thought, too precipitately by the Select Committee.

It remains still to be seen whether these views, like

[1] It may be stated here that Sir J. Burgoyne considered great effects might be produced by rifled howitzers and mortars of large calibre, but his endeavours to persuade the military authorities to make experiments with a weapon of this kind, proved unsuccessful.—Ed.

many others enunciated by him at various times, will not triumph in the long-run.[1] 1859.

Whitworth *versus* Armstrong.

He was at issue also at this time with the artillery authorities, in the decided preference which he gave to the Whitworth system of rifled guns over that of Armstrong. He looked upon Mr. Whitworth's system of rifling, as combining the simplicity of the old smooth bore with the accuracy and force of rifled artillery; nor did he see any reason to change his conviction after the substitution of the Woolwich system for that of Armstrong, looking upon the adoption of studs and grooves as a retrograde step in rifling, introducing an unnecessary expense and complication in the projectile. In 1860, after attending Mr. Whitworth's experiments at Southport, he wrote a letter giving an account of the rival systems, to his son, who was commander of a ship on a foreign station. After describing Lancaster's gun, he proceeds:—

"Since then, Armstrong's and Whitworth's have been brought forward, and both of them have produced great effects in accuracy of fire and enormous ranges. Armstrong adopts the principle of grooves, and a soft metal coating to his shot; he has as many as forty spiral grooves, very small and very shallow; and his cylindrical oblong shot or shell of iron is coated with a thin layer of lead; the fit *must* be so tight that it must be breech-loaded, as it never could be rammed down from the muzzle, and it has no windage whatever. Whitworth's bore and shot are hexagonal, and both of them have a sharp twist or spiral; the shot or shell of iron are oblong. It can be loaded from the muzzle, like Lancaster's, but when a little foul, is very hard to ram home; but he has a kind of waxed wad, which cleans the bore well at every shot. Whit-

[1] In his endeavour to obtain great mobility for field artillery, Sir John wished to reduce the gun to a weight which could not only be drawn by two horses, but on two wheels, the horses being harnessed in shafts, or curricle fashion.—Ed.

1859. worth's has a windage, which would affect the range; but he makes up for it by giving a greater twist in his bore than what Armstrong *can* do.

Whitworth *versus* Armstrong.

"Both Armstrong's and Whitworth's fire with very great accuracy, and at much lower angles of elevation than the old gun: they have obtained ranges from them at 32° elevation of 9000 yards—five miles! In both, the shot being oblong, the bore of the piece is of much less diameter than in the old gun for shot of the same weight; and for both, the charge of powder is only about one-eighth of the shot's weight. The initial velocity of the shot is not so great as in the old gun, but it retains its velocity much longer, on account of the rotatory motion, which gives it the great ranges; thus, at 200, or 300, or 600 yards, the old spherical shot would be quicker, and hit a harder blow perhaps than these new ones, but they would not penetrate so far, because of their larger surface. At 700 or 800 yards, these new shot would have a greater velocity than the spherical, and would not lose it afterwards in the rapid way of the latter. The shot, throughout its whole flight, maintains the direction in its own length with which it left the gun; thus, at the end of its flight, though falling to the ground, the fore point of the shot is cocked up in the air at the same angle with which it left the gun, but it still maintains its forward motion at that angle; this very slant to its direction along the range tends to increase the range, by the action of the air on it, as on a boy's kite.

"Whitworth began his trials by boring out an ordinary cast-iron gun; but after a few trials, the guns burst, which threw discredit on his system. It has been perceived for some time that cylinders of cast-iron in the old-fashioned way, will not stand great pressure, as proved by the bursting of guns, and by the failure of great hydraulic presses; and a new mode of manufacture, by hoops and several different systems, enables them to be given far greater strength with much less metal: thus, the guns on this new principle do not weigh two-thirds of the old ones, and are much stronger. If Armstrong had bored out old guns, they would have burst also most assuredly; but he was more wise, and manufactured his new guns on the new principle, and they stand beautifully.

"Breech loading seems to be now considered advantageous: it is much quicker to load, keeps the men more under cover, saves the labour of ramming the charge and shot in, which is sometimes very great when the piece is a little foul, and that there is not much windage. In Armstrong's system, breech loading is absolutely necessary. Also, by opening the breech after every round, the gun cools and does not get so heated; no complaints have been made, it is believed, on the trials in the gunnery ships, of the inconvenience of the smoke. 1859. Whitworth *versus* Armstrong.

"Against the breech-loader, it must be admitted that it is less simple; and though they may stand great trials in experimenting, there is always a doubt whether the joints and screws and hinges will stand actual service, and some years' wear.

"With Armstrong's gun as yet, it is absolutely necessary to sponge out with water, after every few rounds, to clear out his numerous small grooves; this, it is considered, may be a great inconvenience in many occasions, in the field. Armstrong's shell is very ingenious, but very expensive, and somewhat too refined.

"Armstrong, having at once produced a most beautiful gun, and perfected everything before it was exhibited, has carried the day as yet; he has received a considerable reward, and manufactories are established for carrying out his system; he is also, as well as being very clever, a mild, reasonable, and gentlemanlike man, which gives him an advantage in dealing with the authorities; while Whitworth is somewhat more rough in his manner;—still I am myself of opinion that Whitworth's is the better principle; he is now preparing some guns for further trial; but things are gone so far with Armstrong, who is in much favour, that the other will have up-hill work to make his way; they are both of them rich men, and this matter is not so much for profit as for reputation."

One of the peculiarities of the military engineer's art is its cosmopolitan character; and the reputation in which Sir John Burgoyne was held abroad, led to frequent references to him by the military engineers of other countries. In this year, Major Brialmont of the Belgian Engineers, who was at issue with some of the

1859. On the fortifications at Antwerp.

authorities of his own country, on the subject of the proposed fortifications at Antwerp, referred the disputed points to Sir John Burgoyne. The reply of the latter was shown to the Belgian War Minister and to the late King Leopold; and the modifications in the works advocated by him, were eventually introduced in an amended project, and have been carried into execution.

*From* Sir John Burgoyne *to* Major Brialmont.

"The very flattering terms in which you have expressed your opinions of my qualifications, demand every attention on my part; and you have another strong claim on me as a British officer, by your most interesting and admirable history of the Duke of Wellington. I shall, therefore, frankly comply with your request, by the best judgment my humble means will afford, on the subject of your inquiry.

"It is not with the desire of returning compliment for compliment, but I can state with all sincerity, that since 1855, when the *Projet Keller* for Antwerp—with which, I presume, you were then identified—first became known to me by the publication of their letter to the Minister of War, I was so struck with its merits, that I never lost sight of it since, and am too happy to have an opportunity of recurring to the subject, by the more ample information with which you have now favoured me.

"Your specific inquiry, whether in my opinion the *corps de place* of a great fortress, consisting of an entrenched camp, having a wet ditch, should necessarily have revetted escarps, is easily answered. I should say, decidedly not; that in such a case the masonry revetment should be the exception—the rare exception—and not the rule; but, indeed, you have exhausted the argument in your Annexe No. 9, in which I entirely concur.

"Even suppose it were admitted, which I am not inclined at once to do, that, *abstractedly speaking*, a front with a wet ditch would be stronger for having an escarp of masonry, will any one assert that the extra expense to be incurred for it, in this case no less than 6,500,000 francs, could not be laid

1859.

out much more advantageously, in other means for improving the defensive power of the place?

On the fortifications at Antwerp.

"At this very time, the British engineers are projecting a new line for the Hilsea front at Portsmouth, where the ground is low, and the ditches will be wet; and though it is of moderate extent, no idea of applying revetted escarps ever entered into our minds for a moment.

"It has always appeared to me that engineers frequently commit an error in conforming to *rules* rather than to *principles* in their designs; and thus applying those laid down by Vauban and Cormontaigne, for a hexagon or octagon on plain ground, to other circumstances, whatever they may be.

"It is quite clear that the excess of precautions that are quite necessary for an insulated fort or a small fortress, would be superfluous, and even embarrassing, in a great entrenched camp, covering what may be termed an army. The style of works that were formidable at Sebastopol, would be utterly insignificant round a small circuit enclosing a moderate garrison.

"With regard to the propriety of maintaining the existing line of fortifications round the place, it seems to be admitted on all sides that the ground, if laid open and levelled, would be of great value to the community for the extension of the town, and probably add to its salubrity, as well as produce a very considerable sum by its sale.

"I cannot perceive what military advantages to compensate for these benefits, would be obtained by continuing to retain that line, provided the project of the great exterior *enceinte*, with its advanced forts and the two citadels, be established; while it would absorb armaments, and entail the expenses of continual subsequent maintenance.

"The project without it would be very complete, namely, a double grand *enceinte* adapted to the most vigorous and protracted defence, in which would be space for the contemplated force occupying it to act, and a last place of resort on the left bank of the river, covered by the two citadels.

"Another advantage attending this course would be, that the population would seek to establish themselves there on the new space, and in immediate connection with the present town,

1959. instead of encumbering the ground in rear of the new *enceinte*, which for purposes of defence, cannot be too open.

On the fortifications at Antwerp.

"The objections to the salient of the line at Berghem, you have already clearly answered, by explaining that they are not so valid as they appear, and that whatever amount of disadvantage may attend it, can be amply compensated for by additional means applied to that front.

"Although it may be presumptuous to offer opinions on works for a place that we have never visited, perhaps you will excuse me for simply adverting to some other matters of detail connected with Antwerp, that may be said to partake of general principles.

"Among the points on which I have imbibed an impression which seems to differ from the principles adopted in the proposed works for Antwerp are:—

"1. For such works as the outer detached forts, having fronts of only 300 *mètres*, whether straight, unbroken lines flanked by caponnières are not preferable to the bastioned form, as more simple, and affording greater interior space, while their front, or most exposed line for attack, would be better directed against enfilade; care, of course, being taken so to place or cover the caponnières, as to prevent their being ruined from a distance.

"2. Whether, in consideration of the improvement in fire-arms, particularly of the soldier's musket, in range and accuracy of fire, lines of defence where the space is sufficient, such as in fortifying on a straight line, or on a very flat arc, might not be lengthened to advantage to not less than 600 *mètres*, with an exterior side of 700 or 800 *mètres*.

"3. A great *enceinte*, like that proposed for Antwerp, is for the protection of what may be denominated an army; to be perfectly secure, while entire, from assault, and capable of retarding the approaches of a besieger by occasional battles with him, whenever in the course of his systematic approaches he may be necessarily weak in front.

"On such occasions, the motions of the troops advancing for the support of the outer detached forts, will probably be observed in sufficient time, to enable the besiegers to bring up reinforcements to resist them, and may be also much exposed to their field as well as siege artillery.

1859.

On the fortifications at Antwerp.

"It is possible that much of this might be guarded against, and a vast number of casualties avoided in their advance, and more particularly in their retreat, if a simple line of cover or screen could be thrown up or established even partially, if not entirely, between the gorges of the forts, without ditch or obstacle of any kind, but simply a screen composed chiefly of a bank of earth that infantry or even cavalry could pass freely.

"These screens, powerfully flanked as they would be by the forts, would, in addition, give the troops much cover, and general advantage over the assailants in any attempt to follow them up.

"4. With the same object, that is, to facilitate the *retours offensifs* of the defenders, and particularly for covering their return into the place, which might be long in defiling over the bridges, it would seem very desirable to provide ample spaces under good cover and well flanked, beyond the counterscarp of the continuous *enceinte*, not so much with any peculiar defensive properties, as to be readily and quickly entered, and to afford cover to the retiring masses.

"And considering the importance of ample and thoroughly secure communications in and out of that *enceinte*, the chance of the destruction of ordinary bridges, even by a blind fire from the enemy, and that such a place is not to be entered by narrow *trouées*, it may be a question whether the communications across the ditch might not be in many parts of substantial earthen embankments, with small openings for drawbridges.

"5. In such *battle-fields*, as these entrenched camps may be deemed, the important feature of defence is far less in the obstacle, such as escarp walls or great depth or width of ditch, than in the preservation intact of a powerful flank; and as the flanks alone of bastioned fronts on a straight line are liable to enfilade, it is of great consequence that they should be so placed and constructed, as not to be exposed to distant fire, either direct, enfilade or vertical. Casemates for them, therefore, are of primary importance. It is very essential also to secure in the most perfect manner the batteries in the flanks of the detached forts, in order to maintain their very influential action on the approaches to the collateral forts.

"The system Keller has an advantage at the present time, in

1859. being the one that keeps the enemy at the greatest distance, which is of importance on account of the progress making in the effective range of rifled cannon, some of which, constructed in England, have, at high angles, given a range of 8,400 *mètres* and with considerable accuracy of fire.

On the fortifications at Antwerp.

"I fear that you will find this long statement of crude ideas very uninteresting, and some of the observations perhaps may be inapplicable to the particular circumstances of the place."

During the progress of the works at Antwerp, other questions were referred to him by Major Brialmont; but as they were chiefly of a technical character, his replies would be of little interest to the general reader.

National defences. Circular railway.

A favourite proposition with many civil engineers, is a circular railway running round the coast of England, as a part of the national defences. A letter written by Sir John Burgoyne at this time to Mr. Sidney Herbert, the Secretary of State for War, gives very forcibly the military reasons against such a project.

"War Office, 1st December, 1859.

"My dear Mr. Herbert,

"I return to you Mr. ——'s plan for '*Additional National Defences*.'

"His specific is a continuous railway round the coast, immediately above high water, on which would be conveyed and served, any number of heavy guns to oppose a landing.

"It would seem to be a prevalent idea, for I have had precisely the same suggestion before me at various intervals, and at least half-a-dozen times—one so late as within the last month—and it quite surprises me how so delusive, not to say impracticable, a project can have been entertained by so many persons.

"It is contrary to every military maxim, and to good sense, to expect to be able to defend the immense extent of your outer frontier line, even on the sea; whether you can, by your fleets, prevent an enemy making the attack, is another thing; but to attempt to be prepared everywhere, is to be weak everywhere.

"Effective defence can only be by concentration on given

centres, from whence to diverge to the points of attack; the most useful railways then are those which are radii from the centre base to the outer circuit, and of the connecting lines, peculiarly those which are near, or at a moderate distance from, the centre. 1859. — Circular railway.

"The invaders, by the spread of their squadrons, would threaten a very long line on either flank of their main attack. If on any part, a landing were effected by a few hundred men, or the smallest party who could hold their ground for even an hour, it would be sufficient, with proper appliances, to break up the rail, and thus demolish the whole system, which is a bad imitative substitute for the wall of China! We have, then, to consider the enormous cost, and the difficulties. It must be prepared in time, and would take years in construction. The line, even for a few counties, would not be less than 600 or 800 miles, and much prolonged by necessarily following all the sinuosities of the shore; it must be carried within one narrow limit, in spite of soil, levels, or other impediments; it must be maintained constantly in good repair, and for little or no other use than this chance service; it must cross the mouths of harbours and rivers, and the fronts of all towns, and of every establishment and communication on the coast. It is manifest that, independent of cost of construction, and the assumed trifling value of the soil for it, the consequential damages and objections would be insuperable.

"The whole scheme appears to me to involve a maximum of expense and difficulties, for a minimum of useful effect.

"Yours, &c.,

"J. F. Burgoyne."

A letter he wrote about the same time, to Sir Howard Douglas, expresses very clearly and concisely his opinions upon some of the disputed points of national defence.

"8, Gloucester Gardens, Hyde Park,
"19th December, 1859.

"My dear Sir Howard,

"You ask me to undertake the ungracious task of letting you know 'what I see amiss' in your last publication.

1859. — Sir Howard Douglas on National Defences.

"I have only to say that I see nothing of the kind! I differ from you partially in several matters of detail, but you carry your main object through in so forcible and high-minded a manner, that it would be absurd to enter into discussions on minor matters; and besides, I have every reason to distrust my own judgment in opposition to yours, and still more when, as in some cases, you show that you are backed by other high authorities.

"I must tell you, however, that I have not read above half of the work. The treatises on Carnot, Modern German System of Fortification, and Entrenched Camps, are *studies* that I am forced to defer till I have a little more leisure, when I shall recur to them with much interest; but I flew at once to the matter on our National Defences, as one of immediate interest, and on which the public are as yet much at a loss. Your treatise on the subject in its various bearings will be most valuable, and will tend to correct many fallacies which are afloat, and to point out some system and order to be pursued, where at present is much confusion.

"I will venture to add extracts from one or two of my marginal remarks, on impressions in my mind in the perusal.

"I regret your expression of Armstrong's 'incomparable' gun. Armstrong is a most able man, and has done great things; all the examining authorities have been so infatuated by his production, that I never venture to throw cold water upon it. But he was aided by a sensible and somewhat lucky proceeding, in manufacturing his own gun, and one of admirable construction; while Lancaster, Whitworth, &c., bored out the old cast-iron blocks for their purpose—a material which is now well understood to be quite inefficient. Their guns therefore burst, and that at once throwing them out of the field, left Armstrong in full possession. From thence, he has had full play for perfecting his system, and credit is given to him exclusively, for many of the wonderful improved effects that are common to most of the others, such as great ranges and precision of fire, reduced charges, &c.

"My impression of Armstrong's system is that it will be enormously expensive, that its service is wanting in simplicity, and that it will be difficult to preserve the gun in

1859. — Sir Howard Douglas on National Defences.

order, when much exposed, and for long periods, with its numerous very minute grooves, &c. Now all this is admissible, and must be borne, if as good effects cannot be produced without those inconveniences; but I believe they can and will be; and therefore I should be inclined to modify the word 'incomparable,' which seems to imply that you had reached perfection.

"Holding, as I do, that a landing in face of an enemy is a most desperate undertaking, I should wish that the phrase relative to the landing at Aboukir, and in the Crimea, had been so modified as not to lead to the supposition, which it does in some degree, that you thought lightly of it. Aboukir was a magnificent operation; but certainly such an attack would not succeed now, against a British force equal to what the French had there, with modern appliances, and several days for preparation. The Crimean landing proved nothing, for it was totally unopposed; and now we, and still more the French, could improve greatly on that operation. That which I conceive you mean to establish is, that we cannot be everywhere in sufficient force to prevent a landing, which therefore, with a superior fleet, would no doubt be effected; and in that I quite concur.

"'Block ships' as a defence of estuaries, &c. I have on several occasions objected to the principle of what are called 'block ships'—that is, large old men-of-war, line-of-battle ships, and frigates—on account of expense, liability to the casualties of all ships, great draught of water, abstracting largely from the general naval resources, and so largely demanded for so many places, that they could never be forthcoming. My principle for estuaries and large rivers is rafts or lighters, admitting of great subdivision, easily prepared, and moved to and from moorings, or even into action, by the little local traffic steamers; a beautiful force could be readily thus organised at any of our great commercial ports.

"Your reasonings on the steam rams, as proposed by Admiral Sartorius, appear to me to be very forcible. A great iron manufacturer, some months ago, told me of similar impressions that he entertained.

"It does not sound like a good project to carry on a double advance by Kent and Essex, with the great estuary of the

1860. Thames between, while we possess the compact central base, with good communications from whence to advance in force against either.

Sir Howard Douglas on National Defences.

"The defensive positions between the south coast and London, are not to be compared to that of Torres Vedras, which, in addition to strength of front, was limited to a moderate extent between inaccessible flanks.

"Where I have the greatest doubts on your principles, is that of the management and value of your volunteers, irregulars, partisans, or guerillas. On your system, I think they would be too irregular in organization, and that the war in Spain is not a parallel case: there, it was a prolonged warfare, the French could penetrate anywhere, but had no particular advantage in doing so; and spread over that vast country, the guerilla system was very effective against their dispersed bodies. Whereas the war, on an invasion of England, would be over in three weeks, and the whole line of operations would not exceed a hundred miles. If we are reasonably prepared, the French will never attempt such an undertaking without a retreat. If there is a good chance of success, they may. A great battle will be fought between the coast and London: should we beat them, woe betide them! if they beat us, they will be in London in three days, and there dictate a peace, on the most generous terms, taking from us Gibraltar, Malta, Mauritius, the Channel Islands, and twenty millions as a contribution!!! and the whole will be over, without any opening for a guerilla warfare!

"I hope you will excuse the freedom with which I have given my ideas, which you have brought on yourself.

"Yours, &c.,

"J. F. Burgoyne."

'Cornhill Magazine.'

Shortly before the proposed issue of the 'Cornhill Magazine' on the 1st January, 1860, Sir John Burgoyne had been asked by Mr. Thackeray, the editor, to write an article for the first number, on the volunteer organization, at that time in its infancy. A letter from Mr. Thackeray, a few days after, gives an account of the undertaking.

"36, Onslow Square, S.W., 6th January, 1860. 1860.

"My dear General,

"I hope you will see that the 'Cornhill Magazine' enters the leading columns of the *Times* this morning, thanks to the excellent article with which you furnished us. I have heard the article talked of in a hundred places, and everywhere with praise. We ventured to add one very little sentence of consolation for the volunteers, for which I hope you will hold us harmless. The article has been of the greatest service to us. What I liked best in it, was the kindness and friendliness of the writer, who gave us his goodwill, his good name, and his help, at the outset of our venture, when all these were of such essential service to us. Letter from Mr. Thackeray.

"I think I needn't tell you the magazine has been an immense success; such a sale has never been known in England before. The editor and publisher are both reasonably elated, and the latter has determined to show his sense of gratitude, by inviting the contributors to dinner, *more Anglorum*. You, who have been such an efficient contributor, I hope will go through with your duty, and give us the honour of your company.

"Believe me, my dear Sir John,

"Gratefully and sincerely yours,

"W. M. Thackeray."

Owing to the difficulty of obtaining any appropriation for the purpose from the annual votes of Parliament, little had been done to improve the state of the defences of our dockyards up to 1859; but on Lord Palmerston resuming the reins of government in that year, he determined to make an energetic effort with this object, and propose to Parliament to construct the necessary fortifications, by means of a special loan. With this view, it was resolved to issue a Royal Commission, and to lay the report, and the evidence on which it was based, unreservedly before Parliament. As the War Minister required an independent opinion on the recommendations Royal Commission on defences.

1860. — Royal Commission on defences.

of the Commission, and there were reasons for selecting a president whose views would be untrammelled by his official position, or by previously declared opinions, it was decided that Sir John Burgoyne should not form a member of the Commission, and Sir Harry Jones, of the Royal Engineers, was appointed to this post. The report of the Commission was completed by the early part of 1860, and laid before Parliament in the same session.

In March 1860, shortly before Mr. Sidney Herbert brought the question under the notice of Parliament, he was in correspondence with Sir John Burgoyne, collecting facts and opinions for the occasion.

"War Office, Pall Mall, 5th March, 1860.

"My dear Mr. Herbert,

"You asked me some days ago, whether the failure in carrying the Duke of Richmond's project, between 1780 and 1790, for defences of our leading Arsenals, had not been much felt during the subsequent wars.

"I believe that no direct specific showing can be brought forward referring to it; but, indirectly, assuredly it was the cause of increased uneasiness, when measures of defence were thought to be peculiarly required, and of the necessity for increased forces, which it does not follow that there may be always time to collect.

"I do not know what decision Government may come to on the Report of the Commission on Defences, but I venture to enclose a short Memorandum of what appears to me to be the real value of some measure of the kind in a military view.

"Yours, &c.,

"J. F. Burgoyne."

*Memorandum.*

War Office, 5th March, 1860.

We may, I think, assume that no formidable invasion of this country could be made with any chance of success, against

1860.

Memorandum on national defences.

even moderate means of defence, unless the enemy had a decided naval superiority for the time in the Channel.

But with the known naval resources of the leading Maritime Powers, and the manner in which our own fleets may be necessarily dispersed for the security of our foreign possessions, we can never be sure of not being in inferior force at home, for some interval of time (and a short one would suffice), for such an attempt.

If made, we are aware, from many recorded projects by high French naval and military authorities, that it would be combined with a diversion to some out-station, where important injury might be done to cripple our warlike means, by an attack on one of our Arsenals, or to draw off our forces from where the main effort is to be made.

Under existing circumstances, with such means as we not only know *can* be prepared, but are actually available in France, some 20,000 troops, and an ample provision of artillery and other necessary appurtenances, could be rapidly conveyed to, and landed in the neighbourhood of, any of those Arsenals, and a very few days would be sufficient to master and destroy them. So short a time, indeed, that even without the co-operation of the actual invasion, but merely of a threatening, they might be surprised, perhaps, before a sufficient force could be brought to relieve them, because the attacking army, even in that latter case, would be in greater strength.

These alone, it is submitted, are quite sufficient reasons for applying works of defence to save those establishments, which are of vital importance, from the chance of destruction by any rapid operation.

Under this view, the Duke of Richmond, shortly before the French Revolutionary War, proposed a measure for the purpose, on a scale adapted to the system and means of warfare of that period, but which requires now to be greatly extended.

The proposition was lost by the Speaker's casting vote, and the consequence has been felt ever since, in increasing our sense of insecurity to meet emergencies that may arise at any time, on a very short warning; and ever since there have been endeavours to apply a remedy by a succession of efforts, feeble,

1860. — Memorandum on national defences.

however, and unsystematic, but in accordance with the Duke of Richmond's original proposition.

In addition, however, to the strong reasons for affording security to these places as Naval Arsenals, capacious strongholds, of the character proposed for them, would form most important rallying points, depôts, and places of refuge, for considerable districts, where scattered detachments, volunteers, and the armed population might be gradually collected, organised, equipped, and then disposed of as might seem best. Thus Dover, Portsmouth, Portland, Plymouth, and Pembroke, are all well situated for becoming, each of them, such a focus for refuge or action.

Without such points of support, a few thousand men of the enemy might be thrown into those districts, who would spread consternation far and near, and would break up all efforts to arrange and combine any measure of protection.

Such secure strategical points in our possession, would render it great rashness in an enemy to attempt such enterprises, while they would at the same time give great confidence to our own people.

These places, however, cannot be improvised, they must be prepared beforehand; but when once established, they would be lasting, and always ready as a basis of defence.

Another great consideration in their favour, is, that they need not necessarily, that is for exclusively defensive service, become a drain, except in a very small degree, on our Regular forces, all of whom will be so urgently required in the field; their garrisons may be essentially of Volunteers, and even not requiring those that are most elaborately equipped and prepared for the field.

Bodies of a local stationary force—men remaining at their own homes, and engaged to the moment of the emergency in their ordinary occupations; without marching equipments, but instructed in the use of the different arms, and the most necessary simple exercises, under a few good Staff and Departmental Officers—may be expected to make brilliant defences within fortifications. And if this be doubted, we may refer to the conduct of the Turks, who, under the most imperfect military organization, show an obstinacy in defending even

inferior entrenchments, that frequently neutralises the efforts of besiegers of the most perfectly organized military powers. 1860.

J. F. BURGOYNE.

Memorandum on national defences.

At the request of Mr. Sidney Herbert, Sir John Burgoyne also wrote an article this year, in support of the proposals of the Royal Commission, which appeared in the October number of the 'Westminster Review.' It expresses so fully his opinions on all the vexed questions of national defence, that this reference to it will, it is hoped, be sufficient excuse for the absence in this work of any further papers on this much discussed subject.

In 1862, he was consulted by Sir George Cornewall Lewis, respecting the proposed abandonment of the Ionian Islands:— 1862.

Abandonment of the Ionian Islands.

*Memorandum on a Note from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, sent to* SIR GEORGE CORNEWALL LEWIS *in December*, 1862.

THE late Duke of Wellington having had much influence at the time when the great Council of European States consigned the Ionian Islands to the military protection of Great Britain, and having subsequently been a party to a considerable expenditure on defences for Corfu, the military authorities have assumed, without question, its military importance, and have hitherto only studied and reported upon the best means of giving it strength.

As now put, however, for a free and deliberate opinion, and as applicable to present times, I must say that I am inclined to adopt a new view, and to consider that our only advantage in possession of the islands, is of a negative rather than a positive value, and that we should be gainers by shaking off the charge, if we could do so with honour, and in a manner that might prevent them from falling into other powerful and adverse hands; it is with great deference to his judgment, that I cannot concur in the importance attached to Corfu by Sir C. Young.

1862. — Abandonment of the Ionian Islands.

The only one of the islands of any military value is Corfu, and that solely as a naval station.

Even as a naval station it is very defective: it has no harbour, basins, or docks for men-of-war, but merely a roadstead,—a very fine one it is true; but though well protected against weather, it is much exposed to cannonading and bombardment even from the sea, being only partially covered by the small Island of Vido. It has also an advantage in two distinct entrances, one north and one south, which would render a naval blockade more difficult.

It may be doubted whether France, at the present date, would much covet its possession; and to Russia it could hardly be of service, but as a political means of increasing influence with the Kingdom of Greece, and not for any particular military advantage that I can understand.

It may be assumed that the Ionian Islands were consigned to us as a boon and a concession, and not as an onerous charge, and therefore there may be the less delicacy in our showing a willingness to consult the manifest desires of the population by abandoning them, with the consent of the Great Contracting Powers.

The apparent wish of the people, and the least objectionable disposition for the Islands, would probably be to attach them to the Kingdom of Greece, which did not exist when the Protectorate was established; but this should be effected rather by some principle of a Federal Union, which would give them a degree of independent importance, than by sinking them into an insignificant integral portion of that kingdom, subject to be dealt with at its caprice.

There is one consideration that may be well taken into account, and certainly has great weight with me as a military engineer, which is, that the foreign possessions of Great Britain are so extensive and disseminated, and there is so much reluctance, or perhaps real difficulty in this country to provide, even in a moderate degree, for their military protection by works of fortification, armaments, and, above all, garrisons, that it is to be expected that in case of war with a maritime power, we should suffer losses which would be very lowering to our pride and reputation, if not of more substantial importance,

and therefore it may not be impolitic to reduce the number, where it can be done without sacrifice of any great interests; the vague idea that our fleets will protect all these possessions is preposterous, considering their extent and dispersion, and the paramount importance of providing amply, particularly during the first year or two of war, for the security of England, which is itself in as defenceless a state. 1862. Abandonment of the Ionian Islands.

The standing defences of Corfu are as yet in a most imperfect condition; they consist of the three distinct posts of Fort Neuf, the Citadel, and Vido; and unless the garrison were very strong, a besieging force would penetrate rapidly from San Salvador through the town and establish itself between Fort Neuf and the Citadel, by which the communication between them would be cut off, and the three posts isolated from one another; and each, confined to its own narrow limits, would be easily reduced.

A system for the improvement of the defences, however, has been recently studied, and a project devised for the purpose, which would make it a place of considerable strength, by the occupation principally of Fort Abraham, San Salvador, and the Raimondo Bastion, by strong works, with one or two intervening supplementary works of minor importance.

These great improvements would however require a garrison of about 4000 men, and would cost probably as much as 250,000*l.*, and in their execution would interfere with much private property and civil interests, that would be difficult to adjust.

In dealing with the whole question, it is to be remembered that the Ionian States were bound to provide funds in some degree towards the expense of the military occupation, and that up to a certain period, they had paid to the British Treasury to the aggregate amount of about 800,000*l.*, when the charge was found too heavy, and *all* supplies discontinued, till Lord Seaton, their Lord High Commissioner, suggested the propriety of a compromise, namely, to restrict the subsidy to such fixed amount as the States might reasonably provide, viz., 25,000*l.* per annum, which it is believed was assented to, and that it had been paid regularly ever since; but such an amount, which could not support a single regiment of 500 men, forms an insignificant portion of the entire cost incurred in the occupation.

I have ventured to offer the above opinions more frankly and

1862. fully, because there is a power of consulting superior authorities, to correct any that may be in error.

Abandonment of the Ionian Islands.

His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief has himself been stationed at Corfu, and there are two officers of rank, and of the highest military reputation, namely, Lord Seaton, now commanding the forces in Ireland, and Sir Howard Douglas, residing in London, who were each of them Lord High Commissioners of the Ionian States, and who would be most competent to give opinions on the military value of Corfu, taking into consideration every interest; perhaps the Admiralty might be consulted on the matter as a naval question.

The following characteristic letter was written by him, in reply to a complaint by the Commanding Engineer in China, that he had not been consulted respecting certain operations by the General commanding at the station:—

"War Office, London, 5th August, 1862.

"My dear Colonel,

"I have just received your confidential Memorandum, dated 9th June, complaining that your opinions have been neglected, and even declined, by the general in command, and expressing a desire to have instructions for your future guidance in such cases.

"I have no hesitation whatever in informing you, that you have no claim whatever from your position, to be consulted in any way by the general, and any remonstrance you might offer, in consequence, would be more or less an act of insubordination.

"Military command is absolute. A general may consult none, or whomever, and to any extent, he pleases. It is usual to consult the heads of branches, such as the Artillery, Engineers, or Commissariat, on arrangements appertaining to those branches, in any contemplated operations,—but even that is not obligatory: and it does not appear that in your case, any inconvenience was occasioned by a neglect in that respect, as you mention that 'the engineering operations throughout the campaign were eminently successful;' but as regards other proceedings of the troops, such as those to which you refer as

having been in your opinion injudicious, any consulting with you upon them by the general would have been quite optional on his part. 1863.

"As to councils of war, they are proverbially a bad resource in a campaign, and it is considered weak in any general to apply to them; they are only necessary when independent authorities are acting together, like army and navy, or the combined forces of different countries.

"The general in command does not seem to have required your opinions, as on many occasions has happened to us all, and we have no right whatever in that case to obtrude them upon him.

"Yours, &c.,

"J. F. Burgoyne."

Canada and the United States.

During the war of secession in the United States, Sir John thus expressed his views of the encroaching policy of the North American States, and of the military position of Canada:—

"The United States of America have for very many years, carried on an arrogant bullying system towards Great Britain, which has been most successful.

"After every attempt to obtain moderate views from them, the threats and pressure have been so great upon this country, that '*rather than go to war*' one point after another has been yielded in rights and territories; this is particularly displayed in the manner in which the frontiers of Canada have been pushed back, not only to deprive us of territory, but to give the States the most advantageous military positions in case of a war between us.

"Our submissive yielding on these occasions has been so much a matter of course, that it may be considered a subject of satisfaction that it never occurred to them to require the Isle of Wight from us; since if they had, the question would not have been what claim they could make to it, but whether it was worth our while to '*go to war*' for it, which has been in fact the true solution of all our degrading concessions.

"There is no doubt that a war with the United States would

1863. Canada and the United States.

have been attended with frightful losses and expense to us, independent of those attending on direct active hostilities; their roving cruisers would have embarrassed our commerce to an enormous extent by captures, and by the means necessary for preventing them; keeping out of view their own losses, which at the same time may be admitted would be of far inferior importance, they were enabled to profit by this terrifying vision, and the perpetual bugbear of the invasion of Canada, so as to induce us to yield point after point, each of comparatively minor importance, while the result was not attributed to the true feeling of a cautious policy on our part, but boastfully held up as proofs of their superior power and energy.

"It is more than doubtful how far we have been right in adopting so yielding a policy; the effect on them has produced that of a spoiled child; and our resistance to their exactions when we would not, as they seemed to require, take direct action with them against the seceded States, has raised their fury against us to the greatest pitch; they are in fact confounded by our sudden cessation of absolute submission to their will.

"Since the development of the vast military means required for the war with the Southern States, they now look forward, with far greater confidence than ever, to their power of reducing Canada, which is held up *in terrorem* to counterbalance the advantages we might be inclined to conceive we possessed, in a recognition and active alliance with the Southern States; they do not, however, rely so much on this as to do more than coquette with it, and try it as a feeler.

"The real value of this threat, however, is a subject of some delusion, and is worthy of being analysed as regards its probable effect, if carried out, on the three parties principally concerned, Canada itself, Great Britain, and the United States.

"Canada no doubt has every reason to resist it to the utmost. Its subjection to Great Britain is of the mildest kind; it has a self-government on a most liberal scale; it possesses all its own territory as national property, except a few detached military stations, which would be a burden to it; and it has its own voluntary taxation for its own exclusive benefit—its noted attachment then to the mother country can hardly be

a matter of surprise;—whereas, if conquered by the United States, how different would be its condition! 1863.

Canada and the United States.

"For a time it might probably be held as a conquered province, and subject to all the tyranny, contributions, and exactions to which such a position must lead; but even when subsequently amalgamated with the Union, its interests would be subservient to those of the general body, to the more influential older States, to general laws far less favourable to its own peculiar district, and to a participation in an enormous national debt, with its accompanying direct sacrifices by taxation, or indirect by duties.

"Assuredly, then, Canada would be most grievously injured by the change, and must be well aware of it.

"As regards Great Britain, she would certainly not allow such a possession to be abstracted from her by force, without making most formidable efforts in opposition; and if disengaged at the time from any other enemy, those efforts in aid of the active local power would probably be far greater and more effective than the States are inclined to anticipate; but suppose the worst to happen, and that Canada were finally wrested from us, the loss would be intrinsically as nothing: we derive no direct advantages from Canada, and indirectly the same mutual good feeling would always subsist between us, while, at the same time, we should be freed from all future claims upon us for protection, in periods of differences with the United States.

"Of the three parties, it may be supposed however that the States would be clear gainers, but such is not the case.

"In the first place, as above stated, the conquest itself would cost enormous sacrifices, in spite of the fallacies which seem to be promulgated of late in America, by which we are almost taught to believe that nothing can lead to a greater degree of prosperity in a country than a formidable state of warfare; and then, even if successful, what would it produce but the addition of another powerful and thoroughly discordant element into the previously shaky Union?"

Specimens of his correspondence with the Belgian officer of engineers, Major Brialmont, have been already given. Some letters which passed in the years 1863,

1863. 1864, and 1865, between him and the Generals Totten and Todleben, chiefs of the engineer services in their respective countries, will further illustrate his cordial relations with foreign officers of engineers.

*To* General TOTTEN, United States Engineers.

"War Office, London,
14th February, 1863.

"MY DEAR GENERAL TOTTEN,

Letter to General Totten on the war of secession.

"I cannot send forward our formal acknowledgments on receipt of the Military Works which you have been kind enough to send for the service of my department in this country, without adding in a private communication to you my best thanks for that liberal contribution, which contains so much interesting matter.

"I take the opportunity of condoling with you most sincerely on the deplorable strife in which your country is so unhappily involved; and deeply regretting the shock that it gives to the progress you were making in greatness as a nation, we hope the evil will be but temporary, though there will be a great deal to make up before you can be all right again.

"Besides the great political and social considerations in this frightful contest, I have naturally looked at it with some *professional* interest. The two leading military features that have struck me in it have been—one, the extraordinary fact, hitherto unknown in history, of the number of great battles fought, no one of which was attended by important results; and the other, that the armies of a nation whose men are notoriously full of energy and courage, and which possesses officers of high degree of professional acquirements, as evinced in the very books you have sent me, should have so often failed in their enterprises.

"The first I attribute to the strength of your armies being out of proportion to the physical state of the country in which the war is carried on, which I assume to be thinly populated for its vast extent, and what we should call wild, and consequently wanting in resources and communication.

"In Europe, hundreds of thousands of men can move in all

directions, and obtain supplies for their wants, while at the seat of war in your country, the defending party, even if well beaten, fall back upon their previously arranged means, and can leave to such large forces following them, a country impenetrable. 1863. — Letter to General Totten on the war of secession.

"The failure in the achievement of your armies, I attribute to their imperfect organization, from the want of a sufficient standing army as a basis.

"At the commencement of this warfare, the army of the United States consisted, I believe, of only about 25,000 men, and perhaps even many of them (of the officers at least) were not staunch and true to their colours; but what is that number as a nucleus for several hundreds of thousands to be immediately brought into the field? I have no doubt but that your forces in that case were literally not only raw recruits, but without officers and non-commissioned officers who knew anything of their business to instruct and lead them.

"The army is much more of a profession than many civilians are inclined to suppose; and to be at all respectable, requires much more than the collecting together of any number of the bravest men.

"In England an argument has been frequently used against the necessity for increase to our standing military forces in peace time, by calling to mind how admirably regiments who have been hastily made up of militia and raw recruits, and immediately taken into the field and into action, have behaved so as to have been compared to veterans; but it was forgotten that those men joined skeleton regiments of the line, consisting of old and capital officers and non-commissioned officers, and perhaps with a slight sprinkling of old soldiers—a very different thing from a force where *all*, even those that should lead and direct, are quite new to the business.

"The same cause of having a nucleus of many of the regular army, officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers among the early French Revolutionary regiments in a great measure enabled them to gain the successes with such *raw* material, which appeared so unaccountable at the time.

"One other matter has appeared in the published accounts of your contests, which somewhat puzzles me; namely, the

1863. — Letter to General Totten on the war of secession.

influence in various actions attributed to your gunboats and flotillas. That in your great rivers they should afford an enormous advantage in the conveyance of supplies and troops, and for transport in general, can be readily understood; but I do not comprehend the influence that has been attributed to their action in conflict with the troops on shore, even when the forces have been somewhat considerable.

"All these are subjects thoroughly understood by you in America, and I only advert to them as showing the impression we form of them in England.

"My dear General,

"Yours very faithfully,

"J. F. BURGOYNE."

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*From* General TOTTEN, United States Engineers.

"Washington, June 19th, 1863.

"MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

Letter from General Totten, U.S. army.

"With your permission, I will ignore the lapse of time since your interesting letter reached me. There were several causes delaying my acknowledgments, with which I will not trouble you; but I frankly confess, among these was, from week to week, the sanguine expectation that I could announce to you some great success on the part of the Union forces. While I have not been allowed this gratification, it must not be inferred that there has not been nevertheless a general gain for the Union cause, both in variety and magnitude.

"Your reflections on the incidents of the war have all the characteristic marks of the high professional sagacity that the military world has long been taught to ascribe to you.

"Among the points that you have seized as accounting for some of the partial results of our victories, is that of the uncultivated state of the theatre of war (excepting only eastern Virginia, which was exhausted in the early part of the first campaign and not since cultivated). A victorious army must carry every ounce of supply with it, upon lines of very great length. This, with our best generals, has often prevented any result of victory beyond the retreat of the enemy out of a region that he had already devastated.

1863.

Letter from General Totten, U.S. army.

"But there has been, undoubtedly, bad generalship on both sides, and occasionally misbehaviour in battle on the part of the troops on both sides: considering how the troops have been formed, however, this, on both sides again, has been rare; and, excepting in a very few instances, of little moment. Generally, the fighting has been obstinate and severe; and the one or the other party has succeeded more often because of better management than of greater numbers.

"Our brigades and divisions are generally well handled; the smaller bodies, as battalions, very well. The mistakes, when they have occurred, have been in the disposition and movements of the great masses, corps d'armée of 20,000 to 30,000 men, and of whole armies of 100,000 men or more. To be safe against mistakes with these, demands nothing short of knowledge acquired in actual warfare on the like scale, by a genius that has been 'born, not made.' What we want in this respect, opportunity, time, and Providence will, I doubt not, supply.

"Though the vicissitudes of war, the oscillations of fortune have, like those of the pendulum, been both ways, there has been a continual gain in events with us, like the moments of time, little of themselves often, but great in accumulation. Notwithstanding a late serious defeat, our cause was never more hopeful, never more heartily supported by the people, who will listen to no terms of compromise, no doubts as to the complete suppression of the rebellion. In this opinion I have never wavered, and am now stronger than ever.

"The resources of the Union are as exhaustless as its spirit: every dollar of the cost of the war is, so to speak, expended in the country; and the result, with those who deal in dollars, or who make or raise what dollars purchase, is an unprecedented prosperity. On the other side, there is a growing impoverishment, with no chance or hope of alleviation within themselves: and but for material and moneyed aid received from abroad, there would, from this cause, have been submission and peace months ago.

"You must not, my dear General, be misled by our party politics, nor by the reciprocal abuse of the newspapers on the two sides. Both parties—*all* parties—are for the continuance

1864. — Letter from General Totten, U.S. army.

of the war 'to the bitter end:' none dare profess to the people otherwise. There must be some party cry—and therefore some are for the constitution pure, that is, with the existence of slavery as heretofore — others say the opportunity must be profited of to root out slavery altogether. There are two grand divisions, with some local or personal divarications, here and there. All parties insist on suppressing the rebellion, and will earnestly co-operate to that end; but all desire so to manage the interim, that they shall profit most in political sway in the next Presidency, and all its retinue of office.

"At this moment, military events of importance are pending. Lee (formerly one of my officers, an able man as well as a noble gentleman) has a raid in Pennsylvania and Maryland, and they say threatens Baltimore and even this city; but nothing serious to us can come of his movements, without the grossest mismanagement. But I will not trouble you with guesses and conjectures.

"I send, at the request of Colonel Gordon, to your address, two copies of a congressional document on permanent fortifications and sea-coast defences. There is also one copy for the Colonel. It has become scarce, or I would gladly send more.

"Please command my services always, and believe me to be, my dear Sir John,

"Faithfully yours,

"J. G. TOTTEN."

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*To* General TOTTEN, United States Engineers.

"War Office, London,
25th January, 1864.

"MY DEAR GENERAL TOTTEN,

Letter to General Totten, U.S. army.

"Lieutenant-Colonel Gallwey, an intelligent officer of our Royal Engineers, is under orders to proceed to the United States, with the sanction of your government, to obtain what information he can, on the improvements, alterations, or expedients applied to the implements, devices, and usages in the art of war,—particularly to those of the Engineer branch of the service,—which the experience of the late two years' extensive warfare in the United States may have produced; and

I would request the favour of your affording him any assistance in your power. 1864.

Letter to General Totten, U.S. army.

"I hope you will understand that he is not going out as a privileged *spy:* his object is in a straightforward manner to obtain as much general useful information as possible for the benefit of our own service; it is not for him to presume to criticize the proceedings of your officers, with whose difficulties or motives of action he could not possibly be acquainted; and he is specially charged to drop at once all researches into any matter on which the authorities or officers show the least desire to maintain any reserve; he does not seek for instance for plans of any of your distinct forts at New York, or elsewhere, but certainly would be glad of one of *a* fort or part of one, showing your most modern improved system of construction, application of materials, interior arrangements for the convenience and efficiency of the service, &c.; in short, a good understanding of the progress in the service and art of military engineering that your countrymen are so likely to have produced at this eventful period of the general introduction of rifle guns, armour plating, &c.

"After all, though we are bound to respect the desires of those whom we visit, you and I, General, know very well that for any *sinister* object we might have, we can obtain all that is most important by cursory view as ordinary passers by, and by open ordinary conversation; and on that principle, as well as for the duty of being courteous to strangers, I have myself constantly advocated the opening of all our sources of military engineering information to all the world! In stating this, however, I have no desire to press for more favour for Lieutenant-Colonel Gallwey than what you think it right generally to concede.

"My dear General Totten,

"Yours very faithfully,

"J. F. BURGOYNE."

1865.

*To* General Todleben.

"War Office, London, February, 1865.

"My dear General,

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Letter to General Todleben.

"Colonel de Novitzky informed me that you were desirous of obtaining some account of the pack-saddle equipment of our Engineer Field Train; on which I send you such papers as I have been able to collect, and will, with pleasure, add any more explicit particulars should you need them, that you will be kind enough to ask for.

"Allow me to mention, however, that this equipment is of very recent introduction, and many proposed modifications in the assortment, packing, and arrangements of the tools and stores, will probably be ultimately adopted.

"With regard to the pack-saddle itself, I am a great advocate for the kind used in Spain, from the experience I had of its many advantages during my campaigns in that country, and I still hope to introduce it, if not entirely, at least as an useful supplementary article into our service.

"I enclose a description of this Spanish pack-saddle, drawn up at my desire by one of our officers at Gibraltar; but I fear that without seeing the articles, you will find the account somewhat obscure.

"Their great merits are that they are light, cheap, very easily made and repaired anywhere; when carried or kept as an article of store, they are contained in a particularly small compass, consisting of nothing but cloths and empty canvas bags, to which straw, the only other ingredient can be added when required for use.

"They have no wood nor metal in their composition, except the very few buckles and hooks for fastening them and their loads; and even should an animal become galled, the driver himself can adjust the straw stuffing so as to relieve the part injured.

"Though the principles of the whole system are very simple, it is very desirable to study the *practical* application of them from one who is thoroughly habituated to them, namely, the Spanish muleteer, by which many little resources are perceived to facilitate the arrangements, particularly in the manner of fixing the load, that can hardly be described otherwise.

"To these papers I have added another set, in which you may take some little interest. 1865.

"When you did us the favour of inspecting our works of defence now in progress, it was impossible for us not to be desirous of profiting by any remarks made on them by an officer of Engineers of your eminence. Letter to General Todleben.

"I accordingly demanded from the several Officers who accompanied you at the different places, an account of the observations made by you on the course we were pursuing; I drew up a hasty, rough abstract of the substance of these Reports, which, with a few remarks, I submitted to His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, for his perusal.

"I venture to send you a copy of this cursory Memorandum, which will remind you of intercommunications, that to us were most interesting and gratifying, and will exhibit to you the great respect and esteem in which you are held by myself, and the corps of Royal Engineers of this country.

"My dear General, &c.,

"J. F. BURGOYNE."

*From* General TODLEBEN *to* General Sir JOHN BURGOYNE.

"Palais Michel, St. Pétersbourg,

"MON TRÈS-VÉNÉRABLE GÉNÉRAL, le $\frac{29 \text{ mai}}{11 \text{ juin}}$ 1865.

"Je vous remercie sincèrement pour la bonté que vous avez eue de m'envoyer des notices bien intéressantes sur les selles de fardeaux, usitées dans le train du génie anglais et en Espagne. Je vous serai infiniment reconnaissant, en recevant encore de votre part des notions sur un sujet qui m'intéresse beaucoup, si toutefois vos occupations nombreuses vous le permettent de faire. Votre opinion sur cette matière possède à mes yeux une importance toute particulière, vu la grande expérience que vous avez eu occasion d'acquérir pendant les guerres de la Péninsule. Letter from General Todleben.

"J'ai été agréablement surpris de voir que vous ayez jugé digne de prendre en considération les observations que j'ai énoncées, en jetant un coup d'œil rapide sur vos remarquables nouvelles fortifications — les observations que vous avez eu l'extrême complaisance de me faire parvenir me rappelleront

1865. — Letter from General Todleben.

toujours l'accueil cordial que j'ai trouvé en Angleterre et les jours que j'y ai passés dans votre aimable société, entouré de Messieurs les officiers du corps du Génie anglais.

"Après avoir pris connaissance de ces notices, j'ai trouvé que les observations, que j'ai pris la liberté de faire, par rapport aux différents détails des fortifications en construction—sont en général reproduites conformément à mes idées. Mais en même temps, par un mésentendu, on m'attribue d'avoir condamné entièrement l'emploi des enceintes continues, pour les remplacer dans tous les cas possibles par des forts détachés. Un jugement pareil est tout contraire à ma manière de voir. Il y a des ingénieurs qui sont partisans absolus des lignes continues, ou bien des forts détachés. Il y a aussi des ingénieurs qui sont de l'avis que le tracé bastionné est la seule solution possible du problème de la fortification; d'autres sont au contraire presque aussi partials pour le tracé polygonal. Des idées pareilles, par trop absolues, ne font qu'entraver le progrès de l'art de la fortification, et empêchent à l'ingénieur d'agir selon les circonstances. Quant à moi, je suis bien loin d'être partisan d'une défense basée exclusivement sur l'emploi de forts détachés, ou bien sur celui d'un système quelconque, soi-disant supérieur à tous les autres.

"Je considère au contraire comme efficace, toutes les mesures au moyen desquelles on parvient d'atteindre le but proposé, en prenant en considération les moyens dont on dispose, le nombre des troupes de la garnison, toutes les propriétés du terrain, etc. etc.

"Ce sont ces considérations qui m'engagent à vous envoyer sous ce pli mes observations sur ce sujet; je prends en même temps la liberté de vous prier de vouloir bien les soumettre (si vous le jugez convenable) au jugement bienveillant de son Altesse Royale le Duc de Cambridge, en transmettant à son Altesse ma profonde gratitude pour la grâce qu'il n'a cessé de me témoigner durant mon séjour en Angleterre.

"Veuillez agréer, mon Général, l'expression sincère de la haute considération et des sentiments respectueux

"De votre tout dévoué,

"Édouard de Todleben."

The contents of the letter which follows, were as gratifying as they were unexpected, and in the long course of my association with Sir John Burgoyne, I cannot call to mind anything which appeared to give him so much pleasure and satisfaction. 1865.

*From* Viscount PALMERSTON *to* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE.

"94, Piccadilly, 13th March, 1865.

"MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

"I have been authorized by the Queen, to offer you the appointment of Constable of the Tower and Custos Rotulorum of the Tower Hamlets, as an honourable acknowledgment of your long and meritorious services; and I shall be glad to hear from you that this appointment will be agreeable to you. Appointed Constable of the Tower.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

"8, Gloucester Gardens, Hyde Park,
14th March, 1865.

"MY DEAR LORD PALMERSTON,

"As in duty and affection bound, I beg to express my earnest acknowledgments to Her Majesty for the offer of the highly honourable appointment of Constable of the Tower, which I accept with gratitude. But I have another duty to perform, which is, to tender to your Lordship my very warm thanks for the part that I feel conscious you have taken in having this honour conferred upon me.

"All the contemporaries and superiors with whom I have actually been engaged in the public service, and who kindly thought me deserving of notice, have passed away; and I have long found myself indebted to your Lordship, on whom I have no claim whatever, except your favourable opinion, for *repeated* honours and benefits, of which this last is in continuation, and stands with the rest peculiarly high in my estimation, from the source whence they have emanated.

"My dear Lord Palmerston,

"Your faithful servant,

"J. F. BURGOYNE."

1865. Some correspondence which has preceded will have indicated that the late Earl of Rosse, a man of singular mechanical genius, was probably the first person who conceived the idea of plating ships with iron, to enable them to resist the effect of heavy shot. A letter from him at this date, gives an account of the reception with which his proposal was met in this country.

"14, Adelaide Crescent, Brighton,
September 15th, 1865.

"DEAR SIR JOHN,

Lord Rosse on iron-clad ships.

"You have so often reminded me of our correspondence at the beginning of the Russian war, about the project of casing ships with iron, that perhaps it may interest you to know the sequel. As I thought that nothing but iron could cope with granite, and as you did not suggest any insurmountable difficulties; as, moreover, the Engineers I had an opportunity of speaking to, however sceptical at first, gradually seemed to come round, I thought it might be useful to give a hint on the subject to the authorities. Mr. Nassau Senior was a great friend of Lord Lansdowne, who was a member of the Government. Moreover, Lord Lansdowne had not the same prejudices against science and everything belonging to it, as official personages usually had at that time, who believed nothing which was not the result of pure practice. It appeared to me that it might be well to mention the subject to Mr. Nassau Senior, with the view to his drawing Lord Lansdowne's attention to it. Mr. Senior at once entered into the subject with his usual energy; but he did not think that Lord Lansdowne, at his age, and without professional prestige, would be able to effect anything. He advised me to raise a discussion in the House of Lords; my objection however to that was, I should only be giving the Russians notice to prepare bigger guns. He said the next best thing would be to communicate with the Duke of Newcastle, who, though unacquainted with such subjects, was a man of great energy, and that he perhaps would put some pressure on the Lords of the Admiralty; that the Lords of the Admiralty, though thoroughly conversant with routine business, had not the general knowledge necessary

to enable them to deal with new subjects; and that if I wrote to them, they would merely throw the letter into the waste-paper basket. I wrote accordingly to the Duke of Newcastle, stating that I had discussed the question with the most competent men, and that I had no doubt as to the results of calculation: first, that five-inch plates would be amply sufficient to cope with the Russian guns; and second, that vessels of no very great size would safely carry them. The Duke no doubt sent my letter to the Admiralty, and I presume it speedily found its way into the waste-paper basket. It would have been wiser, as it turned out, to have acted upon Senior's first suggestion, and through the House of Lords, to have endeavoured to stir up the officials, and to have called upon the Admiralty to give reasons for their inaction. Vessels might have been constructed in time, which would have entered Sebastopol, and taken the batteries in reverse. As to the future, you seem to think the guns will beat the ships. There is a limit, however, in the nature of things, to the power of guns, and that limit, I think, will be reached sooner than many expect.

1865. — Lord Rosse on iron-clad ships.

"The last time Mr. Nassau Senior was with us, we talked these questions over. He was a man of very clear mind, but not a mathematician or mechanic. He was anxious to obtain information for his friend Sir G. Lewis. The question seemed to me to take this form:—what is the most powerful gun which men will be able to construct of existing material? certainly a very general question. A formula sufficient to answer that question under all circumstances, was soon obtained. The first result was that the projectile should be spherical; then, given the minimum initial velocity which would give a sufficiently good trajectory, and given the pressure per square inch within the interior of the chamber which the material of the gun could bear without being crushed, it was easy to calculate the diameter of the largest gun which would stand. Before I gave a statement of the principle to Mr. Senior, I submitted the investigation to Mr. Purser, a very able mathematician, now Professor of Mathematics in the Queen's University, then private tutor to my son. He had the subject a week before him, and then gave in his full adhesion. I can have no doubt,

1865. — Lord Rosse on iron-clad ships.

therefore, that all is right. Indeed, from what I read of the Shoeburyness experiments, I believe practical men are beginning to feel what calculation had predicted, that we are approaching the limits which the nature of material has set to the power of guns. As to ships, provided that no greater height above water is insisted upon than that of the *Scorpion* or *Wyvern*, I think that we may easily plate them so as to defy the largest guns. We must have beam in proportion to the thickness of the plates, and we must have great length, if we require much speed, but not otherwise. I have great faith in the power of calculation, if we proceed cautiously; and I believe there is but little of the information which was obtained at Shoeburyness, which might not have been previously worked out on purely theoretical considerations. I met Whitworth at Portsmouth, during the visit of the French fleet. He said they had now a prospect of obtaining better material for guns, that may perhaps extend a little the boundary line between the possible and impossible; but it can in no way invalidate the main result to which calculation points.

"Believe me to be, dear Sir John,

"Truly yours,

"ROSSE."

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"Brighton, 16th September, 1865.

"MY DEAR LORD ROSSE,

"You have evidently given much consideration to the very arduous problems connected with armour-plating for men-of-war; and I know no one better able to form decisive judgments on them than one of your scientific, mechanical, and searching mind. To me, however, it is still full of difficulties, which I am quite unable to reconcile. First, to provide a covering that should be shot proof, entailing such a great additional weight to the structure of the ship as shall much lessen the capability of carrying its other necessary appurtenances of guns, ammunition, fuel, provisions, and stores, &c. Then the distribution of that extra weight round its contour, so different from the principles of diffusing a load for a good sea-going ship, hitherto thought best, are problems for nautical

consideration that do not appear to be solved up to this time, except perhaps partially by having ships of enormous size. 1865.

"Then you rely much more than I do on the power of the 4½-inch or 5-inch plating, backed with timber, to resist shot from guns that there is no doubt can be easily manufactured. What is called invulnerable is that which is not perforated by a single or a few dispersed shot; but *my* requirement would be the withstanding a degree of *battering* by a number.

"I do not presume to take up the subject of the contest of ship against ship in all its phases, which I leave to naval men; my reflections have been turned entirely to shore batteries as opposed to ironclads, and in particular to the defence of entrances to harbours, to rivers, &c., of moderate width—say, where the channels for the vessels do not exceed from 1000 to 1500 yards from the shore. Forts *versus* ships.

"On the land, then, there will be probably from 20 to 200 guns of the best of the day (according to the importance of the station), bearing on the approach and on the passage itself; they will be dispersed if possible, and the more they can be on elevated sites, up to 80 or 100 feet above the water, the better, as the decks of the vessels, which are imperfectly protected, will then be more exposed than the sides. As the vessels approach end on, they will afford a considerable and very fair target to the batteries, even at great distances; the part exposed being the decks, even from low batteries, the firing from which will be at an elevation. When entering the passage, every shot *must* tell; for as the ship cannot run its own length during the time of the shot's flight—the guns being all laid on a concentrated part, and point blank, and at a well-known elevation, and fired when the bow is on the line of sight—she must be hit by every shot; and if fired by signal in salvos, it may be conceived what will be the effect.

"With regard to the fire of the ironclads on the batteries, it may have a powerful effect upon one of exposed masonry, insulated and compact, when opposed for a considerable time to dispersed vessels with powerful guns; but where the shore batteries can be more or less separated in distance and height, with no exposure but of earthen parapets, or rather of their merlons and embrasures, the scattered shot directed on them in

1865. — Forts *versus* ships.

action, will be thoroughly ineffective. Thus, instead of the heavy broadsides of the old men-of-war, that overwhelmed any insulated battery that might be on nearly the same level, and with which it could at all close, the effect of the three or four guns, however heavy, of the ironclads, will make but little impression.

"As to the invulnerability of the iron plating, it has been tried in the way most favourable to it—that is, on targets made with peculiar care, expressly for the trial, every joint and bolt newly applied and fastened, and without being previously subject to wear and tear, to the violent strains of working at sea, or to partial concussions; and yet the 4½-inch, with its backing, has been thoroughly perforated at 200 yards range, with a Whitworth 70-pounder. It was also to be observed that, where a heavy shot made only an indent of an inch or two on the surface, the shock had driven in bolts and splinters from the timber lining within, precisely on the principle that, in the game of croquet, a ball held down to the ground firmly with the foot, and struck with violence, will drive another that is in contact with it, but loose, to a considerable distance. Thus it may be inferred that a number of hard blows from heavy shot, without absolutely penetrating, will disintegrate the entire mass, and reduce the whole to a great state of weakness.

"Nor is it necessary, as I conceive, to have recourse to the enormous class of guns that are from time to time progressively suggested. It appears to me that it would be most advantageous to employ the smallest guns that will really make effective impression, and to multiply them, in preference to having a small number of the monsters. I conceive that a piece carrying a shot of 100 or 150 lbs. would have sufficient effect for the purpose.

"That such guns, having a power of lancing their projectiles with high initial velocity and accuracy, as well as being thoroughly durable, might be readily manufactured, there can be no doubt; they would be, of course, much more easily transported, handled, and served, and by their increased numbers would have fully as great an effect—on the principle that it has been found by experiment, that two 12- or 18-pounders would breach a stone wall with the same aggregate weight of

shot as effectually as one 24- or 36-pounder. I have propounded this principle as worthy of consideration, under the difficulty of manufacturing and serving enormous 300- and 600-pounders; but the suggestion has been rejected by the Ordnance Select Committee. 1866. Forts *versus* ships.

"Lastly, as against the power of ironclads to force entrances into harbours or other restricted passages, we have the system of torpedoes to have recourse to, which may be even rapidly improvised to a great extent with very moderate means, and with which it would be most difficult to contend.

"While I argue somewhat strongly on the difficulties in the way of the ironclads performing all the great services contemplated by many enthusiasts in their favour, I am quite sensible of certain advantages they possess as opposed to other ships, which render it impossible for us not to adopt them if other maritime powers do, and not to strive how in the greatest degree to remedy the many disadvantages which as yet attend those of all countries that have studied and tried them.

"My dear Lord Rosse,

"Yours faithfully,

"J. F. Burgoyne."

The great successes of the Prussians in the war of 1866, made much the same impression upon Sir John as on the rest of the community; but while all the world was exclaiming that these achievements were entirely owing to the needle gun, he gave expression to some opinions in a memorandum to General Peel, the Secretary of State for War, which shows he had attained a deeper insight into the causes of the superiority of the Prussian military system. His paper is entitled 'Reflections on the late War in Germany,' and he first broaches in it the proposal of a shorter term of enlistment in this country, for the purpose of obtaining a trained reserve. This paper was afterwards published by him in the form of a pamphlet in 1868, when these views had obtained a wide acceptance; but at the period when they were German war.

1866. first brought forward, they were looked upon with little favour by the military authorities. He says:—

Proposal for a short term of enlistment.

"The next great desideratum is that our defensive reserve force should consist of more efficient soldiers than our present resource of Militia and Volunteers.

"There are several modes by which this may be effected, all which will probably give rise to objections; and it will be a difficult study how to remove these, or to devise what may effect the object, in a mode more acceptable.

"If the service in the Line could be made more palatable, so as to induce a more numerous and somewhat superior class to enter as soldiers, it would tend to the greater diffusion of a general military capability throughout the community; and, this would be much increased if, instead of lengthening the periods of service, as is the present effort, they could be much reduced; and if the soldier of some few years' regular training were again absorbed among the civil population, remaining available, in whatever shape may be thought best, for the reserve force. It is this that constitutes the power of the Prussian system.

"Citizens of all classes serve for three years as soldiers in the Line, they then follow their various pursuits in life; but while in the full vigour of early manhood, and trained soldiers, they are in the first-class of a reserve liable to be called upon for any emergency. After a few years more, as this first-class becomes successively filled up, they enter into a second-class reserve, to meet the case of a continued increasing emergency, and so on. It is the principle of a system of this kind, that we should endeavour to apply to our constitutional habits."

Retirement from the War Office.

It has been seen that, on the death of Lord Combermere, in 1865, Lord Palmerston offered the post of Constable of the Tower, to Sir John Burgoyne. It was an unexpected honour, and one which he highly appreciated, for the appointment had long been one of the prizes for the most distinguished military service. Under the pressure of financial reformers, however, the military

Governorships of Royal Castles had been suppressed; and although the office of Constable of the Tower was retained, in consideration of certain duties and responsibilities attached to it, the salary had been abolished. As the position involves some outlay, in the form of subscriptions and gifts, the appointment, apart from the distinction it conferred, was of doubtful advantage to a man of moderate means; and it affords a marked illustration of the absence, in this country, of all established provision in reward for the highest military service, that when, on Sir John Burgoyne's retirement from the War Office, in 1868, he was offered promotion to the rank of Field Marshal,[1] the War Minister intimated to him that special arrangements would be made "to prevent the change involving him in any serious pecuniary loss."

1868. Retirement from the War Office.

"War Office, 19th December, 1867.

"My dear Sir John Pakington,

"In acknowledging your letter of this day, I have to thank you very much for your flattering and friendly expressions towards myself. I have had a very long tenure of office, and most assuredly have no reason to complain, when it shall be thought right to make a change; and if, as seems to be thought probable, a new and reduced system of expenditure on fortifications and our military engineer works, shall be adopted, it may be a very good reason for introducing a new supervision of them, in lieu of one which may be supposed to be wedded to the propriety of maintaining it to its present extent.

"I would however hope that, as a matter of principle, this will not be considered as a crime on my part. If I have erred in my views of the propriety of a considerable development of fortifications, it has been in good company, for the late Duke of Wellington and Lord Palmerston strongly urged the same.

[1] The rank of Field Marshal is purely honorary, and carries with it no emolument, unless the holder of it is actively employed.

1868. — Retirement from the War Office.

"If the pressure in the public mind is to obtain a more active administration in the management and control of the expenditure, even while retaining in view the same ends, it affords ample reason for trying a new controlling power.

"Under any view, however, I submit at once, and without a murmur, to whatever arrangement you may think best.

"I beg to remain, &c. &c.,

"J. F. BURGOYNE."

Special pension awarded by Treasury.

The Secretary to the Treasury, on the 11th January following, writes to the Minister of War.

* * * * "I am to state for the information of the Secretary of State that, adverting to the long and varied nature of the services performed by Sir John Burgoyne in a civil and military capacity, the distinguished character of those services, and to the impossibility of awarding him a retired allowance, under the provisions of the Superannuation Acts, my Lords will not withhold their consent to the grant of the proposed military allowance of 1500*l.* per annum, as a special and exceptional case, and a mark of the sense entertained by the Board of the value of his services.

"Their Lordships are, however, of opinion, as the arrangement is altogether of an exceptional character, that this correspondence should be laid before Parliament."[1]

Like all prominent public men, Sir John Burgoyne had passed through periods of unpopularity. In the winter of 1854–55, it was whispered in "well-informed" circles in London that "Burgoyne was the only obstacle to an assault on Sebastopol, and had deterred Lord Raglan from a *coup de main* against the place, because,

[1] The pension for himself and his family, which had been promised by Lord Hardinge for his services in the Crimea, had been ignored by the Administrations which succeeded Lord Aberdeen's; and it acted somewhat as a shock to the old soldier's feelings to find, when the estimates were printed, that this pension, in lieu of appearing amongst the rewards for distinguished services, was entered amongst the non-effective items as a *superannuation allowance*.

as an Engineer officer, he wished for a siege and an opportunity of distinguishing himself in his own branch." And whilst the more censorious part of the community thus summarily set him down as sacrificing the Allies to his professional bias, the more charitable critics concurred in ascribing the miscarriage of the enterprise to a weakness of purpose and want of energy inseparable from his age. After the difficulties of the undertaking had become more apparent, and had been successfully surmounted, and the official accounts of the siege had been published by the English and French governments, public opinion gradually veered round; but neither himself nor his friends were prepared for the hearty expressions of good-will and eulogy which burst forth on all sides from the public press, at the period of his retirement from office in January, 1868. The *Times* led the way by an article headed 'A new Field Marshal,' on the 6th January, 1868; and newspapers of all parties and every complexion of opinion vied with one another in writing in his honour.

1868.

Special pension awarded by Treasury.

Opinions of the press.

The following peroration of an article from the *Examiner*, expresses so gracefully the tone of the public press of this period, that no apology is needed for reproducing it:—

"Sir John Burgoyne now retires, after an unusually long life spent in the service of his country, during which it may be confidently asserted that he never by his own fault lost a friend or made an enemy. The Grand Cross of the Bath, a Baronetcy, and a Field Marshal's baton, are the great prizes which his merit has won. But these are only the outward symbols of that deep and hearty appreciation which his countrymen entertain of his faithful and brilliant services. He retires full of years, but still hale in body, and with an unclouded intellect, carrying with him into private life all

'that should accompany old age,
As honour, love, obedience, troops of friends.'"

1868. On his retirement from the War Office he wrote a farewell memorandum to his corps, which, with the permission of the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, was read as a "General Order" at a full-dress parade of the Royal Engineers at Chatham.

Farewell memorandum to the Royal Engineers.

"War Office, 17th January, 1868.

"Field Marshal Sir John Burgoyne cannot relinquish the post he now holds, without thanking the officers and men of the corps of Royal Engineers for the cordial and efficient co-operation and support which he has always received from them, during the twenty-two years that he has held his present office, and at the same time expressing the great regret with which he bids farewell to the active superintendence of a Corps in which he will never cease to feel the deepest pride and interest.

"On such an occasion he cannot refrain from calling to mind the great changes that have taken place in the Corps since he first entered the Service.

"In the midst of the greatest war in which this country has ever been engaged, the Corps was held in such little consideration that it was without a single Sapper, had no recognised field equipment, and during prolonged campaigns with armies in the field, possessed only a few individual officers to carry on arduous sieges, entrench camps of magnitude, and perform all the varied and important duties of the Engineer Service.

"Nor were the duties in garrison or military stations better provided for, although the effects were of less importance.

"Those days are happily at an end; and the Corps now possesses a fine body of well-trained Engineer soldiers, fully instructed in every field duty, and is thoroughly competent to undertake any of the active services of war.

"As regards its ordinary peace duties, it has given proof of its efficiency in the control and management of the great works of defence considered to be necessary at home and abroad, and of which the design and execution are acknowledged to be at least equal to those of a similar character in any other country.

"An additional proof of the estimation in which the Corps is

held, may be noted in the large proportion of its officers and men selected for extraneous positions of an arduous and responsible character under other branches of the Government. 1868. Farewell memorandum to the Royal Engineers.

"Much of the improved condition of the Engineer Service may be attributed to the spirit and exertions of its individual officers, but it is due in a still greater degree to the increased value which the progress of science has given to the special branches of the army, and to the higher appreciation with which the profession is regarded by the military authorities and country at large.

"After an association extending over seventy years, and comprising many periods of difficulties and hardships, Sir John Burgoyne takes leave of his comrades of all ranks, with the strongest sentiments of esteem, and with the fullest confidence in their future prosperity and distinction."

As a proof of the activity of mind and working power of Sir John Burgoyne, it may be stated that during the interval between 1854 and the end of 1868, he served, in the midst of his regular official duties, as member of a Royal Commission on Army Promotion, and of the Royal Commission for the Administration of the Patriotic Fund, as a Juror of the Great International Exhibition in Paris, as a permanent member of the Defence Committee, and also of the Secret and Confidential Committee on the State of Defence of the Country, of which an account has already been given. Commissions and committees, 1854 to 1868.

In 1859, he served as member of a War Office Committee to consider and report on the probable effect of rifled cannon on the attack and defence of fortifications; and subsequently, as Chairman of the Jury of Class 11 of the Great International Exhibition of 1862, in London; and as President of the Army Signal Committee.

In 1865, after the explosion of a large private powder magazine at Erith, he was appointed President of the Committee ordered to inspect the War Department

1854–68. Magazines, and to report on the storage of gunpowder, and in 1867, he was member of a Treasury Committee on the Concentration of the Public Offices.

Distinctions and honours.

During the same period, honorary degrees, offices, and distinctions were bestowed on him as follows:

On the 15th December, 1854, with sixteen other generals, he received the thanks of both Houses of Parliament for the victory of the Alma; and again, on the 5th January, 1855, the thanks of both Houses were given to him and other Generals for the battle of Inkermann. The University of Oxford conferred upon him the Honorary Degree of Doctor of Civil Law; the Sultan gave him the First Class of the Order of the Medjidie; and the Emperor of the French nominated him a Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour.

In 1856 he was created a Baronet, and promoted to the rank of General, for his services in the Russian war; he was also elected a Fellow of the Royal Society in the same year.

In 1861, he was appointed Honorary Colonel of the 1st Middlesex, and of the 1st Lancashire Engineer Volunteer Corps. In the same year he was enrolled an Honorary Associate of the Institution of Naval Architects, and of the Society of Arts.

In 1865, he was appointed Constable of the Tower of London and Lord Lieutenant of the Tower Hamlets, and on his retirement from the War Office in 1868, Her Majesty presented him with the baton of a Field Marshal; and the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Common Council of London conferred on him the Freedom of the City, in a gold box.

It is noteworthy that none of the extra-official duties performed, or of the honours and distinctions conferred, carried with them any emolument.

A letter of congratulation from one of his few military contemporaries left at this date, will show the estimation in which he was held by his former companions in arms of the Peninsula. 1868.

Letter of congratulation from Sir William Gomm.

"33, Brunswick Terrace, Brighton,
6th January, 1868.

"My dear Burgoyne,

"Your elevation projected, if not actually completed at this hour, to the tiptop post of our service, is sufficiently notorious to justify me in losing no time in congratulating you heartily, on Lady Gomm's part and my own, on the event. Indeed, I should be better satisfied if I found the Government adding the Peerage to the Marshalship, as your just desert beyond that of any who have attained it from our ranks, save one, since the opening of the great French revolutionary war.

"The *Army and Navy Gazette*, which met my notice yesterday, I think, implies as much.

"However, we limit our congratulations for the present to your attainment of the Baton, accompanied by many best wishes of the season to Lady Burgoyne and yourself from us both.

"Always faithfully yours,
"W. Gomm."[1]

With reference to this letter, it may be stated that it was the wish of the Prime Minister to raise Sir John Burgoyne to the peerage, on the occasion of his retirement from the War Office; but the fact of his having a male heir and no private fortune, placed a bar upon the proposition. The design, however, was so far matured that it was debated in the Cabinet whether it would be possible to ask Parliament for the pension which usually accompanies a military peerage; but there was no pre-

[1] The present Field Marshal Sir William Gomm, G.C.B., Constable of the Tower. At the time he wrote this letter, he was not aware that he was himself included amongst the Field Marshals created on this occasion. —Ed.

1868. cedent for such an application, except at the close of successful military operations, and the project accordingly fell to the ground. A few weeks after this date, Mr. Disraeli met Sir John Burgoyne, leaving Buckingham Palace after a royal ball, and after making some complimentary remarks on the number of his decorations, added significantly, "I wish, Sir John, it had been in my power to have added another distinction."

With his retirement from the War Office, Sir John's public career may be said to have come to an end; but his opinions were still consulted on many occasions, and the letters written by him at this period, will show that neither his mind nor his pen had lost any of their former vigour. As a proof of his bodily activity at this period, it may be mentioned that in the autumn of 1868, when he was in his eighty-seventh year, he attended reviews of the troops at Aldershot and Shorncliffe, and on each occasion sat for several hours on horseback. His pen being liberated by his relief from the restraint of office, he published his opinions more freely in the public press. At the request of Captain Walter, the founder and originator of the employment of old soldiers as an organized body of messengers, he wrote a letter to the *Times*, in aid of that undertaking, which eventually produced a sum of 5000*l.* for the purpose of purchasing the freehold of the buildings which form the head-quarters of the Corps of Commissionaires; and having been much hurt by the criticisms on his conduct in Mr. Kinglake's 'History of the War in the Crimea,' he published a contradiction of some of the assertions contained in it, in the columns of the *Times*, which attracted considerable notice. Those who were unacquainted with him at this time, were astonished at the power of thought and language which characterized these letters, proceeding

from a man of his advanced age. His hearing had become much impaired, but his appearance denoted no loss of strength; he was absolutely free from all bodily ailment, and the medical men who attended his family stated that his pulse was as strong as that of a young man, denoting that the action of the heart had not become enfeebled by lapse of years. The frame however which had so well withstood the assault of time, yielded before a blow dealt to his affections. 1870.

The 'Captain' steam-turret ship was the latest development of the great change in naval architecture which had resulted from the simultaneous introduction of iron armour and heavy rifled artillery. She was the masterpiece of her inventor, Captain Cowper Coles, who after a long contest with the Admiralty, had been allowed to build a ship in a private yard, embodying his own principles of construction. She was built by Messrs. Laird, of Birkenhead, of 4272 tons, 900 horse-power, was plated with 8 inches of armour on her sides, and with 12 and 18 inches on her turrets. She was armed with four guns in her turrets, throwing shots of 600 lbs. each; and her value as a man-of-war was such, that the admiral in command of the Channel Squadron, had reported she would sink all the broadside vessels of his fleet. Looked upon as the acknowledged model of the war ships of the future, most of the Government officials who had sons in the navy, had asked for appointments in her, and amongst her complement of officers she carried sons of Lord Herbert, formerly Secretary of State for War; of Mr. Childers, the First Lord of the Admiralty; of Lord Northbrook, the Under Secretary of State for War; of Colonel Boxer, the head of the Laboratory Department; and of Captain Gordon, the principal Controller at the Royal Arsenal. One of her lieutenants was Lord Lewis H.M.S. 'Captain.'

1870. Gordon, a brother of the Marquis of Huntly, and as guests with her commander were her inventor Captain Cowper Coles, and a son of Admiral Sir Baldwin Walker, the former Controller of the Admiralty.[1] At the special request of her designer, Captain Burgoyne had been selected to command her, and she had on board a picked crew of 500 men, many of whom had volunteered for her, owing to the popularity of her captain.

H.M.S. 'Captain.'

Loss of H.M.S. 'Captain.'

She had passed safely through a trial in the previous spring, weathering a very heavy storm in the month of May, in which the force of the wind had been registered as greater than the gale which capsized her in the following September. In August 1870, she sailed on another trial trip with the Channel fleet. On the 14th September she was expected home, when the startling news reached England that she had sunk with all on board, in the Bay of Biscay.

In the afternoon of the 9th September, the present writer, then quartered at Shorncliffe, received from the hands of a special messenger from the Admiralty, a copy of the telegram from the admiral of the fleet, announcing the loss of the 'Captain,' together with a letter from Sir Sidney Dacres, the first Naval Lord, who had considerately taken the precaution that the intelligence should reach the relatives and friends of those on board before finding its way to the evening papers.

It accordingly became the author's task to break the terrible news to Sir John Burgoyne, then at Brighton with his family, where he hoped daily to be joined by his only son on his return with the Channel fleet. All the letters which he had received, spoke of the perfect success of the ill-fated ship, and of her admirable sea-

[1] Captain Burgoyne had married, in 1864, a daughter of Sir Baldwin Walker.

going qualities; and no shadow of anxiety had crossed his mind to prepare him for the blow. He bore the intelligence with an apparent fortitude and resignation, which inspired his family with hopes that his strength of mind and body would enable him to withstand the shock; but within a few days he was seized with a universal trembling of the frame, and nervousness of speech, which filled those around him with alarm, and inspired fears of a stroke of paralysis. By timely precautions this misfortune was averted; the iron constitution triumphed, but the shock had destroyed for ever the vigour and energy of life; and when a short time afterwards he was removed to his own house in London, few would have recognized in the broken-down and infirm invalid, who was half lifted, half supported, into the railway carriage, the hale and hearty veteran, who a fortnight before had excited the interest of the visitors to Brighton by his strong and elastic step, his cheerful conversation, and the good-humoured laugh with which he watched and shared the sports of his grandchildren on the beach.

1870. Shock of the intelligence.

Before this unfavourable change in his condition took place, his feelings appeared to be much soothed by the marks of unfeigned sympathy he met with in all quarters from the highest to the lowest. The unaffected fortitude and gentleness of his character are shown in a letter he wrote at this time to his old friend, Sir Francis Head.

"20, Brunswick Terrace, Brighton,
20th September, 1870.

"My dear Head,

"The sight of your handwriting always does me good—the reading of it does me more! and no comfort can be better bestowed on me than at the present moment of trouble.

"The sympathy of my friends—and from none does it come warmer to my feelings than from you—and the very high character given universally to my poor son, of which testimony

1870. bursts out on all sides on this melancholy catastrophe, afford me much consolation.

"I cannot find in my heart to blame anybody for the awful event. '*The best general is the one who commits the fewest errors*,' and so it may be said of the best inventor of a new model of a ship. Many foretold that the 'Captain' would be found to have certain disadvantages, which would prove themselves on trial by degrees, and be more or less improved upon in future constructions, but no one predicted that circumstances might render the first blow so terrific! With best regards to Lady Head, and many thanks for your very kind action in writing to me,

"Ever, my dear Head,

"Yours most sincerely,

"J. F. BURGOYNE."

The Emperor Napoleon inquires for him.

After his return to London, he somewhat rallied; and as the physicians stated it was of importance that his mind should be distracted as much as possible, efforts were made by his family, to reawaken his interest in public affairs. One of his friends had paid a visit to the Emperor Napoleon, whilst a prisoner of war at Wilhelmshöhe; and the conversation having turned on the loss of the 'Captain,' the Emperor mentioned that it was an experiment he had been watching with great interest, and in allusion to Captain Burgoyne, inquired in feeling terms for the Field Marshal, whom he had known, he added, in former years. Although Sir John had differed from the Emperor's views regarding the military operations in the Crimea, he possessed a genuine admiration for him as a ruler and a statesman; the high value he attached to the Anglo-French alliance has been already indicated in his correspondence with Mr. Kinglake; and these feelings of regard, enhanced by the courtesy shown to him personally on several occasions, by the Emperor, were not likely to be diminished in a chivalrous mind by the sudden reverse of fortune which had befallen him. Actuated by these sentiments, he wrote:—

"5, Pembridge Square, London, October, 1870. 1870.

"SIRE,

Letter to the Emperor Napoleon.

"The difficulty in finding a medium of communication, under the peculiar position of your Majesty at the present time, will, I hope, plead my excuse for presuming to address this letter direct.

"I have for some time had the intention of obtruding on your Majesty's notice, but was prevented by a heavy family misfortune, immediately followed by a serious illness of several weeks.

"Humble as is the offering, my earnest desire has been to communicate my deep sense of condolence and indignation at the very unmerited position in which your Majesty has been placed by the force of circumstances, and the ingratitude of your country. I have myself always been deeply impressed with your Majesty's high qualities, and manifest deep feelings for the interests of France; my warm admiration being greatly increased by your constant efforts to maintain, in the greatest degree consistent with those interests, terms of close amity and friendship with Great Britain.

"As an old soldier, perhaps I may be permitted to express my sense of the self-abnegation and humanity evinced by your Majesty at Sedan, where the responsibility taken upon yourself at the last, prevented a useless slaughter of thousands of men.

"I hope that I am not trespassing too far in adding my acknowledgments for the favourable reception I have ever received from your Majesty and the Empress, on the occasions when circumstances have led to my having had personal communication with the French Court.

"I beg to remain, with great respect,

"Your Majesty's

"Very faithful, humble servant,

"J. F. BURGOYNE, Field-Marshal."

The Emperor appears to have been touched by the feelings of consideration shown for him in this letter written by Sir John in the midst of his own misfortunes;

1870. for within a few days afterwards he replied by a letter in his own hand.

Letter from the Emperor Napoleon.

"Wilhelmshöhe, le 29 octobre 1870.

"MON CHER SIR JOHN,

"Je viens de recevoir votre lettre, qui m'a fait le plus grand plaisir, d'abord parce qu'elle est une preuve touchante de votre sympathie pour moi, et ensuite parce que votre nom me rappelle les temps heureux et glorieux où nos deux armées combattaient ensemble pour la même cause. Vous qui êtes *le Moltke* de l'Angleterre, vous aurez compris que tous nos désastres viennent de cette circonstance que les Prussiens ont été plus tôt prêts que nous, et que pour ainsi dire, ils nous ont surpris en *flagrant délit* de formation.

"L'offensive m'étant devenue impossible, je me suis résolu à la défensive, mais empêché par des considérations politiques, la marche en arrière a été retardée, puis devenue impossible. Revenu à Châlons, j'ai voulu conduire la dernière armée qui nous restait à Paris, mais là encore des considérations politiques nous ont forcés à faire la marche la plus imprudente et la moins stratégique, qui a fini par le désastre de Sedan.

"Voici en peu de mots ce qui a été la malheureuse campagne de 1870. Je tenais à vous donner ces explications, parce que je tiens à votre estime.

"En vous remerciant de votre bon souvenir, je vous renouvelle l'assurance de mes sentimens affectueux.

"NAPOLÉON."

It was fortunate for Sir John that at this period the great military drama in France had entered a phase of extraordinary interest for military men; and his family, in pursuance of the advice of the physicians, made every effort to divert his mind from his own loss, by encouraging discussions in his presence, on the military operations in progress, and providing him with the best maps and intelligence from the seat of war. Amongst these, he had been supplied with an excellent map of Metz and its

environs, where Bazaine and his army were blockaded by the Germans under Prince Frederick Charles. 1870.

The maps showed the ground to be of prodigious strength around Metz for three-fourths of its circumference, and as favourable for the blockading force as for the defenders; and taking into consideration these circumstances, and the time that had been given to the Germans to construct entrenchments, the blockade of the French force by an army nearly double its own strength, was not a difficult military operation. As Sir John expressed it, "the question of a blockade of one force by another, depends on the nature of the ground, not upon their relative numbers. At Mantua, an army of 100,000 men could be blockaded by one of 20,000, it being only necessary to watch the *débouchés* from the marshes. The fault consists in allowing an army to lose its communications, not in the subsequent surrender." There is a natural *esprit de corps* amongst military men of all nations; and when the cry of treason was raised by Gambetta against Bazaine, he felt all the indignation which a soldier would experience at imputations recklessly thrown out against a gallant comrade. Under the influence of these feelings, he wrote the following letter to the *Times*:—

"THE SURRENDER OF METZ.

"*To the Editor of the* TIMES.

"SIR,

"The violent abuse and condemnation of Marshal Bazaine for the fall of Metz can only be received by any impartial person with indignation. Letter on the surrender of Metz.

"To accuse such a man of treason above all things, is most incomprehensible. One who had passed a long and honourable life could have nothing whatever to gain by promoting anything adverse to the interests of his country.

1870. — Letter on the surrender of Metz.

"The French nation entered into a great war under every possible disadvantage: the power opposed to them was in a better state of preparation, and in far greater strength in military means and equipments; while the French, in addition, had been for some time in partial disorder, from the conflicting influences of powerful political factions, the effect of which had been to prevent the complete development of the military power of the country previous to the war, and after the first reverses, to totally disorganize the Government, and effectually prevent any consistent decided action being taken for the regulation of the military operations at a time of vital importance. There was no leading counsel for the armies in general, such as is necessary to produce concentrated action. Everything seems to have been disjointed, and each commander left to his own devices, leading to each being exposed to the united movements of a well-regulated, organized enemy, who was besides in greatly superior force.

"One corps thus fell after another with fearful rapidity, until it came at last to that of Bazaine, who had been for some time with a large force shut up in Metz.

"What were the operations which led to the army which he commanded not having retired in time to join the other corps still in the field, I am not here prepared to discuss; nor is it necessary, since the accusations against him rest on his capitulation two months afterwards.

"If he could not break through the forces opposed to him in the early days of his movement on Metz, he would have less and less chance of succeeding, each day as it passed; as the positions round the place, naturally very strong, were capable of being greatly improved by field works, which would be gradually progressing towards perfection; and while this was a continued state of improvement on the side of the blockading force, his own troops were in as constant a state of deterioration, by the breaking up of his cavalry, field artillery, and army transport: so that isolated as he was by a very great distance from any friendly support, with an army utterly unprovided with every necessary means for a campaign, and his provisions exhausted, he had really no alternative left but to surrender. His detractors appear to forget that his position must have been considered

desperate three months ago, at the period of the movement made from Châlons to relieve him. 1870.

Letter on the surrender of Metz.

"As one of those who served with the Marshal in the Crimea, I feel called upon to repel the attacks made upon a gallant fellow-soldier, whose military reputation has been assailed in so inconsiderate a manner, by political enemies."

"I am, Sir, your obedient Servant,

"J. F. BURGOYNE, Field Marshal.

"London, 20th November, 1870."

Letter from Marshal Bazaine.

Within a few days of the date of the insertion of this letter in the *Times* newspaper, he received the following from Marshal Bazaine.

"Cassel, 29 novembre 1870.

"MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL.

"J'ai été vivement touché de la lettre de Votre Excellence au *Times*, et je m'empresse de lui en exprimer ma bien sincère reconnaissance. Votre appréciation de ma conduite militaire est pour moi une grande consolation: elle fortifie ma conscience, qui me dit que j'ai toujours loyalement fait mon devoir de soldat, pendant la longue carrière que j'ai parcourue, et dans laquelle j'ai eu l'honorable mission de servir avec la brave et loyale armée anglaise: c'est un de mes meilleurs souvenirs.

"Agréez, monsieur le maréchal, l'expression de mes sentiments très-distingués et de profond dévouement.

"MARÉCHAL BAZAINE.

"Son Excellence J. F. Burgoyne,
Field-Marshal de l'armée anglaise, London."

In a letter to Lord de Ros, a few days later, he adverts to the same question.

"5, Pembridge Square, Bayswater,
13th December, 1870.

"MY DEAR LORD DE ROS.

"I have in a general way formed very much the opinion that you have on the value as a military study of the information we usually get from the correspondents of the press with the

1870. armies in the field; the very expression of their letters being so *graphic*, is with me, condemnation; as a soldier, I want what is *instructive*, not what is *graphic*.

"Nor do I attach any value to reasonings on the great strategical movements, by those present, whether civilians or military men. What they see is in very small limits, and what they hear from those about them, is quite untrustworthy; so many infinitely varying circumstances influence the main results, that they can never fully be understood, till carefully compared and reduced to order by competent authorities, some time after the events, and it is to them that I shall look for a proper understanding of the proceedings.

"I quite agree however with what I understand to be your view, which is to turn the attention of our military attachés and correspondents to objects in details which they can themselves observe, or on which they can obtain on the spot, correct information, that would be of great interest to us.

On the Prussian successes.

"I have never myself thought much on the defining of these details, as you seem to have done, and a very interesting study it is; and the particulars you give as queries, you have no doubt found from experience to be well worthy of research.

"Matters connected with some of them have never come under my particular attention, but they are all evidently of importance.

"Many of them could however be inquired into as well at Berlin as with the army in the field, or may be found in their printed regulations.

"There is one thing in which I think you will agree with me, which is, that while the Prussians have shown themselves to have the strongest and best organized army in the world as a whole, and very superior in many of the most essential particulars, it is not to be assumed that in all *details*, they ought consequently to be followed as necessarily the best; this may not be the case for instance with their specific arms and equipments, &c.

"The points on which, however, I should myself be most desirous of obtaining information from our officers now present with the armies, would be those peculiarly connected with operations of such unprecedented magnitude in the field, in

which the Prussians have shown themselves, now and in 1866, to be pre-eminent. 1870.

On the Prussian successes.

"Thus to solve the great leading difficulties in a campaign —of provisions, ammunition, transport, care of wounded and sick, the system they pursue in their movements, what does each man and horse carry of provisions, forage and ammunition when parting from the reserves? what measures are adopted to prevent him from wasting either? and how are the continuous supplies of all secured?

"In what way, and under what organization, are the resources of the country turned to account, in aid of the stores transported?

"Under what system are the abandoned railways made serviceable?

"Then again, as regards the tactics and fighting, what is the system, and what the principles now adopted in making an attack or in receiving it, to counteract as much as possible the great effect of the new arms of precision? for it is evident that the slow steady advance of a front of compact lines and columns of old times, will not do now—cavalry and artillery cannot now hover about infantry, at 400 or 500 yards distance, as they used to do.

"In what way in particular, has the cavalry been made so efficacious even against the rifle, as they seem to be with the Prussians?

"The peculiarities of modern warfare lead to a great number of objects of inquiry as to the practical working in the field.

"One astounding result in the new system of war which you advert to certainly strikes one at first with surprise, which is, that armies of 70,000 or 80,000 men, should be reduced to capitulation; but it is a consequence of the enormous increase of forces now brought into the field; thus the investing force is in proportion, and enabled to maintain powerful defensive positions all around; while the army enclosed is under much greater disadvantages than where all are in smaller proportions, with its artillery, cavalry, and transport disorganized, no possibility of escape by night through a chance unguarded loophole, like Brennier from Almeida, with his 800 men; and even if they did break through, thrown out in such a large mass on

1870. the wide world, far from supplies, reserves, or support of any kind.

On the Prussian successes.

"If in former times with armies of 50,000 or 60,000 men, it was said that for one hour which a general devoted to considering how he should manœuvre his force, he had to give ten hours to considerations connected with the supply of provisions and other requisites; how much more is it necessary with armies of four or five times that number! It is a question, not as to the theoretical organization laid down in the books, so much as how practically it is found to work under the varying circumstances of a campaign, and this can only be learned by actual practice and experience, which from its rarity is the more precious.

"You will find all this a very confused reply to your interesting letter, but the inquiry has come upon me somewhat new and suddenly, and though certainly convalescent, I am still confined to my house and arm-chair, and not equal to much exertion, bodily or mental.

"I return your paper of queries, as you may want them.

"My dear Lord de Ros, yours very sincerely,

"J. F. Burgoyne."

These letters show that his mind had retained its pristine vigour, although he never recovered the prostration of his physical powers, or the shock the nervous system had received—a shock too overpowering for a man of his age; but his constitution was so strong, that it is believed if the events connected with the loss of the 'Captain' could have been laid at rest, he might in the course of time, even have recovered some of his former bodily strength; but the harrowing details connected with the last moments of his son, and the ungenerous efforts made in certain quarters, to throw blame upon him, kept alive the irritation of the nerves, and prevented any amelioration in his state.

Hugh Burgoyne, his only son, was born in Dublin in 1833, and had entered the naval service in 1847. With

1870. Captain Burgoyne, R.N.

the exception of a short time employed in studying steam at the Naval College, he served continuously at sea from this date, till his untimely death in 1870. Having distinguished himself in the Sea of Azof, in command of a gunboat during the Russian war, when he won the Victoria Cross for an act of gallantry, he had early attained the rank of post-captain, and was noted in the service for expertness as a seaman, and the rarer qualities of coolness and nerve under circumstances of difficulty and danger. His energetic character led him to seek occupation in other spheres, when unemployed by the Admiralty. In 1863, he accompanied Captain Sherard Osborn to China, as second in command of the Anglo- [redacted] when that officer threw up his appoint- [redacted] refusal of the Chinese to admit his claim [redacted] no orders except from Pekin, the Chinese Government offered the post to Captain Burgoyne, with an unusually liberal scale of emolument, as an inducement for him to accept it. The other officers told Burgoyne they would follow his fortunes and be guided by his decision, whatever it might be; and on his declaring himself of the same opinion as his chief, and refusing to act under the local mandarins, they acquiesced in the decision, and the flotilla was broken up. On his return to England, he was appointed to the command of the 'Wyvern' turret-ship, the first of this class of vessel set afloat in the English navy, and from her was transferred to the 'Constance,' one of the fast new wooden frigates. On completing her term of commission, he was appointed to the command of the 'Captain,' at the special solicitation of her designer. Thus, out of twenty-three years' service, twenty-one had been passed at sea, ten of which, while serving in the old-fashioned sailing-ships, had afforded him ample instruction in the art of seamanship.

1870. Loss of the 'Captain.'

When the fatal squall struck the 'Captain,' he was on deck; and above the roar of the elements, his voice was distinctly heard, giving orders to let go the halyards and sheets. On the ship's heeling completely over, he was thrown with the remainder of the watch into the sea, and with the assistance of an able seaman, Heard, was enabled to reach a boat, the steam-pinnace, which was floating bottom uppermost. Shortly after, the ship's launch drifted towards them, and most of the men on the pinnace jumped into her. It appeared, by Heard's deposition, that he "stuck by the captain, who remained, sad-looking but calm, and as firm as if on board the ship he had commanded." Heard took hold of him by the hand, and said, "Come, sir, let's jump!" to w[illegible] "Save your own life, my man." Fi[illegible] distance between the launch and the pinnace increasing, the seaman said, "Will you come or no[illegible] sir?" when the captain replied, "Jump and save yourself. I shall not forget you some day." Heard sprang and reached the launch, which drifted rapidly to leeward, and the pinnace and Hugh Burgoyne were soon out of sight.

Admiral Milne, in reporting the loss of the ship, states: "I had the most perfect confidence in Captain Burgoyne, Commander Sheepshanks, and the executive officers with whom I had come in contact; Captain Burgoyne was a thoroughly practical seaman, and it is impossible that the 'Captain' could have been better commanded." Sir Sydney Dacres, the First Naval Lord of the Admiralty, in writing to Sir John Burgoyne after the catastrophe, says: "The ship was under two double-reefed topsails, which your son, ever at his post, ordered to be lowered, and the sheets to be let fly. His last order, 'Keep your oar, you will want it,' was a negation

of self worthy of the man. None of the men saved ever doubted the perfect security of the ship, and I have not heard one word that reflects on your son, but much that adds to his character as a dauntless and distinguished officer." 1870. Loss of the 'Captain.'

The officers of the other ships who were examined at the court martial all deposed that they considered their ships would have been dismasted before they could have been capsized in a squall. Before the catastrophe, the wildest imagination never dreamed that a ship of more than 4000 tons could have been overturned by the pressure of wind on her canvas; the mere weight and inertia of the hull would have been considered to place such an event out of the bounds of possibility; but as soon as it had been substantiated that she had capsized from this cause, the small-fry of men who are wise after the event, at once declared that it was evident she must have done so, and some few attempted to throw the blame of the calamity upon her commander. Attacks on Captain Burgoyne. One officer of the navy wrote a letter to the newspapers, stating his conviction that the loss of the ship was owing to her carrying too much sail; that "cracking on was very amusing, but should not be practised at the expense of men's lives"—the term "cracking on" being applied in this case to a ship keeping her station in a fleet. Another naval officer, an admiral better known on the racecourse than at sea, stated in a letter inserted in the *Times*, "After the silly sentence of the court martial, the Admiralty lost an opportunity of issuing a circular warning to young officers against the fatal effects of want of discipline, and of the necessity of knowing the first rudiments of seamanship; but instead of a warning, it is to be considered a subject worthy of admiration. Some gentlemen, including the First Lord

1870. of the Admiralty, propose a monument to commemorate a disreputable disaster."[1] Happily, few men are to be found so eager to disparage the dead; but if Hugh Burgoyne had survived the loss of his ship, his detractors would have been multiplied a hundred-fold; and who can tell whether the last gleam of thought that flashed through the brain of the dying commander of the ill-fated ship, may not have been that it were better to sleep with his comrades beneath the wide Atlantic, than live to be a mark for the shafts of the malevolent amongst his own countrymen?

Attacks on Captain Burgoyne.

[1] The good taste of this remark will be appreciated, when it is st[illegible] that the monument in question was simply a mural tablet propos[illegible] be set up to commemorate the names of the officers and men lost.

## LAST ILLNESS, DEATH, AND BURIAL.

In 1871, Sir John Burgoyne had entered his eighty-ninth year. Physically he was now a complete wreck of his former self; but the following letters written by him in reply to an application to include his name in a religious demonstration in favour of peace, indicate a mind as unclouded and strong as ever. The proposition came from a well-known member of an extreme religious party, who desired to add Sir John Burgoyne's name to a prospectus of a public prayer-meeting in favour of peace, by *officers of the army and navy*.[1] 1871.

"5, Pembridge Square, 20th January, 1871.

"My dear Admiral,

"As a strenuous advocate for the maintenance of peace among nations, and earnestly praying for it, I could have no possible objection on principle, to your adding my humble name to any proceeding that might tend to forward so praiseworthy an object. But at the same time, I cannot quite understand why the officers of the Navy and Army should step forward, as a class, to make such a *demonstration*, which may have an appearance of adopting the peace-at-any-price principle, to which I can never assent, and might bear a construction with other countries of a feeling of imbecility in this, which may prejudicially affect the action of Government in the maintenance of our most legitimate rights and interests.

"My dear Admiral, yours very faithfully,

"J. F. Burgoyne."

[1] Several names of officers of both services, had been inserted in the prospectus, before it was forwarded to Sir John Burgoyne, but these letters appear to have put an end to the project.—Ed.

1871. "5, Pembridge Square, London,
— "My dear Admiral, 23rd January, 1871.

"I am very sorry that you should have had the trouble of sending me explanations on my little scruples regarding the proposed Prayer for Peace and Good-will among men.

"All the motives and, I am sure, feelings of the promoters originate in their conscientious high principles, and will justify any expression of them as individuals, but I have a repugnance to a formal demonstration of them by a class whose attribute is the protection of the country in case of war; and at a period like this, when our own culpable negligence, as many argue, takes away the power from us of influencing, by human efforts, the preservation of peace.

"You will think my impressions vague, I fear, and not very intelligible, and I am very sorry to be thus drawn into a correspondence about them.

"My dear Admiral,
"Yours faithfully,
"J. F. Burgoyne."

Army bill. The spring of 1871, and the debates on the Army Bill, appeared to give a stimulus to his mind, and his health improved slightly between January and August of this year. With other army reformers, he was looking forward to the meeting of Parliament, expecting that the Government, taking advantage of the impression made upon the country by the rapid subjugation of France by Germany, would bring forward a comprehensive scheme for placing our defensive forces on a better footing. He was therefore proportionately disappointed when the Government measure merely took the form of a Bill for the abolition of purchase, a point which he considered the least important of all; as the system, with all its defects, gave us excellent regimental officers.

He, however, was not so bigoted in his views as to believe that good regimental officers could not be obtained

by other methods; and he was ready to admit that, if the Government considered the measure absolutely necessary as a concession to popular opinion, in order to obtain the necessary leverage for further reforms, it might be justifiable; the concession, however, should be as limited as was necessary for this purpose; whereas the Government proposition as first propounded was, he thought, too sweeping a measure, and tended, to use his own words, "to break up every regiment in the service." In support of these views, he wrote the letters to the Commander-in-Chief and to the *Times* newspaper, which are appended. 1871. Army bill.

"5, Pembridge Square, 27th February, 1871.

"SIR,

"I trust that your Royal Highness will excuse me for venturing to express the high sense which I entertain of the advantage which the military service derives from the retention by your Royal Highness of your present post, at a period of much popular agitation against existing army arrangements, and of proposed organic changes in the composition of our military forces. Letter to the Commander-in-Chief.

"It is impossible to disguise the fact that a strong, though ill-founded, impression exists among the officers of the army, that their interests are in great danger of being sacrificed to the political exigencies of the moment; and I have every reason to believe that the decision of your Royal Highness to remain at the head of the army at the present time, has had a most excellent effect upon the officers of the army at large.

"The comments upon our military system and organisation put forward for consideration, are innumerable—many of them fallacious, and the more dangerous, as some are founded on plausible arguments, and advocated by conscientious and honourable men.

"Great professional judgment and energy will be required, then, to prevent the injurious consequences that may result from the adoption, more or less, of many of these, as I believe, erroneous views,

1871. — Letter to the Commander-in-Chief.

"I will not deny that occasionally I have held different opinions from your Royal Highness on some matters of detail, but always with doubts on my mind whether, on that account, I might not be in the wrong; but in the main elements of the constitution of the army, I am, in common with the army in general, so perfectly satisfied of the sound judgment and high principles entertained by your Royal Highness, that I anxiously hope we may not be deprived of the influence of your watchful advocacy.

"I have a great objection to the term 'army reform' as applied to this movement.

"The word 'army' implies the *personnel* of our forces, and consequently, that it is that which needs reform.

"I will venture, however, to maintain that the combatant portion of our army, from the general to the drummer, is of first-rate quality, and needing no other reforms than, like every other institution of the world, to take advantage in improvements of the progress of the age.

"There is no doubt but that many of the accessory establishments connected with the action and operations of the army as a field force, are defective, and need great improvements; but the two are confounded, and pre-eminence is given to the wrong one.

"Now the army, as I define it, is the particular part of which your Royal Highness has especially the charge, and it is excellent in organisation, discipline, exercises, and capabilities —acknowledged to be so by very distinguished officers of other countries, with the consolatory addition, in their interests, that '*heureusement*,' or as we should say '*malheureusement, il n'y en a pas beaucoup!*'

"Your Royal Highness's attention would assuredly always be given to the improvements required for these extra establishments, so immediately connected as they are with the military service; but it is what concerns the efficiency of the body of the army that is most threatened, and where your Royal Highness's interest is most needed.

"I beg to remain,

"Your Royal Highness's most obedient servant,

"J. F. Burgoyne."

In reply to this letter, his Royal Highness speaks in the warmest terms of the cordial co-operation and support he had ever received from Sir John both personally and officially, during the whole course of his military career. He assures him that his support and assistance were of immense value to him, and that he knew he could always count upon them from "one of his oldest comrades and friends." 1871. Letter to the Commander-in-Chief.

*To the Editor of the* TIMES.

"SIR,

"In the event of the purchase of commissions in the army being abolished, promotions would be made (subject to certain established qualifications) either by seniority or selection. Letter to the *Times* on the army Bill.

"A rule of seniority, if made absolute, would clearly be erroneous; it would take away the stimulus to meritorious industry and exertion, and leave every advantage open to bare mediocrity, or frequently less; it would enable an officer who could just save himself from being turned out of the service to ensure an unchecked progress to all the higher ranks. On the other hand, to suppose that whenever a vacancy occurs, the best man in the army can possibly be selected to fill it, is quite a fallacy. Regimental duties during peace time afford no criterion by which the qualifications of officers can be estimated so absolutely as to justify the supersession of a senior officer by another junior to him in the service.

"The appointment lies with the Commander-in-Chief; he must necessarily derive his information of the qualities of the officers from the commanding officers of regiments, and they will, in nearly all cases, note in respect of probably four-fifths of the officers 'understands his duties, regular and attentive to them, and well-qualified for promotion.' From this general description of hundreds of names, how is any selection to be made? Or should the commanding officers be required to be more precise in their judgment of relative qualifications, what an opening would it not give for favouritism? And in their reports, what a difference may there not be between their

1871. — Letter to the *Times* on the army Bill.

several estimates of the value each might attach to particular qualifications? An officer might by one commanding officer be reported as first-rate, whom another might record as very moderate. The Commander-in-Chief, on such a system, must either select at hazard, or in favour of some of the myriads of applications he would receive. It would be either a lottery or an abuse.

"The only practicable system would appear to be that which exists virtually at present—to adopt the regulation formally as one of selection, and to apply it to such distinct cases as may be found from time to time to be desirable, and on all other occasions to recur to seniority. Thus promotion might be given for gallant or peculiarly able professional service in the field, or for any very marked, undisputed proficiency in the service generally; and, on the other hand, individual officers at the head of their respective ranks should be passed over, if reported as incompetent for the higher station. This would leave, virtually, and not unreasonably, its due weight to length of service in all cases where claims may be deemed comparatively equal.

"It is not easy to understand the advantage of the proposal to alter the promotion from regimental to general throughout the army.

"It would greatly increase the number of changes from one regiment to another, perhaps at different parts of the world, at a considerable expense to the officers and to the public; it would break up many interesting and advantageous feelings of *esprit de corps*, and old associations between the officers and between the officers and soldiers, and would prevent in many cases the reasonable proportion of home and foreign service. The only object gained, so far as can be perceived, is a uniform rate of promotion throughout the whole army, an object not sufficient to compensate for its disadvantages, and not required by the feelings of the officers themselves. Any grievance in peculiar cases of a great accidental stagnation in one corps, or very unusual progress in another, might be alleviated by a few steps being given by the Commander-in-Chief in favour of the former, so as, in some degree, to equalise them.

"The reason given for this most unpopular change in the

method of promotion is the necessity of preventing a recurrence to the system of purchase, which might be effected, as is the case at present in non-purchase regiments, by the bestowal of a bonus on the retiring officer, but this consideration can hardly justify the adoption of so sweeping a measure, and one which would involve the destruction of our whole regimental system. Such private arrangements between officers should not be interfered with; they are really of benefit to the service, for, as there would no longer be the possibility of purchasing over another officer's head, they would only accelerate promotion, without diverting it from its regular channel to the profit of the wealthy. 1871. — Letter to the *Times* on the army Bill.

"The proposal to substitute army for regimental promotion is so fraught with mischief, and has created so uneasy a feeling throughout the army, that it is to be hoped the military authorities will see the necessity of announcing their intention of abandoning the project at the earliest opportunity.

"I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

"J. F. BURGOYNE.

"London, March 9."

These letters reflect the latest gleams of his fine intellect. When the stimulus for mental exertion was withdrawn, he would sit for hours, with his hands folded before him, wrapped in his own thoughts and memories. When asked his opinion on any subject, he would give it, clear and concise as ever; but he had evidently lost interest in passing events. He felt deeply, however, the universal sympathy which was shown, as the fact of his illness became known; it seemed that he then, for the first time, became fully aware of the general esteem in which he was held. As he became worse, the Queen and other members of the Royal Family, sent repeatedly to inquire for him; and his house was thronged with friends, acquaintances, and even many who were personally strangers to him, eager to learn news of his state. During the summer of 1871 his general health improved, His health deteriorates.

1871. and he appeared to be making some progress towards recovery; but in August a sudden turn for the worse took place, and his strength again began to fail. From this time he gradually sank from day to day; so gradually, that the last hour found his family unprepared for the final blow. He passed away without a pang, without a struggle; so quietly, that it was only the stillness in the room which told that he was gone.[1]

His death.

His death took place on the 7th October, 1871. On the intelligence reaching the officers of his own corps, a requisition was set on foot for his burial in Westminster Abbey; but it was subsequently determined to obtain the sanction of Her Majesty for the interment of his remains in St. Peter's Church in the Tower, which, before the Intramural Burials Act, had been the ordinary place of sepulture for the lieutenants and other authorities of the fortress. With Her Majesty's usual kindness and consideration, this permission was granted by telegraph, and the funeral took place in St. Peter's ad Vincula on the 17th October.

His burial.

No one who witnessed the spectacle presented on Tower Green that day, will readily forget the sight. To the sound of minute guns and the music of the Dead March, the funeral procession had passed through two lines of troops with arms reversed, and arrived in the midst of a dense mass of officers, which filled the entire space between the White Tower and the Church of St. Peter. So thickly studded with uniforms was this space, that to the occupants of the mourning carriages, it presented the effect of a waving mass of white plumes. On the arrival of the hearse at the church, the guard of honour presented arms; the entire mass uncovered, and

[1] His wife survived him a few weeks only. She died on the 12th December following.

the sea of white appeared transformed into a mass of scarlet and blue and gold, out of which protruded the thin line of black which marked the funeral *cortége*. On the coffin being taken from the hearse, it was borne into the church on the shoulders of eight sergeants of Royal Engineers, preceded by the representatives of the Queen, the King of the Belgians, the Prince of Wales, the Duke of Edinburgh and Prince Arthur; the Commander-in-Chief, the Minister for War, a deputation from the Trinity House, the Minister of the United States, and the American Generals Jackson, Burnside, Barnard, and Badeau. It was followed by two field marshals, upwards of 40 generals and admirals, the deputy-lieutenants of the Tower Hamlets, and between 500 and 600 officers of inferior rank, of whom 164 were officers of his own corps; and it must be borne in mind that the funeral, although it assumed such stately proportions, was a private one, that the attendance was entirely spontaneous, and as much a tribute to his private worth as to his public service. 1871. His burial.

It may not be inappropriate to conclude this chapter with an extract from the funeral sermon of the Reverend G. R. Gleig, the Chaplain-General of the Forces, one who had long known Sir John Burgoyne, and whose graceful tribute to his memory is thus acknowledged, not because of its praise but of its truth.

"We have this day to speak of one whose public career, extending over a wider interval than the allotted term of human life, exhibits no single blot at which the finger of scorn can point, nor any shortcomings upon which hostile criticism may with justice fasten. Entering the military service of his country before almost any here present were born, he sought in various lands, and under every clime, opportunities of proving how well he understood the trust she reposed in him. No man, on

1871. — Funeral sermon by the Chaplain General.

such occasions, ever thought less of himself, or more of the requirements of duty; and the consequence was that few ever commanded in a greater measure than he the respect and confidence of all with whom he was associated. Even in early youth, while as yet his position was necessarily subordinate, they on whom devolved the care of directing great operations competed for his assistance; and having secured it, they went about their business in a spirit more hopeful of success because he was near them. Neither then, however, nor later, after years had matured his experience without cramping his energies, was it ever known beyond the circle within which he advised, how far the advice thus given tended to clear up doubts or determine consequences. In this respect, indeed, he may be said to have stood well-nigh alone in a profession where the highest prize which men aim at and achieve is reputation. To him it was a matter of the most perfect indifference to whom the credit might be awarded, so long as some undertaking, beset with dangers and surrounded with difficulties, were well begun and successfully carried through.

"The same rare abnegation of self, the same modesty, amounting well-nigh to diffidence, characterized all his actions, and gave the tone to all his words in private life. Richly endowed with knowledge outside the line of his profession not less than within, his conversation had a charm about it peculiarly his own; yet such was the gentleness of his nature, that discussion no sooner approached the verge of controversy than it repelled him, and from disputation he at once turned away. Even when constrained by duty, or that strict regard for truth which was with him a living and ever-moving principle, to contradict or point out the error into which a subordinate had fallen, he invariably so expressed himself as to inflict the least possible wound upon the self-respect of the reproved. He never wilfully outraged the feelings of man, woman, or child; coming nearer in this respect to the great prototype of perfect humanity than any other individual whom I have known through life. Error he would correct, the erring he was anxious to reclaim, but he could not "break the bruised reed nor quench the smoking flax." His services were as those of others

are likely, under existing circumstances, to be—in kind multifarious, in degree most unequal. Here they placed him in the fore-front of his profession; there they were very often subordinate. He undertook them all, be their aspect before the world what it might, in the same spirit of cheerful, zealous, quiet determination, never being diverted from their conscientious discharge by any consideration of personal ease or dread of personal degradation. No business to which by authority he was set presented itself to him except in one aspect. Be it hazardous or facile, important or trivial, falling in with his own cultivated tastes or doing to them some outrage, he gave to it all his diligence, and went through with it to the end. You never heard him murmur at his lot; you never knew him seek to escape from it by turning to the right-hand or to the left. Along the narrow pathway he held his course direct, because it was the pathway of duty. So likewise over all his personal habits, as a husband, a father, a companion, and a friend, the same light from Heaven was shed. Pure among the impure, his habitual cheerfulness never degenerated into ribaldry; his tender heart was open to every tale of sorrow; his liberal hand, forward far beyond his means, to relieve distress. 1871. — Funeral sermon by the Chaplain General.

"Sir John Burgoyne was a religious man, but his religion was without ostentation or parade. He found no vent for it in platform oratory; it carried him into no arena where party questions were discussed. The influence of religion upon him made itself mainly known in a life blameless and pure; a life so pure, so blameless, that, looking to the particular channel through which its course lay, I find myself unable to point to any other with which it may be fitly compared. Bear with me, if in so expressing myself I seem to go beyond the limits of pulpit oratory. I am no chance preacher, no hired advocate called in to paint in exaggerated terms, the character of one who was to him while living a comparative stranger. I saw Sir John Burgoyne for the first time when with his glass he swept the breaches of St. Sebastian, in order that they who filled the trenches might be instructed how best to move to the assault; and from that day, to the hour of his death, our personal knowledge of each other, though less than either

1871. could have wished bringing us into daily contact, has suffered no interruption. Therefore am I justified in speaking of him as of a man rarely to be found in any rank or station; brave, able, intelligent, upright, a humble Christian, a modest citizen, one who could bear no malice were he ever so deeply wronged, who would not bring reproach upon another—no, not even if by so doing he might avert unmerited obloquy from himself. There was one public occasion—I need not stay specially to point it out—when this rare exercise of Christian forbearance was exacted from him. It was a heavy burthen to bear, but he bore it without so much as a remonstrance, and he lived long enough, God be praised, to reap his reward."

Funeral sermon by the Chaplain General.

## "LAST CHAPTER."

THE fragments of Sir John Burgoyne's correspondence which have been published, will have given some indication of the more salient points of his character. His clearness of judgment and firmness of will; his unflinching resolution to make his private feelings and interests subservient to his public duties; the high order of his moral courage, which, as in all strong minds, gathered fresh force from circumstances of difficulty or danger; his chivalrous reverence for fallen greatness and sympathy with misfortune, have been illustrated in his own unstudied letters; but it is doubtful whether the correspondence, consisting almost entirely of private letters, conveys a just idea of his intellectual capacity. Some evidence of this kind will be found in the testimony of his contemporaries with whom he was associated in the more difficult junctures of his career, and in the letters written to him by his immediate superiors; among these the late Lord Hatherton, who was Secretary for Ireland when Burgoyne was Chairman of the Board of Public Works in that country, in speaking to the writer of eminent members of his own corps, stated that he considered Sir John Burgoyne and Mr. Drummond to be, without exception, the two ablest public servants he had ever met. He possessed, however, no showy qualities of manner or conversation; and his advancement in life

His character and disposition.

was undoubtedly much impeded by an extreme diffidence, which bore the appearance of mistrust in his own powers. In the early portion of his career, he seems to have underrated his capacity very much. No man was a more perfect master of good idiomatic nervous English; but he had imbibed an impression that he had no literary ability, and after the close of the great war, he handed to Sir John Jones all his military notes, which materially assisted that officer in his well-known history of the Peninsular sieges. "If Burgoyne only knew his own value, no one would equal him," was said of him by the Duke of Wellington; but to the last hour of his life, he never completely conquered this infirmity. The original cause of this diffidence may probably be traced to his sensitiveness respecting his birth, and his early dependence on the bounty of strangers; while the marked want of recognition of his military services during the Peninsular War, as contrasted with the lavish honours bestowed upon inferior merit when backed by greater social position, must have tended to foster this defect in his character, and to perpetuate it in after life. The same feature in his character created a timidity and hesitation of manner in general society, which must have often produced a very unfavourable impression of his capacity upon strangers. It is but natural that a proud and sensitive spirit in one so essentially modest and retiring should, under a sense of injustice, shrink within itself, and ultimately produce an indisposition to self-assertion, apt to be confounded with want of power. He thus appears to have been morbidly conscious of his disadvantages in oral debate or argument, and it was his custom to place his ideas on paper before taking part in any discussion, whether as member of a deliberative committee or a council of war. These papers, of which

he retained copies, have added much to the value of the materials for this history; but the number of such memorandums during the Crimean war, afforded an occasion for taunt by certain prejudiced writers who were not acquainted with this peculiarity of his disposition. That this defect in his character was not constitutional, but acquired under the pressure of circumstances, is proved by the fact that it did not follow him into domestic life, where, until his hearing became impaired, nothing could exceed the charm and ease of his conversation. He possessed a keen sense of humour, with a ready flow of that genial wit and quick repartée which raises a laugh without hurting the feelings of others. The two stories which follow will serve as examples of this readiness.

His character and disposition.

"He was crossing the Channel from Newhaven to Dieppe, in November 1844, when a violent storm arose, which disabled the ship's engine, and she was forced to turn back, when close to the French coast. They had been nearly twenty-four hours at sea, and were in the extremities of discomfort and sea sickness, when (this is quoted from one of his letters) 'a passenger on deck just now said to me, "This is a bad job."—"Very," said I. "Particularly," says he, "for a man who is on business."—"And what do you think of it," said I, "for a man who is on *pleasure!*'"

He was in the habit of wearing a very shabby hat, and a workman employed upon some job in his house, took it away by mistake for his own. On discovering the error, the man brought it back a short time afterwards. Lady Burgoyne, wishing to "improve the occasion," was remonstrating with her husband on the subject, and pointing out what a very bad hat it must have been, for a workman to have taken it by mistake for his own,

when Sir John interrupted her lecture by saying, "A much better proof of that is his *bringing it back*."

His writings.

Sir John Burgoyne's life was so fully occupied by his official duties, that he had little leisure for literary pursuits; but he has left behind several short treatises on professional subjects. The most important of these are to be found in the Royal Engineer professional papers, where his papers on 'Coast Batteries' and 'Attacks of Fortresses' will probably be read as long as the art of the military engineer endures. Some of his best productions were collected and published in 1869, under the title of 'The Military Opinions of Sir John Burgoyne.' He is also the author of treatises on 'Blasting of Rocks' and on 'Road Making,' which have passed through several editions, and are still referred to as authorities by engineers.

He possessed also some versatility and talent for lighter literature. This usually took the form of *jeux d'esprit* and epigrams in verse, of which the following are some specimens among many. In publishing a few of these trifles in a work, which, as a rule, has treated of serious subjects, I must claim the indulgence due to a partial biographer. They must be read as illustrations of a playful turn of thought, and not as pretending to any merit as literary compositions.

### THE ELEMENTS OF LOVE.

Fire, water, earth, and air,
The Lover's progress well declare.
He first asserts his heart's on *fire*,
Then *tears* lets fall in mock despair,
Whilst *earthly* gains his soul inspire,
And his last vows are — what but *air!*

## INTRODUCTION FOR A COLLECTION OF NEGRO MELODIES.

His writings.

The French feel sure that Love's *a Moor:*
To follow the same track,
I think I'll show, before we go,
How Love may be a Black!

Don't rack your brain—the matter's plain
To gentle and to boor:
Isn't every Negro that we see
A genuine *Black amour!*

## TO A LADY,

WITH THE GIFT OF A FOOTSTOOL.

Go, happy stool, and while you last,
My fair one's wants complete;
Tell the dear creature that I cast
My homage at her feet!

A lowly and submissive part
Learn to endure from me:
Too long she has trampled on my heart;
She'll trample now on thee!

## TO MISS ———,

WITH A TOILET MIRROR.

This work of art, sweet maid, I send,
An offering from a tender friend.
As a chameleon changes hue,
So will this magic tablet too.
Within, to *my* inquiring eyes,
Nothing but imperfections rise;
But let thy radiant countenance
Descend upon it, and at once,
Presto! 'twill show, so changed its worth,
The loveliest creature upon earth.

His writings.

Yet since that fleeting form divine,
Thus stamp'd, thou canst not render mine,
Resign the living counterpart,
And let me press it to my heart!

Your poems one day,
As they stood in my way,
I impatiently threw in the fire;
When quite dull it became,
Where I looked for a flame,—
Sad emblem of what they inspire!

## TO A YOUNG LADY, FOND OF WHIST,

WITH A PACK OF CARDS.

This pack—it may be welcome, or may not;
At all events with good advice 'tis fraught.
First *deal* with caution all you have in hand,
That what shall then *turn up* you may command;
And when a *partner* is designed by Fate
To share the fortunes of your coming state,
Offer a willing *hand* to meet his *suit*
(All stealthy signs and signals breed dispute).
Play then an open, honourable *game*,
*Leading* in measured steps that none can blame.
While others may be failing in a trump,
Show all that you at least deserve a *trump*.
Never *revoke* what follows duty's call;
*Honours* may then attend you, great and small.
Then should an adversary (for who has none?)
With artful *tricks* insidious courses run,
Should he not prove in all his *dealings* true,
And fail to give to every one his due,
Exact the penalties the law demands,
And put his business into better hands;
Try each *finesse* that may produce effect,
And to his *shuffling* give the *cut* direct.
Thus will the one you're bound to find you true,
And pass due praises on whate'er you do;
While *love* all *love* he'll count with great address,
And take a *bumper* to your joint success!

## WHERE THERE'S A WILL THERE'S A WAY.

His writings.

Alas! 'tis too true what they say,
That it's "where there's a will there's a way:"
For 'twas ever my *will*
Yonder maid to court still,
And her answer was ever,—*Away!*

'Tis plain why for Belinda
The inward spark I feel:
My heart is soft and tinder,
While hers is flint and steel!

Some merry fellows love a glass:
Some maidens love one too!
The self-same motive each,—to pass
The happiest hours they know!

## 1ST JANUARY, 1865.

You wish me a happy New Year, as a toast,
And a kindly good act it appears;
But when you perceive I'm as deaf as a post,
You should wish me *two* happy new ears.

## TO A YOUNG LADY,

WITH A PAIR OF EARRINGS.

To the bells we've recourse when we ring in the year;
But how to account for the spell,
That by some strange vagary it now would appear
We've to ring in the ear of the belle!

The strongest sensations that savage man feels
Are at view of the scene that a mirror reveals:
'Tis strange the same joy will be often displayed
At the very same sight by the civilized maid!

His writings.

"I and J are the same," Miss Selina averred;
To her dictum who'll dare to say, Nay?
For there is not in all Nature's host, take my word,
A more chattering thing than a Jay.

## INSCRIPTION FOR THE TITLE-PAGE OF A PHOTOGRAPHIC BOOK.

I strive to make this precious book comprise
All I can find most grateful to my eyes:
Come then, my friends, one little boon I ask,
Give me your countenance in this my task!

## TO A YOUNG LADY NAMED KATE, WHO WAS CALLED BY HER FRIENDS CATO.

Cato in olden times disdained to live,
And 'midst a world of slaves his homage give:
A different fate our Cato's charms confer,
For all the world shall bow as slaves to her.

He possessed very keen powers of observation; and few men have exceeded him in the faculty of describing scenes of everyday life which struck his notice. The following are extracts from his private letters to his family:—

"June, 1835.

"I have been in attendance on the Committee all day. A capital specimen of an Irish gentleman was examined, a Mr. Fetherston, full of information on bog drainage, and with a degree of frankness and nonchalance in giving his opinions, apparently unconscious of the impression created, that astonished the reserved Englishmen. 'Pray, sir, is there not a danger, after the reclamation you have described, that these lands may revert to their original state of bog?'—'*Yes, about as much as that sawdust would revert to deal boards.*'"

He thus describes a dinner at Colonel Hare Clarges' the same year :— His writings.

"We had a most agreeable evening at old Hare's; Lord Lynedoch, Mr. Cathcart, Colonel Shawe, and Colonel Brotherton, a distinguished cavalry officer. Lord Lynedoch, eighty-six years of age, took a most hearty dinner of the best leg of mutton and beef-steak that I ever ate, and a couple of good stiff glasses of spirits and water, and smoked his cigar with the best of us. After fighting over all our old campaigns, and generally agreeing that we should like to go over them all again, Mr. Cathcart looked at his watch, and Lord Lynedoch, who had his carriage waiting to take him to Lady Ogle's party, said, 'Well, I must go: I suppose *it is almost eleven.*' It was past *one.*"

"January, 1859.

"Lord Hatherton, showing Margaret his farm and prime stock, just before producing a magnificent young ox, perfectly quiet, said to her, 'Are you brave?'—'Oh yes,' said she, 'very!' The beast came out very gently, but showing an immense pair of horns, and fine lively eyes: 'That is,' said she, retiring behind the gate, '*when there's no danger!*'"

His private letters are replete with sketches and scenes of this kind; and so much is this the case that one may read through hundreds of them without experiencing a moment's sense of weariness.

With this keen sense of humour, he possessed a strong poetic feeling. If he met with an idea that pleased him in a foreign language, his impulse was to translate it into English verse. From an Italian author he obtained the beautiful thought which he embodied in these lines :—

"That eye so languishing, so sweet, so mild,
At once of love the parent and the child."

The following address to his daughters on St. Valen-

His writings.

tine's Day, has a vein of graceful sentiment running through it :—

"Say! shall an old man dare this day to seek
Grace in young maidens' eyes—their *love* bespeak!
What though full seventy busy winters pass'd
Have o'er this haggard brow their wrinkles cast,
And trembling hands and drowsy hours betray
Unerring symptoms of a life's decay;—
Still, with proud confidence, I seek and gain
The deep affections of yon youthful train. . . .
Approach then with unblushing front, and shed
Your warm caresses on this aged head;
With undisguised love return my call,
And take a *father's* blessing on you all."

My task is now completed. In my anxious endeavour to do justice to the character of a great, a wise, and a good man, I have never ceased to be conscious of the danger of being betrayed into partiality by my feelings of personal attachment to one whom I have long revered as a father and honoured as a chief. I have therefore, as far as possible, suppressed the utterance of my own opinions, and allowed the subject of these pages to be judged by his own recorded acts, his written or spoken words, and the testimony of his contemporaries. The only exception to this rule has been in allusion to the want of official recognition which embittered his early life, not only because he himself bore this injustice,

"The law's delay,
The insolence of office, and the spurns
That patient merit of the unworthy takes,"

without murmur or remonstrance; but because to this cause I cannot help tracing certain peculiarities of his character, which probably tended to some extent to weaken his official usefulness. In public life, "the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong;" and

Sir John Burgoyne's unfailing sense of justice must have been outraged long after every feeling of personal injury had passed away. He had seen his own great services unrequited, the corps whose interests were dearer to him than his own, slighted, his opinions disregarded, his motives impugned, and his acts misrepresented; but he lived to be compensated for all, not only by the approbation of his sovereign, and the honours freely if tardily conferred by the State, but by the unanimous verdict of the nation, whose voice—when, full of years, the old soldier laid down his public burdens—was raised in unmistakable tones to proclaim his wisdom and his worth.

His writings.

# APPENDIX.

THE papers left by Sir John Burgoyne show how great an importance was attached to his opinion by the leading statesmen of the day, not only in matters connected with his profession, but upon a variety of political and financial questions of public interest. Thus we find him referred to by the Admiralty, the Colonial Office, the India Board, and the Foreign Office, upon many different subjects, all of which he treats in the same clear-sighted and unprejudiced manner. His reports are far too numerous for publication in this volume, but many of them possess a permanent interest, and throw light upon topics still under discussion.

His series of papers on Colonial Defences, the remarks on the Channel Islands, on the formation of a Volunteer Force, and the still pending questions relating to the respective powers of Forts and Ships, are so instructive, even after the lapse of years, that they have been quoted in the Appendix.

Those who charged him with being too conservative in his professional and official capacity, will be forced, after a perusal of these documents, to admit that not only was Sir John Burgoyne ever ready to entertain proposals of improvement and change, but that he himself, as in the case of light artillery, was a bold innovator, and—a rare quality in one of of his age—an original thinker, equally untrammelled by prevalent opinions as by traditions of the past.

G. W.

## No. 1.

### Hong Kong:

*Memorandum on the Despatch of* Governor Bonham, *to* Earl Grey, *dated 23rd May*, 1849.

1849. — Memorandum on Hong Kong.

If it is desired to make extensive reductions in public establishments, there cannot be a more ready way for obtaining full and plausible propositions for the purpose, than will be elicited in a report from persons entirely ignorant of the nature of the services.

Thus it will be observed in the enclosures accompanying this despatch, that the admiral and the chief commissary advert to many essential reductions that could be effected in the civil departments; on which the governor very naturally remarks that they know nothing about the business.

In dealing, however, with the army and navy, Governor Bonham quite shames Messrs. Hume, Cobden, &c., in his showing the sweeping way in which offices might be reduced, and services amalgamated.

It is quite manifest that the establishments at Hong Kong have been founded on an understanding of far greater importance being attached to the station, and greater stability given to it, than appears to be the intention of Earl Grey. If intimation had been given to the master-general, that the occupying force should be permanently limited to 600 or 700 Europeans, with about as many more of a Ceylon corps and Lascars; that it was not thought desirable to strengthen the place by any works of defence, nor to maintain depôts of consequence there, and that the Ordnance establishments were to be made to conform to those principles, the reductions would have been proposed accordingly, and the same result would have been arrived at, after due consideration given to the suggestions of the governor; but this would have been done in a manner better adapted to the regular order of the department than as he proposes, and without a necessity for the sharp, not to say offensive reflections, that seem to run through all that gentleman's report.

Many of his remarks are against the very system and general organization of several of the services, and if correct, would show that these departments are acting on erroneous principles, not at Hong Kong alone, but everywhere. 1849. — Memorandum on Hong Kong.

It is hardly to be supposed that such changes of system could be adopted, on so slight an investigation into their general bearing as the governor has been able to afford.

Governor Bonham bases his calculations of the arms, ammunitions, stores, &c., requisite for the station, on the average peace consumption and existing condition of affairs.

I would submit that this is an erroneous foundation altogether; these articles are essentially *warlike* stores, and to be prepared for the contingency of *war*.

The main provision to be established at Hong Kong or any other station, is the amount of depôt that is judged to be necessary to be prepared for *war*, due consideration being given to the nature of the station, and the anticipated means of obtaining further supplies on the emergency; to which is usually added, as a much less important ingredient, the quantities necessary for the ordinary peace consumption.

The first six months of a war might lead to a greater drain on these stores, particularly arms and ammunition, than the consumption of ten years of peace.

It is impossible that on the breaking out of a war, everything necessary could be supplied from England to every foreign station, and therefore the practice is to regulate the extent of depôt that shall be kept at each for the first emergency.

This would affect the naval as well as the military service. A squadron or reinforcement of ships might be sent out rapidly in case of war, but it would not be so easy to send out as readily the stores necessary for its maintenance and refitting.

In like manner, the governor argues that the store of salt meat, biscuit, &c., should be regulated by the facility with which contracts are now made with the Chinese for fresh meat and bread; but the only necessity for the stores at all is in order to be prepared for an emergency that might cut off the contract supplies, and the small habitual consumption on which the governor calculates the necessary depôt, is only for the purpose of not leaving that store to be deteriorated by long keeping.

1349.

Memorandum on Hong Kong.

As in the case of the more warlike stores, it is the reserve depôt, not the peace consumption, that is the ordinary regulating basis of regulation.

Those reserve depôts may be large or small, according to the decision of Lord Grey, on an understanding with the superior naval and military authorities.

The governor seems to consider that one of the large fifty-gun steam guard ships would afford a perfect substitute for any land defences. This may be disputed; such a resource, it is submitted, would be far more costly and less efficient. The first cost for construction and equipment of such a floating battery would exceed that of a first-rate fort; and the expense of maintenance would be subsequently much more heavy.

On the appearance of a superior enemy's force, it would have to seek refuge under the batteries, if they were capable of protecting it, and a landing being effected, which it could not under those circumstances prevent, the island would be subdued and it would fall with it: whereas a system of land defences and force are intended to hold out against even a superior power of armament, until time afforded for succour.

I cannot conclude these memoranda without adverting in a military point of view, to the precarious tenure we should have of Hong Kong, if the views of Mr. Bonham should be adopted.

It may be admitted, as he states, that the military and naval means he proposes will be equal to any contingency except a war with a European power (or, I presume, with the United States); but he adds, that then it might be protected by the navy.

In that case, it is to be understood that the station is to fall into an enemy's hands, should he have a superiority in that sea during a war, for however short a period.

With our vast maritime ascendancy during the last war with France, such a contingency was always possible, and actually did occur at times.

But perhaps it may be meant that reinforcements and additional means may be added on the breaking out of a war.

In the very low state of ordinary maintenance proposed by Mr. Bonham, with small armaments and without any works of defence, the means then required to be added to give a chance of security must be large, and with the heavy demands upon

the service generally, might not be forthcoming as early as necessary. 1852.

Memorandum on Hong Kong.

It also assumes a great and decisive naval superiority in the first instance, which may be considered doubtful; and even if it should be the case, it assumes that we shall be able to foresee in sufficient time where any attempt may be made, which is almost impossible.

For instance, in 1845 or 1846, when some angry disputes with France created an apprehension of a rupture, it was found that a French armament was in the neighbourhood of the Isle of France, in sufficient force, should hostilities have taken place, to cause a doubt in the mind of the general commanding in that colony, whether he could have saved it.

In fact, under the system proposed by Governor Bonham, a small squadron, with 3000 or 4000 troops in the eastern seas in time of war, would take the Mauritius and Hong Kong, and destroy the naval arsenal and means at Trincomalee, if it did not capture the whole island of Ceylon.

September 12, 1849. J. F. BURGOYNE.

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No. 2.

*Extract from Memorandum on Rifled Small Arms.*

Memorandum on rifled small arms.

Since the Peace of 1815, we have been in a placid, stationary condition, without making a step in advance of any essential importance. In a positive sense, we are quite as we were then; but comparatively we have fallen.

The Continental states have in the meantime been constantly engaged in the most anxious researches. They studied, and made themselves masters of all our improvements, endeavouring to make them more perfect.

Their artillery have adopted the system of ours; and they have introduced into their several services the shrapnels and the rockets, studying, after long and minute investigation, to carry them to the greatest perfection.

Of late years, they have turned their attention to the soldier's musket, and certainly there was no implement of war more

1852. — imperfect, or more susceptible of improvement, or on which the fate of battles might more depend.

Memorandum on rifled small arms.

The ordinary soldier's musket is incapable of throwing its bullet, with any degree of precision, beyond 200, or at most, 300 yards, although it will range in a wild manner to very much longer distances.

Consequently, when an action was commenced, which may have been when the respective forces were at about 1000 or 1200 yards asunder, the first effects were confined to the guns of the artillery, with an occasional wild fire from musketry; as the opposing forces approached the real effective distance, within 150 yards, the contest then became violent and short, with a powerful effect from bullet and bayonet.

The soldier (and in all services it was the same) was but slightly practised in the use of his weapon as a fire-arm at 100 or 150 yards, and knowing nothing beyond of its power, but that the bullet would fall somewhere at a considerable distance. Hence, not well acquainted with the effect, nor being a good judge of distance, he would frequently be tempted to open a fire at advancing or manœuvring bodies of the enemy that were hovering about at from 300 to 400 and 500 yards, to the utter waste of his ammunition, so as to establish the acknowledged fact of the hundreds of rounds fired in every action for every hit.

All this was so much a matter of course, that officers as well as men, had no principles to guide them in the knowledge of how to make even the best of this imperfect implement. The only known remedy for correcting this inherent defect in the musket, was a rifled barrel.

The rifle had been partially adapted to troops in the United States, in Switzerland, Tyrol, &c., where such a weapon was frequently used for other purposes than war.

Small corps of riflemen were also added to the British service, in the early part of the wars of the French Revolution, and with excellent results. The fire of the rifle was far more accurate, in skirmishing, in opposing an enemy's artillery in a fortress; and in the various occasions, where a deliberate aim could be taken, its service was very effective; but it was subject to many inconveniences that rendered it inapplicable as a general weapon.

1852.

Memorandum on rifled small arms.

It was a refinement, and very costly, as compared with the ordinary musket, and its effective range was scarcely considered to exceed 300 yards. The loading very slow, wanting in the simplicity of the ordinary arm, and requiring an effort. It was short and unwieldy; and altogether inferior for sharp close action.

At length efforts were made by different Continental nations, and with great effect, to obtain the advantages of the rifle without its inconvenience.

Several systems and forms have been adopted, the principal of which are the Prussian *Zündnadelgewehr*, or needle-gun, the *carabine à tige*, and the Delvigne Minié; all of these, giving accurate and very long ranges, using much smaller charges of powder, are fired with a running ball, that is, as easily and quickly as the ordinary old musket. They are of about the same length with or without the bayonet, and are consequently as applicable in all respects for close action, and not much more expensive.

The Swiss, however, after very anxious investigations and trials, have finally determined upon a principle differing very much from the others.

With their national predilections for the rifle on the old system, it is that which they have adopted. The ball of the new form, cylindro-conical, is driven, as of old, with a patch of greased rag, but is of a small size and weight, and the arm is short.

It is clear that a new era is arising with regard to this influential weapon. Great improvement has been effected already in other countries. The troops are now furnished with a musket that, with a reasonable amount of practice, will produce good effect at 800 and even 1000 yards, while the old one was worth little at ranges exceeding 200.

Every one of these new weapons has disadvantages which it will require an anxious course of future research to remedy, retaining as far as possible the advantages of each. It is impossible to stand still, and therefore the least imperfect must be used until further assured improvement shall be devised. The expense of these changes will be very heavy, but *must* be borne, and it becomes a matter of first importance to make

1852. every effort to effect as much improvement as may be, before any great provision of new arms is made.

Memorandum on rifled small arms.

The present decision is in favour of a modification of the Minié, probably a better weapon than that of France, or even Belgium; but it is submitted, that the subject calls for much more consideration than it has yet received, and which should be given to it without loss of time.

Several talented and eminent gunmakers are in the field—Lancaster, Purdey, Wilkinson, Needham, &c., and it is strongly recommended that every encouragement should be afforded them. It would be desirable in the first instance to fix on certain data for the desired results, and these, at first starting, are subjects for discussion; and the more so, as many high authorities, perhaps the majority of influential opinions in the military world, adopt principles that, I would submit, are not sound, and should now be abandoned.

One of these is, that it would be objectionable to give to the mass of the troops, a musket capable of long effective ranges, or one that can be loaded and fired with great rapidity, as affording additional inducement and facility for the expenditure of ammunition wildly, and with even less effect, than has notoriously been the case hitherto.

Such a result, however, is not to be apprehended. Without attaching so much importance as perhaps the subject may deserve, to the extended information now given to soldiers generally, it is one essential of the new system, the natural consequence of the introduction of the new arm, and which must necessarily ensue, that the soldier is to be far more exercised in ball-firing than formerly; and it is the combination of the goodness of the tool with the skill of the workman in the use of it, that will produce superiority of effect: and the army in which this combination shall be found to exist in the greatest perfection, will have striking advantages over an opposing force.

This practice will give each soldier a knowledge of his own proficiency, and how his fire can be turned to most account. And as a check upon individual impetuosity or want of judgment, there will be henceforward the superior knowledge and authority of the officers and non-commissioned officers, who

will have their attention peculiarly turned to a matter that is becoming of such primary importance 1852.

Memorandum on rifled small arms.

On these grounds, it is considered that there is no danger of a *waste* of ammunition in action being a consequence of the superior power given to the musket.

With regard to the more rapid loading and firing which is possessed by the Prussian needle-gun, should anything presenting the same facilities ever be adopted in our service, the same reasons, of the more perfect intelligence of the soldier in the use of his weapon, and the check upon him, will hold good against that facility being misapplied when not in close combat; and when they are so, say within from 100 to 200 yards, when almost every shot must tell, the loading and firing cannot be too quick.

Another matter requiring reconsideration is as to the best weight to be given to the bullet. This is a subject of very peculiar interest, because with it will be involved, in some degree, the weight of the musket, and, of course, the quantity of ammunition that can be carried *by* the soldier, as well as *for* him. It is also of more importance, because there are strong impressions in favour of the weight of the old regulation musket ball, in the minds of the very highest authorities, which it is submitted are not founded on thorough trial and consideration.

The elaborate experiments made of late years in Switzerland, will throw considerable light on this subject.

From them it will be seen that the lighter bullet was propelled with *greater* force, and consequently would require less elevation than the heavier, up to a certain range; beyond that distance, the heavier, by retaining its impetus longer, had gradually more and more advantage as the distance increased. The subject for inquiry is the comparative weights, distances, and effects, on which to decide as to what would be best as a whole for the troops.

On one side is the lightness of weapon, with all its advantages of less fatigue in carrying on a march, and less fatigue in use in firing, by which greater steadiness of aim will be obtained, increased number of rounds of ammunition carried by the soldier, diminished cost of ammunition for practice, and easier practice at the shorter ranges. On the other side,

1852. greater length of effective range, and easier practice at the long ranges.

Memorandum on rifled small arms.

However strong may be the impression in favour of the weight of the present musket-ball, I would submit that the relative merit of one that is lighter (say twenty to the pound) should be fully tested as to accuracy of fire, degrees of elevation, and force of blow at different ranges.

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## No. 3.

*Occupation of Perim, in reply to a reference by the Earl of Ellenborough.*

*To* the Earl of ELLENBOROUGH.

1858. War Office, Whitehall, 16th April, 1858.

Occupation of Perim.

THE island of Perim would appear to be a possession of great interest, as regards the navigation of the Red Sea.

A rocky island, at the very entrance, with a good harbour, and where the channel is very narrow—the widest of the two passes into which the island divides it being not above eleven miles—a distance which can be thoroughly overlooked.

It is manifestly capable of being made into a very powerful stronghold, should circumstances require it, at some expenditure of means. At present, however, it seems to be the intention to occupy it only in form, with 50 or 60 men, and to establish upon it a lighthouse.

That body, for security, is being placed in a blockhouse, or fortified barrack, which perhaps will be sufficient protection against any predatory excursion of the wild inhabitants of the neighbouring countries, from boats, and without cannon; but more precautions will be necessary should we be engaged in war with any maritime power.

We are accustomed to calculate upon an incessant superiority at sea; but this, of course, will be subject to partial contingencies, particularly if there be a coalition of two or more such powers against us; or even at best, we cannot

always be prepared everywhere in full force; and there is no distant part of the world where a superiority may not be gained for a time against us, say, for perhaps two or three months, when it would be a subject of much annoyance to have such a settlement taken from us, and destroyed, even if it could not be maintained. 1858. — Occupation of Perim.

These considerations would lead, then, to the propriety of having plans thoroughly digested for a more complete occupation in different degrees, as may be hereafter requisite.

It is impossible to devise such plans with any confidence, on the slight information now before us. I would therefore recommend that an Officer of Engineers, of intelligence, with the necessary assistants, should be sent at once to make a complete report upon it and its capabilities, embracing, as much as possible, on one progressive system, the different degrees of power of self-defence that might be given to it, so that everything done might tend towards the ultimate best end, if ever required to be persevered in.

Towers are a favourite system for such localities, but are expensive, inconvenient for occupation, containing the smallest interior space for the greatest amount of building, ill adapted to self-defence, and readily reduced when artillery can be brought to bear upon them; and as landing on many parts of the island, with a heavy gun or two, must no doubt be practicable to men-of-war's men, that system would be very imperfect. Projecting points, connected to the land by narrow necks, generally present the most favourable features for defence: and establishing on them a powerful, well flanked, and covered entrenchment, immediately in rear of the neck, with a slight flanked line round the shore, and with bomb-proof cover, will make, by comparatively small means, a very strong work, with the largest interior space—an element of great advantage.

Such a point appears to present itself between the harbour and a small bay towards the S.E. of the island. It is represented on the map as being 140 feet high; a work, there, would of course have to be defiladed from the higher ground in front.

This position, if applicable in other respects, would have

1858. — Occupation of Perim.

the advantage of commanding the harbour—an object of importance.

The proposition of establishing a battery to adjoin the Lighthouse, on the principle of "commanding" that channel (being the one most used), is scarcely to be recommended. The channel is 3000 yards wide, and the fire from a battery against passing vessels would be very ineffective, or if at all dreaded, could be entirely avoided by taking the trifling circuit of the other course.

The Lighthouse itself might easily be made defensible, instead of requiring a detached work for its protection.

The services of an Officer of Engineers would probably be of use from the very commencement, for the defensible barrack, construction of tanks, &c.

One of his chief studies would be how to turn to most account what is to be found on the spot, as to natural advantage of situation, and to the materials to be employed in construction. Thus, if of the loose stones stated to be scattered over the island, the small were made up into concrete with hydraulic lime and cement, taken to the island for the purpose, and the large boulders built up into rough walls, they would form a rapid and cheap mode for escarps and other works of defence.

Any stronghold established, would of course be made to contain within it ample tanks of water, all provisions, depôt of ammunition, and the most important stores.

J. F. BURGOYNE.

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## No. 4.

*Memorandum submitted by Sir John Burgoyne to the Master-General of the Ordnance.*

### CHANNEL ISLANDS.

1853. — Memorandum on the Channel Islands.

May, 1853.

THE relative advantages of the artificial harbours in progress, or that might be established in the three several Channel Islands, being still matters of doubt and difference of opinion,

1853. — Memorandum on the Channel Islands.

I would beg, with great deference to the superior judgment of naval authorities, to submit a few reasons that induce me to persevere in the conclusion I have long come to, that Braye Harbour at Alderney should be completed on the most perfect scale, as one that may be of very great advantage; St. Catherine's at Jersey absolutely abandoned, as from position and other circumstances it would be of very little or no utility; and that the one at Guernsey would be of value by no means compensating for the cost that must be incurred for its construction and security.

Looking at the chart, it would seem to be difficult to deny the great advantage of the position of the Channel Islands, for a military station during a time of war with France, as a place of resort and coaling for war steamers, or occasionally for men-of-war of any class: to watch and intercept the communication along and near the French coast, and to afford a place of refuge to our own commerce or inferior forces, when accidentally intercepted from our own coast by a superior force of the enemy.

We have the experience of the great wars between 1793 and 1815, for a confirmation of the advantages of any hold so near the French, in the efforts made to get and keep possession of such poor places as St. Marson, near Havre, the Chaussées Islands, near St. Malo, and Houat, near Belleisle. The necessity, however, will be greatly increased now, by the general introduction of steamers, and the want of as many points as possible for supplying them with coals. The question here is only as to the propriety of establishing harbours in all three islands, or at which, if not at the whole of them.

The original design of constructing a harbour at each island (most of the plans for which have been gradually increased in size) was under the conviction that each island could only be defended by the maintenance of a steam fleet at every one, to compete with what an enemy might bring against it; but as such a subdivision of force, and the appropriation of a large one, as it must be to produce the desired effect, to one minute object, would be almost impracticable; while as regards the protection of the islands themselves, the very large expenditure required for each harbour would be far more effective

1853. — Memorandum on the Channel Islands.

if applied to works of defence on shore, it will, it is presumed, be conceded that the whole three are not desirable for that object, but that for the general purposes of Channel warfare, one would be most useful, and would suffice.

Adopting that view, then, I would submit that Alderney is to be preferred, and even without reference to what has been already effected at any.

Alderney is only 9 miles from the French coast, and 48 from that of England, being much nearer to either than Jersey or Guernsey; indeed, from Alderney and Portland together, observers might nearly span whatever passes in the Channel between them; it is also much nearer to Cherbourg, from which it is only 25 miles distant, and it is easier of access from the open sea, particularly its harbour, than either of the others, having a clear entrance from the Channel nearly midway between the fine lights of the Caskets and Cape la Hogue.

Alderney has also the incalculable advantage of very great strength with small means, while the tenure of the others would be doubtful even with very large means, the only quality in which it can be by any assumed to be inferior, may be in its capacity as a port, but it has a capability sufficient for all the purposes of a port of the second class.

St. Catherine's in Jersey is much inferior in capacity of deep water to either of the other two: it is difficult of approach from every direction, owing to numerous sunken rocky shoals, one of which will be precisely opposite to its entrance.

It lies on a remote part of the island, distant from the principal resources, and from where it is most likely to be wanted, and though it might by batteries be effectively protected from being forced by shipping, the great extent of its base on shore, composed of hills and ravines, renders it totally impossible to apply any security for it against an enemy on the land side; its defence, therefore, must depend entirely upon the preventing an enemy landing on the island at all. These considerations are so palpable, that the completion of this harbour has now very few, if any, advocates.

Not so Guernsey; there are so many, it is understood, of very superior Officers, who decidedly prefer it to Alderney,

that it is with much diffidence I would venture on a contrary opinion. 1853.

Memorandum on the Channel Islands.

The projects for a harbour at Guernsey as they have been successively increased, certainly exhibit a greater capacity of deep water, and more advantages in its immediate entrance, although not in its approach, than that of Alderney, in which alone its superiority consists; and the question is, how far these are sufficient to counterbalance its inferiority in other qualities. The accompanying diagram shows the relative capacity and form of the three harbours.

Neither, it is presumed, would be considered to compare, under any circumstances, with Portland as a *station* for a Channel fleet, nor indeed would even Guernsey, it is apprehended, be sufficiently large for it, but either could receive one or more ships of war of the largest size on any emergency, or for any occasional purpose; that of Alderney, however, requiring that such a ship should either enter by its own screw power, or be towed by a steamer, which, perhaps, would not be so necessary at Guernsey. The application of steam power is rapidly becoming so essential and so general with fleets, that this necessity could hardly create a difficulty; while for frigates and steamers of every class, the port of Alderney may be considered fully available, and it is submitted, that it is those and smaller classes of ships, for which the Channel Islands' harbour would be almost entirely required, leaving the habitual rendezvous for our large fleets, Plymouth, Torbay, Portland, Spithead, and St. Helen's, where they would be near to all their resources.

It will be perceived by reference to the chart, that while the cruisers from Alderney would be constantly out in the open Channel, and very rapidly in the position for active operations, even to the extent of steamers being able to reserve their consumption of fuel, and to remain in port to a very late period; from Guernsey, to be in equal readiness, they must keep the sea, and perhaps for long periods without performing any particular service, the site for its port being on the further side of the island, in the part most distant from the Channel.

The cost of a great harbour, capable of rendering very im-

1853. — Memorandum on the Channel Islands.

portant services in war time, ought not to be a subject of consideration to a country like Great Britain, but we know that in fact it is a matter of extreme difficulty to obtain means for an expenditure of so large an amount, even when the advantages are indisputable, and combine great utility during peace, as well as war, which cannot be said of Guernsey. The outlay for the construction of the Piers at Guernsey would necessarily be very heavy, on account of the length, the depth of water, and the sources from whence the material is to be obtained.

If only given sums are to be allotted to great harbour works of national importance, it is surely impossible to put one for Guernsey to compete in any way with those desired for Dover, or the coast of Sussex.

There is another most important ingredient to be considered in this question, which is, the absolute necessity for providing at any cost for its perfect security from the greatest efforts an enemy might make for its reduction, for of whatever value it might be to us, there cannot be a doubt but that it would be of very far greater to the French, who have not at present a port between Brest and Cherbourg, which is not a *tidal* harbour; owing to which, during the last wars, many a ship was captured or recaptured from them, by being caught on the coast where the tide would not admit of an entry into these ports. To obtain this security, Guernsey has certainly some advantages. The island is not easy of access, and a landing in force could only be effected in certain bays, but they are numerous and some of them extensive; still, with a strong garrison, and these bays thoroughly fortified by works, an attempt to invade it would be desperate. It has, besides, a good position, embracing a great part of the site of the proposed new harbour, on which Fort George and its outer lines are situated, which also, by a considerable expenditure, might be converted into a fortress that would cover the harbour, and keep an enemy out for perhaps three weeks, even if the rest of the island was gone, and in which reinforcements might be received to the last. But to gain either of these objects effectually, would cost, probably between 200,000*l.* and 300,000*l.*, and the chances would be very small of being able to regain possession of the island, if the French were once

firmly established on it, with all the power they could then introduce. In addition to the construction, equipping, and maintenance of the works, the island could not be considered safe without a garrison of at least 5000 Regulars in addition to its Militia. Thus it will be seen that the means required for its safety would be very heavy, and very likely to be wanting in many essential particulars. 1853. — Memorandum on the Channel Islands.

The necessity for these great exertions would arise almost entirely from the construction of the port. Guernsey under present circumstances does not hold out a temptation for so much exertion for its capture, nor would its temporary loss be of anything like so much consequence to us.

Importance has been attached to certain expressions of the late Duke of Wellington, in favour of all these harbours, but they were in conversation, we know not *à propos* to what statements made to him, or how they might have been qualified. The importance he attached to our maintaining the Channel Islands is well known, and everything in the context of the reported conversation, shows that he had in contemplation solely the security of the islands.

It is hardly doing justice to the Duke's memory, to make him responsible for such great undertakings, on some casual remarks from a first impression, and on imperfect information.

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*On the importance of Alderney as a Naval Station in War.*

*To* the Right Hon. Sir JOHN PAKINGTON, Bart., First Lord of the Admiralty.

31st May, 1858.

MY DEAR SIR JOHN PAKINGTON, 1858.

It does not appear that in the discussion which took place in the House of Commons on Friday, relative to Alderney, the parties understood the real merits of the question, when they seemed to desire a revision of what had been deliberately Alderney as a Station of War.

1858. — decided upon years ago, and on which very large sums of money have been expended.

Alderney as a Station of War.

There was originally a project for establishing large harbours at Jersey and Guernsey, and a very considerable expenditure was incurred towards that at St. Catherine's in Jersey. They were, however, on consideration postponed—entirely at Guernsey, and the continuance of the work in Jersey *sine die;* and a harbour commenced at Alderney.

The objections to those for Jersey and Guernsey were that, while the expense of each would be very great, their utility would be small, as they could only be approached by passages of difficulty, owing to rocks and violent currents; they were on the wrong sides of the island for quick communication with the Channel; and they would create strong additional inducement to the French, in case of war, to try and capture the Islands, which now can only be defended against any formidable efforts by very extensive fortifications and very large garrisons.

In former wars, before the habitual employment of steam navigation, the circumstances of the navigation round them gave them a strength which they do not now possess.

The advantages of Alderney are:—

A harbour which, though it may be as costly as either of the others, will be much more favourably situated.

It will be much nearer to the coast of England than the others, and exactly opposite to Portland, from which it will be under 60 miles distance, while the island is only 7 or 8 miles from the French coast.

The harbour opens at once, and without any difficulty or impediment, into the Channel, so that it can be made or departed from with facility by day or night, and without pilots.

Though small, it has a depth of water to receive any class of men-of-war.

Thus, with that of Portland, it forms what may figuratively be considered a gate into all the upper end of the Channel, admirably adapted for watching and controlling its passage.

No good harbour can exist without being under some circumstances applicable to refuge; but that at Alderney was not intended as such, but essentially as a war station; in which

case, however, it would act valuably as a port of refuge against an enemy, for any vessels which might find themselves at times cut off from the coast of England by their cruisers. 1858. — Alderney as a Station of War.

Alderney has also another very important advantage, that it is capable of being made a place of great strength, and the works for that purpose are at this moment drawing towards completion, and it only wants its armaments and a garrison—both of which can be thrown in very rapidly—to be now perfectly defensible.

The full force for its garrison, instead of being 5000, as stated in the House, has only been calculated at 2400, and those might be of effective Militia; and even half that number if need be, would have a very good chance, with a commander of energy, of maintaining it successfully.

It is quite true that some able officers of the navy did not see the advantage of this position of Alderney; but after every consideration given to them, their opinions were overruled. The only objection I ever understood was that the harbour was small: it would not, in fact, hold the Channel fleet; but I would submit that Portland and the Solent are far more appropriate positions for our great fleet, on our own coast, near our resources, and where it would be well placed as against Cherbourg; while Alderney would act as an outpost for detached cruisers to any extent.

The proposition of extending the capacity of the harbour, from the original design, and in what degree, may still be matter for discussion, as perhaps it may not be now too late; but it is believed that many of those even who objected to Alderney as a whole, have been decided advocates for making the best of it, by enlarging the harbour so far as could be done without any very unreasonable increase of outlay.

My dear Sir John Pakington,

Your faithful servant,

J. F. Burgoyne.

1857.

Formation of a National Volunteer Force.

## No. 5.

*On the formation of a National Volunteer Force.*

*To* Lord Palmerston.

War Department, Whitehall,
January, 1857.

My dear Lord Palmerston,

I return the paper of which your lordship was so good as to allow me the perusal, containing a proposition offered by some Frenchman for an attack upon Pembroke, which was not ill devised for the time.

The period can be fixed with some precision, as some five years ago, by the description he gives of the works, and the very brewing of such a project at so recent a period, and during a time of profound peace and amity, may prove to us how desirable it is that we should hasten our preparations to meet sudden contingencies of the kind.

By another sketch which I enclose, your lordship will perceive that since that project was concocted we have added three, good works near the mouth of the Haven, and if not all precisely on the points indicated by the author of it, on his very rough sketch, they are (having precisely the same object in view) on the sites that we, from our longer study and superior knowledge of the localities, have decided to be the best, and those most required in the first instance; others are contemplated when more pressing wants shall be provided for.

But though these additional works will render the proposed mode of attack much more difficult, and though as supports to more active forces, they will be of the greatest value, they would be quite insufficient of themselves to prevent the success of such an enterprise, if conducted with vigour.

The matters in which we are now very deficient for the protection of most of our numerous harbours, are floating defences and batteries, to co-operate with the above batteries, and garrisons to prevent the places being run into by two or three thousand, or perhaps even a few hundred men landed for the purpose; either of which, I believe, could be obtained in a

manner to be of great effect, without the enormous establishments and expenses that would be required, if to be provided by our men-of-war and regular armed forces. 1857. — Formation of a National Volunteer Force.

Respecting floating defences, I submitted to the First Lord of the Admiralty my ideas several months ago, and now enclose a copy, which I would beg to be added to the Memoranda on the Standing Defences at home and abroad, which I lately presented to your lordship.

With regard to garrisons for these places, neither the Line nor the Militia can be looked to for them, if invasion at other points is threatened, for they will *all* be required for the most urgent want, of opposing an inroad in strength into the country; the only remaining armed forces, then, will be the dockyard battalions and the pensioners, which should be cherished, augmented, and kept as efficient as possible, but still they would be numerically quite insufficient.

A very powerful and most valuable force, however, could be created by an enrolment of large bodies of volunteer corps in the maritime districts, for purely local service, very much on the admirable system of the Militia in the Channel Islands, but even at less expense than there, and at very far less than that of the British Islands; by this system, from 6,000 to 10,000 organised men could be collected at any time within twenty-four hours, for the protection of each of such places as Pembroke, Liverpool, Hull, &c. &c., bodies which would be perfectly efficient within works of fortification, if not at first in the field.

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## No. 6.

### *On Colonial Defences.*

THE WEST INDIA ISLANDS. 1858.

6th August, 1858. — On Colonial Defences. West India Islands.

ALTHOUGH these reports were called for by the Secretary of State for War, for information, it ought to be thoroughly understood that the War Department is in no degree whatever responsible for the utterly neglected condition in which these islands are, as regards military protection.

1858. — On Colonial Defences. West India Islands.

Not only have they no means of opposing the slightest hostile attempt which might be directed against them, even perhaps solely for plunder; but they have not the means of securing their property against the efforts of their own mobs.

There is probably a vague idea among them that, in case of war, troops would be sent to them, which it is believed is by no means intended, even if we had the means, which most assuredly we should not have; several of the governors rely upon protection from our navy, which however would be very precarious, and could not be constant; while one reproaches the Government, even at present, with leaving them in their very insecure state: it therefore would seem that it is not clearly understood, that the protection of those islands from foreign or domestic aggression depends solely and entirely upon themselves, and it might be well that there should be no misunderstanding about it.

Whatever value may be attached to them politically, I am not aware of any of them being of military importance, except the Bahamas; the navy, however, may feel an interest in some one or more, on account of harbour or anchorage.

It may be particularly regretted that there should be universally such apathy on the subject on the part of the islanders, as where the population is British, it is conceived a very respectable force of volunteer militia might be organised, at a very small expense and at little inconvenience, to encourage which the Imperial government might co-operate, by providing arms, ammunition, and a few accessories. J. F. B.

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No. 7.

*On Colonial Defences.*

CEYLON.

*To* His Excellency Sir HENRY WARD, G.C.M.G., Governor of Ceylon.

War Office, Whitehall,
29th October, 1858.

MY DEAR SIR HENRY WARD,

I am extremely obliged to you for taking so much trouble in making known to me your ideas on the tendency of

certain War Office regulations, to be very grievous to many most valuable local interests, and to raise conflicts between the civil and military authorities, many of the objects contended for being of little or no value to the military, and founded on very doubtful rights.

I may say that I go entirely with you in general principle; and I see no reason to believe that we should differ on details, judging from the remarks in your able report, of which I had the perusal, and in which you seemed far from ignoring the real claims for *bonâ fide* and well-grounded wants for military defences.

Anxious as I must naturally feel for the maintenance of the greatest possible military capabilities at every station, I have always thought it consistent with my duty to give due consideration to the social wants of the country, to reconcile the two interests where possible, and even to concede where the civil requirements very greatly exceed in value the military advantages; and I have been taunted before now for considering interests with which I, as a military authority, am said to "*have nothing to do.*"

In England, the civil interests will take very good care of themselves; and I do think it not only just, but good policy, not to trample too much upon those abroad, because we have more power there. With our very low military means, nearly every foreign possession we have will be at the mercy of any enemy of maritime power, unless supported by, at least, the good will of the population; therefore we require, as a matter of self-interest, if not of liberality, to gain its friendly feeling, and to promote, as far as we can, its prosperity. At the same time, I would seek from the civil authority a reciprocity of consideration, and a desire to attend to the capability for defence, which might some day become of vital importance to the station.

With regard to the particular case of Ceylon, it is not for me to decide; but having been referred to by the Secretary of State for War for opinions, I have recommended the adoption of your views, the abandonment altogether of those assumed military reserves, not at present used for military purposes, nor for which any necessity can be anticipated.

1858. — On Colonial Defences.

Military provision may be required for two objects—one for defence, the other for accommodation for troops only: the demands for the first may be precise, and consequently a little encroaching; for the other, any healthy site of sufficient capacity, not too far from their work, ought to suffice; and the arrangement will admit of considerable latitude.

Works for defence will be of varying importance, and therefore should not be subject to general rules. I would not compromise the safety of such a garrison as Gibraltar, to benefit ordinary commercial interests; at the same time, it is absurd to place the same restrictions in favour of places of very minor consideration.

We have an engineering regulation, to keep a clear space of 600 yards in front of works of defence; but such a rule is outrageous in the midst of a thriving community, where every foot of ground is of very great direct value to the proprietor, and far more indirect value to the community.

Who, for instance, would think of keeping a clear space of 600 yards round the Tower of London.

Even for important posts under such circumstances, we ought to try and make up for deficient open space around, by giving increased power of resistance by internal additions and improvements, or by additional works, where space can be more readily obtained.

In Ceylon, I certainly attach great importance to Trincomalee as a naval station, which ought to be well secured; and I continue to do so, notwithstanding the present impression in favour of Singapore. At Trincomalee, then, I should hope for due consideration being paid to the conservation of defensive capabilities; and here I would observe, that I think it is not a sufficient plea for destroying such capabilities there or elsewhere, that little or no work has been applied to them, because we all know the reluctance there is for incurring much expenditure on such prospective wants; still the time may come when they may be of immense importance.

Trincomalee, I think, ought to be considered as an imperial rather than a colonial establishment. Colombo and Galle ought also to possess some accessories for defence, and perhaps there may be one or two minor stations.

1858. — On Colonial Defences.

With regard to small stations for troops, there may be circumstances to require them; but it has always been a favourite principle with me to work troops rather by *Reserves*, and to occupy the out-stations by police and irregulars, as much as possible. It will be understood that the local officers in command cannot make concessions.

I fear I shall have troubled you very much with this prolix statement of my own opinions; but as you have appealed to me, I think I cannot do less than explain the motives that guide my individual recommendations.

My dear Sir Henry Ward,
Your faithful Servant,
J. F. Burgoyne.

Note.—In 1865 a Commission was appointed to report upon the amount of military force absolutely necessary for *Colonial* purposes in Ceylon, with a view of the cost being borne by the island instead of the Imperial Treasury. The conclusions arrived at by the Commission, after six months' local investigations and inquiry, and subsequently carried into effect, entirely bear out the opinions expressed by Sir John Burgoyne, and the principles he laid down.—Ed.

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## No. 8.

### *Minute on a reference from the Foreign Office.*[1]

13th June, 1859.

1859. — Minute on a reference from Foreign Office.

No fixed rule can be given for the military *rayon* round a fortress. It will depend greatly upon social, local, and even political considerations.

600 yards, the regulation in the British service, is considered as a restricted limit among our own population, chiefly to avoid more interference than possible with private property and enterprise.

[1] At the close of the war between Spain and Morocco.—Ed.

1859. — Minute on a reference from Foreign Office.

For absolute defence, 1000 yards would be a great improvement.

But where the limits are to be a line of demarcation between different nations, it certainly would tend to avoid disputes, collisions, and jealousies, that the boundary should be farther removed, and I would recommend its being not *less* than from 2500 to 3000 yards.

After the peace of 1782, the Spanish line of entrenchments were allowed to be constructed at about 1800 yards from the rock of Gibraltar, which it was subsequently considered was oppressively close.

The range of a 24-pounder shot is too precarious a distance: if it were a rifled cannon, it might be as much as five miles.

It should therefore be a fixed measure, but with a latitude for varying more or less according to local circumstances, at the discretion of a mediating commission: thus, a watercourse, a ridge of heights or other natural feature, nearly along the distance, might be adopted for the actual boundary.

It is believed that Melilla is on a peninsula, and therefore that the greater or less extension from the place, would probably not involve much difference in the amount of occupation; and if it includes any valuable property, it might be right to prescribe that due compensation be made for it.

In the final arrangement, the respective rights over the intervening ground should be well defined. In the case of Gibraltar, by styling it the neutral ground, questions have arisen whether the garrison had a right to cultivate a few gardens on it, even close to the place, and it has only been by very slow tacit gradual proceeding that the garrison has been accustomed to assume a certain right, though never acknowledged by the Spaniards, midway between the rock and the old Spanish lines.

J. F. B.

No. 9.

*Colonial Defences.*

AUSTRALIA.

*Memorandum to the Under-Secretary of State for War, on a Despatch from the Governor, Sir Charles Darling, to the Colonial Secretary, 24th March, 1864, forwarding a Report by* Captain SCRATCHLEY, R.E.

13th July, 1864.

THE Colony of Victoria shows more energy in taking up the subject of its defences, and applies more means to it, than any other of Her Majesty's foreign possessions. While others seem to expect the great burden of their protection to be thrown on the Imperial resources, contributing, on their own part, some moderate co-operating aid,—that of Victoria acts upon the justice of reversing that position, and therefore seems to have a peculiar claim to every support.

On this understanding, it is not for us to prescribe the course for them to pursue, except as regards that portion which we directly contribute; and for the remainder, we may merely offer our judgment and advice, so far as the nature of the communications made to us require or admit.

The report by Captain Scratchley is very elaborate and judicious. On the many details, as applied to special localities and to local considerations, it is impossible here to form a correct judgment; but the reasons given for the several propositions seem to be sound and appropriate. On one or two points of general principle, however, I should be inclined to express a doubt.

First, in his too great reliance on protection from our fleet. He assumes that there would always be a squadron on the Australian station, and always within reach and available, in sufficient collected strength to prevent any attack by an enemy of any moderate force; and that fleets in due proportion would be present in sufficient time to oppose any great attempts, which however he considers not likely to be made.

1864. — Colonial Defences. Australia.

I have great doubts of the correctness of any of these three data, and do not consider that they justify in any degree the omission of a thorough provision of means for resisting on shore any attack that could be made on the territory.

They are, however, essentially for the consideration of the Admiralty, but my own impression is, that while flying squadrons and detached men-of-war would be frequently on the coasts of Australia, they would be very variable in their presence and in their force, particularly as regards specific districts of that greatly extended line of coast, and by no means under any stationary arrangement for defence of the territories; nor do I conceive it at all improbable that an enemy of powerful maritime means might think it worth while to send out a large squadron, capable of landing 10,000 men or more, to the Indian and Australian seas, for specific or general aggressive operations; and even with our general naval superiority (should we happily be able to maintain it uninterruptedly), that he might not be able to have a command in any such given distant sea for weeks, if not for months together. We have cognisance of projects in possession of the French marine authorities, expressly adapted to such a course of proceedings, particularly as against the smaller squadron.

It would be very injudicious, then, to shut our eyes to these contingencies, and to decide that it is unnecessary to provide against them.

It is argued, however, in addition, that it is a case of necessity, since the great expense of an adequate provision to defend the colony on shore could not be borne; this, however, I cannot believe to be so certain. It would be so, if the requisite force was necessarily to be formally organised and put together, as regular soldiers and ordinary militia are, with uniforms and every other soldier paraphernalia, and assembled every year, for periods more or less prolonged; but where the population would be cordially opposed to any foreign invader, a most powerful defensive force might be established, by a simple enrolment, as volunteers, of the great mass of those capable of bearing arms; with such slight knowledge of drill and soldier exercises as can be given, with the least possible annoyance or trouble,—which might be usefully introduced

even in boys' schools — and encouraging rifle practice as a recreation, the expense of all which would be moderate. This force, which would naturally be much improved in war-time, would be very powerful, and amply make up in numbers what it might want in organisation; by such preparation, added to a small basis of a superior order of troops, and with a due supply of arms and ammunition, no foreign possession of British population should be in danger of invasion by any enemy whose approach to it is by long sea.

Another proposition with which I do not feel quite satisfied, is that of a great block-ship, for which one of our obsolete line-of-battle ships is applied for. Floating defences of some kind are clearly very necessary, but I doubt the advantage of this. It will be, however, for the Naval Department to decide whether so large a vessel in one venture, for which there could be no dock in case of want of repair, would be the most applicable, or whether a number of gunboats, each capable of carrying one of the same class of guns, and of the aggregate compensating force in armament and cost, would not be better. Capable of acting together or of being dispersed; of comparatively small draught of water, and consequently applicable to many favourable positions not available to the other; not presenting such a mark as could hardly be missed by the enemy; if one be injured, not paralysing the whole; easier to be plated and prepared for service by degrees, when wanted; and during peace, without their plating or armaments, which may be stored in full readiness on shore, they might be applied to many useful services, instead of lying idle or nearly so, as must be the case with the great block-ship.

I am also inclined to believe that, for exclusive defence of a great estuary like Port Phillip, a system of iron-sided gunboats, without steam power, would be a valuable resource, to be moored in favourable positions, and trusting for their occasional removals to being towed by the steamers at the place, which would habitually have their other regular employment. This could not be called a manœuvring force, but might be powerfully auxiliary, at much less outlay.

One matter of detail in the shore batteries will admit of some modification. The number of guns is laid down for their

1864. — Colonial Defences. Australia.

armament, and then it is required to have 15 artillerymen per gun. I would suggest, however, that in a battery, fort, or garrison, the guns may with advantage, be greatly in excess of the proportion of gunners. In a considerable garrison this is manifestly the case, since no kind of attack or siege will bring more than a certain portion of the guns into action; but even in forts or batteries, it is good to have an excess of guns, for which the quantity of ammunition need not be increased, the only sacrifice being the first cost and subsequent maintenance of the pieces and their platforms, and perhaps some additional extent of terreplein and parapet for them; while the advantages are great. First, they may all be loaded at leisure, and then, for a first round, only require to be fired; then, during any lull or interval of action, the whole may be reloaded; the guns are more dispersed; if one is found to be peculiarly exposed to the enemy's fire, or more or less disabled, the men can take up another, &c.

If, on the principle above advocated, there be sufficient armed forces in the station to prevent a landing, many auxiliary coast batteries may be open, and not closed in the gorge, by which they might be multiplied, and at a moderate outlay.

Lastly, with reference to the protection of Port Phillip, with all the large and increasing establishments on it, forming the life and soul of this very important settlement, I can never omit to urge strongly, as of paramount importance, the application of the most powerful defensive means at what are called the Heads, at its entrance channel. This channel is certainly wide, and therefore it is assumed that iron-sided steamers could run past with impunity; but it is tortuous, which would keep them longer exposed to the fire of the batteries, with armaments of the most powerful guns, submerged mines, and other obstructions, aided by some floating batteries and rams. The attempt to force such a passage would be a desperate enterprise, and the more so under the knowledge that the same opposition would be forthcoming on the return out, and when probably the vessels which had entered might be in a more or less crippled and unprovided state.

J. F. Burgoyne.

1864.

## No. 10.

*Right of Resistance against Capture by Neutral Merchantmen in War*, 1864.

Resistance against capture by Neutral Merchantmen.

Lord A. Churchill, on putting an interesting question as to the right of neutral merchantmen to resist, by arms, capture by a belligerent, appears to have obtained a very insufficient answer from the Solicitor-General, who says no, and under no circumstances; and that the very act of resistance would justify the condemnation of the ship, even in the absence of any other grounds; in short, that resistance in such a case is a *crime!*

It is presumed that by resistance to capture, is meant resistance to being detained, boarded, and overhauled; because after being boarded, the power of resistance will in most cases be at an end.

Let us put a strong case, and suppose a fine merchantman, such as we have navigating from Europe to India and Australia, with a moderate usual armament, to be met at sea by a small man-of-war of a belligerent, of really very inferior force, is that giant to allow itself to be detained and searched, and perhaps taken possession of as a prize, by the dwarf? The doctrine of the Solicitor-General would imply yes. But it is contrary to human nature to suppose that such a law would be submitted to. It may be said that in such a case, it could not be expected; but the principle is the same; the power of successful resistance can only be ascertained by trial, and it can hardly be meant that the same act only becomes criminal if it fails. J. F. B.

## No. 11.

*Captain Cowper Coles on Ships* versus *Forts.*

*From* the Right Hon. Sidney Herbert. 1860.

Ships *versus* Forts.

My dear Sir John, Wilton, Salisbury, October 5th, 1860.

I gave yesterday to Major Jervois a map, made by Captain Coles, R.N., of the deep channel of Spithead, which is

1860. designed to show the inutility of Forts. He assumes two things from the evidence before the Fortification Committee: first, that no iron ship can be injured at a range beyond 1000 yards, and that the Dockyard can be bombarded at any range less than 8000.

Ships *versus* Forts.

He then shows how much deep water there is out of the former distance from any of the proposed forts or batteries, and within the latter number of yards from the Dockyard: *ergo*, forts are useless, and ships the only available defence.

It appears to me that no one has ever asserted that forts alone can make Spithead inaccessible, but that it would be important to secure by forts that all the defences may not have walked off elsewhere, and that certain positions, at any rate, should be made unapproachable.

His map is ingenious, and explains his view very well. Since I gave it to Major Jervois, however, I have received the enclosed note from Captain Coles, and I think it would be well if you would see him, and hear him state his case. It is well put *ad captandum*, and ought to be heard, though I think there is an answer to it.

Pray believe me yours sincerely,

SIDNEY HERBERT.

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*To* the Right Hon. SIDNEY HERBERT.

War Office, Pall Mall, 13th October, 1860.

Letter to Rt. Hon. Sidney Herbert. Spithead Forts.

MY DEAR MR. HERBERT,

I return the letter from Captain Coles, R.N.; his chart has been returned to him.

I have known Captain Coles long and intimately, and I have had a long interview with him since I received your letter; he is a most ingenious man, and I believe an excellent officer and seaman. The raft battery which he constructed in the Black Sea did him great credit, and I have little doubt will be imitated to advantage hereafter in the defence of our ports.

He is, however, most enthusiastic in regard to his propositions: he has full faith in every argument in their favour, and despises whatever is in opposition to them. He considers

every *prospective* improvement that will tend towards their success, as if established, while what are contrary will be, in his eyes, surely failures. 1860. — Letter to Rt. Hon. Sidney Herbert. Spithead Forts.

His improved floating batteries involve novelties without end; every one of which seems plausible, and he thinks, cannot fail of success, but all requiring more proof than any arguments, however plausible and, perhaps, sound they may be. But I think that I can myself perceive many difficulties to be overcome.

I will not, however, enter into any disquisition regarding them, and more particularly as they are so intimately connected with naval considerations; but I am entirely at issue with him in his assumption of the uselessness of constructing the forts at the eastern entrance to Spithead, which is the object of his present appeal to you.

1.—He assumes the attacking force to be all iron-sided and shot-proof. They may be shot-proof against scattered shot, but not even the French, who are the most sanguine about their power, will suppose they can resist two or more striking near the same place, which will be one chance in favour of the forts. But allowing every credit to these ironclad ships, they are enormously costly, and may be wanting in sufficient numbers; and at all events, the batteries would be thoroughly effective against timber ships, which, without their existence, might be employed.

2.—To make out his case, he limits the useful range from the forts to 1000 yards, which may be too much or too little; all that has to be tried with Whitworth's hardened flat-headed shot; but where a great number of hits may be expected, we must believe that much damage would be done even at greater ranges. Then there is a very considerable aggregate of opening by the ports, where shells, rockets, or anything will penetrate. Captain Coles himself proposes a system to avoid all these openings; but we must take credit for this evil as it exists, and as it is likely to continue; for very large and costly armaments are now preparing with them, and Captain Coles's principle is not yet proved and sanctioned.

3.—He describes his attack in regular column of five vessels abreast, indicating the width of deep-water channel which he

1860. — Letter to Rt. Hon. Sidney Herbert. Spithead Forts.

considers out of reach of effective shot. At all events, the advance would probably be in a cluster, and though subject to a less number of shot than one by one at intervals, they could in such mass, hardly be missed even by dropping, instead of direct, shot or shells, which would perhaps be the preferable practice. It may be here observed that these forts will not only be of service by their direct fire, but will be the basis and support for submarine mines, and other obstructions in the channel.

4.—Then comes his final object, which is to place his flotilla at Spithead in such precise positions (which he finds by compasses on the chart) as that none will be nearer to any individual battery than 1700 or 2000 or more yards, while they will be within the great ranges of the rifled guns, at high elevation, of the Dockyard, which they are to cannonade, it is presumed, for some hours, and then retire as best they may. But during this operation they will be *surrounded* by batteries, not opposed by a single one; all at very effective ranges of from 2000 to 5000 yards, to all which their decks will be more exposed than the sides, and from whence the shot and shells will be poured in *showers*. To suppose they could escape under such circumstances, is to suppose a miracle. Captain Coles certainly has a project for iron-coated ships and floating batteries that shall be in some degree bomb-proof; but, as stated before, nothing of the kind is attempted yet, and there is very much to be done before that system of his will be adopted. And then again, their practice, amidst all the smoke and confusion and swinging of the vessel, at an uncertain distance, would be most wild, even against so large a mark as the Dockyard.

The substitute that Captain Coles proposes for these forts, is vessels of the same character; but what are they but floating forts? that is, under the extra risk of being burnt, sunk, and not nearly so well protected against shot and shells. They have to be sure the advantage of being moveable; but if the forts occupy the best defensive positions, and which, to gain the object, are not to be avoided, that advantage is very small.

These vessels, also, to make an effective resistance, must be as powerful in numbers and quality as the enemy; whereas a

very inferior proportion may do admirable service in conjunction with the forts. But the great difficulty will be that such an extreme armament must be provided for *each* of the great ports; for the same arguments will apply to Plymouth, Milford, the Thames, &c., for the attack could not be made unless the enemy had a decided superiority in the Channel at the time, and then it would be too late to reinforce the port in danger.

1860. — Letter to Rt. Hon. Sidney Herbert. Spithead Forts.

With regard to his being present to answer objections, which he requests, he certainly is entitled to have means of enforcing his propositions, either in writing or before a committee of the different services,—but again the objections, such, for instance, as I have stated, should be more fully explained, if to be submitted to his criticisms.

My dear Mr. Herbert, yours faithfully,

J. F. Burgoyne.

## No. 12.

### *Notes on a proposed General Disarmament.*—1870.

1870. — Notes on a proposed General Disarmament.

A general disarmament, by the reduction of the warlike forces of such enormous magnitude as are now maintained by all nations, is no doubt a great desideratum, and worthily occupies much public attention; it is thoroughly philanthropic, but it is feared must be deemed utterly impracticable, whether by treaty, or by any understood agreement.

Every nation has its impulse for some looked-for advantage or aggrandisement, or, if not so, at least has an impression that others, if they had the power, would seek for some advantages at its expense; and each adopts the preparations which it thinks best adapted for its interests.

Amidst the jealousies and conflicts of interests then that exist in the world, many of which are well recognized, what country would submit to have the scale of its preparatory resources defined by others, or how even can others be judges of them in all their bearings.

Independent of ambitious views of aggrandisement entertained by some, or fears of the consequences of aggressive views upon

1870.

Notes on a proposed General Disarmament.

themselves by others, there may be a *positive* need for extra armaments by different nations; one, for instance, may consist of ill-assorted, dissatisfied component parts, requiring a large force to keep them together; another may have colonies and detached stations, for the protection of which, a considerable reserve force is necessary; in either case, such forces, though necessitated for those specific purposes of self-protection, may be turned to account for other objects, against which the other Powers must therefore always be prepared.

And then again, how are the relative forces in different countries to be defined, subsequently ascertained, controlled and enforced?

A reduction to a given amount in the troops or fleets now maintained, in given proportions, would have a very unequal effect, as the means for their speedy re-establishment may be much greater with some than with others, which would give them a much greater advantage than they had before, in case of hostilities; the superior aptitude and tendencies of some nations for war, and their more or less arrogant and quarrelsome feelings must be guarded against.

All these are difficulties, which it would seem hopeless to overcome in the consideration of a general measure of disarmament.

FINIS.

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